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Abstract 
 
The aim of my thesis is to explore the role of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary in 
promoting Costa Rica’s democratization process by applying a novel analytical framework 
that combines insights from post structural discourse theory, discursive institutionalism and 
ideational theories. It addresses the following puzzle: How was it possible for a society that 
historically prided itself on being “exceptionally” egalitarian, homogenous, peaceful, and 
democratic to become transformed into revolutionary agents by an unknown political figure 
(Jose Figueres) in a fight against the Caldero-comunista administrations responsible for 
creating the very institutions consensually attributed as serving as a base for Costa Rica’s 
democratic stability? To understand how civil war was averted during previous periods of 
deep socio-economic crisis and after fraudulent elections, it contrasts the discursive context 
during the 1940s with that of the liberal oligarchic hegemonic period. From its independence 
until the 1930s, political leaders had been able to disarticulate political alliances between 
potentially antagonistic groups by differentially incorporating the demands made by labour 
movements, peasant associations, and anti-imperialist movements through institutional and 
legislative means, thus preventing populist ruptures. The dislocatory effect of the Great 
Depression encouraged the proliferation of new discourses battling for hegemony. The 
hegemonic battles fought amongst the liberal oligarchs, the communists, the Christian 
Democrats and the social democrats within an ideational context polarized by World War II 
and the Cold War created the discursive conditions of possibility for the 1948 Civil War.  After 
failing to garner support for their political project aimed at founding a social democratic 
Second Republic, Figueres took advantage of the political crisis created by the annulment of 
the 1948 presidential elections to launch an armed insurrection. However, the ideational path 
dependency created by the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary encouraged reformist as 
opposed to foundational institutional development during the immediate post civil war period.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Costa Rica is the oldest and most stable liberal democracy in Latin America 
(Peeler 1985, 1991, Booth 1999; Mahoney 2001; Lehoucq 2001, 2012; 
Seligson 2014). Its exemplary levels of human development, free and open 
quadrennial elections, outstanding human rights record, use of negotiation for 
resolving conflict, and adherence to the rule of law make it an exception in a 
region that has been dominated by social, economic, and political turbulence 
for most of its post-independence history (Seligson 2014: 362).  
 
Costa Rica has a highly legitimate central government with a clearly defined 
system of checks and balances amongst its four branches, and a weak 
executive relative to other Latin American countries (Booth 1999:442)1. The 
president cannot veto a budget, use line-item vetoes, assume emergency 
powers without a two-thirds Congressional majority, rule by decree, or stand 
for re-election without sitting out a term (Isbester 2010:190). The legislature 
and the executive share the legislative agenda, deferring to the president only 
during extraordinary sessions. The judiciary, particularly the Constitutional 
Court, settles jurisdictional disputes amongst the other powers and interprets 
the constitutionality of the law. Access to the courts is broad and virtually 
costless, guaranteeing citizens their constitutional rights and protections (BTI 
Costa Rica Country Report: 2012). The government inaugurated the electoral 
branch, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, in the wake of the 1948 Civil 
War, charging it with guaranteeing free, fair, and open elections. International 
electoral observers praise Costa Rica’s electoral system as an exemplary 
model (Seligson 2014:361).  
 
The current academic consensus argues that Costa Rica’s “exceptional” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  As Isbester (2010) states, while all Latin American constitutions establish the 
separation of powers into three branches of government (or four), they are rarely 
equal and autonomous.  The judiciary and legislature generally are granted less 
power than the executive.  Emergency powers –which the executive can invoke – 
allow for the suspension of civil liberties and democratic procedures and the ability of 
the president to rule by decree. However, emergency powers must be approved by 
the legislature and are for a limited time period. Typically, the courts do not have the 
right to judicial review (Isbester 2010:78). 
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liberal democracy evolved due to a combination of factors including: a) 
atypical socio-economic factors present during the colonial period which led to 
the early development of an ethnically homogenous, egalitarian, consensual 
and innately democratic political culture (Monge Alfaro 1966, Rodriguez Vega 
1972, Ameringer 1982); b) policy choices made by key political actors during 
critical junctures leading to path-dependent democratic institutional 
development (Yashar 1997, Mahoney 2002, Cruz 2005, Isbester 2010); c) 
Costa Rica’s neutrality during the Central American wars in the post-
independence period (Mahoney 2010); d) the public division of the political 
elites during a period that coincided with the rising organization of 
marginalized sectors demanding political inclusion (Yashar 1997); e) positive 
relations with the United States and its neighbours (Longley 1997); and f) the 
political leadership of key actors – notably the founding fathers Juan Mora 
Fernandez (1825-1833) and Braulio Carrillo (1838-1842), the liberal oligarchic 
benevolent dictator Tomas Guardia (1870-1880), the liberal presidents Cleto 
Gonzalez Viquez (1906-1910 and 1928-1932) and Ricardo Jimenez 
Oreamuno (1910-1914, 1924-1928 and 1932-1936),  and the social 
democratic leader Jose Figueres (1948-1949, 1953-1958 and 1970-1974).  
 
The academic consensus argues that Costa Rica’s democracy was 
consolidated through an elite pact2 made between the major political actors 
after the brief but bloody 1948 Civil War. Its democratic stability is attributed to 
the post-civil war institutional framework including: the abolition of the military, 
the establishment of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones as a fourth branch 
of government ensuring free and fair elections, the extension of suffrage rights 
to women and blacks, the reduction of the power of the executive vis-à-vis the 
legislature, its extensive welfare system, the strength and legitimacy of its 
state, the allocation of technical functions of the government to autonomous 
institutions, its stable party system, the quality of political leadership, and 
good public policies leading to high levels of human development (Booth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 An elite pact is defined “as an explicit but not always publicly explicated or justified, 
agreement among a select set of actors, which seeks to define (or better to redefine) 
rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital 
interest of those entering into it “(O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986:36 quoted by Isbester 
2010:58)  
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1999; Lehoucq 2012; Seligson 2014).  
 
John A. Peeler (2004) argues that Costa Rica has remained politically stable 
for decades because (its state) was structured to maintain social and 
economic stability (Peeler 2004:54, emphasis in original quoted by Isbester 
2010:189).  After the civil war, new public sector companies operating 
autonomously from partisan politics were created to stimulate economic 
production, tackle unemployment, reduce poverty, sponsor job training, and 
promote human capital (Isbester 2010: 191).  According to Katherine Isbester 
(2010), the post Civil War developmental state “became the mediator in all 
aspects of society, negotiating conflict between sectors and insuring order. 
Improving social justice to protect citizens from economic inequalities was an 
integral part of preserving that order. This required the state to become highly 
active in both the economy and social issues (Isbester 2010:189), which in 
turn, strengthened the state and granted it legitimacy. Scholars argue that the 
combination of these factors created a “reservoir of regime support” which has 
allowed the Costa Rican democracy to withstand periods of deep socio-
economic crisis (Seligson 2002:163; Seligson and Gomez Barrantes 
1987,1989; Booth 1991:53). 
 
Scholars point out that Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation is exceptional in 
a region where authoritarian legacies persist after the establishment of façade 
democracies3 . As Isbester (2010) states, by focusing on the procedural 
component, most Latin American states have produced “minimum”, “electoral” 
or “illiberal”4 democracies. Although they have free, fair, contested and regular 
elections, people remain socially, politically and economically excluded. The 
rule of law is not always respected and freedom of speech is often curtailed 
(Isbester 2010:69). As George Philip notes, pre-democratic patterns of 
political behaviour—institutional, organizational, and cultural—have all too 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Uruguay and Chile are the other exceptions to this rule. 
4 According to this definition, only Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica have 
genuine democracies (Wiarda and Kline 2007:85; Isbester 2010:64). Isbester states 
that the combined weakness of the states and of civil society institutions has crippled 
these democracies. Limited rule of law, code-law constitutions, fragmented political 
parties, poor legislative processes, presidentialism and weak bureaucracies have 
undermined democratic institutions, procedures and norms (Isbester 2010:99). 
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often survived democratization leading to “non-consolidated democracies” 
(Philip 2006:12). The bureaucracies remain patrimonialist, law enforcement is 
weak, and public favour falls upon openly law-breaking political leaders (Philip 
2003: 2). In sharp contrast, the consolidation of Costa Rica’s democracy has 
meant that laws, rules, and procedures not only exist, but also have been 
internalized, accepted, and valued. Under such circumstances, overt rule 
breaking alienates constituents and is therefore prohibitively costly (Philip 
2003: 13).  
 
One factor continuously highlighted by national and international scholars, 
policy analysts and political leaders to explain Costa Rica’s “exceptionalism” 
is its consensual, peaceful and innately democratic political culture. 
Proponents of this view argue that the atypical socioeconomic factors present 
during the colonial period in Costa Rica - a lack of exploitable natural 
resources such as gold or silver, an abundance of fertile agricultural land, 
scarce indigenous populations, isolation from colonial centres of power due to 
mountainous and difficult terrain (allowing early experiments in self-
government), and non-coercive social relations due to labour-scarcity and 
land abundance - led to the absence of class struggle and facilitated intra-elite 
cooperation.  There is an argument that these conditions created an 
“exceptional” democratic political culture that enabled the emergence of a so-
called yeoman democracy (Monge 1966) and shaped Costa Rica’s national 
identity. An essential part of the construction of this national identity has been 
the contrast created by Costa Rican political leaders between Costa Rica and 
the rest of the Central American region.  Costa Ricans have defined 
themselves as the opposite of their neighbours, portraying themselves as a 
predominantly white, homogenous, egalitarian, peaceful and innately 
democratic society, while portraying their neighbours as predominantly 
indigenous, hierarchical, violence-prone and autocratic/dictatorial societies. 
According to these accounts, the early consolidation of this “exceptionalist” 
national identity created a sense of internal social cohesion that favoured the 
emergence of a consensual/ deliberative democracy (Fischel 1990, 1992; 
Sala 2008, Vargas Araya 2005, Diaz 2009, Palmer and Molina 2009).   
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Explaining the 1948 Civil War poses the greatest challenge to scholars 
analysing Costa Rica’s democratization process. How was a civil war possible 
in a society that prided itself for being innately democratic, egalitarian, 
peaceful, consensual and ethnically homogenous? This dissertation 
addresses this puzzle left unsatisfactorily answered by the existing literature. 
Before introducing how this dissertation addresses this puzzle, section one 
will discuss the antecedent conditions of the 1948 Civil War.  Section two 
reviews the existing literature explaining the 1948 Civil War.  Section three 
outlines the contributions this dissertation seeks to make. Section four 
explains the analytical framework adopted by the dissertation. Section five 
presents the data that has been analysed. Section six provides the chapter 
outline.  
 
Antecedents of the 1948 Civil War  
The justification for the civil war was the annulment of the 1948 presidential 
electoral results by the Congress.  Two political coalitions participated in the 
1948 presidential elections, the first of which was the governing Christian 
Democratic political party (the Independent National Republican Party), which 
had formed a coalition with the Vanguardia Popular communist party. This 
coalition was known as the Bloque de la Victoria. The presidential candidate 
of this Caldero-comunista alliance was the former president Rafael Angel 
Calderon Guardia (1940-1944). The opposition had formed a coalition known 
as the Union Nacional composed of progressive liberal oligarchs led by Otilio 
Ulate, conservative coffee barons led by Jorge Hine, and social democrats led 
by Jose Figueres. The progressive liberals were the strongest members of the 
opposition coalition, with Otilio Ulate having overwhelmingly defeated the 
social democratic and the conservative candidates in the Union Nacional 
convention. Presidential elections were held on February 5th, 1948. On 
February 28th, 1948 the Electoral Tribunal announced that the Union Nacional 
coalition’s candidate Ulate had defeated Calderon of the governing political 
coalition obtaining 55.3% of the votes. Voter turnout was estimated at 
57.66%. However, the Calderonista-dominated Congress viewed these 
results as fraudulent, annulling the election results on March 1st 1948, and 
stating that the opposition’s control of both the newly established Electoral 
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Tribunal and the Electoral Registry had allowed them to commit fraud.5  
According to the Calderonistas and the communists, thousands of their 
followers had not been allowed to vote due to confusion associated with their 
electoral identification cards or the fact that they did not receive them in time 
to vote.  Right after the annulment of the presidential elections, Ulatistas, 
Hinistas, Calderonistas, communists and the Catholic Church began to search 
for a consensual solution - as was the norm after previous contested 
elections. The two main leaders of the opposition – Otilio Ulate (progressive 
liberal oligarchs) and Jorge Hine (conservative liberal oligarchs) were close to 
reaching a compromise solution with president Picado and the Christian 
democratic presidential candidate, Calderon, aimed at selecting amongst a list 
of “neutral” political figures to choose one who could rule Costa Rica for two 
years after which new elections would be held.  
 
The social democratic Figueristas were the only party that did not want to find 
a consensual solution to the impasse created by the annulled election.  Since 
1944, Jose Figueres had been trying to gather popular support for the Partido 
Social Democrata’s political project, which consisted of the substitution of the 
liberal oligarchic order with a social democratic “Second Republic”. However, 
the Partido Social Democrata represented only 5% of the electoral votes in 
the 1948 presidential elections (Delgado 1998).  Failing to garner popular 
support for his “Second Republic”, Figueres took advantage of the political 
crisis created by the presidential elections to launch an armed insurrection 
with the support of the Caribbean Legion. During his exile in Mexico in 1942, 
Figueres had met a group of political exiles known as the Caribbean Legion 
plotting to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, the Trujillo 
dictatorship in Santo Domingo, and the Tiburcio dictatorship in Honduras.  
Right after the annulment of the 1948 presidential elections, Figueres 
contacted the Guatemalan General Juan Rodriguez Garcia of the Caribbean 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The fact that electoral fraud was committed against the government is one of the 
atypical practices of the Costa Rican example. On July 1947, the opposition staged a 
strike to protest among other things the use of fraud in the mid-term congressional 
elections of 1946 that had granted the caldero-communistas control over Congress. 
Picado had granted the opposition control of the Electoral Registry and the Electoral 
Tribunal as a concession to end the Huelga de Brazos Caidos strike.  	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Legion stating the annulment of the elections by the Calderonista-controlled 
Congress proved that Calderon was seeking to establish a dictatorship in 
Costa Rica with the help of the communists.  Figueres promised the 
Caribbean Legion that, in exchange for their help, he would in turn help them 
overthrow the remaining dictatorships in Latin America starting with the 
Somoza dictatorship upon their victory in Costa Rica. He argued that Costa 
Rica would serve as a perfect base for the Caribbean Legion’s subsequent 
attack on Nicaragua. The rebels’ victory in Costa Rica and Nicaragua would 
reinforce anti-dictatorial movements throughout Latin America.  The 
Caribbean Legion agreed to help Figueres under those conditions and, with 
their backing, Figueres launched his armed insurrection on March 12, 1948. 
The social democratic revolutionaries framed their armed insurrection as a 
defence of the sanctity of the vote in order to mobilize support amongst the 
other members of the opposition - the Ulatistas and the Hinistas.  
Exaggerating the influence of the communists over the Picado administration, 
the social democrats argued that a Caldero-comunista dictatorship would 
pose an “existential threat” (Norval 2000) to Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” 
national identity.  With this crisis narrative, Jose Figueres was able to 
transform peaceful citizens into revolutionary agents.   
 
When Picado heard that Jose Figueres had launched an armed insurrection, 
he erroneously believed he could find a consensual solution. He did not order 
the military to crush the insurrection but rather sent a mobile unit to contain 
the insurgency. At the outset, the only two factions fighting were the social 
democratic revolutionaries under the leadership of Jose Figueres and the 
communists under the leadership of Manuel Mora. Neither one of the two 
presidential candidates - Ulate or Calderon - mobilized their supporters to fight 
in the civil war. Ulate did not fight at all but rather remained in the Archbishop 
of Costa Rica’s house, and Calderon joined the communists only one month 
after the civil war started when Manuel Mora directly asked him for help. As 
the war progressed, the conservative oligarchs and progressive liberals joined 
the social democratic forces to fight against the communists. The United 
States ambassador to Costa Rica, Nathaniel Davis, urged Picado to negotiate 
a cease-fire to avoid a potential communist take-over (Longley 1997: 72).  
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The priority of the US was to avoid the conflict from spreading to other Central 
American countries.  The government did not provide appropriate armament 
to their communist6 “allies” as top members of the Picado administration also 
feared a potential communist take-over. When Picado was informed that the 
Nicaraguan dictator Somoza was planning an invasion to avoid the victory of 
the Caribbean Legion-backed social democratic revolutionaries, the president 
surrendered. The forty-four day long civil war was officially over on April 19 
1948, when the warring factions signed the “Pact of the Mexican Embassy” 
naming Picado’s Vice President Santos Herrera as an interim president. 
Calderon, Picado and Mora went into exile.    
 
Upon their victory, the social democrats believed their military success had 
granted them the right to rule (Shifter 1986:274).  However, the opposition 
coalition expected Figueres to hand over power to Otilio Ulate.  To avoid 
further bloodshed and based on his understanding that Figueres would 
continue to fight if not granted interim authority, Ulate negotiated a standstill 
agreement.  On May 1, 1948 Ulate and Figueres signed a secret pact known 
as the Ulate-Figueres Pact which stated that: 1) a social democratic 
revolutionary Junta would govern for eighteen months with a possible 
extension of six months; 2) elections would be held on December 1948 to 
select a constitutional congress to produce a new constitution; and 3) the 
Junta would recognize and declare that Ulate was the legitimate winner of the 
previous elections and would allow him to take over after the Junta’s mandate 
expired (Aguilar Bulgarelli 1986: 396-7). On May 8 1948, the self-proclaimed 
Junta for the Foundation of the Second Republic had its opening session. 
During the first six months, the Junta ruled without congressional oversight 
passing a series of highly contentious decrees including the nationalization of 
the banking system, an extraordinary tax of 10% on capital over 50,000 
colones - the equivalent of $8000 US dollars - and a 10% increase on 
minimum wages for coffee and sugar-cane workers (Bowman 2002:98). A 
powerful and feared Tribunal for Immediate Sanctions was created, charged 
with seizing the properties of members of the previous administration (Munoz 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  President Calderon Guardia and the Costa Rican Communist Party leader, Manuel 
Mora, formed an alliance in 1942.	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Guillen 1990:15; Bowman 2002:95).  On July 18 1948, the Junta passed a 
decree outlawing the communist party. There was growing popular opposition 
to the Junta rule, which was viewed as an illegitimate body as the population 
had expected an Ulate administration after the war.  
 
On December 7, 1948 Constitutional Assembly elections were held. The 
Partido Social Democrata party was humiliatingly defeated by the Ulatista 
progressive liberal Partido Union Nacional, which won 34 out of the 45 
Constitutional Assembly seats receiving 72.4% of the popular vote.  The 
social democrats obtained only 4 seats receiving 7.6% of the popular vote. 
The conservative oligarchic faction, the Partido Constitucional, secured 6 
seats with 10.8% of the popular vote. The social democratic Constitutional 
Proposal was rejected.  The only social democratic amendments approved by 
the Constitutional Assembly were those perceived as in keeping with the 
liberal spirit of the 1871 Constitution.  On April 3, 1949 Edgar Cardona 
attempted a coup demanding the immediate return to constitutional order with 
an Ulate administration.  Ulate did not support Cardona’s insurrection 
because he did not want his administration to be associated with a coup. 
Although the coup was averted, Figueres recognized that prolonging the 
period of the Junta rule was being counter-productive as it was helping the 
opposition unite against him.  On November 7, 1949 Figueres handed over 
power to Ulate.  Soon after, Figueres started to prepare his campaign for the 
1953 presidential elections.  To reverse the negative perception the Costa 
Ricans had of the Junta, Figueres focused on spreading the social democratic 
narrative of the 1948 civil war and its aftermath. Soon after winning the 1948 
Civil War, the social democrats started the process of creating the National 
Liberation myth. In an interview with the Diario de Costa Rica conducted on 
the 20th of July 1948, Figueres stated:  
The popular “effervescence” was manifest in all the corners of the 
country and it arrived to its climax on the 1st of March 1948 when a 
Calderonista dominated Congress annulled (in an absurd and 
unconstitutional manner) the presidential electoral results in which the 
opposition had obtained an honest and clear victory.  The Costa Rican 
population was left with only two options: an armed insurrection or the 
unconditional surrender, who knows for how long, to a dictatorial regime 
[…] These were the origins of the revolutionary movement that due to a 
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twist of fate I had the luck of leading  (Diario de Costa Rica - July 20, 
1948). 
 
Through this re-interpretation of events, the social democrats presented the 
armed insurrection as a defence of Costa Rica’s democracy by arguing that 
Figueres had prevented the emergence of a so-called “Caldero-comunista 
dictatorship”. Through discursive strategies known as “populist interventions7” 
(Panizza 2009), Figueres was portrayed as a political outsider who “due to a 
twist of fate had the luck of leading the revolution”.  They called their army the 
National Liberation Army to portray the revolutionaries as pro-democratic 
freedom fighters. The social democratic narrative disregarded the facts that: 
a) Figueres had been planning his armed insurrection since he met members 
of the Caribbean Legion in 1942; b) that negotiations were taking place 
between the head of the opposition, Otilio Ulate, and the presidential 
candidate of the governing party, Calderon Guardia, to find a compromise 
candidate; c) that the only faction of the opposition who wanted to go to war 
was the Figuerista faction, which represented only 5% of the opposition 
forces; d) that the success of his armed insurrection depended on the 
armament, technical, financial and manpower support provided by the 
Caribbean Legion and not on mass Costa Rican popular support; and e) that 
after the war the Junta had committed anti-democratic acts such as outlawing 
the communist party, exiling its leaders, and persecuting former Calderonistas 
and communist party members.  
 
The social democratic re-interpretation argued that Figueres had installed a 
Junta only because it had been indispensable to the re-establishment of order 
and that he had handed over power as soon as the political situation had 
stabilized. This narrative highlighted that no other successful leader of a 
revolution in Latin America had ever voluntarily handed over power.  It did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Panizza (2009) argues that because populism is best understood as a political 
discourse or as Kazin (1995:3) phrased it a “flexible mode of persuasion” it makes 
sense to talk about “populist interventions”. A populist intervention is a distinctive 
style of political rhetoric that sets the leader apart from the political establishment and 
draws him closer to the popular sectors. Populist identification is strengthened by the 
leader’s adoption of cultural elements that are considered markers of inferiority by 
the dominant culture. 
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mention the growing popular opposition to the Junta.  
 
To shift the responsibility for starting the civil war away from Figueres, this 
narrative argued that the civil war was the inevitable result of the political 
polarization in Costa Rica during the 1940s triggered by the socio-economic 
crisis after World War II. The victory of Jose Figueres in the 1953 presidential 
elections allowed the social democrats to spread their own interpretation of 
the 1948 Civil War.  Social democratic academics wrote hundreds of books 
presenting their interpretation of the 1948 Civil War.  The Deans of the most 
important university of Costa Rica – the University of Costa Rica - as well as 
leading social democratic intellectuals such as Rodrigo Facio helped 
propagate this interpretation through their influential books. One of the most 
influential works of the period was Alberto Cañas’s The Eight Years (1955), in 
which he argued that the Caldero-comunista regime had deviated Costa Rica 
from its democratic path and portrayed the civil war was as a necessary 
measure to return Costa Rica to its democratic path.  Although several 
prominent individuals of the Caldero-comunista regime wrote memoirs, their 
accounts did not receive sufficient attention (Lehoucq 1991:39).   
 
Existing Literature regarding the 1948 Civil War 
As Lehoucq (1991) states, a corollary of the social democratic interpretation 
was the perception that the 1948 civil war was inevitable.  This interpretation 
influenced the best works subsequently written by academics regardless of 
their ideological inclination. 8 The academic consensus that emerged during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The following is a list of the best academic books regarding the 1948 civil war: 
Acuna, Miguel (1974) El 48 (San Jose: Imprenta Lehman). Aguilar Bulgarelli, Oscar 
(1969) Los Hechos Politicos de 1948 (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica). Bell, John 
Patrick (1971) Crisis in Costa Rica (Austin Texas: University of Texas Press). Canas, 
Alberto (1955) Los Ocho Anos (San Jose, Editorial Liberacion Nacional). Mora, 
Manuel (1958) Dos Discursos en Defensa de Vanguardia Popular (San Jose: 
EUNED). Rojas Bolanos, Manuel (1986) Lucha Social y Guera Civil en Costa Rica 
(San Jose: Alma Mater). Contreras, Gerardo and Cerdas, Jose Manuel (1988) 
Historia de una Politica de Allianzas (San Jose: Editorial Porvenir). Guido Miranda 
Gutierrez “Desarrollo Historico de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social” en 
Gaceta Medica de Costa Rica Suplemento No 2 Ano 2006 Salazar Alfaro, Javier 
(2008) “El Acuerdo de la Discordia: Huelga Medica y Conflicto Socio-Politico en 
Costa Rica Mayo-Junio 1946” en Dialogo Revista Electronica de Historia (San Jose: 
Universidad de Costa Rica)	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the 1960s and 1970s argued that the civil war was the result of rising class 
tensions and growing political polarization as a result of the socio-economic 
crisis triggered by World War II.   Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli (1969) and John 
Patrick Bell (1971) analyse the growing opposition to Rafael Angel Calderon 
Guardia amongst the dominant classes due to: a) his dispute with former 
president Leon Cortes; b) his administration’s confiscation of property and 
imprisonment of German descendants during World War II; c) the progressive 
reforms that gave birth to the Costa Rican Social Security System (1941), the 
country’s first Labour Code (1943), and the amendments of the constitution 
known as the Social Guarantees (1943); d) Calderon’s  alliance with the 
Costa Rican Communist Party; e) accusations of fiscal corruption and 
nepotism; and f) accusations of electoral fraud during the 1942 legislative 
elections and the 1944 presidential elections.  They argue that the annulment 
of the 1948 presidential election by the Calderonista-controlled Congress 
during a politically charged environment naturally led to the 1948 Civil War. 
Lehoucq (1991), Rosenberg (1981), Cruz (2005) have criticized the 
assumption that the dominant classes opposed Calderon because his policies 
harmed their economic interests.  Lehoucq, Rosenberg and Cruz highlight 
that, in contrast, Calderon passed many policies that protected the economic 
interests of the dominant classes such as tax exceptions and subsidies.  The 
national social security system did not incite much opposition to the 
government because the Christian democratic congressmen were able to get 
congressional approval for it only after they agreed to exclude seasonal 
workers - which meant that agricultural workers comprising much of the 
country’s workforce were not covered. The progressive liberal oligarchs and 
the social democrats can be shown to have supported a good deal of 
Calderon’s progressive policies criticizing only his paternalistic policy-making 
process and his manipulation of these reforms for political ends. In fact, after 
the war, the social democrats and progressive liberals passed reforms that 
strengthened and improved the same institutions created by presidents 
Calderon and Picado.  
 
Other scholars have focused on socio-economic factors leading to the civil 
war. According to Jorge Salazar Mora (1981): 
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The 1948 elections could not resolve peacefully the dispute between the 
two political groups of that epoch, because the degree of social tension 
between class fractions and classes exceeded the limits of peaceful co-
existence.  Consequently a trial of strength was required to restructure the 
state apparatus. (Jorge Salazar Mora 1981: 51) 
 
Manuel Rojas Bolanos (1979) focused on the growing opposition amongst the 
peasants due to the war-induced scarcity of basic goods, high levels of 
unemployment, and inflation (Rojas Bolanos 1979:89). Jorge Rovira Mas 
(1988), Gerardo Contreras and Jose Manuel Cerdas (1988) also argued that 
class interests determined the behaviour of political actors.  However, 
Lehoucq and Molina (2002), Cruz (2005), and Diaz (2009) have shown that 
the alliances formed during the 1940s did not follow a class-based logic. 
Members within classes were split in different factions. Workers and peasants 
were divided between those mobilized by the CRCP trade union and those 
mobilized by the Costa Rican Catholic Church trade union. The members of 
the Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales (the Centristas) included 
young intellectuals coming from the lower, middle and upper classes (Cruz 
2005). Although there was growing discontent amongst the elite and the 
masses, these sectors did not initiate the civil war. A marginal political force, 
the social democrats, started the civil war with the aim of installing a Second 
Republic.   
 
As Lehoucq (1996, 1998, 2012) correctly points out, the civil war was not the 
inevitable result of class conflict. Lehoucq presents an alternative 
interpretation arguing that the civil war was the result of electoral breakdown. 
Lehoucq states:  
The 1948 elections, the triggering event of the civil war of that year 
culminated nearly a decade of struggle between an ambitious president 
and his often-strident opponents (Lehoucq, 1991). Political competition 
began to polarize once Calderon of PRN deployed the presidential power to 
exclude his opponents from the political system.  The election of Picado to 
the presidency was widely perceived as a product of fraud even if there 
was no proof that it was the defining thing. Equally destabilizing was the 
marginalization of the opposition in Congress.  Between 1940 and 1944 the 
PRN and PVP held approximately ¾ of all legislative seats. By upsetting 
the delicate balance of power responsible for maintaining political stability, 
Guardia provoked the formation of groups dedicated to using force to 
capture state power (Lehoucq 2012: 63). 
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Lehoucq’s argument that the civil war was due to the disruption of the delicate 
balance of power does not answer the question of why there was a civil war in 
1948 and not during other periods in which the balance of power was also 
biased in favour of the president. Since electoral fraud was the norm up until 
1953, why didn’t other highly polarized and fraud-ridden elections spark civil 
wars? Why were Costa Ricans willing to die for Ulate and not for other 
political leaders who had also been denied their legitimate right to rule?  
 
The theories focusing on political polarization and socio-economic factors fail 
to explain why Costa Rica avoided a civil war after the 1930s Great 
Depression when the socio-economic situation was worse than during the 
1940s and when the CRCP was actively creating social antagonisms to 
mobilize the workers against the government as they did from 1931 to 1936. 
The current academic consensus argues that Figueres took advantage of the 
political polarization and the socio-economic crisis to launch his armed 
insurrection due to his personal vendetta against Calderon following his exile 
in 1942, and to vent his frustrated political ambitions (Diaz 2009).   Although 
these factors were undoubtedly crucial factors leading to the civil war, the 
political agency based interpretations still fail to explain how Figueres was 
able to transform peaceful citizens into revolutionary agents - especially 
considering that he was an unknown political figure for most Costa Ricans. 
Without mass support, his armed insurrection would have been as 
unsuccessful as the June 24th 1946 failed coup attempt headed by Edgar 
Cardona.  
 
The dominant interpretations of Costa Rica’s democratization process are still 
heavily influenced by the social democratic interpretation.  This has meant 
that scholars exploring Costa Rica’s democratization process have not 
integrated the findings made by Costa Rican historians during the past 
decade. Katherine Isbester’s interpretation of Costa Rica’s democratization 
process is a perfect example of this. Isbester (2010) states that: 
When Calderon stole the (1948) election, Figueres organized a protest, which 
became an insurrection spearheaded by his own private army. […] When it 
became obvious that Figueres would win, negotiations resulted in a peaceful 
end to the civil war.  Those supporting Calderon’s reforms wanted them 
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protected, as did Figueres and his supporters.  So there was a considerable 
overlap of agendas, the primary difference being a respect for democratic 
mechanisms.  Thus, a pact was created between competing elites and 
conflicting social classes.  The pact agreed to establish political stability by 
permitting Figueres to run Costa Rican for 18 months; when the time was up, 
he would turn the presidency to Otilio Ulate and a newly elected legislative 
assembly.  In his 18 months as dictator, Figueres substantially changed the 
political and economic organization of Costa Rica, ending the liberal republic 
and beginning the era of social democracy (Isbester 2010:188-89). 
 
Isbester’s account does not acknowledge the indispensable role that the 
Caribbean Legion played in the civil war referring only to Figueres’s “private 
army”. Isbester incorrectly argues that Picado had to surrender when it 
“became obvious that Figueres would win” (Isbester 2010:188).   Costa Rican 
historians have shown that Figueres’s victory was far from certain at the time 
Picado surrendered. They have also proven that Picado had chosen not to 
mobilize the military and refused to properly arm his allies – the communists 
(Cruz 2005, Vargas Ortega 2010). Although Isbester correctly points out that 
there was a considerable overlap between the agendas of the Calderon and 
Picado and those of the social democratic revolutionaries led by Jose 
Figueres, she does not explore what other factors may have led to the civil 
war. She argues that the difference between these factions was that the 
Figueristas wanted to guarantee the “respect for democratic mechanism”.  
The fact that Figueres did not launch the civil war for his stated cause of 
respecting democratic mechanisms is evident by his unwillingness to hand 
over power to the president elect Ulate when the civil war was over. Isbester 
assumes that Figueres was able to substantially change the political and 
economic organization of Costa Rica as a result of his victory.  She does not 
acknowledge the enormous opposition that the Junta faced from all sectors of 
Costa Rican society. She incorrectly attributes to Figueres the creation of the 
Electoral Tribunal (which was created in 1946 under the Picado 
administration).  She states that Figueres “wrote an innovative constitution, 
parts of which became the founding constitution of 1949” (Isbester 2010:189). 
She does not acknowledge the fact that the draft constitution written by the 
social democrats was widely rejected by the Constitutional Assembly and that 
only the reforms perceived as in keeping with the liberal spirit of the 1871 
Constitution were accepted. Isbester also states that “Figueres unexpectedly 
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lost to the conservatives in the 1949 elections” without exploring the reasons 
why he lost. Reading the newspapers of the time, the multiple biographies 
and autobiographies of the civil war veterans, it is evident that the social 
democrat’s defeat was far from “unexpected” as the vast majority of the Costa 
Rican population opposed his illegitimate Junta rule. Isbester then states:  
Given Figueres’s past record of operating outside the system, it would have 
been entirely possible for him to insist on remaining in power using his 
charisma, track record, and private army to create a personal power base.  
Yet Figueres’s commitment to social democracy meant that he became its 
architect, although not its first president (Isbester 2010:189).   
 
Isbester does not acknowledge that Figueres’ “charisma” and “track-record” 
could not be used to attract popular support without first creating a narrative of 
the civil war that made his actions appear compatible with Costa Rica’s 
“exceptionalist” tradition. To be effective, Figueres’s populist interventions had 
to be grounded on a widely accepted myth.  Isbester assumes that the social 
democrats’ military victory naturally led to their rise to hegemony. This 
dissertation disputes this consensual view. 
 
Contributions made by this dissertation 
First, this dissertation addresses the following puzzle that remains 
unsatisfactorily answered by the existing literature:  How was it possible for a 
society that historically prided itself on being “exceptionally” egalitarian, 
homogenous, consensual, peaceful, and innately democratic to be mobilized 
by an unknown political figure (Jose Figueres) belonging to a marginal 
political party (Partido Social Democrata) to fight against two progressive 
Christian Democratic leaders responsible for creating the very institutions 
consensually attributed as being the base for Costa Rica’s modern democratic 
stability (the national social security system, Social Guarantees and Labour 
Code passed under the Calderon Guardia administration, and the National 
Electoral Tribunal passed under the Teodoro Picado administration)? To solve 
this puzzle it explores a dimension that has not been analysed by the existing 
literature – the discursive condition of possibility of the 1948 Civil War.  
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Second, it seeks to close a gap that exists between the dominant 
interpretation of Costa Rica’s democratization process and the findings made 
by Costa Rican historians regarding the 1948 Civil War.   
 
Third, it disputes the dominant view that the social democratic military victory 
facilitated the party’s rise to hegemony.  It argues that, paradoxically, their 
military victory and subsequent Junta rule proved to be an obstacle to their 
rise to hegemony as it allowed their opponents to frame their actions as 
incompatible with the Costa Rican “exceptional” national identity. The social 
democrats’ rise to hegemony was a very complex, non-linear, highly 
contested process in which the victors had to make significant changes to 
their original goals and strategies.  When analysing the social democrat’s rise 
to hegemony, it explores the emergence of the National Liberation myth, 
which portrayed Jose Figueres as the “founder of Costa Rica’s democracy”.   
It argues that although Figueres had tried to use his charismatic personality 
and discursive strategies known as “populist interventions” (Panizza 2009) 
before the civil war and during the immediate post civil war period, it was not 
until after the National Liberation myth became hegemonic that these populist 
interventions became effective.  It also supports Panizza’s (2009) argument 
that different varieties of populist interventions have context-dependent 
relations with democratic institutions.  It analyses how Costa Rica’s 
democratic institutional framework helped shape the political discourses that 
emerged.   
 
Fourth, it argues that Ulate’s contribution to Costa Rica’s democratic 
consolidation has been under-appreciated by the existing literature due to the 
influence of the social democratic narrative, which downplays Ulate’s input to 
highlight Figueres’s contribution.  For this reason, the Ulate administration 
remains under-analysed by scholars exploring Costa Rica’s democratic 
consolidation.   
 
Fifth, it explores how two contradictory myths have co-existed in Costa Rica. 
The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary that argues that Costa Rica’s 
democracy naturally evolved as a result of its innately peaceful, egalitarian, 
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consensual and democratic society has co-existed with the National 
Liberation myth that argues that a civil war was necessary in order to 
consolidate Costa Rica’s democracy. It explores the roles that these myths 
have played in consolidating Costa Rica’s democracy.  
 
Analytical approach 
This dissertation uses a novel analytical approach to analyse the discursive 
condition of possibility of the 1948 civil war and the role of myths in 
consolidating Costa Rica’s democracy. It applies a social constructivist 
analytical framework that selectively borrows insights from post structural 
discourse theory - PSDT - (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Howarth and Glynos 
2007, Norval 2006 and 2009, Howarth and Griggs 2012), discursive 
institutionalism - DI - (Vivien Schmidt 2002, 2008, 2010) and ideational 
theories - IT - (Hall 1993, Colin Hay 2001, Gofas and Hay 2010, Daniel 
Beland (2005, 2008, 2010, Kjaer and Pedersen 2001).  Despite significant 
ontological and epistemological differences amongst these approaches, the 
author agrees with Carstensen (2011), Schmidt (2012), and Panizza and 
Miorelli (2012) that there is sufficient common ground among them to allow for 
fruitful cross-fertilization.  They all seek a more dynamic analysis of politics, 
have similar constructivist views of the relations between subjects and society 
and share a critical view of structuralist and individualist approaches to 
political analysis (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:15). Combining these approaches 
provides “a more rounded analysis of the discursive dimension of institutions 
and the institutional dimension of politics” (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:2).  
 
This analytical approach breaks from the interest based, neo-materialist 
approach that continues to dominate the literature analysing the 1948 civil war 
and Costa Rica’s democratization process. When these works assign a role to 
discourses they present them as controllable, self-contained tools used by 
political actors to achieve their fixed and pre-determined interests based on 
their socio-economic position and within “objective” socio-political and 
historical contexts.  This dissertation disputes this current consensual view. It 
argues that discursive structures are best conceptualized as one more set of 
institutions influencing political outcomes by: a) shaping the way political 
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actors interpret their socio-economic and political context; b) influencing the 
perceptions of interests held by key political players; c) delimiting the types of 
discourses and actions considered legitimate within historically specific 
national and international ideational contexts; d) determining which political 
outcomes are considered feasible depending on the “crisis narrative” that 
prevails during critical period; e) influencing the way political leaders present 
themselves to the public by outlining which attributes are considered desirable 
in a political leader; f) impacting the ways political leaders respond to 
international factors; g) structuring social relations within a polity; and e) 
structuring political dynamics amongst opponents by determining the possible 
modes of political mobilization during specific historical periods.   
 
It therefore falls within the “discursive turn” in the human and social sciences.  
As Howarth and Griggs (2012) explain, rather than searching for law-like or 
causal explanations, scholars working within this tradition focus on the need 
for understanding, interpreting, and critically evaluating social and political 
phenomena. The dissertation adopts a “thick” definition of discourse that 
views discursive structures as articulatory practices, which in turn constitute 
and organize social relations (Howarth and Griggs 2012:308; Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985:96).  
 
The dissertation analyses the transformation and stabilization of the liberal 
oligarchic regime during Costa Rica’s post-independence period leading to 
the country’s transition to democracy and its substitution with the social 
democratic regime during the post civil war period, further consolidating 
democracy. While analysing this process, it shows how the dislocation of the 
liberal oligarchic hegemonic regime during the 1930s and 1940s was the first 
step towards creating the discursive condition of possibility for the 1948 civil 
war. To explain how this dislocatory process happened, it adopts Jason 
Glynos and David Howarth’s PSDT (2007) model of practices and regimes.  
 
Practices, regimes and logics 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) argue that social actors can react to dislocatory 
events such as major economic depressions leading to closure of businesses, 
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mass unemployment, inflation, and so forth in drastically different ways.  They 
can interpret and respond to this situation through passive resignation, 
despair and alienation or through mounting rage and outrage leading to new 
grievances.  These grievances can be articulated as claims and demands. If 
people realize that other people also have unfulfilled demands, they may 
create links between the demands of disparate groups, forming new political 
projects or social movements.  In the process, new political identities and 
subjectivities are created. As Glynos and Howarth state, “there may emerge a 
radical political subjectivity and ideology that seeks to transform social 
relations along fundamentally different lines. Equally, of course, these 
developments may provoke renewed efforts by power holders and political 
elites to meet or deflect claims and demands, thus channelling and reshaping 
grievances into the existing institutions and structures of power” (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007: 105).  A dislocatory experience serves to show the 
contingency of taken for granted social practices, highlighting the fact that the 
existing system represents only one way of organizing social relations. 
 
Glynos and Howarth formalize these processes by inscribing them into a 
broader framework of concepts. They define social practices as “the ongoing, 
routinized forms of human and societal reproduction” (Glynos and Howarth 
2007:104). These social practices contribute to the reproduction of wider 
systems of social relations.  Every practice is articulatory “as human beings 
constantly engage in the process of linking together different elements of their 
social lives in these continuous and projective sequences of human action” 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007:104).  While social practices and the identities 
they sustain tend to conceal the inherent contingency that inhabits social 
systems, this does not mean that social systems are closed.  Building on 
Heidegger (1962), and Lacan’s work (2006), Glynos and Howarth state that: 
“the irreducible presence of negativity means that any social edifice suffers 
from an inherent crack which may become visible in moments of dislocation” 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007:105).  In such situations new possibilities emerge 
allowing actors to create new identities.  A dislocation of social relations can 
provoke political practices defined as “struggles that seek to challenge and 
transform existing norms, institutions and practices – perhaps even the 
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regime itself – in the name of an ideal or a principle”  (Glynos and Howarth 
2007:105).  This entails the construction of political frontiers, which divide 
social space into opposed camps. The power bloc can disrupt the 
construction of antagonistic frontiers by breaking down the equivalential links 
being created by different demands. To explain how antagonistic relations are 
constructed, Laclau and Mouffe develop the concept of logic of equivalence, 
which consists of the dissolution of the particular identities of subjects within a 
discourse by creating a purely negative identity that poses a threat to them. 
That is, if a = b = c with respect to d, then d must totally negate a, b, and c. 
Therefore, d = - (a, b, c). The identity of the different actors is split between a 
set of particular differences (a, b, c) and the more universal threat, d  
(Howarth 2000: 107). They define “d” as the “constitutive outside” giving unity 
to the discursive formation.  By contrast, Laclau and Mouffe introduce the 
logic of difference “to account for the expansion of a discursive order by 
breaking existing chains of equivalence and incorporating the “disarticulated” 
elements into the expanding formation” (Howarth 2000: 107).  As Howarth 
explains: “whereas a project principally employing the logic of equivalence 
seeks to divide social space by condensing meaning around two antagonistic 
poles, a project mainly employing a logic of difference attempts to displace 
and weaken antagonisms, while endeavouring to relegate divisions to the 
margin of society” (Howarth 2000: 107).  While discourses using the logic of 
equivalence lead to relations of antagonism, discourses using the logic of 
difference lead to transformist models.  As Norval explains, transformist 
projects consist of efforts to expand the system of difference defining a 
dominant bloc. Transformist projects result in a lessening of the antagonistic 
potential of the remaining excluded elements and a broadening of the 
hegemonic bloc (Norval 2000:220).  
 
As Glynos and Howarth explain “a hegemonic movement can exercise a 
transformative effect on an entire regime of practices, resulting in the 
institution and sedimentation of a new regime and the social practices that 
compromise it” (Glynos and Howarth 2007:104). Glynos and Howarth have 
developed the following model to illustrate the relationship between regimes, 
social and political practices. 










A simplified model of practices and regimes 
 
This figure displays a triangular relationship between regimes and social and 
political practices. Regimes have a structuring function in the sense that they 
order a system of social practices. The institution of a particular regime (for 
example, the Thatcherite regime) is always defined in opposition to a 
contested regime (for example the Keynesian Welfare State regimes) and this 
oppositional contrast defines the regime’s practices.  Yet political practices 
can shape, modify or reorder the regime itself. If these practices succeed in 
constructing a new hegemonic order, they come to redefine key parameters of 
a range of practices (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 106). 
 
Glynos and Howarth use a three-fold typology of logics – social, political and 
fanstamatic - to characterize practices and regimes, to account for their 
dialectical relationship, and to explain how and why they change or resist 
change.  They define social logics as “the substantive grammar or rules of a 
practice or regime”(Glynos and Howarth 2007).  Political logics enable us to 
understand the way a social practice or regime was instituted or is being 
contested or instituted. These political logics include the logic of equivalence 
and the logic of difference previously explained.  The fantasmatic logic allows 
us to explain the appeal of an existing or anticipated social practice or regime. 
Glynos and Howarth (2007) explain:  
By invoking fantasmatic logics we suggest that one condition for 
subscribing to an existing or promised social project concerns the extent to 
which it can tap into the subject’s existing mode of enjoyment (in Lacanian 
terms).  When working in tandem with political logics, fantasmatic logics 
Regime	  (Order,	  system,	  discursive	  formation)	  
Social	  Practices	   Political	  Practices	  
Structuration	   Hegemony	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may be invoked to help explain why certain demands – or responses to 
demands – succeed in gripping or interpellating a particular constituency. 
Equally, they can be mobilized to account for the way explicit challenges to 
existing social structure or institutions are blocked (Glynos and Howarth 
2007:107).   
 
Discourse theory’s definition of a myth and its function 
 
This dissertation argues that the concept of myths developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe can help us explain the appeal or lack of appeal of particular political 
projects (i.e. the fantasmatic logic). Laclau and Mouffe introduce myths and 
the social imaginaries as analytical concepts aimed at explaining the process 
through which the precarious unity of the social is established.  They argue 
that myths become particularly important during moments of political change 
or structural dislocation, because they help restore the perception of social 
coherence and order. As Noval explains, according to Laclau: 
The work of myth is to re-establish closure where a social order has been 
dislocated. This is done through the constitution of a new ‘space of 
representation.’ A myth, as a novel principle of reading, thus attempts to 
reconstruct the social as objectively given; its operation is nothing other 
than an endeavour to reconstitute the absent unity of society via the 
naturalization of its divisions and a universalization of the demands of a 
particular group. In so far as it succeeds, or manages to become 
institutionalized, it can be said to have become hegemonic. Under such 
circumstances, the myth has been transformed into an imaginary: a horizon 
on which a multiplicity of demands may be inscribed (Norval 2000:329). 
 
Thus, myths emerge to “compensate for a ‘lost fullness’ and […] offer a 
reorganizing principle when identities have been dislocated, concealing the 
contingent ‘origins’ of social institutions” (Buenfil Burgos 2000: 86). When a 
myth is overwhelmingly accepted by a society it becomes a “collective social 
imaginary” defined by Laclau as a “horizon or absolute limit, which structures 
a field of intelligibility”.  He gives “The Enlightenment” as an example of a 
collective social imaginary. 
 
Carstensen’s model of incremental ideational change 
Martin Carstensen (2009) builds on insights from PSDT to develop a model of 
incremental ideational change that allows us to explore how different 
discourses gradually and continuously change during hegemonic battles.     
Carstensen (2009) argues that the mainstream perspective on ideas is based 
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on an oversimplification.  Theorists tend to focus on the role of ideas in times 
of crisis (critical junctures) and, by doing so, overlook incremental yet 
significant ideational change in times of stability.  Existing models fail to show 
how ideas develop gradually and how they continuously inform institutional 
change. To understand this micro-mechanism, Carstensen borrows insights 
from PSDT. Rather than conceiving of ideas as stable, coherent, closed 
entities (as neo-materialists and rational choice scholars do), Carstensen 
views them as constituted by a network of related elements of meaning that 
typically do not reach a final stage of equilibrium. He argues that actors are 
“a-rational” because there are “no clear rational course of action in the 
absence of interpretative filters” (Parsons 2007:98).  
 
Political actors are seldom perfectly aware of what their interests are or how 
to maximize them due to the level of complexity around them. They use ideas 
to identify those interests, to create the content of their policies, and to 
legitimise these policies (Beland 2009). A-rational actors need socially 
constructed heuristics to reduce societal complexity and to enable them to 
act. The elements of meaning within an idea act as cognitive shortcuts. While 
ideas can be a powerful political tool used by political actors to influence 
political outcomes, they can also serve as a source of constraint for the same 
political actors. Discourses do not operate in a vacuum - actors must place 
new ideas within a network of previously existing ideas. The range of different 
possible networks is therefore structured by the existing ideational tradition of 
a policy area exerting ideational path dependency because in order for a new 
idea to have public resonance, it must be linked to existing ideas. The 
ideational environment of the new idea is determined by the national political 
culture and by the previous policy paradigm.  This dissertation argues that 
Cartensen’s notion of ideational change can be linked to Howarth and 
Glynos’s concept of fantasmatic logic to help explain the appeal of alternative 
political projects.  This dissertation thus combines insights from Carstensen’s 
model of incremental ideational change with those of Howarth and Glynos 
(2007). It also borrows the concept of “crisis narrative” developed by Colin 
Hay.   
 
	   31	  
Colin Hay’s concept of crisis narratives 
According to Hay’s model of punctuated evolution, policy paradigms tend to 
become institutionalized and, in the process, internalized by political actors 
over time, thus creating the conditions for stability (Hay 2001: 197). There are 
two broad types of institutional change:  
1) An incremental (yet developmental) cycle within which policy 
changes iteratively within the parameters of the existing paradigm 
in response to strategic learning on the part of policy makers […]. 
This happens in the absence of wide-scale public debate about 
such policy failures and fiascos that manages to link policy 
contradictions to a more generic sense of crisis [...]. [T]he 
narration and definition of the problem is likely to remain internal 
to the state apparatus itself.    
2) A punctuating cycle of paradigmatic transcendence, by which the 
very parameters of the policy-making process are periodically 
redefined. This happens when there is a perception of the need to 
make a decisive intervention […]. The narration of crisis here 
plays a crucial role (Hay 2001: 202-3).  
 
The insight from ideational institutionalism that is most of interest to this 
research is the notion that for paradigm shifts (defined as profound 
institutional change) to be possible, there must be a perceived crisis. Although 
the “weight of accumulated contradictions” may facilitate a paradigm shift, “it 
is at best a necessary but insufficient condition” for change (Hay 2001: 203). 
Change requires “an awareness and an understanding of current political and 
economic circumstances […] as indicative of contradictions that not only must 
be dealt with but that can be dealt with.” That is why a crisis narrative is 
essential.  Hay further argues that “if we wish to analyse the mechanisms of 
institutional development, we have little choice but to acknowledge the 
perceptual or discursive quality of the moment of crisis and hence consider 
the process through which competing narratives of crisis struggle for 
ascendancy in the battle to shape the course of subsequent institutional 
development” (Hay 2001: 204).  
 
Finally, this dissertation also borrows insights from discursive institutionalism 
to compensate for the blind spots left by PSDT.  As Panizza and Miorelli 
(2012) explain, Laclau’s notion of politics corresponds to what another 
member of the Essex School, Aletta Norval (2006:245), defines as a “heroic” 
conception of the subject. This conception is grounded in the distinction 
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between “subject positions” understood as sedimented identities located in 
the structure as a result of their everyday participation in social life, and the 
“subject” as an autonomous political agent on the other.  As Panizza and 
Miorelli point out, PSDT tends to privilege political actions such as those when 
a populist leader mobilizes people in mass protests to create a counter-
hegemonic order, over those of a local councillor working to address the 
needs of the community  (Panizza and Miorelli 2012: 18). Thus, Laclau 
downplays the role of institutions because he equates “politics” and “the 
political” with “populism” (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:8, Arditi 2010, Laclau 
2005).  As Panizza and Miorelli point out, by equating politics with populism 
and populism with anti-institutionalism, Laclau is indirectly stating that politics 
cannot be about institutions. The emphasis placed on the constitution of 
political agency involving a radical break with existing institutional 
arrangements risks leaving the political out of everyday politics in highly 
institutionalized political orders (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:8).  They suggest 
an analytical approach that combines insights from DI with PSDT.  PSDT’s 
concept of “social logics” proposed by Glynos and Howarth 2007 is 
compatible with DI’s notion of institutions, defined as rules about acting in the 
world (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:9).  We will now briefly summarize DI’s main 
contributions to new institutionalism.  
 
Discursive Institutionalism 
DI is an umbrella term for the vast range of works in political science that 
account for the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process of 
discourse that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to the 
public (Schmidt 2000, 2002a ch. 5, 2006 ch, 5, 2008; Schimdt and Radaelli 
2004). On a substantive dimension, DI includes different types of ideas 
(cognitive and normative), different levels of ideas (policy ideas, programmatic 
ideas or paradigms, and philosophical ideas) and different representations of 
ideas through discourse (frames, narratives, scripts, myths, collective 
memories, and stories). On an interactive dimension, DI covers works that 
focus on the discursive processes by which ideas are constructed in a 
“coordinative” policy sphere by political actors, and deliberated in a 
“communicative” political sphere by those actors and the public (Schmidt 
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2011: 47). DI pays close attention to the institutional context in which and 
through which ideas are communicated.  
 
It is instructive to contrast DI with its precursors. The three older 
institutionalisms conceive of institutions as external rule-following structures, 
constraining actors with rationalist incentives, historical paths, or cultural 
frames. In this new approach, institutions are simultaneously constraining 
structures and enabling constructs internal to “sentient” agents whose 
“background ideational abilities” explain how they create and maintain 
institutions at the same time as their “foreground discursive abilities” allow 
them to communicate critically about those institutions to change or maintain 
them (Schmidt 2008, 2011).  
 
DI provides a different definition of institutions and deals with continuity and 
change in a novel way relative to the older new institutionalisms.  Because 
rational choice institutionalism (RCI) assumes fixed preferences and is 
focused on equilibrium conditions, it tends to be static and can only account 
for change exogenously, as the result of external shocks (Levi 1997), which 
prevents it from explaining satisfactorily why institutions change over time 
(Green and Shapiro 1994, Blyth 1997, Schmidt 2011: 50). RCI scholars’ 
recent incorporation of the role of ideas into their work has been problematic, 
because adding ideational variables makes it difficult to retain the range of 
assumptions about objective interests, fixed preferences, and neutral 
institutional incentive structures which had previously given this approach its 
parsimony and its ability to model rational actors’ games (Schmidt 2011: 52).  
 
As Schmidt states, historical institutionalism (HI) is better at describing rather 
than explaining change, despite its recent attempts to focus on incremental 
change through processes of drift, layering, and conversion (Thelen 2004, 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). DI uses HI findings as background information. A 
third approach, sociological institutionalism (SI), focuses on the forms and 
procedures of organizational life resulting from culturally specific practices. 
Institutions are conceived as norms, cognitive frames, and meaning systems 
that guide human action. They are also conceived as the cultural scripts and 
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schemata that diffuse through organizational environments. SI argues that 
rationality is socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent. 
According to Schmidt, this approach tends to provide an overly static account 
of change over time. Further, SI fails to provide a set of general propositions 
to explain why certain institutional scripts intermittently become vulnerable to 
displacement (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).  
 
DI, by contrast, provides a more dynamic model of institutional change. 
Viewing institutions not only as structures that constrain actors but also as 
constructs changed by actors, DI accounts for the effects on institutions of 
actors’ daily political battles. Yet Schmidt notes that DI’s has not yet 
developed an adequate model for tracing ideational change at a micro-level 
(Schmidt 2011: 55). Schmidt suggests that one promising way forward is to 
build on the work of PSDT confirming Panizza and Miorellis’ (2012) argument 
that these two approaches are not only compatible but also complementary.  
 
This dissertation will thus adopt an analytical framework that combines 
insights from PSDT, DI and IT to analyse the rise and fall of the liberal 
oligarchic hegemony, its dislocation during the 1930s – 1940s which was key 
in creating the discursive condition of possibility for the 1948 civil war, and the 
rise of the social democratic hegemony in Costa Rica.  It argues that the 
“exceptionalist” national identity is best conceived as a collective social 
imaginary fulfilling a function defined by Glynos and Howarth as that of 
fantasmatic logic.  The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary served as one 
more institution, as defined by DI, shaping political outcomes. Borrowing 
Carstensen’s model of institutional change, it shows how, in their hegemonic 
battles, political actors continuously rearticulated the web of related elements 
of meaning derived from the exceptionalist collective imaginary (homogeneity, 
equality, democracy, poverty and peace) by placing their particular political 
discourses - liberalism, communism, Christian Democracy, social democracy - 
as the nodal point of the new discursive formation. The dynamic interaction 
between these discourses battling for hegemony within the confines of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary led to gradual yet continuous ideational 
shifts regarding the conception of the appropriate role of the state, the most 
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suitable economic development model, and the expanding concept of 
democracy. These incremental ideational changes led to gradual but 
significant institutional changes facilitating Costa Rica’s democratization even 
during critical periods such as during the post civil war period. 
 
The dislocatory effect of the 1930s Great Depression created the discursive 
condition of possibility for the 1948 Civil War.  The social democrats created a 
crisis narrative to induce a “paradigm shift” (Hay 2001). Failing to garner 
enough political success for their Second Republic, they decided to launch 
their armed insurrection.  However, despite their military victory, the social 
democrats remained a marginal political force.  It was not until after the 
National Liberation myth had become widely accepted, that the social 
democrats were able to start the process of becoming hegemonic. Therefore, 
to understand Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation we must explore the 
hegemonic battles fought amongst the liberal oligarchs, the communists, the 
Christian democrats and the social democrats within the confines of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary and the changing international and 
national ideational context.  
 
Data Analysed 
This dissertation analyses political speeches made by Tomas Guardia during 
his dictatorship (1870-1881) contrasting them to those made by the 
Guatemalan dictator Rufino Barrios (1873-1885) and the Nicaraguan dictator 
Jose Zelaya (1893-1909).  It also analyses the speeches of the following 
Costa Rican presidents: Cleto Gonzalez Viquez (1906-1910 and 1928-1932), 
Ricardo Jimenez (1910-1914, 1924-1928 and 1932-1936), Leon Cortes 
(1936-1940), Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia (1940-1944), Teodoro Picado 
(1944-1948), and Jose Figueres (1948-1949 and 1953-1958). It also analyses 
the following primary data: Boletin Oficial newspapers during the Battle of 
Rivas (April – May 1856), the liberal newspaper El Ciudadano, and the 
conservative newspaper 7 de Noviembre, a book written by the Olympians in 
1886 titled Los Deberes, a book written by the Nicaraguan liberals published 
in 1906 titled Jose Santos Zelaya President of Nicaragua, a book written in 
1889 by the Swiss scholar Paul Biolley – Costa Rica and her Future, selected 
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articles from the Communist newspaper Trabajo (from 1931-1940), key 
speeches by the Costa Rican Communist Party leader Manuel Mora, selected 
articles from the liberal oligarchic press La Tribuna (1940 - 1948)  and Diario 
de Costa Rica (1940-1948), the social democratic newspaper Accion 
Democrata/ Social Democrata (1945-1948), and the 183 Acts Congressional 
debates held by the 1949 Constitutional Assembly. As background 
information the author has relied on the most current works available on the 
historical period under study (1820-1958), as well as the memoirs and 
interviews made by other scholars of the main political figures and 1948 Civil 
War veterans.   
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 provides a literature review of the existing theories of Costa Rica’s 
democratization process.  It highlights the gap between these theories and the 
findings made by historians regarding the 1948 Civil War. When filling this gap 
it becomes evident that to deepen our understanding of Costa Rica’s 
democratization process, we must analyse the crucial role that discursive 
structures have historically played in shaping political outcomes. 
 
Chapter 2 traces the emergence of the liberal oligarchic hegemony.  It 
contrasts Costa Rica’s liberal reform period with that of Nicaragua and 
Guatemala.  While the Costa Rican political leaders chose to develop 
discourses following the logic of difference, the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan 
leaders chose to develop discourses using the logic of equivalence. Applying 
the prevailing logic of difference, the Costa Rican liberal oligarchic political 
leaders expanded their base of consent by differentially incorporating the 
“democratic9” demands made by labour movements, peasant associations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  According to Laclau, a democratic demand is a demand which satisfied or not 
remains isolated. Laclau argues that democratic demands can become popular 
demands when a plurality of demands, which through their equivalencial articulation 
come to constitute a broader social subjectivity. Laclau argues that popular demands 
start at a very incipient level to constitute the people as a potential historical actor 
(Laclau 2005: 74). A demand, which is met does not remain isolated; it is inscribed in 
an institutional/differential totality. So we have two ways of constructing the social: 
either through the assertion of a particularity – in our case, a particularity of demands 
– whose only links to other particularities are of differential nature (as we have seen: 
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and anti-imperialist movements through institutional and legislative means, 
thus disarticulating political alliances between these potentially antagonistic 
groups. By gradually absorbing and domesticating opposition discourses, they 
prevented the emergence of relations of antagonism prevalent in the rest of 
Central America during this period. The logic of difference also influenced the 
anti-liberal oligarchic discourses making it possible for the liberal oligarchic 
political leaders to co-opt their leaders. Therefore, Costa Rica developed a 
transformist model, while the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan dictators imposed 
their oppressive authoritarian regimes using relations of antagonism.  
 
Chapter 3 contrasts the political dynamics during the height of the liberal 
oligarchic hegemony (1880s-1920s), with those during the dislocation of the 
liberal oligarchic order following the Great Depression. During the 1930s, the 
emergence of the Costa Rica Communist Party (CRCP) created for the first 
time in the country’s history an internal political frontier. This chapter analyses 
the strategies used by the CRCP leaders to build a counter-hegemonic 
movement, and those used by the political leaders in the country to counter 
the communist threat. It traces the emergence of the comunismo a la tica 
myth. It applies Carstensen’s model of ideational change to show how the 
communists were able to combine elements of meaning derived from the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary with typical Marxist elements despite their 
inherent contradictions.  
 
Chapter 4 traces the emergence of the discursive condition of possibility for 
the 1948 Civil War during the 1940s. It analyses the hegemonic battles fought 
between the Christian Democratic Generación de los Años 40 led by 
President Calderon (1940-1944), the social democratic coalition composed of 
an intellectual arm led by Professor Roberto Brenes Mesen and Rodrigo 
Facio under the Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales and a 
political arm led by Jose Figueres under the Accion Democrata/Partido Social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no positive terms, only differences); or through a partial surrender of particularity, 
stressing what all particularities have equivalentially in common.  
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Democrata, the communist faction led by the CRCP leader Manuel Mora, the 
conservative oligarchs led by Hine, and the progressive liberal oligarchs led 
by Ulate. It argues that there were three main differences between the 1948 
presidential elections and the previous highly polarized and fraud-ridden 
elections held during periods of socio-economic crisis that were resolved 
consensually:  1) the existence of a political discourse creating an internal 
political frontier attempting to divide Costa Rican society into two antagonistic 
blocks (the communist discourse); 2) the changing international ideational 
environment that a) made possible the alliance between Calderon and the 
CRCP during World War II but turned this alliance into a great liability during 
the emergence of the Cold War, and b) fostered anti-dictatorial Latin 
American movements such as the Caribbean Legion willing to support 
Figueres; and 3) the existence of a political discourse seeking to induce a 
paradigm shift (the creation of a social democratic Second Republic) by 
creating a crisis narrative that exaggerated the communist threat to Costa 
Rica’s “exceptional” democracy. Without these factors, the social democrats 
would not have been able to mobilize certain sectors of the opposition to fight 
the civil war. In turn, without this mobilization the other political leaders would 
have resolved the 1948 political stalemate through consensual means as 
previous leaders had done after contested elections. Rather than interpreting 
the 1948 Civil War as the result of “objectively” antagonistic socio-economic 
and political interests and personal vendettas, as the dominant view states, 
this chapter argues that these social antagonisms were discursively 
constructed by the social democrats in their hegemonic pursuit.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the negotiations following the cessation of the armed 
conflict.  It explores the difficulties the social democrats encountered in 
legitimating their Junta Rule due in large part to the perceived incompatibility 
between their actions (starting an armed insurrection, imposing a military 
Junta and supporting the Caribbean Legion) and the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary.  It shows how the social democrats had to change their approach 
from arguing that their military victory justified their political power and 
attempting to impose radical change, to showing their commitment to peace 
and consensual politics and highlighting the elements of continuity between 
	   39	  
the social democratic project and the previous liberal oligarchic model to 
induce reformist change. This chapter interprets Figueres’s decision to abolish 
the military as an attempt to prove the social democrats’ compatibility with the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary. By reviewing the 183 Acts of the 1949 
Constitutional Assembly, it shows how the battles between the social 
democrats, the conservative liberal oligarchs and the progressive liberal 
delegates led to reformist changes to the 1871 constitution despite the social 
democrats’ initial foundational ambitions.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on a period that remains under-analysed by scholars 
explaining Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation – the Otilio Ulate 
administration (1949-1953). It argues that Ulate played a crucial role in 
facilitating the emergence of the social democratic hegemony.  Ulate chose to 
adopt the National Liberation myth despite its historical inaccuracies because 
he realized that this narrative could suture the dislocated order and help re-
establish peace and stability.  Without Ulate’s acceptance of this myth, the 
social democratic rise to hegemony would have been made much more 
difficult.  This chapter traces the social democrats’ rise to hegemony.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes outlining some broad lessons that can be drawn from the 
analysis of Costa Rica’s democratization process focusing on the previously 
under-analysed discursive dimension. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Existing theories explaining Costa Rica’s “exceptional” transition to 
democracy and its consolidation 
 
This chapter reviews the existing theories analysing Costa Rica’s 
“exceptional” democratic development placing them within the theories of 
democratization informing them. It argues that the dominant interpretation of 
Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation does not take into account key findings 
made by Costa Rican historians regarding the civil war period. By 
incorporating these findings, it becomes evident the crucial role that discursive 
structures played in the consolidation of Costa Rica’s democracy.  We will 
begin with the earliest interpretation of the founding of Costa Rica’s 
democracy – the socio-economic and cultural precondition approach. 
 
Socio-economic and cultural pre-conditions approach 
Influenced by modernization theory, the pre-conditions approach first 
emerged during the 1950s and 1960s at a time when democratic forms of 
government were the exception rather than the rule. It argued that certain 
levels of literacy, urbanization, industrialization, and capitalist development 
were required for democratization (Chang 2002:59). Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
seminal piece Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Development (1959) established a theoretical link 
between the levels of development of a given country and its probability of 
being democratic – “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that 
it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959:75 quoted by Wucherpfenning and 
Deutsch 2009:1). 10  According to Lipset, modernization manifested itself 
largely through changing social conditions that fostered a democratic culture 
by increasing the receptiveness to the types of norms and values that 
mitigated conflict, penalized extremist groups and rewarded moderate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The relation between socio-economic development and political democracy is one 
of the most analyzed questions in political science. Lipset’s conclusion has become 
conventional wisdom. As Julian Wucherpfenning and Franziska Deutsch (2009), 
some of the most influential contemporary books analyzing this relation are 
Przeworski et al. (2000; Przeworski & Limongi 1997), Boix (2003), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2005) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005).  
	   41	  
democratic parties (Lipset 1959: 83-84 quoted by Wucherpfenning and 
Deutsch 2009:1).11  
 
Inspired by the pre-conditions approach, the proponents of the rural 
democratic/egalitarian theory argued that liberal democracy arose in Costa 
Rica as the result of a combination of atypical socio-economic structural 
variables present in Costa Rica during its colonial period. These structural 
variables gave rise to an egalitarian, violence-avert, ethnically and religiously 
homogenous, and innately democratic political culture. One of the first 
proponents of the rural democracy theory was Carlos Monge Alfaro (1966) 
through his highly influential book Historia de Costa Rica. Other works include 
Eugenio Rodriguez Vega’s Apuntes para una sociologia Costarricense 
(1979), James Bussey’s Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (1962), and 
Charles Ameringer’s Democracy in Costa Rica (1982). They present the 
following interpretation of Costa Rica’s colonial history. 
 
Costa Rica’s lack of resources - the absence of significant deposits of 
exploitable minerals (such as gold or silver) and the scarcity of indigenous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 	  During the same period, Walt Whitman Rustow (1960) developed a model 
outlining five progressive stages that led from economic development to 
democratization.  Rustow’s model was criticized for its assumption that this process 
was linear and inevitable.  Based on the European and American experience, this 
model was seen as inadequate for explaining Asian, African and Latin American 
countries.  During the 1970s, dependency theorists argued that instead of focusing 
on domestic socio-economic and cultural factors hindering processes of 
democratization in “traditional” societies, it was necessary to focus on international 
factors hindering processes of development in “dependent” or “peripheral societies”.  
They argued that the position of each country within the world capitalist system 
determined the probability of the country’s democratic and developmental success or 
failure. Dependency theorists focusing on Latin America concluded that this region’s 
integration into the international market economy enhanced the necessity for 
authoritarian order in order to maintain its competitive advantage in the international 
economy.  Those focusing on Central America argued that multinational firms and 
United States’ intervention explained the development of pervasive and harsh 
authoritarian rule in the isthmus. Dependency theory was subsequently harshly 
criticized for its failure to provide a clear and compelling explanation of the diverse 
patterns of democracy and development in the third world (Yashar 1997:12)11. 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued that although international factors were catalytic 
as they structured the export economy, shaped the international political climate, and 
underwrote capital and military alliances, they did not primarily or singlehandedly 
cause either democracy or authoritarianism in the absence of domestic conditions 
that could found and sustain these regimes (Yashar 1997:13).  
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labour - prevented the Spanish conquistadores from replicating coercive 
relations found in other parts of Latin America.  The insufficiency of 
indigenous labour and abundance of unclaimed land meant that the colonists 
could not successfully introduce the exploitative encomienda12 system used to 
man large hacienda estates elsewhere in the region.  Instead of relations of 
coercion between capital and labour, relations of mutual dependence 
developed.  Landowners needed hired labour. They had to treat the labourers 
well; otherwise, they would work for someone else offering better working 
conditions. The lack of indigenous labour also meant that many colonists were 
forced to till their own land or work side-by-side labourers. Therefore, the 
colonists who chose to stay in Costa Rica were people looking for a new life in 
the new continent (much like the pilgrims in the United States), rather than for 
a way of extracting the maximum amount of wealth to take back to the old 
continent (the typical colonial model in South America).   
 
Gudmundson (1989), Samper (1990), Paige (1997) argued that the 
emergence of a small property owning society without a rigidly stratified class 
structure and a relatively egalitarian distribution of resources promoted Costa 
Rica’s democratic development. Influenced by Barrington Moore’s class-
based historical structural approach13, they argued that lack of extensive 
hacienda estates in Costa Rica resulted in a more even distribution of land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In order to encourage Spaniards to go to the New World, the Spanish crown 
started the practice of the encomienda whereby the Spaniards would be granted 
command over indigenous people.  The indigenous people had to give the 
encomendero tribute and work for them, in exchange for which the encomendero 
was charged with converting them to Christianity and taking care of them (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012). 
13 In his book Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Moore sought to explain 
how changes in social structures over long periods of time led to diverse societies: 
democracy in Britain, France and United States, fascism in Germany and Japan, and 
communism in Russia and China.  The type of route a given country took was 
determined by the relative configuration of five factors: 1) the power distribution 
amongst the elite, 2) the economic basis of the agrarian upper-class, 3) the class 
constellation, 4) the distribution of power between classes, and 5) the state’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant class. (Wucherpfenning and Deutsch 2009:2) He 
viewed economic classes as the main actors in social and political change. 
Democratization according to Moore was the result of the loss of social and 
economic power of the landed aristocracy vis-à-vis the emerging bourgeoisie class.  
Moore considers the emergence of liberal democracy as a direct manifestation of 
bourgeois dominance and bourgeois interests (Peeler 1985: 15). “No bourgeoisie, no 
democracy” (Moore 1966).  
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and wealth. This led to the predominance of the bourgeois class or “yeoman 
farmers” believed to be conducive to democratization. The fact that Costa 
Rica was a poor colony also meant that the colonial administrative institutions 
were very weak (Diaz Arias 2007: xvii). Given that is was far away from 
Guatemala - the capital of the isthmus - Costa Rica had some experience with 
self-government prior to independence.  The combination of these atypical 
socio-economic factors led to the emergence of a particular egalitarian, 
democratic, peace-loving and consensual Costa Rican culture (Wilson 
1998:12). These works reversed the logic of the socio-economic pre-
requisites approach, which argued that a certain degree of economic 
development was needed for democratization by arguing that the key to Costa 
Rica’s democracy lied in its poverty.  However, socio-economic factors 
remained crucial since the key to Costa Rica’s democratic success lied in its 
relatively egalitarian socio-economic structures. These socio-economic 
structures encouraged the creation of an egalitarian political culture breeding 
values of moderation, political trust, social cohesion and consensus.   
 
They then contrast Costa Rica’s colonial experience with that of other Central 
American countries. In the rest of Central America, the abundance of 
indigenous labour coupled with the scarcity of land meant that the elite had 
the incentive to concentrate land in their own hands through a gradual 
privatization of Indian lands.  These latifundista elites were able to keep 
wages low and to exploit workers because the broader population had no 
other source of subsistence (Perez Brignoli, 1994; Lauria-Santiago, 1999).  
When indigenous workers would rebel against this oppression, the large 
landowners would successfully pressure the state to coercively force them 
into submission.  The defence of the economic interests of the hegemonic 
landowning elites led to the militarization of the Central American states 
excluding Costa Rica (Gudmundson 1995).  This view argued that autocracy 
emerged in all Central American nations except for Costa Rica in order to 
defend the commercial agricultural interests of the elites (Lehoucq 2012). This 
is the argument of the classics of Central American sociology (Paige 1997, 
Torres-Riva 1994) and of the economic historians (Cardoso 1975, Samper 
1998, Williams 1994 and Weeks 1985, Baloyra-Herp 1983, Brockett 1998, 
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Dunkerley 1988, Perez Brignoli 1989, Robinson 2003, Vilas 1995).  As 
Lehoucq (2012) argues, these works neglect political factors because they 
wrongly considered Central American states as little more than instruments of 
local elites, foreign companies, or the United States government. Therefore, 
most historical studies have focused on the economic and social constraints 
on political and economic development (Smith and Boyer, 1987; Smith, Boyer, 
and Diskin, 1988).   
 
Limits of the rural democracy theory  
During the 1980s and 1990s, a series of political scientists started to criticize 
the accuracy of the socio-economic analysis made by the proponents of the 
rural democracy theory. For example, Carlos Melendez Chaverri (1982) 
argued that land distribution during the colonial period was not as even as had 
been claimed.  In his work Conquistadores y pobladores: Origenes historico-
sociales de los Costarricenses he stated that, while it is true that land in the 
Costa Rican Central Valley was more equally distributed relative to other 
Central American nations, the rest of the country had a different fate.  In the 
northwest large cattle ranches known as haciendas emerged and on the 
Atlantic coast large cacao plantations were established.  Chaverri claimed that 
in these areas the social differentials between the large estate owners and the 
labourers of the land was immense.  Chaverri stated that even in the Central 
Valley, despite the fact that the colonizers had to work their own land due to 
scarce labour, daily life was nonetheless based on status differences defined 
in accordance to Spanish tradition (Chaverri 1982). Samuel Stone rejected 
the notion of an egalitarian distribution of power in Costa Rica’s colonial 
period.  In his work, “Aspects of Power Distribution in Costa Rica”, he argued 
that during the 16th and 17th centuries Spain created a pattern of power 
distribution that continued to determine the nature of Costa Rican politics.  It 
reserved access to political posts for conquistadores and hidalgos, thus giving 
control of the province to a small group of families by virtue of their descent 
(Stone 1974). Later studies made by Gudmundson (1999) questioned the 
extent of social equality during the colonial period by using previously 
unanalysed census material.  In his article “Costa Rica Before Coffee”, 
Gudmundson argued that in the early 19th century, the Costa Rican village 
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economy was characterized by complex and unequal land tenure, and that 
social division of labour affected all but the most isolated peasants.  Tangible 
differences existed between the ‘elite’ and the peasant masses, as well as 
within the peasantry and among a surprisingly well-developed urban artisan 
group and agricultural sector (Gudmundson 2001).  Samper (1994) showed 
that Costa Rican land distribution was similar to that of El Salvador in the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Booth (1999) and Lehoucq (2012) argued that 
Nicaragua’s ethnic composition was not dissimilar to that of Costa Rica as 
they both had a predominantly mestizo ethnic composition. Nicaragua also 
had extensive unclaimed lands during the colonial period (Cruz 2000:287).  
Aguilar and Alfaro (1997), Melendez Chaverri (1975) and Rojas Bolanos 
(2010) have disputed the claim that Costa Rica is an ethnically white 
homogenous society and pointed out the existence of a significant Afro-
Caribbean population living in the Atlantic region.  Molina (1990) disputed the 
degree of harmony amongst the colonial elites and the indigenous population.  
These new findings led to the consensus that socio-economic variables were 
at best necessary but insufficient conditions for explaining the emergence of 
democracy in Costa Rica.  Scholars used insights from political crafting 
approaches to search for alternative explanations.   
 
Political Crafting Approach 
The political crafting approach was first developed during the 1970s and 
1980s as a critique of the socio-economic and cultural determinism of the pre-
conditions approach.  The failure to find a set of identical conditions that could 
yield clear results regarding the presence or absence of democratic regimes 
led to the replacement of this endeavour by more modest contextually-
bounded approaches to the study of democratization (Yashar 1997). This 
gave way to more process oriented approaches emphasizing the open and 
contingent nature of political reality. These democratic theories shifted their 
emphasis from explaining the pre-conditions for democratic stability to 
explaining what conditions led to democratic transitions. Political crafting 
scholars argued: “in their functional concerns, these pre-conditions theorists 
concentrated their attention on the functional relations between existing 
democracy and some socio-economic or socio-cultural variables and 
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neglected the generic issue of developing and crafting democracy” (Chang 
2002:61). What scholars viewed as pre-requisites14 of democracy – patterns 
of greater economic growth and more equitable income distribution, as well as 
higher levels of education – were in fact best conceived as the products or 
outcomes of democracy.  
 
Political crafting scholars were influenced by the elite pact-making theories 
first developed by Robert Dahl. In his Polyarchy, Dahl (1972) wrote that “the 
rules, the practices, and the culture of competitive politics developed first 
among a small elite whose ties of friendship, family, interests, class and 
ideology restrained the severity of conflict. Later, as additional social strata 
were admitted into politics they were more easily socialized into the norms 
and practices of competitive politics already developed among the elites” 
(quoted by Chang 2002: 65). Building on Dahl’s works, they argued that the 
decision to transition into a democracy emerged not out of a fundamental shift 
in values but out of political strategic considerations. Elites chose democracy 
instrumentally because they considered that the costs of attempting to 
suppress their political opponents exceeded the costs of engaging them in 
constitutionally regulated competition. As Chang states, according to this view 
what mattered in the decision phase was not the values the leaders held dear, 
but the concrete steps they were willing to take to found a democracy (Chang 
2002:67). Arturo Valenzuela (1977) also argued that choices made by 
politicians shaped the democratic trajectories.  In his book Latin American 
Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, Peeler (1985) concluded 
that elite accommodation was the crucial variable in the establishment and 
maintenance of liberal democracies in Latin America.   
 
Proponents of the political crafting approach argued that political leaders were 
capable of transcending structural constraints in order to found and sustain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 As Dankwart Rustow (1970) argued, Lipset was careful to speak of requisites not 
pre-requisites of democracy acknowledging the difference between correlation and 
causation.  But this subtlety escaped many readers who then translated it to 
preconditions.  Rustow argues that: “the text of the article, moreover, encourages the 
same substitution, for it repeatedly slips from the language of correlation into the 
language of causality (Rustow 1970:342). 
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democracy (Linz 1978; Di Palma and Whitehead 1986; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Di Palma 1990; Higley and Gunther 1992). Some scholars 
analysing Costa Rica’s democratization process such as Alexander (1962), 
Aguilar Bulgarelli (1969), Baez Flores (1969), Acuna (1974), Bonilla (1977), 
Cañas (1982) and Guerra (1997) shared this view.  Their works attributed a 
predominant role to Jose Figueres when analysing Costa Rica’s 
democratization process. 
 
In his book Quest for Democracy (1999), Booth combined elements of political 
crafting (elite settlements) with class-based structural approaches (Booth 
1998:197).  He argued that the coffee elites were forced to share power and 
accept political democracy when an emerging middle class gained sufficient 
power and resources to challenge their rule.  This was possible due to the 
weakening of the liberal oligarchic elite’s grip on power under the Calderon 
administration (1940-1944) when Calderon abandoned his oligarchic 
supporters and formed an alliance with the CRCP party leader Manuel Mora 
with the blessing of the Costa Rican Catholic Church’s progressive 
archbishop Monsignor Victor Sanabria.  This in turn led to a decade of class 
conflict that inevitably culminated in the 1948 civil war.  Costa Rica’s 
democracy was consolidated only after the war through an elite settlement 
between the two victorious political groups, the social democratic 
revolutionaries led by Jose Figueres and the progressive liberal oligarchs led 
by Otilio Ulate. The elites had to negotiate with the politically activated 
working class leaders, who had become too strong to ignore (Booth 1998: 
197). Booth’s book fails to incorporate the latest historical findings of the 
period leading to the 1948 civil war, which prove that the civil war was not the 
result of class conflict (Diaz 2009, Molina 2002). 
 
Booth’s book The Quest for Democracy suffers from the same limitations of 
other works that base their analysis on information biased by the social 
democratic re-interpretation of the 1948 civil war. These works do not 
acknowledge the high degree of opposition faced by the social democratic 
victors in the immediate post civil war period due to the widespread narrative 
developed by their former pre-war allies (progressive liberals and 
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conservative coffee oligarchs) that portrayed the Junta as an illegitimate body. 
To understand Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation process it is necessary 
to explore how the social democrats succeeded in reversing their initial 
widespread opposition during the immediate post civil war period to 
subsequently becoming a hegemonic force during the late 1950s early 1960s.  
Only by exploring the discursive dimension can we explain this.  
 
Deborah Yashar’s book Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in 
Costa Rica and Guatemala 1870-1950s also suffers from historical 
inaccuracies. Yashar claims that there is an unanswered puzzle in the 
literature explaining Costa Rica and Guatemala’s divergent regime types after 
the mid 20th century: despite sharing a number of similar characteristics 
(regional location, size, position in the world economy, levels of economic 
development) and similar patterns of political change and development up 
until the middle of the twentieth century, Costa Rica and Guatemala represent 
Latin America’s most divergent political regimes in the post-war period 
(Yashar 1997:6). Using a critical juncture approach, Yashar argues that the 
cycles of reform and reaction in the 1940s and 1950s were regime-defining 
moments exerting path dependent tendencies: while the Costa Rican 
“counter-reform movement” installed political democracy in 1948, the 
Guatemalan “counter-reform movement” installed authoritarian rule in 1954.  
Yashar concludes that: 
The cases of Costa Rica and Guatemala suggest that democratizing 
coalitions emerged in the context of publicly divided elite and the rising 
organization of marginalized sectors demanding political inclusion.  The 
ability to sustain these democratizing coalitions, however, rested on their 
capacity both to redistribute elite property and to develop political control 
of the countryside.  Rapid but bounded redistributive reforms implemented 
during the transition to democracy were more conducive to democracy’s 
endurance than their implementation after democratic institutions were 
assumed to be in place (Yashar 1997:4).  
 
The main problem with Yashar’s work is that her central premise that Costa 
Rica and Guatemala were similar up until the middle of the 20th century is 
inaccurate as has been pointed out by many scholars including James 
Mahoney (2001), Fabrique Lehoucq and Ivan Molina (2002), and Consuelo 
Cruz (2005). After their independence, Costa Rica and Guatemala followed 
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quite different political trajectories. To understand their divergent paths we 
should not focus on the 1940s and 1950s as Yashar does, but rather trace 
their divergent paths from the post-independence period onwards. This 
dissertation focuses on one factor that remains under-appreciated by the 
existing literature explaining these two nations’ divergent political paths. It 
argues that since their independence, Costa Rica’s and Guatemala’s political 
dynamics have been structured in profoundly different ways in part due to the 
predominance of the logic of transformism in Costa Rica and the logic of 
relations of antagonism in Guatemala and the rest of the isthmus.   
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism  
Other scholars have tried to explain Costa Rica’s exceptional democratic 
institutional development using rational choice institutionalism (RCI). Arguably 
the best works used to analyse Costa Rica’s democratization process using 
RCI are those written by Fabrice Lehoucq in collaboration with Ivan Molina.  
These include: The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Cooperation in 
Costa Rica (1996), Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform and 
Democratization in Costa Rica (Lehoucq and Molina: 2002), Democratic 
Institutions and Political Conflicts in Costa Rica (2010) and The Politics of 
Modern Central America (2012).  Throughout his works, Lehoucq sustains 
that the choices made by Costa Rican political actors can be explained using 
the premises that politicians want to hold office to shape public policy and that 
the rules governing access to state offices generates incentives for them to 
act in fairly predictable ways.  Based on these assumptions, the decision to 
respect the result of the ballot box is a product of strategic and institutional 
constraints. Unable to impose their rule on their rivals, politicians settle for 
what they can get and not for what they want (Lehoucq 1996:329).  Lehoucq 
suggests that this inductive strategy can serve to identify the conditions that 
prompted incumbents and adversaries to respect and to build democratic 
institutions in Costa Rica after the 1948 Civil War (Lehoucq 1996:336).  
 
Lehoucq argues that although Costa Rica had made some significant 
progress towards democratization prior to the 1948 Civil War, its transition to 
democracy dates to the post civil war period.  He correctly points out that 
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electoral fraud was the norm until after the 1948 Civil War. As Theodore 
Creedman points out from 1889-1936 only four elections (1910,1920,1928 
and 1936) were considered untainted.  Three (1890, 1884 and 1932 were 
accompanied by minor uprisings.  The remaining five (1898, 1902, 1906, 1914 
and 1924) were the result of continuismo – the constitutional prolongation of a 
term of office, illegal imposition of candidates or other illegal procedures 
(Creedman 1971:53). He argues that the high and unchecked concentration 
of power on the presidency granted by the 1871 Constitution meant that, once 
in power, the president could do as he pleased – including appointing the next 
president.  This made the position extremely coveted, encouraging the 
opposition to consider the use of violence to obtain the presidential seat.  
Even if the political elite recognized the need to reduce the power of the 
presidency, all attempts would fail due to the influence of the political 
machines backing the incumbent president at the time.  No one was willing to 
give away the advantage they had acquired (Lehoucq 1996, 2002, 2010). 
 
Politicians began to respect electoral results only after the 1948 Civil War 
when the institutional reforms a) reduced the power of the president, b) 
provided a meaningful role to the opposition, and c) guaranteed the opposition 
that they would have a fair chance of attaining power in future elections.  
Political competition became more peaceful as those parties that failed to 
capture the presidency were nevertheless allowed to occupy legislative 
offices. Lehoucq further argues that democratic stability was the product of 
decisions made by incumbents and their opposition to share state power. 
Lehoucq states: 
Under the threat of being overthrown, incumbents began to permit electoral 
competition to select the occupants of executive and legislative offices. The 
ability to send representatives to Congress also encouraged ruling and 
opposition parties to start respecting the results of the ballot box. 
Concerned with their political survival, incumbents and their rivals struck a 
bargain whose by-product was the gradual increase in rates of compliance 
with democratic institutions (Lehoucq 1996: 342). 
 
Lehoucq’s work provides a wealth of knowledge regarding Costa Rica’s 
electoral reform process and the development of its electoral democracy. 
However, his work offers a narrow conception of democracy adopting an 
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“aggregative model of democracy15” and prioritizes suffrage rights over other 
elements of democracy. As the current consensual academic view states, 
free, fair, and transparent elections are a necessary but insufficient condition 
for democracy.  A broader conception of democracy requires an analysis of 
other factors neglected by Lehoucq.  Lehoucq’s work also leaves many 
interesting questions unanswered.  Although he correctly points out that 
electoral fraud was the norm in Costa Rica during the liberal oligarchic period, 
he does not explore why none of the contested elections in Costa Rica led to 
civil unrest. One of the most interesting things to note about this period is that 
although there was instability at the individual level (with presidents being 
removed and replaced), this did not translate into instability at the regime 
level. Considering the Central American context at the time, it is quite 
surprising that these tense electoral battles did not lead to civil unrest. 
Lehoucq provides only two options for the incumbents – either being 
overthrown or permitting electoral competition.  He does not explore why 
incumbents did not consider mobilizing a large sector of the population to fight 
against their opponents – as was common in the rest of Central America. In 
other words, he does not inquire why Costa Rican political leaders had less 
power of mobilization than their Central American counter-parts.   
 
When comparing Costa Rica with the rest of the region in his latest book, 
Lehoucq (2012) states that the origins of their divergent regime trajectories 
lied in the nature of political competition itself.  He states:  
Where the struggle for hegemony led to on-going stalemates, as in Costa 
Rica, contending political forces learned to share state power, an 
arrangement that gradually reduced the powers of the executive and 
enfranchised increasing number of voters.  Where strongman managed to 
impose themselves, as in the rest of the isthmus, the military became the 
arbiter of state power.  The chaos that engulfed Central America so well 
analysed by Munro 1918 and later Mahoney 2001 typically ended when a 
strong man vanquished his rivals and institutionalized his rule in 
personalistic dictatorships so common in isthmus (Lehoucq 2012:28).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) explain, the aggregative model of democracy 
reduces the democratic process to the expression of those interests and 
preferences, which are registered in a vote aimed at selecting leaders who carry out 
the chosen policies.   	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Lehoucq does not explore further what factors led to these differences, 
namely addressing what factors structured political competitions in these 
countries. Furthermore, he does not explore why strongmen were able to 
impose themselves in the rest of Central America, but not in Costa Rica. To 
understand this we must explore the discursive context present in each 
country - a factor RCI scholars dismiss.  This dissertation argues that the 
prevalence of a transformist logic of articulation meant that Costa Rican 
political leaders did not/could not mobilize their supporters in the same way 
that Central American leaders did. While the liberal Guatemalan and 
Nicaraguan dictators were able to mobilize their supporters portraying the 
conservatives as an “existential threat”, the Costa Rican conservative or 
liberal leaders chose to present their opponents as “adversaries” as opposed 
to “enemies” (Norval 2000).  Neither the conservative nor the liberals in Costa 
Rica wanted to destabilize the existing order structured by the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary. The Costa Rican population liked the positive self-image 
portrayed by this collective imaginary and the positive interpretation of their 
democratic institutions derived from it. This meant that the Costa Rican 
political leaders could not mobilize support for themselves as individuals 
outside of the existing democratic institutional structures. As a result, Costa 
Rican political leaders were not able to concentrate the power that other 
Central American dictators amassed for themselves.  
 
Costa Rican leaders did not establish the patron-client relations established 
by their counter-parts. The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary made the 
Costa Rican masses view democracy as the only regime compatible with their 
“exceptional” national identity. In order to gain political support, the 
conservatives and the liberals had to show that they were democratic 
(according to the standards established at that historical period) and that they 
respected the rule of law. The only way they could win popular support was by 
addressing the demands of as many diverse political groups as possible.  
They created an elaborate institutional framework to address specific 
demands differentially preventing populist ruptures. This meant that the liberal 
period in Costa Rica was significantly different from that in the rest of the 
region. One of the best works contrasting the liberal reform periods in Central 
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America is the book written by James Mahoney using a historical 
institutionalist (HI) approach.   
 
Historical institutionalism  
In his book The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependency and Regime 
Change in Central America, Mahoney (2001) argues that in order to 
understand the divergent regime types and historical paths that the Central 
American countries took, it is necessary to analyse the choices that the liberal 
political actors made during the 19th century liberal reform period.  Building on 
Collier and Collier’s (1991) concept of critical junctures and path dependence, 
Mahoney argues that the adoption of radical liberalism, reformist liberalism, or 
aborted liberalism helps explain subsequent political dynamics in the region 
(Mahoney 2001: 4). In all the countries analysed, liberal reform brought 
reactions from actors who were excluded or marginalized during the reform 
process.  These contrasting reactions – ranging from major democratizing 
efforts to efforts of authoritarianism to anti-imperialist movements – can in part 
be explained as a consequence of the type of liberal reform undertaken in a 
given country. The persistence of military-authoritarian regimes in Guatemala 
and El Salvador, a democratic regime in Costa Rican and traditional 
dictatorships in Honduras and Nicaragua over many decades in the 20th 
Century can be explained by the legacies of the three patterns of radical, 
reformist and aborted liberalism. However, Mahoney does not explore what 
factors influenced the decisions taken by political actors in the first place.  
This dissertation argues that to understand why Costa Ricans chose reformist 
liberalism, Guatemalans and Salvadoreans chose radical liberalism and 
Hondureans and Nicaraguans were not able to implement liberalism it is 
necessary to analyse the discursive context prevalent in each country during 
the liberal reform period.  
 
In his later book Colonialism and Post Colonial Development: Spanish 
America in Comparative Perspective, Mahoney (2010) compares the 
postcolonial development of Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay. Mahoney argues that only Costa Rican and Chilean 
postcolonial actors were able to establish competitive economies and sustain 
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real growth via primary exports. According to Mahoney, what gave Chile and 
Costa Rica an advantage was their ability to elude the adverse consequences 
of international war (Mahoney 2010:190). Mahoney argues that stability and 
peace in Costa Rica allowed political actors to exploit early on their export 
potential – coffee production. Mahoney once again does not take a step back 
to analyse what factors encouraged Costa Rica to avoid the civil unrest faced 
by all other Central American countries in the first place.  
 
The prevalent explanation of why Costa Rica’s political actors chose policies 
conducive to stability and peace during the post independence period states 
that Costa Ricans had an innately peaceful and democratic political culture. 
This view has been influenced by the political culture theory. We now briefly 
outline the main arguments of this approach. 
 
Political culture theory  
During the 1980s and 1990s, political culture theory elaborated on 
modernization theory, emphasizing the importance of certain values or civic 
culture for the emergence of democracy. Scholars such as Inkeles and 
Diamond (1980) and Inglehart (1990) re-formulated the pre-conditions 
approach eliminating the ethno-centrist bias of modernization theory, which 
equated modernization with westernization.  When analysing the relationship 
between democracy and political culture on the one hand, and between 
democracy and economic development on the other, they concluded that 
political beliefs, attitudes and values were an important intervening variable in 
the relationship between economic development and democracy (Chang 
2002: 60).  Inglehart (1988) argued that a civic culture would have a higher 
probability of producing a democratic system. Lipset, Seong and Torres 
(1993) and Huntington (1991) also argued that cultural factors appeared to be 
more important than economic ones in determining democratic success 
(Chang 2002: 60).  When analysing the transition to democracy of the former 
communist countries, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) argued that the mass 
protests that helped topple the authoritarian regimes and the struggle 
between the elites and the people were not about economic issues but about 
political rights and civil liberties.  They conclude that: “the major effect of 
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modernization is not that it makes democracy more acceptable to elites, but 
that it increases ordinary people’s capabilities and willingness to struggle for 
democratic institutions” (Welzel and Inglehart 2008:136 quoted by 
Wucherpfenning and Deutsch 2009:6). Drawing on survey data of global 
scope, they demonstrate the linkages between macro socio-economic 
development and micro-emancipatory value changes in order to counter the 
argument that value change is a consequence as opposed to a cause of 
democracy thereby supporting their theory of democratic culture (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Inglehart 2006).16 
 
When analysing Latin America’s failed democratic experiences, several 
scholars (Morse 1954, Dealy 1954; Smith 1974) concluded that this region 
had inherited an anti-democratic culture from Spain.  According to Wiarda 
(1974) the Catholic, corporatist, hierarchical, authoritarian, patrimonialist and 
semi-feudal Spanish heritage inhibited the democratization of Latin America. 
In their most recent work, Wiarda and Klein (2014) contrast the United States’ 
political culture with that found in most Latin American countries.  They 
conclude that whereas the political culture in the United States has been 
mainly democratic, liberal, and committed to representative government, that 
of Latin America has been historically elitist, authoritarian, hierarchical, 
corporatist and patrimonial (Wiarda and Klein 2014:12). Wiarda and Klein 
argue that: 
When Latin America became independent in the 19th century, a new 
political culture based on representative institutions emerged, even while 
the old political culture17 remained strong. The result was two political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As Wucherpfenning and Deutsch (2009) state, Hadenius and Teorell (2005) have 
criticized Inglehart and Welzel’s work stating that they fail to distinguish between 
causal effect and correlation.  Because they do not sufficiently control for prior levels 
of democracy, their proposed causal relationship is spurious. 
17 Wiarda and Klein state that: “Latin America has long been dominated by a political, 
social and economic structure that had its roots not in modernity but in medievalism.  
Much of Latin America’s recent history involves the efforts to overcome or ameliorate 
that feudal past.  Because this feudal legacy remains so strong, because the heavy 
hand of ancient history hangs so oppressively over the area, we must come to grips 
with Latin America’s past to understand its present and future (Wiarda and Klein 
2014: 17). Colonialism and imperialism also devastated the area. The institutions that 
Spain brought to the New World reflected the institutions that had developed in the 
mother countries during their struggles against the Moors and their effort to form a 
unified nation-state out of disparate social and regional forces.  These institutions 
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cultures, one authoritarian, and the other nascently liberal existing side-by-
side and vying for dominance throughout the 19th century and into much of 
the 20th.  The two political cultures also had different social bases: the more 
traditional one was centered in the church, the landed elite, the military and 
the conservative peasantry, with the newer, liberal one concentrated in 
urban areas among intellectuals, students and emerging middle class, and 
some business elements.  With no single political culture dominant (unlike 
the United States after the civil war when the liberal-democratic ethos 
definitely triumphed), Latin American politics was often unstable and torn by 
frequent civil war between the two ways of life (Wiarda and Klein 2014: 13). 
  
Wiarda and Klein argue that this legacy still impacts Latin America’s 
democracies today.18  
 
In his book, Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: the Latin American Case, 
Lawrence Harrison (1985) argued that Costa Rica was an exception to this 
rule.  Contrasting Costa Rica and Nicaragua, he suggests that, while 
Nicaragua failed to democratize because it was part of the “main-stream of 
Hispanic-American culture”, Costa Rica’s special colonial experience “in some 
ways reminiscent of the New England colonies” led to significant modifications 
of its culture enabling its democratization process (Harrison 1985:54). Costa 
Rica’s unique socio-political development was due to “the values and attitudes 
that flow(ed) from a common levelling experience” when colonizers had to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
included a rigid, authoritarian political system, a similarly rigid hierarchical class 
structure, a statist and mercantilist economy, an absolutist church and a similarly 
closed and absolutist educational system (Wiarda 2014: 19). 
18 Although a political consensus has emerged in the region that democracy is the 
preferred form of government, “the authoritarian temptation is still often present” 
(Wiarda and Klein 2014:3).  Democracy does not always work well or quickly enough 
and it is still threatened by upheavals, corruption and vast social problems. (Wiarda 
and Klein 2014: 4) Many new democracies are not very well institutionalized lacking 
strong and independent legislatures, judiciaries and court systems, and 
bureaucracies. Governments have not been very effective in carrying out public 
policies.  On the positive side, there has been an emergence of interest groups, 
NGOs, and governmental organizations monitoring governments, the legislature, 
court systems, police and local governments with the mandate of overseeing that 
public institutions provide public goods and services rather than merely jobs, 
patronage and handouts. Political parties are better organized, with real mass base 
and real programs and ideology, as compared with small, personalistic and 
patronage-based parties of the past.  However, patronage and special favoritism still 
operates  (Wiarda and Klein: 2014). Most Latin American democracies can be 
referred to as electoral democracies (formal elections are held) but not liberal 
democracies in the sense of being open, pluralistic, and egalitarian. Many regimes in 
the area are still partial or limited democracies, designations that indicate links to the 
past.  	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work side-by-side their labourers to survive. Political stability was maintained 
in Costa Rica because “that common levelling experience triggered a process 
of cultural change that is self-reinforcing” (Harrison 1985:54).  More recent 
studies made by Costa Rican scholars have criticized this view that atypical 
socio-economic factors naturally led to the emergence of an innately peaceful 
and democratic political culture.  
 
The dominant interpretation of Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” national 
identity  
As David Diaz states (2009), contemporary works analysing Costa Rica’s 
national identity have been influenced by the constructivist perspective of the 
Canadian historian, Steven Palmer.  Palmer criticized the previous 
consensual view that argued that Costa Rica’s exceptional national identity 
naturally evolved because of the atypical socio-economic structure present 
since the colonial period (Rodriguez Vega 1950, Monge Alfaro 1959, Facio 
1971).  In his book A Liberal Discipline: Inventing Nations in Guatemala and 
Costa Rica 1870-1900, Palmer (1990), claimed that there was nothing 
spontaneous about this process.  He rejected the primordialist argument that 
national identity is a naturally evolving phenomena shaped by a common 
language, race, ethnicity, territory and history, as well as the instrumentalist 
argument that it is the result of economic, social and political processes. 
Influenced by Ernst Gellner (1983) and Eric Hobsbawn (1989), Palmer 
asserted that instead of nationalism serving as the basis for state building, the 
reverse happened. There were some pre-requisites that had to be met before 
the emergence of Costa Rica’s national identity. These included the 
construction of a stable state power with an ideologically unified political and 
economic elite sharing similar interests, the expansion of the coffee export 
economic model that ensured the viability of the state, and the ability of the 
liberals to restrain the influence of the Catholic Church, which had dominated 
the Costa Rican cultural realm using religious ideas instead of nationalism to 
promote its own interests. Once the elite imposed their socio-economic and 
political model, the intellectuals saw the need to legitimate their power and 
incorporate the masses (Diaz, David xix). Applying Benedict Anderson’s 
(1983) concept of imagined communities, Palmer argued that Costa Rica’s 
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national identity did not emerge until after the liberal dictator Tomas Guardia 
(1870-1882) consolidated the Costa Rican modern state. Thus, he argued 
that Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” national identity was a cultural construct 
created during the 1880s by a group of liberal intellectual elites known as the 
Grupo del Olimpo or Olympians who self-consciously engaged in the 
elaboration of a national mythology in order to establish the foundation of a 
secular, liberal oligarchic hegemony (Palmer 1990). 
 
The current dominant interpretation widely accepts Palmer’s constructivist 
thesis. It argues that the Costa Rican nation emerged as a project of 
domination of the elite classes achieved through the construction of symbols 
of cohesion by the liberal state and through educational reform. It argues that 
the different cultural projects directed from the state made diverse sectors of 
society identity with this national identity leading to cultural homogenization. 
The elites were then able to create a social universe that served as a base for 
the oligarchic project of domination. Also, the internalization of the ethnically 
white discourse helped construct a shared culture (Alvarenga Venetulo 2004). 
The best works addressing this view include (Fischel 1990 and 1992), (Molina 
and Palmer 1992), (Taracena and Piel 1995), (Acuna Ortega and Diaz Arias 
2002), (Molina Jimenez 2002), (Sandoval Garcia 2002), (Acuna Ortega, 
Mendez Alfaro and Fumero Vargas, Amoretti 2002), (Cortes 2003), (Diaz 
Arias 2006, 2007) and (Sojo 2010). These scholars have focused on the 
different methods used by the liberal intellectuals to spread their political 
mythology – the liberal educational reforms (Fischel 1992, Molina and Palmer 
2003), the re-interpretation of historical events, the creation of new heroes, 
the introduction of civic holidays (Mendez 2007, Diaz 2006, Diaz 2007), the 
liberal oligarchic historiography (Molina 2012), and the role of the press (Vega 
Jimenez 2000).  
 
These academics share the view that political mythologies and discourses are 
mere tools used by the political elite in order to pursue their own strategic 
interests and to legitimatise their particular socio-economic and political 
project. They do not acknowledge that a hegemonic order is the result of the 
interaction between different political actors’ discourses and not the single-
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handed imposition of one group’s ideology on others. Nor do they 
acknowledge that the Olympians were also constrained by the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary and the international ideational context. The fact that the 
types of discourses that were accepted by the Costa Rican population were 
only those perceived as in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary restrained the actions of the political elites.  Another weakness with 
the existing literature is that most works take the economic interests of the 
coffee oligarchs as the starting point of their analysis.  Most works are heavily 
influenced by RCI’s conception of interests.19  
 
This dissertation adopts the PSDT’s conception of interest as discursively 
constructed. Actors give meaning to their interests only after placing them 
within contextually and historically specific discursive structures. The existing 
literature neglects the influence that the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
played in shaping political leaders conceptions of their own interests, 
delimiting the types of political identities that could be created, and 
determining the possible modes of political mobilization. This dissertation 
argues that the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary was politically powerful 
because “discursively constructed identities and discourses grant specific 
interpretations of the social world a hegemonic position, thereby legitimizing 
the organization of specific structures and hierarchies, which eventually come 
to be seen as the natural order of things.  By regulating what can be said, 
what can be thought of as true or false, rational or irrational, these discursive 
structures condition and constrain political action by legitimizing certain 
aspects and policies and delegitimizing certain others” (Madianou, Mole, 
Ifversen 2007: 210).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Berman criticizes RCI’s narrow conception of interests arguing that: “actors are not 
motivated simply by a desire to maximize income, wealth and resources; indeed, 
ideational scholars believe that actors often (purposively) behave in ways that will not 
maximize material interests, however defined, and that these nonmaterial interests, 
goals, and identities will critically shape the way they evaluate different courses of 
action” (Berman 2012:16). Berman states that rational choice scholars need to 
expand their understanding of what types of interests motivate political behavior, as 
well as how these interests are shaped by the actors’ subjective understandings of 
specific events and by their particular thought-processes in order to address the full 
complexity of human motivations (Berman 2012:17).   
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Contrary to the belief that the Olympians created the “exceptionalist” national 
identity during the 1880s, this dissertation agrees with Consuelo Cruz’s view 
that it dates back to the colonial period.  This dissertation reverses Palmer’s 
logic that a strong state is needed to create a national identity, arguing instead 
that a strong national identity is a pre-requisite for a strong state.20  It then 
builds on the work of Consuelo Cruz (2000, 2005). In her article Identity and 
Persuasion: How nations remember their past and make their futures and her 
book Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua: World Making in the Tropics, Cruz (2000, 2005) argues that the 
founding governor of the Costa Rican province, Juan Vazquez de Coronado 
was the first to develop the “exceptionalist” national identity.  Cruz sustains 
that the colonial ideational context at the time of his arrival to the Costa Rican 
province had a significant impact on determining the particular type of national 
identity he created.  Spain did not appoint a governor to Costa Rica until 1559 
due to this province’s lack of natural resources and its small indigenous work 
force. During the period in which the encomienda system was in place and the 
harsh treatment of the indigenous population by the conquistadores was 
condoned, Costa Rica did not have a colonial governor. By the time Vazques 
de Coronado arrived to the province, the violent uprisings throughout the 
colonies against the encomienda system had convinced the Spanish Crown 
that Friar Las Casas’ arguments that the Spanish colonial rule was being 
debilitated and delegitimized by the abusive treatment of the natives was 
correct. The Crown issued new royal guidelines stating that the conquerors 
had to “live in harmony” with local populations and that the governors had to 
rule “in peace and tranquillity” and “deal peacefully” with the Indians, who 
were to be “attracted” to the faith (quote from Cruz 2000:290). To prove he 
was respecting this mandate, Vazquez de Coronado sent letters to the Crown 
dwelling on the “great love and benevolence” with which he treated the 
Indians, and how the natives reciprocated this (Cruz 2000:295).  As Cruz 
states: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The absence of a unified national identity and a common political project has been 
a constraint to democracy throughout the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.  It 
was one of the main limits of the Arab Spring. 	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He enveloped his narratives in an almost technical aura, as when he very 
straightforwardly reported that his benign method of colonization proved 
‘so efficacious that it was publicized throughout the land, and that one 
Chief came to render obedience and to recognize his serfdom’. These 
exemplary exercises in reportage, then, documented the ideal conquest – 
a conquest seemingly free of jealousies, among conquerors wilful deceit 
or wanton violence against the natives (Cruz 2000: 295). 
 
As Cruz states these rhetorical practices influenced the relations between the 
Spanish governors and the creole “nobles”:  
Costa Rica’s governors routinely pressed the nobles’ agenda and 
accorded them the respect they craved; and the nobles for their part, 
celebrated their governors as ‘protective fathers’ whose ‘progressive 
administration’ promoted the province’s tranquillity. Meanwhile, in 
Nicaragua (as in the rest of Central America) acrimonious relations 
between the Spaniards and creoles destabilized the colonial order. The 
contrast merely emphasized Costa Rica’s exceptional image (Cruz 2000: 
296). 
 
Therefore, by the time Costa Rica received its independence, its political elite 
perceived themselves as having exceptional traits. Cruz argues that political 
actors situate their struggles within dominant rhetorical frames defined as “a 
discursive structure that articulates in accessible ways the fundamental 
notions a group holds inter-subjectively about itself in the world and that 
allows or disallows specific strategies of persuasion on the basis of 
presumptive realism and normative sway” (Cruz 2000:275).  Political contests 
between them “engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities, defined 
as a restricted array of plausible scenarios of how the world can or cannot be 
changed and how the future ought to look” (Cruz 2000: 277).  She further 
argues that political cultures shape actors’ understanding of what is fair and 
feasible.  Actors are realistic because in their pursuit of their agendas, they 
seek a reasonable grip on the possibility of things.  Their realism is normative 
because people look for compelling reasons to select one alternative over 
another when facing a difficult choice.  In the struggles and settlements over 
vital issues no reason can be more powerful than one that appeals 
simultaneously to actors’ selfishness, sense of justice and notions of the 
possible. She concludes that Costa Rica’s political culture crucially affected 
democracy’s chances and the way that democracy actually worked (Cruz 
2005:2).  
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Although this dissertation builds on Cruz’s research on the colonial period, it 
adopts a “thicker” definition of discourse arguing that discursive structures not 
only influenced the way political actors understood their particular world, but 
also structured political dynamics by delimiting the possible modes of political 
mobilization and by structuring hegemonic battles. The concept of identity 
developed by PSDT differs from that developed by Cruz’s SI approach. PSDT 
offers a bottom-up approach, placing particular demands as the most basic 
unit of analysis. Cruz focuses on macro variations of normative systems of 
meaning. This macro view encouraged Cruz to adopt a conception of 
ideational change that favours ruptures and punctuations in otherwise stable 
set of norms.  According to Carstensen (2009) this is a common mistake 
made by ideational theorists.21  
 
Cruz argues that at key points “political culture itself can change at a 
surprisingly rapid pace, sometimes ahead of institutional and even 
socioeconomic restructuring” (Cruz 2005: 22). Cruz states that political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Cartensen states that PSDT and the interpretative approach offer a helpful tool-kit 
for understanding incremental ideational change. Cartensen adopts PSDT’s 
relational understanding of language to his definition of an idea. Thus ideas are 
conceived as being constituted by a web of related elements of meaning.  As Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) argue ideas are constituted by regularity of dispersion rather than 
an underlying principle external to the idea, so that different parts of the idea depend 
closely to each other (Cartensen 2009:600).  Cartensen further explains that: “we 
can speak of the relation between elements of meaning within an idea as the internal 
determinant of ideational meaning. There also exists an external determinant of 
meaning, namely the ideational environment that the idea is part of” (Cartensen 
2009: 600).  To explain the external determinates of meaning, Cartensen builds on 
Bevir’s arguments (1999) that the meaning of an idea derives neither from logic or 
experience, but rather from the other ideas it is related to. Cartensen quotes Bevir:  
If people are to accommodate a new understanding, they must hook it on to 
aspects of their existing beliefs. The content of their existing beliefs, 
moreover, will make certain hooks available to them. To find a home for a 
new belief among their old ones, they must make intelligible connections 
between it and them. The connections they can make will obviously depend 
on the nature of their old beliefs. People can integrate a new belief into their 
existing beliefs only by relating themes in the former to some already 
present in the latter ... As people alter one belief, so they almost 
necessarily have to modify the beliefs connected with it, and then the 
beliefs connected with these others, and so on (Bevir, 1999, pp. 235–6). 	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learning can occur in a compressed time period: “When discursive formations 
fall into dispute, they can cause accelerated political-cultural change.  
Political-cultural shifts can occur swiftly because actors can learn to recognize 
the broader, unintended consequences of their rhetorical politics and amend 
them accordingly” (Cruz 2005: 22-23). She concludes that the 1948 Civil War 
was “the result of political-cultural change that was fast in pace, minor in its 
alteration of normative realism, and profound in its political-institutional 
ramifications” (Cruz 2005: 42).  Cruz perceives institutional change as the 
result of political actors’ recognition of flaws in their rhetorical politics.  This 
dissertation argues that institutional change is best conceived as the result of 
gradual and incremental ideational change resulting from hegemonic battles 
fought amongst political actors. It argues that the conditions of possibility of 
the 1948 Civil War can be traced back to the dislocation of the liberal 
oligarchic hegemony after the 1930s Great Depression. This “political-cultural 
shift” (Cruz) was not fast in pace, but rather evolved gradually as the different 
discourses battled for hegemony during the 1930s and 1940s.  During this 
period, these discourses influenced each other and in the processes shaped 
the national ideational context.  
 
Taking the consensual view, Cruz assumes that the social democrats’ military 
victory guaranteed their rise to hegemony. Cruz therefore fast-forwards from 
the end of the civil war to the first Figueres administration (1953-1958). This 
dissertation also differs from Cruz’s conception of politics. Cruz adopts 
Habermas’s model of “deliberative democracy”, while this dissertation adopts 
the “adversarial model of politics” proposed by Laclau and Mouffe. We will 
now outline PSDT’s adversarial model of politics. 
 
Post Structural Discourse Theory: Radical Democracy  
In the second edition of their seminal book Hegemony and the Socialist 
Strategy, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe criticize the liberal conception of 
politics “which envisions democracy as a simple competition amongst 
interests taking place in a neutral terrain” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: xvi). They 
argue that although Habermas’ concept of deliberative democracy offers the 
most promising and sophisticated vision of progressive politics, it is based on 
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the flawed assumption that arriving to a consensus is possible if people are 
able to leave aside their particular interests and think as rational beings. They 
agree with the Habermasians on the following points: a) their criticisms of the 
aggregative model of democracy; b) their argument that political identities are 
not pre-given but constituted and reconstituted through debate in public 
spheres; c) their belief that politics does not consist in simply registering 
already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects; 
and d) their concern for widening the field of democratic struggles.  However, 
they criticize Habermas’s belief that the aim of the democratic society is the 
creation of consensus and that the elimination of conflict is possible and 
desirable. Laclau and Mouffe argue that:  
The central role that the notion of antagonism plays in our work forecloses 
any possibility of a final reconciliation, of any kind of rational consensus, of 
a fully inclusive “we”.  For us, a non-exclusive public sphere of rational 
argument is a conceptual impossibility.  Conflict and division, in our view, 
are neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated nor 
empirical impediments that render impossible the full realization of a 
harmony that we cannot attain because we will never be able to leave our 
particularities completely aside in order to act in accordance with our 
rational self – a harmony which should nonetheless constitute the ideal 
towards which we strive. Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and 
division, a pluralistic democratic politics would be impossible.  To believe 
that a final resolution of conflicts is eventually possible – even if it is seen 
as an asymptotic approach to the regulative idea of a rational consensus – 
far from providing the necessary horizon for the democratic project, is to put 
it at risk (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:xvii-xviii). 
 
As Inigo Errejon Galvan wrote in an article commemorating Laclau’s life and 
his works, Laclau’s conception of politics is best conceived not as a boxing 
match (mere clash between existing actors), or a chess game (strategic 
choices, movements and alliances between pre-existing actors with pre-
defined identities in a fixed context), but rather as a continuous Gramscian 
“war of positions” (April 13, 2014 edition of the Spanish newspaper Diario). 
Adopting Carl Schmitt’s notion of politics built around the friend-enemy 
antagonism, and re-articulating the Gramsciam concept of hegemony, Laclau 
and Mouffe view politics as the continuous hegemonic battles fought amongst 
different political actors attempting to temporarily inscribe and partially fix the 
meaning of floating signifiers within a certain discursive chain to the exclusion 
of others. Politics implies a disruption process, which challenges established 
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identities and norms (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014:4). Mouffe argues 
that one of the specificities of modern democratic societies is the following:  
A democratic society makes room for the ‘adversary’, i.e. the opponent 
who is no longer considered an enemy to be destroyed but someone 
whose existence is legitimate and whose rights will not be put into 
question. The category of the adversary serves [..] to designate the status 
of those who disagree concerning the ranking and interpretation of values. 
Adversaries will fight about the interpretation and the ranking of values, 
but their common allegiance to the values, which constitute the liberal 
democratic form of life creates a bond of solidarity which is expresses 
their belonging to a common “we”.  It must be stressed however, that the 
category of the enemy does not disappear, it now refers to those who do 
not accept the set of values constitutive of the democratic form of life [.. ] 
there is no way for their demands to be considered legitimate within the 
“we” of democratic citizens, since their disagreement is not merely about 
ranking but of a much more fundamental type (Quoted by Norval 
2000:230).   
 
Therefore, as Norval states, democratic politics is not about overcoming the 
“us/them” distinction, but about the different ways of establishing that 
distinction through the discursive creation of political frontiers. Power 
struggles cannot be eliminated from democratic systems even if the political 
actors stop perceiving each other as enemies. 
 
As Panizza and Miorelli (2012) highlight, power struggles are at the centre of 
all hegemonic battles:  
Discursive practices involve binding together heterogeneous ideational 
elements that have no necessary logical relations among themselves and 
were not previously thought of as belonging together in a relational 
ensemble. Thus, discursive practices enable actors to experience and think 
about the world in certain ways. In doing so, discourses crystallise power 
struggles and set the parameters of what is sayable and indeed thinkable in 
a given social order (Laclau, 1980). (Panizza and Miorelli 2012:5) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that it is impossible to have a world where 
hegemonic power struggles and emerging hierarchies cease to exist 
(Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014:6). They assign a special role to 
progressive intellectuals in processes of democratization due to their power of 
persuasion. According to them persuasion occurs when new elements enter 
into a given situation that cannot be accommodated by the old view. At this 
point, a new view may forcefully displace an old view by introducing a 
principle of coherence and intelligibility into the situation (interview conducted 
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by Worsham and Olson to Laclau and Mouffe 1999).  Intellectuals are 
responsible for being the vocal advocates of the new view and showing the 
contingency, incoherence and contradictions of non-democratic regimes.  
Laclau and Mouffe view “literacy” as a crucial element in any kind of 
revolutionary struggle, but do not restrict literacy to formal education. They 
state that: “literacy begins to be possible in a situation in which there is a 
proliferation of discourses opposed to oppression” (Worsham and Olson 
1999: 3).   
 
The formation of alliances and the development of a coherent political project 
are also crucial factors determining the success of a counter-hegemonic 
movement.  When criticizing the “radical Centre” strategy adopted by leftist 
political parties after the fall of communism, Laclau and Mouffe proposed an 
alternative strategy.  They state: 
If one is to build a chain of equivalences among democratic struggles, one 
needs to establish a frontier and define an adversary, but that is not 
enough.  One also needs to know for what one is fighting for, what kind of 
society one wants to establish.  This requires from the Left an adequate 
grasp of the nature of power relations, and the dynamics of politics.  What 
is at stake is the building of a new hegemony. So our motto is “Back to the 
hegemonic struggle” (Mouffe and Chantal 2000:xix). 
 
Thus, they claim that the possibility of a free society depends on the 
understanding of relations of power and creating productive alliances leading 
to new hegemonies (Worsham and Olson 1999: 3). Scholars influenced by 
PSDT have applied the concept of a counter-hegemonic bloc to interpret the 
anti neo-liberal globalization movements that have emerged over the last 15 
years: from the Zapatistas, the Seattle Protests22, to the more recent Arab 
Spring, the Spanish indignados, the Greek aganaktismenoi and the Occupy 
Wall Street movement 23 . In the introduction to the new book Radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As Alexandros Kiolipkiolis and Giorgios Katsambekis states, the Zapatista and 
Seattle Protest gave rise to theoretical debates over the import of their ideological 
and political forms (Baiocchi 2004, Day 2005, Holloway 2005, Tormey 2005, 
Robinson and Turmey 2007, Newman 2011). 
23 All of these movements shared the following characteristics: a) they appear to be 
leaderless and self-organized insurgencies of common citizens, b) their membership 
was socially and ideologically heterogeneous, c) they had no set agenda or ideology, 
d) they used new technologies and social networking.  They were committed to direct 
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Democracy and Collective movements today: Responding to the Challenge of 
Karios, Alexandros Kiolipkiolis and Giorgios Katsambekis explore the current 
debate in political theory between the horizontal multitude (non-representative 
networks of autonomous multiplicities) proposed by Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt versus the politics of hegemony proposed by Laclau and 
Mouffe.  When analysing the “re-awakening of history” with the post 2011 
global popular uprising, they conclude that: “Gramscian politics of hegemony 
and the construction of counter-hegemonic bloc are arguably more than ever 
required in order to arrest the humanitarian disaster and the existing social 
dislocation.”  Arditi (2014) and Panizza and Miorelli (2012) however warn that 
PSDT’s conflation of hegemony with politics seems to close the conceptual 
space for any other kind of politics that does not entail hegemonic practices 
and articulations.  
 
Alternative interpretation of Costa Rica’s democratization process 
applying a social constructivist approach 
Analysing Costa Rica’s democratization process allows us to appreciate both 
the impossibility and undesirability of eradicating conflict from politics, but at 
the same time the crucial importance of channelling this conflict through 
institutional means. This dissertation agrees with the consensual view that 
Costa Rica’s democratic success lies to a great extent in its solid institutional 
framework. Yet it argues that the existing literature has disregarded the 
importance of one crucial institution – the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary. This discursive institution has structured political dynamics by 
encouraging political actors to transform antagonistic relations into agonistic 
ones.  It has also encouraged political actors to create narratives interpreting 
socio-economic indicators in ways that have facilitated democratic political 
stability. The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary has also encouraged 
political actors to address emerging demands differentially, leading to the 
expansion of the state and the avoidance of populist ruptures. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
democratic participation of all in the procedures through deliberate and coordinated 
actions. 	  
	   68	  
This transformist logic has been broken only once – during the 1948 Civil 
War.  Applying a social constructivist analytical approach allows us to explore 
the discursive condition of possibility of the war and the hegemonic battles 
fought during the 1930s and 1940s. This approach encourages us to place 
these hegemonic battles within the changing national and international 
ideational context.  It allows us to appreciate that the success of the various 
political projects being proposed depended to a large extent on the public 
perception of the consistency between the particular political projects and the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary. It also allows us to explore the new 
myths developed by the intellectuals and later used by the political leaders 
and the population to structure social relations - such as the Juan Santamaria 
myth, the comunismo a la tica myth, and the National Liberation myth. This 
approach further lets us explore the role that these myths played in shaping 
Costa Rica’s democratic institutional development. In a nutshell, the social 
constructivist approach proposed by this dissertation encourages us to focus 
on the role of intellectuals/ political leaders, myths, hegemonic battles, and 
discursive strategies in analysing Costa Rica’s gradual and reformist 
democratic institutional development. 
Focusing on these factors allows us to have an alternative, but certainly not 
definitive interpretation of Costa Rica’s democratization process. This 
dissertation acknowledges that the complex and multi-dimensional process of 
democratization cannot possibly be explained by a single approach. Social 
scientists focus on building and assessing models that are forced to simplify 
a far more complex reality. Therefore, all theories inevitably direct our 
attention towards some issues while obscuring others, thus creating a 
distinctive “play of light and shadow” (Jensen 1989 from Hall 2005). This 
dissertation’s ambition is modest – it merely seeks to shed light on discursive 
factors that have remained in the shadows of the existing literature.  
Shedding light on them opens up new ways of understanding Costa Rica’s 
democratization process. 
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I have no doubt that the sons of Costa Rica, inspired by their desire to contribute to 
the well-being of our country, will once again embark with me on the task of making it 
grander and preserving it, which is our task at hand.  My fellow compatriots, 
disregard any voices that can deviate you from the path of the inalterable wise and 
healthy values of our country; show the whole world that you are capable of being 
free: foster your peaceful nature; and never, never, give a step that is not bound by 
the law. This will be, I guarantee you, the guiding principles of my administration and 
I will be its most faithful guardian. 
President Jose Rafael de Gallegos acceptance speech delivered to Congress 
San Jose, March 9th 1833. 
Chapter 2 
Costa Rica’s transition to democracy and the rise of the liberal 
oligarchic hegemony  
 
This chapter explores the Costa Rican political elite’s unique response to the 
dislocation of the colonial order during the post-independence period. While 
this dislocatory effect triggered devastating civil wars between conservatives 
and liberals throughout Latin America, Costa Ricans were able to channel the 
conflict between conservatives and liberals through democratic/institutional 
means. The fact that the battles over hegemony in Costa Rica were fought 
within the confines of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary limited the 
modes of political mobilization available for Costa Rican political leaders and 
influenced their political projects. Neither faction sought to make alliances with 
their counter-parts in the region, resulting in a situation where Costa Rica was 
able to avoid involvement in the regional wars. The conservative and liberal 
political leaders viewed it in everyone’s interest to maintain the external 
political frontier that placed Central Americans as the “constitutive outside” of 
their political order. This strong external political frontier weakened internal 
differences and encouraged the emergence of a transformist political project. 
 
Using discourses applying the logic of difference to integrate the demands of 
the conservative elites, the liberal intellectuals belonging to the Tertulias 
Patrioticas succeeded in forming a stable hegemonic order. As was common 
in the region during the post-independence period due to the influence of 
liberal ideas, the members of the Tertulias Patrioticas assumed that politics 
was the exclusive domain of the educated elites.  Yet unlike the rest of 
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Central America, the Costa Rican political leaders understood the importance 
of addressing the needs of the Costa Rican population in order to guarantee 
the country’s political stability.  
 
During the 1870s a counter-hegemonic movement led by Tomas Guardia, a 
member of the Grupo del Olimpo, sought to end the domination of the coffee 
oligarchs on Costa Rican politics and strengthen the Costa Rican state. 
Without challenging the socio-economic power of the coffee elites, they 
sought to expand the liberal hegemonic order by integrating the masses into 
Costa Rica’s political system. In order to transform the illiterate masses into 
“responsible” citizens with “appropriate” democratic values (Ferraz 1889), the 
Grupo del Olimpo started an educational reform program and created a new 
myth of national unity - the Juan Santamaria myth.  This myth combined 
elements of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary with elements of 
liberalism.  Both conservatives and liberal leaders adopted this unifying myth 
as they appreciated the structuring effect that it had vis-à-vis the masses. 
Costa Rica’s transition to democracy was facilitated by the continuous 
expansion of the liberal oligarchic hegemony. 
 
This chapter argues that one of the key factors explaining why Costa Rica 
followed a drastically divergent path relative to its neighbours was due to 
differences in the predominant logics of articulation during the post-
independence period. It contrasts the discourses used by the Olympians 
during the Tomas Guardia dictatorship (1870-1881), which applied the logic of 
difference, with those used by the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan liberals under 
the Guatemalan Rufino Barrios dictatorship (1873-1885) and the Nicaraguan 
Jose Zelaya dictatorship (1893-1909), which applied the logic of equivalence.  
It also illustrates the process by which the Olympians sought to transform the 
masses into citizens by analysing excerpts from the liberal newspapers 
Boletin Oficial (April – May 1856) and El Ciudadano (1880-1883). To illustrate 
how the conservatives also adopted discourses using the logic of difference, it 
selects excerpts from the conservative newspaper 7 de Noviembre (1889).  
Other primary data analysed includes the following: a book written by the 
Juan Ferraz in 1889 entitled Librito de los Deberes; a book written by the 
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Nicaraguan liberals published in 1906 entitled Jose Santos Zelaya President 
of Nicaragua; a book written by member of the opposition to Guatemala’s 
dictatorship Alvaro Contreras A los Pueblos de Centro America published 
August 1, 1879; and a book written in 1889 by the Swiss scholar Paul Biolley 
– Costa Rica and her Future. 
 
Dislocation of the Colonial Order 
The news of independence came as a shock to all Costa Ricans. On the 12th 
of October, Juan Manuel de Cañas, the subaltern political head of the Costa 
Rican province, received three letters: 1) a copy of the Acta de Guatemala of 
15 September 1821; 2) a copy of the Bando de Leon of the 28 of September 
of 1821; and 3) a letter by the Jefe Politico Superior of Guatemala giving his 
views on the events that transpired.  These letters gave the Costa Ricans 
three choices: they could form part of the Mexican Empire, form a new Central 
American entity under Guatemala or stay subordinated to Nicaragua.  On 
October 13th, 1821 de Cañas invited the members of the cabildo de Cartago 
and other important functionaries to Cartago, the capital of the province, to 
decide how to respond to these letters. Despite the desire of all Costa Rican 
elites to have greater autonomy, they realized they could not become a viable 
nation due to their small dimensions, low population (approximately 50,000 
people), economic weakness, and the risk of being invaded by other nations 
(Acuña Ortega: 67). Juan Manuel de Cañas tried to diffuse the rising tension 
amongst the conservative factions prevalent in Cartago, and the liberal 
factions prevalent in San Jose, Heredia and Alajuela. The meeting was 
disbanded when a conservative political representative from Cartago, Osejo, 
argued that this body did not have the right to agree on anything because the 
representatives had not been elected and not every major city of the province 
of Costa Rica was represented. Other participants agreed and the meeting 
came to a close.  Juan Manuel de Cañas was asked to visit the remaining 
mayors in the cities of the province that had not been invited to the meeting to 
ask them their views.  San Jose and Heredia were in favour of staying aligned 
to Leon. In the meanwhile, the leaders in Cartago were discussing the 
potential conflict that could emerge between Guatemala and Nicaragua.  They 
decided that the wisest thing would be for Costa Rica to remain neutral and 
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pressed other cities to annul the vote altogether.  The leaders in San Jose 
agreed with those in Cartago and Alajuela while those in Heredia decided to 
retain their support for the Diputacion of Leon.  The political elite in San Jose 
suggested another meeting with representatives of all the cities and towns to 
discuss the topic further.  Initially, the representatives of Heredia stated that 
they would not send any delegates to this meeting as they stressed that they 
would not change their mind on maintaining their support for Leon.  After 
much insistence from other representatives, the political elite of Heredia 
agreed to send a representative stressing that they would do so only to 
demonstrate their “patriotism” and “their brotherly union” with the rest of the 
province  (Acuña Ortega 1995).  It is interesting to note the dynamics used by 
the Costa Rican elites to settle their differences.  Everyone agreed that the 
decision had to be taken through institutional “democratic” means. The 
discourses used by the different factions retained external political frontiers, 
placing them either in Guatemala or in Nicaragua depending on their position, 
which in turn were influenced by the economic ties that these elites had 
established with Guatemalan or Nicaraguan elites during the colonial period.  
Neither one placed the political frontier inside the Costa Rican province.  
 
On November 12, 1821, the meeting of La Junta de Legados Denominada de 
los Pueblos was held in Cartago.  The representatives were called legados 
and not diputados as Costa Rican political elites had decided not to create a 
new Constitution but rather to make amendments to the Cadiz Constitution of 
1812 (Calderon Hernandez 2003: 216). The name used for the 
representatives was considered important because it signalled the elite’s 
desire to maintain continuity with the colonial past, thus maintaining a sense 
of stability. During this meeting, the Junta accepted the renunciation of de 
Cañas who chose to abdicate his position freely as there were rumours that 
de Cañas would be deposed since he had been appointed by the Spanish 
Crown and not elected by Costa Rican representatives. The fact that de 
Cañas did not try to impose himself as a new dictator or was not used as a 
puppet by the elites to promote their interests reflects the influence of the 
transformist logic of articulation.  Juan Manuel de Cañas and the rest of the 
elites knew that they could not mobilize significant sectors of society to 
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support a dictatorial imposition perceived as going against the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary.  
 
The influence of the logic of difference on the discourse used by the political 
leaders is clearly visible in the document produced during the La Junta de 
Legados Denominada de los Pueblos meeting which they called the “Pacto de 
la Concordia” (The Pact of Harmony). The delegates agreed that this Pact 
would serve as “the base of conciliation amongst all the people of the Costa 
Rican province during the period in which the provisional government would 
rule” until the fate of the province was settled (Calderon Hernandez 2003: 
216). The preamble of the document stated:  
Upon swearing absolute Independence from the Spanish Government, the 
people were free to form a new government. This province, wanting to stay 
free, united, safe and quite, has formed a covenant of union and concord, 
while a supreme constitutional government is formed (with the other Central 
American nations) (quoted by Calderon Hernandez 2003: 216).  
 
As this excerpt states, the priorities of the Costa Rican political leaders were 
to remain “united, secure, and in peace”.  To this end, a Junta Superior 
Gubernativa composed of 7 elected permanent members and 2 substitutes 
was formed. It was agreed that elections would be held every six months to 
renew half of the Junta.  Every three months elections would be held to 
confirm if the president could stay in power (Calderon Hernandez 2003:217). 
To avoid conflict amongst the political actors of the four major cities San Jose, 
Cartago, Heredia and Alajuela over which city would become the capital, the 
Junta Superior Gubernativa decided to rotate the capital every three months 
amongst these cities. This shows the degree of consensus amongst the Costa 
Rican elites that internal conflict had to be avoided at all cost. As Cruz states 
this is one of the first examples of a transaccion (bargaining to arbitrate 
conflicts among competing claimants) in Costa Rica’s history (Cruz 2005:88). 
The Pact of Harmony encouraged the political elite to remain united to avoid 
civil unrest:  
Countrymen, if you remain united in your opinions, you shall observe from 
the tranquillity of your homes the disastrous picture of anarchy that 
unfortunately becomes visible in many provinces of this continent.  (We 
must) remain attentive to the cruel circumstances of other countries so that 
we may perfect the political wisdom that brings us honour (quoted by Cruz 
2005:88).  
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The writers of the Pact of Harmony placed the external political frontier 
outside the Costa Rican province (in other Central American countries) in 
order to diffuse internal tension amongst the Costa Rican political leaders. 
This political frontier sought to delimit the types of actions that could be 
considered appropriate and legitimate in Costa Rica.  It created subject 
positions by stating that the Costa Rican elites had to “subordinate 
themselves to the authority of the ruling government” because failing to do so 
would lead the Costa Rican province down the “Central American path” of 
anarchy and violence.  The writers of the Pact of Harmony argued that in 
order to “perfect the political wisdom that brings us honour” (quoted by Cruz 
2005:88), Costa Ricans had to retain internal unity.  
 
Meanwhile, from Mexico the Emperor Iturbide sought to annex the Central 
American region. On 1823, the Guatemalan elites decided to join the Mexican 
Empire but the Salvadoreans did not. Iturbide’s forces defeated the 
Salvadorean forces and Salvador was annexed by force.  The Costa Rican 
political elites had not reached a consensus on whether to join the Mexican 
Empire.  The elites in Cartago and Heredia argued in favour of joining Mexico 
in order to avoid an invasion and certain defeat by the Mexican armies as had 
happened to El Salvador, while the elites in San Jose and Alajuela argued 
that it was more prudent to wait and see how circumstances evolved. 
However, the elites in Cartago under the leadership of Joaquin Oreamuno of 
the Partido Anexionista, declared a proposed date for Costa Rica’s 
annexation by Mexico.  The fact that Oreamuno acted without the consensus 
of the rest of the provinces made the San Jose political elite furious. During a 
Cabildo Abierto held in San Jose, Jose Gregorio Ramirez was named General 
Commander and was asked to organize an army to fight against Oreamuno’s 
followers in Cartago.  On 5th April 1823, in the Alto de Ochomogo, the forces 
of San Jose under the leadership of Jose Gregorio Ramirez defeated those of 
Cartago due to major desertions of the Oreamuno forces. It is interesting to 
note that the rationale for going to war was because Oreamuno acted without 
the consensus of the rest of the province, not because he posed an 
“existential” threat to the nation.  Other Central American political leaders 
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mobilized the masses to fight their opponents (conservatives versus liberals) 
by portraying them as enemies posing an “existential threat” to the nation. 
Another interesting thing to note is that the first Costa Rican civil war lasted 
only three and a half hours precisely because the cause was not considered 
sufficiently grave by the combatants to justify risking their lives.   
 
The San Jose political elite also reacted differently to their victory.  In other 
Central American countries, the military victors would become dictators - 
instead, Jose Gregorio Ramirez convoked an extraordinary session of 
Congress.  He explicitly stated that no one who had fought in the Battle of 
Ochomogo should be present as their participation in the battle prevented 
them from being in the right state of mind to negotiate (Acuña 1995). 
Therefore, Ramirez was making a clear separation between war and 
administration: people who participate in wars should not be take part in the 
task of administration. This was a profound contrast to the rest of the region, 
where a military victory legitimatized the right to rule of the victorious faction, 
in part because the leadership skills required in combat were perceived as 
desirable skills for political leaders. In essence, they perceived political 
administrations as a continuation of the revolutions against their conservative 
or liberal enemies. Thus the logic of articulation used in the battlefield also 
informed their administrative policy choices.  
  
In the meanwhile, opposition to Emperor Iturbide’s rule had grown amongst 
former members of the Mexican Congress, Mexican military leaders who had 
not been adequately paid, and Mexican Republican intellectuals.  An 
opposition coalition led by General Santa Ana defeated Iturbide’s forces, 
leading to his surrender and the Mexican Empire’s collapse. Since Costa 
Ricans believed they could not remain independent due to the province’s 
small size and poor economic situation, they agreed to join the Central 
American Federal Republic founded in 1823 with its capital in Guatemala. 
Internal strife developed between Central American liberals and the 
conservatives reflecting tensions between the centralists and the local 
nationalists (Hayes 2006: 39).  In 1824 civil war broke out in Nicaragua.  With 
the intensification of the war, Guanacaste asked to be annexed by Costa 
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Rica.24 By 1828, the internal fighting amongst all Central American leaders led 
to the disintegration of the Central American federation.  
 
The Tertulias Patrioticas intellectuals 
Immediately before the disintegration of the Central American Federation, a 
group of Costa Rican liberal intellectuals formed a group called the Tertulias 
Patrioticas. These intellectuals were heavily influenced by masonic ideas.  
They viewed the United States founding fathers as their role models and set 
up a presidential system based on the United States model.  The first 
president of the Tertulia Patriotica was Juan Mora Fernandez, who became 
the first president of Costa Rica in 1823, ruling until 1833. He was a lawyer by 
profession and established the foundation for a sound judicial system with a 
Supreme Court, expanded public education, brought the first printing press to 
the country, and founded its first newspaper to spread the group’s liberal 
views.    
 
Other members of the Tertulias Patrioticas included Mariano Montealegre, 
one of the most influential political figures in Costa Rica’s independence 
period and the priests Manuel Alvarado, Felix Bonilla and Camilo de Mora.  
The members of the Tertulias Patrioticas wanted to preserve good relations 
with the Catholic Church in order to maintain stability. They sought to combine 
elements of the Catholic discourse with elements of the liberal discourse in 
order to integrate the masses and the conservatives into their emerging 
hegemonic regime. The Costa Rican political leaders continued to rely on the 
Catholic Church to act as intermediaries between government authorities and 
the masses as they had done during the colonial period and left the Church in 
charge of health care and education until 1884.  
 
The post-independence liberal political elite knew the Catholic Church could 
play a vital role in maintaining social cohesion and containing rising tensions – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Guanacaste is an interesting region because it shows how people with Nicaraguan 
heritage and socio-economic structures acted in politically distinct way once they 
were integrated into Costa Rican society through the “exceptional” collective 
imaginary. 
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a role it played with some success. This is seen in a letter sent to all priests by 
Jose Joaquin de Alvarado the Costa Rican ecclesiastic vicar dated the 7th of 
February 1835: 
Peace is the serenity of the mind, the simplicity of the heart and the bond 
of love; without it there is no stillness nor order in families or in peoples, 
without it the whole edifice of society is ruined and destroyed; with it 
comes all good […] Therefore, I charge you and strongly pray that in your 
exhortations to the people, and in your family or in your private 
conversations, you highlight the enormous benefits brought to our state, if 
we succeed in establishing a solid and perpetual peace. Also remind them 
that the Authorities have been decreed by God to procure all possible 
goodness both temporal and spiritual […] (ACM Box N 67 sf)) 
 
The Costa Rican Catholic Church’s discourse also incorporated elements of 
meaning derived from the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary to encourage 
the maintenance of peace, tranquillity and unity. The Church’s discourse 
reinforced the subject positions used during the colonial order in which the 
masses had to be submissive and obedient to the authorities, while the 
authorities had to address their basic needs.  The liberals did not want to 
change those subject positions. The Church’s discourse argued that by 
retaining internal peace and stability all citizens would help the state to fulfil its 
duty to the people, portraying social harmony and peace as a precondition for 
progress. They added “Peace” to the Liberal Latin American slogan “Order 
and Progress”.  Their slogan “Peace, Order and Progress” reinforced their 
message that peace was a pre-requisite for order and progress.  
 
All of this led to an interesting dynamic emerging in Costa Rica. During the 
moments of greatest civil conflict in the region, the Costa Rican political elites 
pursued reformist policies to preserve their internal peace.  They argued that 
social harmony could be guaranteed by providing property ownership to the 
greatest number of people and that Costa Rica’s exceptionalism was derived 
from this more egalitarian distribution of land and from peoples’ resulting 
respect for private property.  
 
During the immediate post-independence period, Costa Rica’s economy was 
based on subsistence farming in nuclear settlements and small trading 
networks based on the domestic consumer market for imported textiles, the 
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exportation of cacao, livestock, silver and some tobacco to Panama and 
Nicaragua, and through the trade of food and handicrafts in the daily local 
market (Mahoney 2001:83). The Costa Rican liberals created a coffee-based 
agro-export development model maintaining small and medium sized farms 
as opposed to creating large latifundia. Public land policies were passed 
which granted homesteading rights and confirmed ownership based solely on 
peaceful occupation of unclaimed land for ten years or more (Gudmundson 
1989: 229).  In 1825 the national government removed the tithe on coffee and 
other potential export crops. In 1828 it awarded up to 110 acres of extra land 
to growers who managed to establish permanent crops on underutilized 
lands. In 1832 it passed legislation offering direct subsidies for successful 
coffee growers (Mahoney 2001: 144). Within the central coffee districts of 
Costa Rica, smallholding was the overwhelmingly predominant form of 
landownership between the mid-19th century and the early 20th century 
(Gudmundson 1989:231). While the small and medium sized property holders 
benefitted from coffee expansion, the indigenous communities of the Central 
Valley suffered from the privatization of communal lands and were forced to 
move to the wilderness (towards Talamanca). By the time Braulio Carrillo 
became president in 1835, coffee production and exports became the engine 
of economic growth. The insertion of Costa Rica into the global capitalist 
market through coffee exports generated sufficient resources to finance the 
expansion of Costa Rica’s state apparatus (Taracena, 1995: 56), a symbol of 
which was Carrillo creating a new currency by modifying the existing Central 
American coins. 
 
In the process of state formation, Carrillo had to deal with two forces suffering 
negative consequences from the emergence of a stronger national state: the 
Costa Rican Catholic Church and the local governments known as 
ayuntamientos. Carrillo maintained the conciliatory approach towards the 
Church.  He supported the Costa Rican Catholic Church’s successful plea to 
the Vatican for them to be able to form their own ecclesiastic government in 
Costa Rica, granting them functional independence from the Nicaraguan 
Church.  
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Carrillo centralized power in a strong state. He repealed the legislation that 
had allowed for the rotation of the capital between San Jose, Cartago, 
Heredia and Alajuela as had been agreed under the Pact of Harmony.  Upon 
receiving this news, a group of political leaders from Heredia, Cartago, and 
Alajuela formed a “League” to attack San Jose, but were easily defeated. 
Carrillo’s opponents could not mobilize significant sectors of Costa Rican 
society, therefore, the civil conflict did not last long and the liberals 
consolidated their power in San Jose (Mahoney 2001:81).   
 
The insertion of Costa Rica into the capitalist system through a single product 
– coffee - made them vulnerable to changing coffee prices and international 
crisis. By 1840, coffee represented roughly 80% of all exports from Costa 
Rica (Mahoney 2001: 147). When coffee prices dropped in 1847-49, many 
small property owners were forced to sell their land to pay off the debts they 
had incurred to finance the planting season, becoming wage labourers. The 
proportion of agricultural wage labourer in the economically active population 
rose from 25% in 1864 to 36% in 1892 reaching 40% in 1927 (Molina and 
Palmer 2009:65).  
 
Rise to hegemony of the liberal oligarchic discourse 
During this period, the liberal political leaders used the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary to de-politicize the masses. Placing liberalism as the new 
nodal point of their discursive formation, the liberals re-articulated the floating 
signifiers poverty, equality and democracy.  They argued that Costa Rica’s 
generalized poverty during the colonial period had led to the emergence of an 
egalitarian, peaceful and democratic society in Costa Rica.  Therefore, 
generalized poverty was framed as a unifying and positive concept (Jimenez 
Matarrita 2008).  The solution to this generalized poverty (underdevelopment) 
was the promotion of agro-export development model based on the product in 
which Costa Rica had the greatest competitive advantage - coffee. Liberals 
argued that once the country became fully integrated into the international 
capitalist system, Costa Rica would be lifted out of its state of generalized 
poverty, automatically making everyone better off. Thus the role of the state 
was to promote the coffee industry, build the infrastructure necessary for the 
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import/export businesses, promote education, and establish the rule of law 
necessary for the proper working of the capitalist system.  Another necessary 
ingredient was the attraction of foreign capital and investors to build the 
needed physical infrastructure and provide the expertise to promote the 
import/export sector.  Good levels of health and sanitation were also 
perceived as necessary factors for attracting foreign investors.  Both liberals 
and conservative political leaders held the dominant liberal economic view 
and gave priority to these factors.  
 
While the notion of generalized poverty created the image of Costa Rica as a 
classless egalitarian society, the notion of ethnic homogeneity sought to 
reduce racial tension. The liberal discourse downplayed racial divisions, 
arguing that all Costa Ricans were white - neglecting the fact that there was a 
significant portion of blacks, mulattos and indigenous people. They sought to 
prevent racial tension by encouraging everyone to identify themselves first as 
Costa Ricans and only secondarily in racial, class-based, or regional based 
terms stressing the Costa Rican “us” versus the Central American “other”. 
This discourse had an impact on the interaction between the elite and the 
masses as both the elites and the masses had to play within the rules defined 
by the liberal oligarchic discourse.  The Costa Rican political leaders used the 
existing notions of interdependence and egalitarianism to create equivalential 
chains between the demands of the masses and the demands of the elites, 
arguing that they all shared a common objective – to avoid falling into the 
cycles of violence prevalent in the rest of the region. They argued that since 
Costa Rica was an ethnically homogenous and socially egalitarian society, all 
demands were equally important. The political leaders created ad hoc state 
institutions to address particularistic demands differentially – thus preventing 
potential populist ruptures. 
 
As Costa Rican society became more diversified, the Costa Rican state 
organized certain workers and professions to regulate key trades and protect 
wider societal interests (Booth 1999:432). Between 1830 and 1865, the Costa 
Rican state created mandatory guilds of miners, drovers, port and 
dockworkers, and boatmen. The government also chartered guilds for medical 
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practitioners and lawyers in 1850s. During periods in which the economy 
suffered from drops in coffee prices, mutual aid societies proliferated. The 
Costa Rican municipal governments sought to address demands as they 
arose and also settled disputes between rural workers and their employers. 
The workers perceived the municipal government as fair intermediaries as 
they were able to obtain their demands more often than not.  
  
Meanwhile, the Costa Rican elites continued to consolidate their economic 
power by controlling the commercial aspects of coffee production – i.e. 
financing, processing, and marketing. During this period, Costa Rican coffee 
barons dominated politics, largely excluding the general public. The lack of 
active political participation amongst the masses was as common as it was in 
the rest of the region. Throughout much of the 19th Century, literacy and 
property ownership requirements as well as the exclusion of women barred all 
but 10% of the population from voting.  Most elections were indirect. Those 
eligible voted in the first round of elections to choose electors (usually from 
the coffee aristocracy), who in turn would choose officeholders.  Liberal and 
conservative factions struggled for power, often manipulating electoral results 
or conducting coups.  From 1824 to 1899, the average Costa Rican 
presidency lasted only 2.4 years and 37% of the presidents resigned before 
completing their terms, with one fifth deposed by coup d’état.  However, 
despite this turnover, there were no civil wars or broader instability in the 
regime.  
 
The fact that conservative and liberal factions plotted coups against each 
other shows the limits of theories that explain Costa Rica’s exceptionalism 
based on a democratic political culture and Habermas’s models of consensual 
politics.  Conflict and power struggles were as central to Costa Rican politics 
as they are in any liberal democratic political system. What made Costa Rica 
exceptional was that these political struggles did not escalate into civil wars as 
they did in the rest of the region because neither faction could mobilize 
different sectors of society outside of the elite.  Respecting the external 
political frontiers, neither faction portrayed their opponents as an “existential” 
threat to gather support from specific sectors of the population. Both liberal 
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and conservative political leaders appreciated the strong power that the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary had on structuring social relations 
between classes in a way that de-politicized them.  This guaranteed the 
conservative and liberal elites a privileged position in society without having to 
resort to the coercive measures used in the rest of the region. They thus 
conducted their power struggles without mobilizing the masses.  In turn, the 
masses were left at the margins of politics – mostly oblivious to the details of 
the power struggles between the conservatives and the liberals. 
 
A member of the military, General Tomas Guardia, wanted to put an end to 
the conservative and liberal power struggles and create a counter-hegemonic 
movement that would integrate the masses into the political system. To this 
end, Tomas Guardia agreed to join the liberal plotters of the 1870 Coup.  
 
Factors leading to the 1870 Coup  
During the 1860s, the main political cleavage was between the Montealegre 
clan led by liberals educated in the United Kingdom and with coffee based 
commercial interests in San Jose, and the conservative faction led by the 
Iglesias and the Tinoco clans who had been educated in Guatemala and were 
landowners based in Cartago. The Church sided with Tinoco clan as did some 
newly emerging commercialists, lawyers and young intellectuals. The two 
main leaders of the conservative faction were Julio Volio and Francisco Maria 
Iglesia, both nephews of the Costa Rican Catholic Church bishop Anselmo 
Llorente. The Montealegristas and the Tinoquistas disagreed over the role of 
the Church in public education, the types of infrastructure projects that were 
necessary and the location of these projects, the elimination of certain 
monopolies, decentralization of power to the municipalities, and the imposition 
of controls over the budget.  By the 1860s, the liberals started to see the 
necessity of a profound educational reform to spread liberal values amongst 
the masses throughout the country. Although liberals wanted to retain cordial 
relations with the Catholic Church, they wanted to eliminate their monopoly on 
public education, leading to a natural point of conflict. 
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In 1868 the conservative candidate Jesus Jimenez became president for the 
second time.  Tensions between the conservatives from Cartago and liberal 
factions from San Jose were mounting.  According to the liberal factions, the 
policies passed by Jimenez favoured the Cartago elite.  One of the most 
important policies was Jimenez’s decision to build a costly road connecting 
San Jose to the port in Limon instead of the port in Puntarenas.  The road to 
Limon would pass through Cartago and would benefit the coffee business of 
the Cartago based families (Molina 1994). Costa Rica did not have the means 
to build another road to Puntarenas.  Rumours were spreading of a potential 
coup. The 21st of May 1869, Jimenez handed his resignation to Congress 
stating that he could not govern under those circumstances. As Jimenez had 
planned, the Jimenista-controlled Congress rejected his resignation.  Jimenez 
then declared that in order to stop the instability caused by the liberals he had 
to suspend the constitutional order and exile the people disturbing the peace - 
Joaquin Fernandez Oreamuno, Bruno Carranza, Leon Fernandez, Juan Felix, 
Francisco Maria Iglesia and the Generals Maximo Blanco and Salazar.  Two 
of his three secretaries of state resigned – the third was the president’s own 
brother Agapito.  When Francisco Montealegre and other opponents of 
Jimenez heard that Eusebio Figueroa, Minster of War, Justice and 
Gobernacion and Fomento had resigned, they set up a meeting to plan a 
coup.  According to the memoirs of Tomas Guardia’s brother, Victor Guardia, 
the conspirators included: a) relatives of those exiled by Jimenez; b) members 
of the San Jose based liberal elite who viewed Jimenez’s policies as hurting 
their economic interests; c) congressmen opposed to Jimenez’s authoritarian 
actions; and d) military officials who objected Jimenez’s removal of General 
Blanco and Salazar. Their removal triggered the purging of officials from San 
Jose and their replacement with officials from Cartago (Molina 1994). 
Amongst the military officials were General Tomas Guardia and General 
Prospero Fernandez. Their plan consisted in taking control of the military 
barracks in San Jose, Heredia, Cartago and Alajuela and then demanding 
Jimenez to step down. 
 
On April 27th 1870, General Tomas Guardia, General Prospero Fernandez, 
and a group of other men attacked the main military barrack in San Jose 
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where most of the ammunition was stored. Minutes after the troops stormed 
into the Cuartel de Artilleria, General Alejo Biscoubi was killed. Without their 
commanding leader, the rest of the soldiers surrendered (Molina 1994) . Once 
in control of the Cuartel de Artilleria and most of the ammunition, Tomas 
Guardia demanded the surrender of the other military barracks. Further 
confrontations in Heredia, Alajuela and Cartago were avoided due to the 
mediation of relatives of the parties involved and the diplomatic skills of the 
French and Spanish ambassadors (Botey 2003: 286). Jimenez was forced to 
step down.   
 
Under the leadership of Tomas Guardia, the military decided not to hand over 
power to Francisco Montealegre Fernandez as originally planned. Both 
Tomas Guardia and General Prospero Fernandez belonged to the group of 
intellectuals known as the Grupo del Olimpo who wanted to end the coffee 
barons’ dominion over Costa Rican politics, strengthen the Costa Rican state 
and start a “Liberal Revolution”. Without the backing of any faction of the 
military, Francisco Montealegre was forced to accept.  On the 28th of April, the 
military set up a provisional government and designated Bruno Carranza as 
the interim president. On August 8th 1870, Bruno Carranza stepped down and 
Tomas Guardia became president.  Bruno Carranza argued that the top 
priority of his interim presidency had been to re-establish national cohesion in 
order to instate a new constitutional order as quickly as possible as desired by 
the Costa Rican population: 
The decree of April 28 [1870] was the first major act made while the noise 
of the weapons was still being heard […] In it the fundamental rights of the 
citizens were recognized and it placed a limit on the absolute power 
delegated to me […] From the day the decree was passed, to this day, in 
just over one hundred days, the actions of the dictatorial power have been 
limited to sustaining public order, and to pursue the Constitutional 
reorganization of the country, fulfilling the mandates of the people 
expressed in popular acts, which constitute for us a real plebiscite 
(Message to Congress by Bruno Carranza on delivered on August 8, 1870).  
The Olympians argued that their revolution was fought to defend Costa Rica’s 
civil liberties trampled over by Jimenez. Using a discourse applying the logic 
of difference, they framed their “Liberal Revolution” as a defence of Costa 
Rica’s democratic institutional framework and its rule of law, as opposed to a 
	   85	  
coup against Jimenez. According to them, their immediate priority was to 
reinstate the civil dimension of liberalism (individual liberties, freedom of 
speech, and the right to justice) present in Costa Rica since the post-
independence period but weakened by the coffee barons during their power 
struggles. They stated that their next aim was to foster the political dimension 
of liberalism (expanding political participation and the freedom to advocate 
political alternatives as well as creating strong political parties).  However, for 
the political dimension of liberalism to come about, it was first necessary to 
pass further liberal reforms. To do this it was necessary to constrain the 
power of the liberal and conservative elites. 
 
The absence of relations of antagonism in the discourse used by the liberal 
revolutionaries can be seen in the following message delivered by Bruno 
Carranza to the Constitutional Assembly on August 8th, 1870: 
And I am pleased to say that neither exile nor prison, nor persecution have 
been means employed by our Cabinet for the preservation of public order.  
The loyal and prudent conduct of the army, the good sense of Costa 
Ricans, and a set of moderate policies that prevented the population from 
feeling the full scope of power that the revolution had invested in the 
revolutionary government, have served to guarantee that this government 
has fully respected the purest Republican values (Message to the 
Constitutional Assembly delivered by Bruno Carranza on August 8, 1870).  
Carranza wanted to highlight to all congressmen that the Olympians had not 
exiled, imprisoned or persecuted their opponents. He argued that “loyal and 
prudent conduct of the military”, the “good sense of the Costa Ricans” and 
his moderate policies allowed him to maintain Republican order without 
coercive measures.  Through this discourse alluding to the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary, Carraza sought to diffuse tensions and re-establish a 
sense of stability and internal harmony.  
The Olympians used two discursive strategies simultaneously.  On the one 
hand, they wanted to re-establish a sense of stability and internal harmony to 
avoid a counter-revolution.  On the other, they wanted to create a crisis 
narrative (Hay 2001) to justify their Liberal Revolution and their desired 
paradigm shift.  We will now discuss this other strategy. 
The framing of the 1870 Coup d’état as a dislocatory event  
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On March 27th 1870, Tomas Guardia issued the following Manifesto to justify 
the coup:  
We are in insurrection.  But the government we are fighting against is one 
based on usurpation and arbitrariness under the guise of legality. 
Insurrection in this case is the fulfilment of a duty, the military exercise of 
a supreme law.  Fellow citizens!  The people have been oppressed in their 
freedom and coerced in their public consciousness.  We must restore 
popular sovereignty and the rule of law (Presidential Message delivered 
by Tomas Guardia to Congress on March 27, 1870).  
 
Rather than presenting the revolt as a coup against the conservative 
president Jimenez by a liberal elite faction (as it had been originally), Guardia 
framed it as a revolt against a form of government, which had allowed political 
leaders to consistently violate the civil liberties of its citizens. The crisis Costa 
Rica faced was deeper than simply the authoritarian presidency of Jimenez - 
the fact that Jimenez was able to commit these transgressions was due to 
weakness in the existing political order, which allowed the elite to exert 
excessive influence over the state. He reiterated this crisis narrative in 1872: 
The political situation was therefore distressing as evident by the great 
ease with which revolutions could be implemented, causing the 
institutions to be impaired due to the disregard of the rule of law, to 
progress and to the prestige that should surrounded public authority. Due 
to this bad situation, uncontrolled selfish interests led to frequent political 
and social upheavals.  The people […] whose education, improvement 
and prosperity should be the object of the legislator, the judge and the 
powerful, had become the victim of abandonment by some and of greed 
by others. […] It was then that the nation had reached the limit of its 
development. […] Growth was paralyzed, fertile land and qualified labour 
needed for industries, transportation facilities, everything was scarce; and 
this shortage, whose supply was difficult to provide, produced general 
unease.  This discomfort brought mistrust, insecurity and posed a threat to 
the peace and stability of our institutions. The country in general began to 
decline noticeably (Presidential Message delivered by Tomas Guardia to 
Congress on May 1, 1872).  
The crisis narrative developed by the Olympians argued that the 1870 coup 
was necessary to re-direct Costa Rica into its exceptional democratic 
institutional path. The weakness of the Costa Rican state had allowed the 
conservative and liberal coffee barons to promote their selfish economic 
interests at the expense of the masses. Guardia did not portray the masses 
as “oppressed” but as “abandoned”. He stated that the conservative and 
liberal elites were neglecting the valid demands of the masses for improving 
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the quality of their education and creating more economic prosperity. This 
situation was putting at risk Costa Rica’s internal peace, the stability of its 
institutions, and its economic development.  Under these circumstances, 
Tomas Guardia and the Olympians argued that it was necessary for them to 
retain power after the 1870 coup. 
  
Guardia, in his first message to Congress on May 1870, framed the 27th of 
April 1870 coup as a unifying event by symbolically linking the coup to the 
“exceptionalist” collective identity: 
 
Costa Rica has a homogenous population, consisting of owners in major or 
minor scales.  Here we do not have those clashing interests that in other 
countries produce political and social upheavals.  The principles proclaimed 
on April 27, 1870 reflect the general true interest of all, because they are 
geared towards the welfare of all, eliminating the privilege of the few, the 
closed circles of power, and factionalism. (Presidential Message delivered 
by Tomas Guardia to the Congressional Assembly on April 27, 1870).  
 
By alluding to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, which portrayed Costa 
Ricans as a homogenous society with no clashing interests, Guardia was 
seeking to de-radicalize his opponents and incorporate the excluded sectors 
of society into a new political order. By “describing” Costa Rica as a 
homogenous, classless society without inherent tensions, he was seeking to 
remove possible cleavages that could be used to mobilize the population 
against his rule. He then contrasted Costa Rica with the rest of the region 
stating that Costa Rica’s unique situation made it immune to the disruptions 
present in the rest of the region. The reference to Central America served as 
a reminder of what could happen if Costa Ricans fought against his 
dictatorship. Guardia’s discursive strategy differed significantly from that 
adopted by the liberal dictators Zelaya in Nicaragua and Barrios in Guatemala 
who discursively exacerbated ethnic divisions and class conflict in order to 
mobilize sectors of society in support of their oppressive dictatorships.   
 
The Olympians argued that their Liberal Revolution would lead Costa Rica 
towards a “real democracy”.  On October 28, 1870 an article entitled “The 
Enlightenment: Our Ideas” in the newspaper El Comercio described the pre-
1870 dominion of the coffee oligarchs using the following language: 
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A closed political circle large or small is nothing other than the obvious 
denial of the inevitable social consensus in a modern democracy.  The 
interests of a circle can never be those born out of a true democracy 
based on social consensus (El Comercio – October 28, 1870). 
 
It is interesting to note that, although the Olympians argued that the elites’ 
domination of Costa Rican politics was an impediment to “real democracy”, 
the language they used did not portray them as a class posing an “existential 
threat” to the rest of society.  The Olympians also warned against 
misinterpreting this as an attack on representative forms of democracy. 
 
The problem is not that a few carry the voice of the many.  They are 
always a few who govern the peoples of the world: France, Italy, England 
and America.  But there is a huge difference if those few serve fraternally 
the interests of everyone or if they serve solely and exclusively their 
personal interests.  Such a procedure is to put oneself at war with society.  
The evil is not that a man seeks personal advantage.  The good citizen, 
the true Republican, the sincere democrat seeks his own good 
considering the social progress, creating harmony between his interests 
and the prosperity, honour and glory of his country (El Comercio – 
October 28, 1870).  
 
The Olympians argued that the problem rested with the way that these elites 
in particular and the Costa Rican population in general had been 
conceptualizing their interests. “Sincere democrats” and “true republicans” 
should perceive their interests as being in harmony with those of the nation.  
The Olympians wanted to re-define the Costa Rican’s conception of self-
interests.  They also wanted to create new types of leaders and new citizens. 
The liberal discourse placed “special interests”, “selfish interests of profit” and 
“people with unfounded preoccupations” on the impact of the liberal reforms 
proposed by the Olympians as the “constitutive outside” of their discourse. 
However, they did not want to create class tension.  
On the other hand, Guardia’s opponents attacked him, arguing that the 
dictatorship he was imposing went against Costa Rica’s democratic tradition. 
When Guardia replaced Bruno Carranza, he disbanded the Constitutional 
Assembly arguing that the political tensions were too high to write a new 
Constitution at the time.  Guardia felt he needed more time to convince the 
population of the wisdom of his liberal project.  The opposition wrote an article 
in the newspaper El Comercio de Costa Rica on December 25th, 1870 stating: 
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The President, General Guardia, seeks to impose order by prolonging an 
abnormal situation – a tyranny.  He aspires to achieve peace by violating 
people’s rights because he is ignoring their abilities […] The political 
passions are not going to calm down, but rather they will intensify more and 
more […] We live in a democratic society, the political forms of this society 
have to be precisely democratic.  Ignoring this by oppressing this tendency 
is to have a mistaken conception of patriotism […] (El Comercio – 
December 25, 1870).  
Guardia’s opponents also avoided using discourses that could create relations 
of antagonism. Their opponents did not portray him as an oppressor posing an 
“existential threat” to Costa Rica’s society. They argued that his dictatorial 
actions were incompatible with Costa Rica’s democratic nature. This difference 
had enormous repercussions on the way the opposition could be mobilized.  
While in the rest of Central America, framing the leader as an “existential 
threat” meant that the leader had to be killed and his political order destroyed, 
in Costa Rica the opposition argued that Guardia’s dictatorial tendencies had 
to be checked. This did not exclude the possibility that members of the 
opposition may have had the desire to kill Guardia out of deep hatred. It only 
constrained them from acting upon it, as they knew they would have been 
severely punished (unlike what happened in the rest of the region). Killing 
Guardia would have been perceived as an illegitimate and unjustified action in 
a peaceful, democratic society. Just as the opposition was constrained by the 
logic of articulation derived from the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, so 
was Guardia.  He had to justify his dictatorial actions using the following 
language:  
The administration that emerged from this change was an administration 
willing to make reforms, but powerless to execute them. Unfortunately, after 
a few days, protests appeared revealing an impatience and 
thoughtlessness that obstructed the ability [of this government] to make the 
real and fundamental reforms that the situation demanded in order to avoid 
national ruin.  The country needed to change radically, not only the 
character of its out-dated political maneuvering, but also the laissez faire 
philosophy, and its political and economic isolation  (Presidential Message 
to Congress delivered by Tomas Guardia on May 1, 1872). 
Guardia argued that after the 1870 coup, his administration sought to make 
necessary changes but it was not able to do so due to the “impatience” and 
the “lack of reflection” displayed by his opponents.  Guardia downplayed the 
level of opposition to his policies.  He stated that his opponents disagreed with 
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the form, not the substance of his reforms. That was not factually true; as 
Guardia’s reforms were meant to weaken the coffee oligarchs power vis-à-vis 
the state.  However, the coffee barons could not present their opposition to 
Guardia in class-based or economic terms, as this would prevent them from 
gaining the support of other sectors. Guardia, on the other hand, justified his 
dictatorial actions by stating that they were necessary to make the radical 
economic and political changes needed to avoid the country’s “ruin”. Guardia 
stated: 
We needed to establish peace and stability in the solid foundation of 
national opinion […] constructing a decent and moral army that could 
become the true defender of the peace, the integrity and the honour of the 
nation.  We needed a powerful engine of progressive elements to combat 
the inertia and to create a new industrial power – powerful enough to take 
our industry from the stagnation it had been for years.  Thus, we needed 
to restore to the government the prestige through the means of justice, 
give life to the faltering industry, build a lasting peace, and create new 
wealth and new hopes through visible progress  (Presidential Message 
delivered by Tomas Guardia to Congress on May 1, 1872). 
In doing so, he framed the necessity of a dictatorship in the context of 
fostering internal peace and stability. Military involvement was necessary to 
bring back the prestige of the state authority that had been lost when the 
coffee oligarchs dominated politics.  To have “lasting peace” and “progress” it 
was necessary to promote new industries, create more wealth and address 
the basic needs of the masses.  Just like other liberal revolutionaries in the 
region, Guardia’s linked the floating signifiers “order” and “progress” to military 
rule.  He argued that the Costa Rican military would guarantee Costa Rica’s 
“exceptionalist” democratic institutional development. As soon as Guardia 
stabilized his position, he started the process of strengthening Costa Rica’s 
institutional framework through the creation of the 1871 Constitution, 
appointing a Constitutional Assembly on October 15th.  He made the following 
speech on the occasion: 
If to this situation so conducive to organizing this political society in peace, 
in calm and without hindrance, we add the consideration that you are here 
to lay down the fundamental law to the most docile people, perhaps the 
most sensible and peaceful in Spanish America; a truly free people 
because they know how to be slaves to the law; to an immanently moral 
people because they consider their work ethic – the strongest base morality 
– as a religion, you would agree with me that your mission is an easy task 
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of patriotism, of good faith and of good intentions (Presidential Message to 
the Constitutional Assembly delivered by Tomas Guardia on October 15, 
1871).  
By alluding to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, Guardia sought to de-
politicize the process of writing a new Constitution. He stated that their task 
was to write the fundamental law for the most “docile”, “wise” and “peaceful” 
people in Spanish America.  This discourse sought to structure the 
“appropriate” relation between the citizens and the state stating that the Costa 
Ricans “know how to be slaves of the law” making them “an immanently moral 
people” (Guardia 1871).  Costa Ricans were depicted as hardworking people.  
According to Guardia, under these “atypical” circumstances, the task of writing 
a Constitution was an “easy” one.  Guardia placed the emphasis on having 
solid institutions that were in keeping with their collective imaginary. 
   
Work with independence, with justice and with ardour to give to this noble 
and beautiful nation social institutions that are appropriate to its tradition, its 
nature, its costumes and the aspirations of all Costa Ricans for our children 
to inherit; institutions that can lead this young and hopeful Republic to a 
peaceful, progressive and smooth path towards the high destinies that it 
justly aspires to achieve (Presidential Message delivered to the 
Congressional Assembly by Tomas Guardia on October 15, 1871).  
 
Guardia’s discourse was seeking to legitimatize the 1871 Constitution being 
written by the Constitutional Assembly by arguing that it was in keeping with 
Costa Rica’s exceptionalism.  The Constitution was approved on November 7, 
1871. Following the model of the United States Constitution, the 1871 
Constitution was sufficiently lean so as not to directly interfere with the interest 
of the coffee oligarchs.  Its flexibility allowed it to remain in place until after the 
1948 Civil War when it was amended and was renamed the 1949 
Constitution.  
 
In 1872 Tomas Guardia was sworn into office for a four-year presidential term.  
In 1876, elections were held with only one candidate running for office – 
Aniceto Esquivel. However, two months after Esquivel’s electoral victory, 
Guardia conducted a silent coup. According to Botey (2003), Esquivel was not 
as malleable as Guardia had initially hoped and thus Guardia chose to stay in 
power. When he took over, Guardia changed the military structure to avoid 
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potential coups. He reduced the size of the military and removed any 
potentially disloyal men while improving the training of the remaining force. He 
linked his military restructuring with the Costa Rican founding fathers’ decision 
to make education a top priority. He justified this move by saying that it would 
allow his administration to spend more on education and other public 
services. In his annual presidential message to Congress on May 16, 1879 
Guardia stated:  
It is remarkable indeed that it is greater (by more than 10%) the number of 
school teachers to soldiers in the military garrisons […] This system also 
provided a surplus in the budget allowing us to devote more money to 
public education and all other branches of administration (Presidential 
Message delivered to the Congress by Tomas Guardia on May 16, 1879). 
 
It is interesting to note that once Guardia had consolidated his position, he 
sought to reduce the power of the military.  The political leaders in the rest of 
the region relied on the military to retain their power and thus the military grew 
in importance under their rule.  Guardia relied on consensual discursive 
means as opposed to coercive military means to retain power.  He sought to 
consolidate his position by portraying the 27th of April coup as a unifying event 
and by linking it to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary. In his speech to 
Congress on the 9th of June 1878 he made the following argument: 
The revolution of April 27, 1870 marked the end of a period.  Since then, a 
small number of people started a new movement. Others have joined 
them in a collective effort to make the political, economic and social 
reforms that in other more developed countries have produced great 
disturbances and bloody ruins.  This was avoided here, among other 
things due to the peculiarity of this people, who due to the more equitable 
distribution of property and due to their work ethic have acquired the 
practical notion of order and a certain positivist character that corrects the 
impressionability and lightness that has caused in other nations that the 
people fall under the spell of an eloquent orator, the illusory effect of a 
utopia or a reflection of the last decrepit ideas (Presidential Message to 
Congress delivered by Tomas Guardia on June 9, 1878). 
 
Guardia argued that the confrontation experienced in other countries by liberal 
reforms was avoided in Costa Rica due to Costa Rica’s exceptionalism. He 
also indirectly argues that this collective identity prevented Costa Ricans from 
falling prey to populist leaders.  While the rest of Central America constructed 
their political systems around the “eloquent words of an orator”, and the 
“illusory effects of a utopia”, Costa Rican constructed theirs around institutions 
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and ideals. Tomas Guardia did not seek to build a cult around his persona as 
other Central American leaders did. Guardia states: 
 Even when I am gone, I, who have no further merit than merely to 
symbolize ideas and represent principles, and, while being true to my 
flag, have respected the believes of others - keeping my differences with 
them within the practical field of public administration […] the right ideas 
and the true principles, when they have been properly understood and 
appreciated by the people, never die, even when the first person who 
proposed them dies.  How unfortunate the country whose future 
depends on the transient life of a single man (Presidential Message to 
Congress delivered by Tomas Guardia on June 9, 1878).  
 
To appreciate the difference between the Tomas Guardia’s mode of political 
mobilization and that used by other Central American leaders, we can 
contrast it with how Guatemalan liberals framed their leader Justo Rufino 
Barrios: 
 
I heard him (Barrios) say once that he felt within him the “plebeian 
soul” – so was the interest he had for the disinherited.  Barrios infused 
himself into the soul of the country.  His work was not superficial, 
neither of vain purpose.  He was a creator.  He gave the people the 
spirit it was missing and instead of putting bandages on their eyes, lit 
the path where they should walk to reach their destiny […] Barrios did 
not turn off the torch of civilization that once it is lit by the sacred fire of 
the people’s heart, there is no human force that can turn it off.  Barrios 
did not let this fire be turned off and for this he was loved by his people. 
(Ramon Salazar 1895).  
 
This is clearly a political model of mobilization using the logic of relations of 
antagonism. It can be defined as a populist form of identification taking 
Panizza’s definition (2005). As Panizza explains, “whereas republican forms 
of identification allegedly emerge out of a rational identification with the 
universal institutions of the republic, populist identification is associated with 
an irrational, instinctive and spontaneous identification with a strong leader” 
(Panizza 2005:18). The narratives, myths and symbols constructed around 
the figure of Barrios indirectly indicated to the Guatemalan people what 
actions should be considered appropriate, legitimate and desirable for a 
Guatemalan leader. Barrios’ qualities highlighted in these narratives were 
those of an astute military leader, while the qualities used to describe Tomas 
Guardia were those associated with his administrative skills.  This is how 
liberal Guatemalans described their leader: 
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Never has our hero been more admirable than in those days of the 
revolution when the Eastern revolt threatened the gates of the capital 
and threatened to derail the work done on 71. It could be felt in the 
environment that we were on the eve of a major catastrophe.  You 
could see the faces of the sad and scared neighbours, the vipers 
flashing with anger and hatred.  The defeated whispered to each other 
that it was time for either their final victory or their supreme defeat.  
Barrios, fearless did not hesitate for a moment and did not stop to pick 
up the candles.  On the contrary, he threw himself with all his force to 
expel the monks and clergy dispossessing them of their property and 
throwing punches in such a formidable style that even his enemies 
admired him while they fell injured in the sand to rise no more.  This is 
how revolutions are made!  (Ramon Salazar 1895) 
 
 
As illustrated by the previous quote, through discourses applying relations of 
antagonism, the Guatemalan liberals placed the political frontier within 
Guatemalan society defining their revolution as an existential battle against 
“retrograde”, “barbaric” and “uncivilized” conservatives. While Costa Ricans 
liberals defined their revolution as an institutional transformation, the 
Guatemalans presented their revolution in zero-sum terms.  This can also be 
seen by the type of logic of articulation used by Guatemalan liberals when 
speaking about their opponents: 
You are the utterly vanquished.  You are condemned and condemned 
without possibility of appeal.  The spirit of the new times is now with us 
(Ramon Salazar 1895). 
 
Instead, Guardia presented his opponents as adversaries. He argued that the 
opposition he received had been fruitful because it had helped make his 
policies more targeted and viable. Guardia stated: 
 The work has been painful.  As every effort of progress, it has had 
moments of thrust and moments of resistance that have manifested 
themselves in transient disturbances which have, however, caused the 
effect of awakening certain moral forces that are necessary for reform, 
which otherwise would have remained inert and latent. The struggle 
between these two tendencies directed by opposing parties has been 
arduous and intense but not bloody.  It has caused commotion in the 
realm of ideas; but at last, we have been able to reach solutions that are 
more precise and based on a better understanding of our problems 
(Speech entitled “Manifest to the Costa Rican people” delivered by Tomas 
Guardia on June 9, 1878). 
 
Guardia stated that in liberal democratic systems political struggles and 
conflict were not only inevitable, but were actually positive.  This idea is quite 
revolutionary for 1870s Latin America.  This is clearly seen by contrasting 
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Guardia’s discourse with the discourse used by the Guatemalan liberal 
supporters of General Barrios.  The following is an excerpt describing one of 
the many failed attempts to assassinate the dictator Barrios:   
In October 1877 a conspiracy was being plotted in this capital, which was 
meant to take place on October 2 1878. The conspiracy was to assassinate 
General Barrios and his ministers and to avenge themselves on their wives 
and family members in an unspeakable way for the wrong done to them – 
those alleged and those real.  There was a Polish official, brave like all of 
his people. Young Rodas proud, full of ambition and aspiring nothing less 
than the presidency had surrounded himself with lawyers, priests, writers 
and a crowd of young strangers, all full of hatred in their breasts towards 
real FREEDOM.  In all those hearts beats a hatred of LIBERTY. But Barrios 
uncovered the plan and relentlessly punished his opponents. O sacred 
freedom, much blood is spilled for the people who love you! (Ramon 
Salazar 1895). 
 
As we can see from the above excerpt, the Guatemalan liberals defined their 
battles with the opposition in existential terms.  General Barrios was framed 
as the sole provider of Guatemala’s liberty and freedom.  The liberals argued 
that in order to defend this sacred liberty, Barrios’ enemies had to be killed. 
Alvaro Contreras, one of Barrios’ fierce opponents wrote in his book entitled 
To the Central American People the following description of Barrios:  
It is undeniable that he [Barrios] makes war against fanaticism and 
superstition that blinds people.  But his desire for reform is not based 
only on the philosophy, the science and the discussion of Liberty.  His 
war against fanaticism and superstition is one pursued with relentless 
force; one pursued with the aim of suppressing all the ideas that are 
contrary to his own, annihilating the men who represent these contrary 
ideas like the pagan Caesar against Christianity and the Catholic 
Inquisitors against Science and the Enlightenment (Alvaro Contreras: 
1879).   
 
This quote shows how his opponents portrayed Barrios – as a warrior against 
fanaticism and superstition but through the use of brute force.  Alvaro 
Contreras compares Barrios with the Pagan Caesars and the Catholic 
Inquisitors. Barrios indeed had unchecked power. In Guatemala, the leader 
was viewed as having a blank slate to radically change the country at 
whatever cost, as he was perceived as embodying the Guatemalan state. 
Therefore, he could make reforms as he pleased.  In fact, the Guatemalan 
liberals framed the Liberal Revolution of Barrios as a complete break from the 
past regime.   
It is necessary […] to destroy the old institutions that echo in all areas of the 
Republic.  If men do not want this to happen; too bad for them.  And indeed 
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there were those who were opposed and they fell victim due to their 
blindness.  Such was the philosophy of the reform.  And now the results -  
the facts.  They are there for everyone to see.  The earthquake of 71 
destroyed the idol of the Conservative Party.  What remains today of that 
man? A forgotten tomb for his family members to visit and nothing else 
(Ramon Salazar: 1895). 
 
In Guatemala, the complete destruction of the conservative order was 
conceivable because it was equated with the previous dictator, Rafael 
Carrera, deposed by Barrios. Therefore, once this leader was dead a new 
order could emerge. Instead, in Costa Rica, the power and political relevance 
assigned to the leader was different. In sharp contrast, the positive perception 
that Costa Ricans had of their history and national identity made them want to 
retain as much continuity with the past as possible. This constrained the 
scope and extent of possible institutional change. 
 
The political dynamics in Nicaragua also reflected a political system in which 
discourses using relations of antagonism were used to mobilize political 
support. This can be appreciated in the following quote in which the 
Nicaraguan liberal described when General Juan J Estrada took up arms 
against the Liberal Dictator Zelaya:  
This ignominious proceeding on the part of General Estrada that falls so 
undeservedly on the Liberal Party obliges the latter to express 
energetically their profound indignation of his crime, a sing of the future 
blood of the Liberal Party, which will be shed on the alters of 
conservatism, a stigma of blood that has already gushed forth to the 
eternal shame of the conservatives’ greed and their conscious. When the 
country had scarcely recovered from its past struggles in which it crowned 
itself with glory at Namisigile, when the blood of its veins was still running 
down the open wounds, it was asked to make a new and superhuman 
effort, and once more go forth to the battlefield to give, if necessary, its 
last drop of blood in defence of Order, Law and Liberty.  The reactionary 
party, that party that hides behind the Cross of Christ, the dagger and 
poison of a Borgia, that Jesuit Legion that believes that the power of office 
is the patrimony reserved to them by Providence and who aspire to raise 
the throne of the privileged above the servile men of their country and 
thus enslaves them, has shouldered the rifle a hundred times and as 
many times has put it down in bitter disappointment resulting from its 
ineptitude and unpopularity. (Secretary Tomas Enrique in book entitled 
The Revolution of Nicaragua and the United States published 1910). 
 
This discourse used by the Nicaraguan liberals shows how the supporters of 
Zelaya created an internal political frontier dividing Nicaraguan society into 
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two irreconcilable antagonistic camps.  The members of the Liberal Party 
portrayed the conservatives as the “reactionary party”, “a poison of a Borgia” 
who “enslaves” the “servile men of their country”.  To understand the mandate 
the Nicaraguan liberal dictator was perceived as having, and the type of 
relation he sought to develop with the Nicaraguan population, it is interesting 
to read a propaganda book written by the Nicaraguan liberals in 1906.  The 
book entitled Jose Santos Zelaya: President of Nicaragua was given as a gift 
from the Nicaraguan Delegation to Washington DC to the president of the 
United States. The book starts:  
The intellectuality of the Spanish American people should be measured 
only by their representative men.  In those countries still but imperfectly 
developed, where the different ethnical elements have not been mixed to 
such an extent as to produce a typical racial standard, the men who rise 
above all others as the most perfect product of such peculiar traits, do 
actually represent, by reason of their superior intelligence, all the latent 
energies of the people to whom they belong (Nicaraguan Delegation to 
Washington Jose Santos Zelaya 1906:5). 
 
While the Costa Rican liberals emphasized the racial homogeneity of their 
population and elevated the masses, the Nicaraguan liberals highlighted the 
racial inferiority of the Nicaraguan population.  Only a few Nicaraguans were 
worthy of being considered “civilized”.  The backwardness of the vast majority 
of the Nicaraguans justified the need for a strong leader. The Nicaraguan 
liberals argued that Zelaya was the right person to lead the country.  The book 
continues: 
Such men possess the characteristics inherent to men of action, being both 
impulsive as well as persistent in their efforts, bold in their concepts, patient 
to mature and firm to realize their plans.  They feel they have a mission to 
fulfil, and while they are not deaf to the advice of others. In their natural 
inclination to do good, they leave their name and the memory of their deeds 
forever linked to that of the period of greater activity in favour of a social era 
along new lines, though to attain this end, the very foundation of that 
society might have to be shaken (Zelaya 1906: 5-6). 
 
In sharp contrast to the Costa Rican institutional model of governance, the 
Nicaraguan liberals proposed a caudillista model led by an “impulsive”, 
“persistent” and “bold” leader. This leader was expected to listen to the advice 
of others (meaning their inner circle of advisors).  The demands of the 
Nicaraguan population were not even considered as relevant as they claimed 
that the caudillo knew what was best for the uneducated masses based on his 
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“natural inclination to do good”.  According to this account, the leader’s 
“inclination to do good” served as a sufficient guarantee that he would govern 
wisely.  The leader had a mandate to “shake the very foundation of that 
society” to accomplish his mission.  The book continues: 
It is the temperament that makes the man, and such men have a triple 
mission in life, which is to fight, to organise and to civilize, a mighty task 
requiring both firmness of purpose and strength of character.  To that class 
of men of destiny, who leave the stamp of their personality and their deeds 
in the history of the people, belongs General Jose Santos, the leader of the 
Liberal Party and President of Nicaragua (Zelaya 1906: 6). 
 
While the Costa Rican liberals argued that it was the president’s mission to 
ensure peace and prosperity for all Costa Ricans, the Nicaraguans argued 
that Zelaya’s mission was “to fight, to organise and to civilize” (Zelaya 
1906:6).  They referred to Jose Santos first as the leader of the Liberal Party 
and then the President of Nicaragua.  In Costa Rica, the presidents always 
presented themselves as the presidents of all Costa Ricans, not mentioning 
their political party.   
 
While Zelaya was ousted from power in 1909,25 Guardia ruled until his health 
no longer permitted it.  Upon his death, Costa Rica remained politically stable. 
One of his closest advisors and leading member of the Grupo del Olimpo, 
General Prospero Fernandez, became president of Costa Rica in 1882.  
General Fernandez maintained the same reformist policies as Guardia.  He 
only sought to change one aspect of the prior paradigm, gradually eliminating 
the link between the 1870 coup and the liberal reforms to make the liberal 
reforms be perceived as more in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary by erasing references to the 1870 coup. Prospero started to portray 
the liberal reforms as the result of a process of “tranquil evolution”.  This is 
seen in the following newspaper excerpt from the El Ciudadano: 
The policy that guides the men who are building the future of Costa Rica 
today is the product of the patriotic evolution that has taken place during 
the past three years.  No revolution, not even the most prestigious, nor the 
most popular, nor the most just would have given these results. 
Revolutionary governments […] can never develop a program.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The United States’ interests in the inter-oceanic canal being planned in Nicaragua 
led to them to establish a protectorate in the country until 1933 in order to guarantee 
political stability. 
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political commitments, ambitious and hatred that are aroused during 
revolutions obstruct them.  The blessings of Liberty, of the rule of law, of 
progress can only be conquered under the shelter of peace and through 
calm evolution (El Ciudadano: October 1882). 
 
This is significantly different from the way that other liberal revolutionaries 
framed their regimes in the region.  Liberal and conservative dictators in 
Central America framed their governments as a continuation of the armed 
revolution.  The same logic of articulation used in the battlefield was 
transferred to the administrative offices. Instead, the Costa Rican liberal 
leaders presented their political project as the model most compatible with 
their atypical colonial demographic, socio-economic, and cultural heritage.  It 
argued that the liberal oligarchic model gradually evolved out of its idyllic 
colonial experience. Emphasizing the naturalness of Costa Rica’s liberal 
model had two desired results. First, it implied the passivity of all social actors 
in the creation of this institutional framework, encouraging the Costa Rican 
population to accept it without questioning if the model favoured one group 
over another. Second, it gave the model its legitimacy by arguing that it was 
the only one that fit Costa Rica’s unique history and its “exceptional” national 
identity. Linked to any inevitability argument is a de-politization process. The 
liberal political leaders succeeded in constructing a sense of national unity by 
drawing from the positive national self-image created by the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary.  They kept the masses subdued by addressing their 
demands through institutional means and linking their particularistic demands 
(for better education, healthcare, hygiene, security) differentially into their 
expanding hegemonic discourse.  
 
Strategies by the Olympians to disseminate their liberal discourse  
The Grupo del Olimpo knew that controlling education was the most effective 
means of spreading their hegemonic ideology. By the mid-1880s, the 
Olympians believed they no longer needed the support of the Catholic Church 
to legitimize their rule. The Olympians passed a series of anti-clerical laws 
geared at removing the monopoly that the Catholic Church had on education.  
This led to the closing of the University of Santo Tomas and limiting university 
education to one single university, with one single faculty - the faculty of Law -
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which was needed to train the future political elites with liberal views (Fischel 
1992). The Educational Reform of 1885 provided free and mandatory 
education so as to spread the liberal hegemonic model throughout all sectors 
of society and all regions of the country. As President Prospero Fernandez 
stated in his annual message to Congress on the 10th of August 1882:  
A need that is felt in the country and that must be satisfied for building 
an unshakable foundation for the Republic is to infuse within the spirit of 
all citizens the habit of Republican practices, and love and respect for its 
institutions (Presidential Message delivered by Prospero Fernandez to 
the Congress on August 10 1882).  
 
To spread these civic ideas of love and respect for institutions, the liberals 
founded the newspaper El Ciudadano, first printed on July 30th 1880. In its 
first edition, it argued that Costa Rica’s democracy was not fully developed 
due to the apathy of the uneducated people.  It argued: 
Today all Costa Ricans agree that the ills of the country have their 
origins mainly in the apathy of its inexperienced children (El Ciudadano: 
July 30, 1880).  
 
The Olympians also wrote civic books such as the one entitled Librito de los 
Deberes written by Juan F. Ferraz published in 1889 to create “new citizens”.  
In this book, Ferraz argued that for Costa Rica to achieve “absolute peace” it 
was necessary for the population to understand not only their rights, but also 
their duties. Their duties were the following: 
To respect at all costs and above everything else the Law, which 
represents the will of the people, to accept the verdict of the Courts that 
are responsible for the justice of the people, of your justice and defend 
your rights and to obey the authorities that execute and that comply with 
the law.  This is the most holy, the most sublime duty of every citizen. By 
doing this there will be peace and progress in the country (Juan F. 
Ferraz 1889:5).  
 
 
The liberals highlighted the necessity that both citizens and their leaders had 
to strictly abide by the rule of law. Appealing to the religious devoutness of the 
Costa Rican population, abiding to the rule of law was equated to following 
the holy commandments. More specifically, Ferraz stated that their duties 
were the following: 
It is our duty to obey the Law, to submit ourselves to Judicial Decrees and 
to respect the legally constituted authority, to educate our family abiding by 
the national plan, to contribute to the public administration, to join the 
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military if the integrity of our country is at risk and to maintain order and 
peace (Juan F. Ferraz 1889:5).  
 
 
To highlight the supremacy of the rule of law, Ferraz stated that Socrates and 
Jesus Christ accepted their death sentences so the law would be respected.  
He then stated: 
And we cannot emphasize enough that without submission to the law, there 
is no liberty nor freedom, without duties there is only debauchery.  A life 
without law leads to savagery.  Only wild beasts use brutal force to obtain 
what they want (Juan F. Ferraz 1889:15). 
 
He argues that only the uncivilized disrespect the law and, by extension, that 
only the uncivilized commit revolutionary acts: 
 
It is clear that if an unruly mob wants to attack the legitimate Authority, they 
can do it because their numbers make them strong. But considering that 
the Authority represents the collective will of the nation, people must 
understand that submission is necessary, appropriate and fair.  Otherwise, 
social order is lost and once social order is lost, all of us forgo our rights 
and place ourselves outside the law (Juan F. Ferraz 1889:15-16).  
 
This typical liberal discourse clearly delimited the types of political actions that 
were to be considered illegitimate and unacceptable in Costa Rica such as 
mass protests or revolts. Instead, the appropriate behaviour for the model 
citizen was to be submissive and respectful of the established order.  The 
book concluded by stating that all Costa Ricans, whether ignorant or 
educated, rich or poor must contribute to society: 
Each citizen, the wise or the ignorant, the rich or the poor, the young or the 
elderly must do something right for his society to which he owes his civil 
existence.  Everything revolves around the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  Everyone must recognize with good will his 
situation and the position that he has to fulfil and the situation and the 
position that the other has […] We must make of our own family a small 
model of social governance. That is what we must regard as the highest 
point of our aspirations. Love and respect are the two axes of the family. 
(Ferraz 1889:22).  
 
The liberal discourse sought to dissolve the perception of differences between 
the rich and the poor, and between the ignorant and the educated by making 
all Costa Ricans members of a single family.  In order to teach citizens the 
values they had to emulate, they created a mythical figure – Juan Santamaria.  
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The Juan Santamaria Myth 
Juan Santamaria was an 18-year-old boy who allegedly fought in the Battle of 
Rivas in 1856 against the American aggressor William Walker. Walker was an 
American lawyer, journalist, and adventurer who organized private military 
expeditions into Latin American with the intention of establishing English-
speaking colonies under his personal control.  This was a common practice 
during this period known as filibustering. When the Nicaraguan liberal political 
leaders Francisco Castellano Sanabria and Maximo Jerez Telleria of the 
Partido Democratico heard of Walker’s mercenary army, they contacted 
Walker to request his help in overthrowing the conservative dictator Fruto 
Chamorro Perez. Upon his arrival to Nicaragua, Castellano made Walker the 
general of the liberal forces.  Under Walker’s leadership, the liberals defeated 
the conservatives, but instead of handing over power to the liberals as he had 
previously agreed with Castellano and Jerez, Walker declared himself 
president of Nicaragua in 1856 and subsequently sought to annex Costa Rica.   
 
In April 1856, he invaded Costa Rica through Rivas. The Costa Rican 
President Juan Rafael Mora and his brother-in-law General Jose Maria Cañas 
led an army to Rivas and succeeded in forcing Walker’s army to retreat back 
to Nicaragua. The newspaper articles of the government newspaper Boletin 
Oficial from April 11 to May 30 1856 presented the Battle of Rivas as a one 
battle within the larger Central American war against Walker, portraying 
President Mora and General Cañas as the war’s heroes. On May 3rd, 1856, 
the President wrote the following newspaper article in the Boletin Oficial:  
Thank you Generals and Officers of the Army because through the 
triumphs of Santa Rosa, Rivas and Sarapiqui you have endowed Costa 
Rica with the brightest pages of her history.  Thank you because you have 
earned your glory not by fighting your own brothers, but rather by fighting 
in a Holy War against the aggressors who had invaded Central America 
(Boletin Oficial – May 3, 1856).  
 
 
The President made the military leaders the heroes of the “Holy War” against 
the invaders of Central America.  Mora highlights the fact that the mobilization 
of Costa Ricans army was justified because it was not to fight against other 
Costa Ricans, but to fight against an external threat.  After the battles on 
Costa Rican soil, Mora ordered the Costa Rican army to disarm.  Many 
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soldiers were infected by a cholera outbreak in the region.  Mora argued that 
the cholera outbreak and the torrential rains made it impossible for the Costa 
Rican army to cross over to Nicaragua to defeat Walker.  Mora stated in the 
same article: 
There is no dishonour to stop fighting due to the crushing climate.  We can 
retreat into our territory with serenity and with great pride knowing that we 
have left our enemy exhausted, with no prestige, no resources, better 
prepared to flee than to mount a real battle.  If the formal agreements made 
with our Guatemalan, Salvadorian and Honduran allies are respected, they 
will undertake the simple task of expelling the bandit that still harasses the 
Nicaraguan people (Boletin Oficial – May 3, 1856).  
 
Once the threat to Costa Rica was over, President Mora was not willing to 
sacrifice any more Costa Rican lives for the Central American cause. The 
newspapers reported the fighting between Walker and the Central American 
forces, but did not mobilize the Costa Ricans to fight against Walker.  On May 
1 1857, Walker surrendered under the pressure of the Central American army 
and was repatriated by the United States Navy Commander Charles Henry 
Davis.  
 
In 1860, Walker returned to the region, invited this time by British colonists in 
Roatan in the Bay Islands who did not want the Honduran government to 
assert control over them. They asked Walker to help them establish an 
English-speaking government over the islands.  When Walker disembarked in 
the port city of Trujillo, he fell into the custody of the Commander Nowell 
Salmos of the British Royal Navy.  The British government controlled the 
neighbouring regions of British Honduras (now Belize) and the Mosquito 
Coast (now part of Nicaragua).  They had a strategic and economic interest in 
the construction of an inter-oceanic canal through Central America and 
considered Walker a threat. Rather than returning Walker to the United States, 
Salmon delivered Walker to the Honduran authorities.  On September 12, 
1860 the Honduran authorities executed Walker.  
 
In 1885 the Olympians reinterpreted the 1856 Battle of Rivas, eliminating the 
Central American dimension. As Palmer and Molina note, the birth of the Juan 
Santamaria myth coincided with Justo Rufino Barrios’s declaration of his 
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intentions to recreate a Central American Union on February 28 1885 by force 
if necessary.  Palmer and Molina argue that the Grupo del Olimpo created the 
myth of Juan Santamaria to mobilize the Costa Rican people in the event they 
would need to call for an army to fight a defensive war. A few days after 
Rufino’s announcement, the Grupo del Olimpo published an article in the 
Diario de Costa Rica entitled “An Anonymous Hero”.  This article stated that: 
“When a party of filibusters tried to take over our territory (in 1856), the heroic 
valour of the sons of this soil manifested itself. The name of Juan Santamaria 
comes to the forefront” (quoted by Palmer 1993). According to this newspaper 
article, Juan Santamaria’s feat consisted in burning down the wooden house 
where Walker and his troops were hiding while planning their attack.  Juan 
Santamaria died soon after accomplishing his mission. However, his action 
forced the invaders out of hiding, in turn triggering their retreat back to 
Nicaragua after being outnumbered by the Costa Rican army. The Olympians 
claimed that the Battle of Rivas had been Costa Rica’s second “war of 
Independence”.  
 
They created this new hero – the courageous foot soldier.  Juan Santamaria 
had not been mentioned in any of the articles of the Boletin Oficial or by 
accounts given by the Battle of Rivas veterans. The Olympians downplayed 
the roles played by President Mora and General Cañas.  As Rafael Angel 
Mendez (2007), David Diaz (2008), and Juan Rafael Quesada (2010) have 
argued, the Olympians reinterpreted the Battle of Rivas to fit their liberal 
ideology. Palmer and Molina state that between 1885 and 1895 the 
Olympians solved the problem of the nation’s ‘imagined origins’ by creating 
the myth of Juan Santamaria as a prototypical patriotic hero, whom the lower 
classes were encouraged to emulate.  
 
In looking at the example of the Juan Santamaria myth, it is interesting to note 
the fact that “exceptionalist” collective imaginary influenced the type of hero 
the Olympians selected. They chose a poor foot soldier as opposed to a 
military commander to highlight the peaceful nature of the Costa Rican 
population. The Olympians were not just seeking to mobilize the Costa Ricans 
for a possible war against the invading forces of Barrios, they were also 
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creating new political identities. Through the Juan Santamaria myth, they 
could highlight the virtues that the new citizens should have - obedience, 
patriotism, humility, and self-sacrifice. The Olympians moved the celebration 
of Juan Santamaria from April 11th (when the Battle of Rivas was fought) to 
the 15th of September (the date when Costa Rica was granted Independence 
from Spain), further unifying his myth with the broader “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary and removing the broader Central American dimension.  
 
Juan Santamaria is the only Costa Rican to have a named national holiday. 
Although Costa Ricans celebrate his heroic actions every year, most do not 
know how William Walker died. Juan Santamaria continues to be praised by 
Costa Rican political leaders across the ideological spectrum as model to be 
followed.  Alongside the Juan Santamaria myth, the Olympians created 
another myth we will now discuss.  
 
 
The 7th of November 1889 as the “birthdate of Costa Rica’s democracy” 
myth 
During the 7th of November 1889 presidential elections, the handpicked 
successor of President Bernardo Soto Alfaro (1885-1889), Ascension 
Esquivel Ibarra, ran against the conservative candidate Jose Rodriguez 
Zeledon of the Partido Constitutional Democratico.  The main supporter of 
Jose Rodriguez Zeledon was the Costa Rican Catholic Church, who felt 
threatened by the liberal reformers’ “civic” educational reforms. Although the 
Catholic Church had not been made a “constitutive outside” of the liberal 
discourse as in the rest of Central America, the Church undoubtedly had lost 
power during the liberal reform period. Soon after the voting polls were 
closed, President Bernardo Soto declared Esquivel the winner. The opposition 
denounced the results as electoral fraud and the Costa Rican Catholic Church 
helped organize mass protests. After several days of these protests, Soto 
agreed to step down and placed Carlos Duran in as interim president until 
Jose Rodriguez took power. Accepting their defeat, the Olympians then 
framed their acceptance of the 1889 electoral results as proof that, under 
Olympian rule, Costa Rica’s democracy had been consolidated. They argued 
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that this was the first election in the county’s history in which the Costa Rican 
people had actively mobilized in favour of a candidate and the government 
had respected their sacred right of suffrage.   
 
The conservatives also adopted this interpretation of the 7th of November 
1889. The Partido Constitutional Democratico created a newspaper entitled 
the 7 de Noviembre 1889 to commemorate this event.  On its first issue on the 
7th of November 1890, they praised Bernardo Soto’s “democratic” decision to 
step down.  They stated the 7th of November represented a victory for all 
Costa Ricans. The front-page article stated: 
The 7th of November 1889 will go down as one of the greatest days of our 
history.  We do not say this guided by passions because it gave us our 
victory over our political opponents, or because we think we are superior to 
those who we defeated. It is memorable because unnecessary bloodshed 
was avoided – a war of brother against brother was averted […] It is 
memorable because it was the day that citizens rightfully stood up to 
demand that their suffrage rights be respected, the right that has been so 
often abused not by dictators (as in other Central American countries) but 
by individuals who have put in places of power political leaders who have 
not been lawfully elected by the people (November 7 edition on July 1890).  
 
Instead of using this date to mobilize support for Jose Rodriguez Zeledon, the 
conservatives chose to adopt the liberal interpretation of it as a unifying factor. 
They framed their differences with the liberals as political differences amongst 
individuals rather than as a battle against an “enemy” as conservatives in 
Central America did. Subsequently, Costa Rican political leaders across the 
ideological divide have used this myth at various points of its history to 
reinforce a sense of internal social cohesion and reduce political tensions.   
 
The conservatives also sought to mobilize the Costa Rican masses through 
institutional means. They used the 7th of November newspaper to spread their 
ideas.  The front-page article of the 7th of November 1890 stated: 
Education is an essential factor for progress. We want this publication […] 
to reach out to everyone – from the artisan in the small workshop to the 
artist in the great workshops.  We are all interested in reading, in getting 
instructed, in fulfilling our desire of making our country a nation of progress 
whose history is composed of a collection of works done by all of us for the 
good name of our country, for the advancement of our children, and for the 
maintenance of the place of pride our nation has reached because of the 
deeds of the past citizens whom we must always remember with respect 
and veneration. […] The farmer, the peasant, the woodcutter, the 
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transporter all will find support in the weak hands of those writing these 
pages in order to defend their rights not granted to them because of their 
ignorance. They will find in us a helping hand because they, like every 
citizen, have rights that must not be abused and must be respected as 
those of all men. They are the first to change the hoe and machete for the 
gun when it comes to defending the independence of our country, they 
enrich our markets with cereals and fresh fruit from our fertile land […] 
(November 7 newspaper – July 1890). 
 
Just like the liberals, the conservatives also sought to integrate the demands 
of all sectors of Costa Rican society into a single national narrative.  Unlike 
their Nicaraguan and Guatemalan counterparts, they placed the emphasis on 
the peoples’ demands and not the vision of their leader.  Both conservatives 
and liberals argued that ignorance was the greatest challenge faced by the 
Costa Rican masses. But this ignorance was not the result of their racial 
inferiority. Knowledge could be brought to these people by devoting more 
government resources to education.  Both liberals and conservatives placed 
the masses as central figures in their discourses arguing that, without their 
valuable work, the Costa Rican family would have no food to subside on. 
They also compared them to Juan Santamaria by stating that if necessary the 
broader masses would be the first to fight to defend the autonomy of the 
country against a foreign threat. This discourse structured relations between 
citizens and the state and amongst the different political factions during the 
liberal hegemonic period until the 1930s. Therefore, the main ideological 
division between the conservatives and the liberals was on the role that the 
Costa Rican Catholic Church should play in politics.  
 
Conclusion 
The post-independence political history of Latin America was shaped by 
intense hegemonic battles between conservatives and liberals leading to long 
and devastating civil wars, some of which spilled over into international wars. 
A puzzle that has remained unsatisfactorily answered by the existing literature 
regarding Costa Rica’s transition to democracy is why the political conflicts 
between the liberal and conservative factions did not lead to civil wars in 
Costa Rica as they did in the rest of the region. This chapter searches for the 
answer to this puzzle by analysing the discursive context present during the 
post-independence period.  It argues that, contrary to the dominant view that 
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Costa Ricans had a “blank slate” during the post-independence period since 
they had not developed well-defined institutions during the colonial period, 
they had an extremely effective discursive institution – the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary. Ever since the late 1500s, the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary defined Costa Ricans as innately democratic, consensual, peaceful, 
egalitarian, and ethnically homogenous (Cruz 2000, 2005). Throughout the 
colonial period, Costa Rican political leaders discursively reinforced the social 
antagonism that defined the Costa Rican “us” versus the Central American 
“enemy” in order to convince the Spanish Crown that Costa Rica should be 
granted greater economic and political autonomy from Nicaragua (Acuña 
Ortega: 1995).  They reinforced these social antagonisms through the letters 
sent to the Spanish Crown by the Costa Rican governors, through 
coordinative discourse amongst the political elite, and through communicative 
discourses with the populations. Throughout the 1700s, the Costa Rican elite 
viewed the Guatemalan businessmen (not other Costa Rican businessmen) 
as their main rivals since the Spanish Crown allowed the Guatemalans to 
have a monopoly over the production of tobacco (Calderon Hernandez 2003: 
220). This frustrated the economic aspirations of the Costa Rican elites.  It 
also pushed the political frontier to the margins of Costa Rican society, 
placing the Central American “authoritarian, violent, hierarchical and 
predominantly indigenous” order as the “constitutive outside” of the Costa 
Rican discourse.  
 
During the post-independence period, Costa Rican liberals were able to 
consolidate their power, avoid civil wars, and foster gradual and reformist 
democratic development because they were able to create a stable 
hegemonic model.  They were able to do this by appropriating the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary and re-articulating the elements of 
meaning derived from it (homogeneity, peace, equality and democracy) into 
their own chain of signification placing liberalism as the new nodal point. They 
weakened and displaced the antagonistic polarity between the conservatives 
and liberals as well as between the elites and the masses by retaining the 
external political frontier derived from the colonial “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary. The fact that the liberals succeeded in making their political project 
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become hegemonic meant that when conservatives came to power, they did 
not make significant institutional changes, but rather only addressed other 
demands, further expanding the differential political system. More importantly, 
it meant that Costa Rica’s liberal order did not undermine democratic 
development as happened in the rest of the region.  Costa Rican liberals were 
able to reconcile the inherent tensions between liberalism and democracy by 
re-articulating them within the confines of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary.  
 
In sharp contrast with the Costa Rican experience, other Central American 
liberals and conservatives placed the political frontier within their societies, 
portraying each other as the main obstacles to the realization of their 
interests.  When liberals were in power, conservatives sought to create 
equivalential chains with the masses to overthrow liberal regimes and vice-
versa. They were able to do so because of the frustration of the masses due 
to the multiplicity of unfulfilled demands by the state. Both the conservative 
and the liberal leaders, once in power, rewarded the people who had 
supported their rise to power through patronage. This meant that certain 
sectors of society and areas of the country were openly favoured, while others 
were openly punished. Under these circumstances, it was easy to mobilize 
“oppressed” heterogeneous sectors of society against a common enemy. 
Anti-status quo political leaders could transform particular demands into 
political demands creating new “revolutionary” political agents.  This internal 
conflict often spilled to other equally divided neighbouring societies. It was 
common in Central America for both liberals and conservatives to create 
equivalencial chains with their Central American counterparts encouraging the 
invasion of foreign forces into their own countries. 
  
The sharp internal political frontier in other Central American countries 
dividing the social space around two antagonistic poles hindered the 
emergence of hegemonic orders in the rest of Central America. Despite 
prolonged periods in which their discourse dominated political space, neither 
liberals nor conservatives were able to establish a national project. The 
groups excluded by the ruling block were continuously challenging the socio-
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economic and political order highlighting the contingency of the dominating 
discourse. The myths created by the Central American political elites were 
antagonizing myths.  They were meant to create unity amongst various 
sectors of society against an internal enemy, which in turn fuelled a constant 
cycle of political crisis and revolutionary institutional change.  
 
In contrast, the Costa Rican political elites were able to conceal the 
contingency of their discourses by creating a unifying hegemonic myth.  By re-
articulating the elements of meaning derived from the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary, Costa Rican political leaders succeeded in integrating 
diverse sectors of society into a “one nation” project. The Central American 
example shows the validity of the PSDT’s notion of social antagonisms as 
discursively constructed by political leaders in their effort to mobilize 
heterogeneous sectors of society. As PSDT states, one of the most powerful 
motivations for mobilization is the belief that one’s identity is being threatened.  
As Howarth (2000) explains social antagonisms are seen to occur when: 
the presence of another prevents me from being totally myself… This 
‘blockage’ of identity is a mutual experience for both the antagonizing 
force and the force that is being antagonized. Insofar as there is 
antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself.  But nor is the force 
that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of 
my non-being, and in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings, 
which prevent it being fixed as a full positivity (Howarth 2000: 10). 
 
The contrast between the Costa Rican and the Central American liberal – 
conservative power struggles shows social antagonisms are not fixed by a 
class essence and that there is no fundamental social agency or political 
project that determines processes of historical change in a priori fashion. In all 
Central American countries, elites fought over economic resources and socio-
political power with liberals dominating politics in the region for significant 
periods of time.  However, these conflicts were dealt with in very different 
fashions. One of the main differences was the prevalent logic of articulation. 
The different logics of articulation structured social relations in particular ways, 
making certain actions legitimate while precluding others.  It also made 
possible certain forms of political mobilization.  
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The success of the Costa Rican political leaders’ discursive strategies meant 
that by 1889 Costa Ricans were made to believe they were living under an 
“exceptional” democracy.  The same view was held by foreign visitors such as 
the Swiss scholar Paul Biolley who wrote the book Costa Rica and her Future 
published in 1889. After highlighting Costa Rica’s exceptional adherence to 
the rule of law, Biolley wrote:  
Much is said in Europe, it is true of the instability of the governments and 
the insecurity of affairs in Spanish American republics.  This is an 
erroneous idea as far as Costa Rica is concerned.  The country has 
hardly known revolutions.  It is wisely governed today.  Its financial 
condition is prosperous, and the state of civilization at which it has arrived 
places it beyond any retrogression. […] The aspect of the cities, the 
character of the inhabitants, the condition of public instruction, the 
government’s administrative wisdom, and the development of commerce 
are a proof of it (Biolley 1889:91). 
 
After praising Costa Rica’s sound public policies, Biolley stated:  
The forward march, but the march of wisdom without struggle, without the 
clashing of ideas – the march to the conquest of wealth and prosperity – 
this is what characterizes as a whole the work of the Costa Rican 
government.  The few traditional abuses, momentary errors, vices which 
have not yet entirely disappeared, have but secondary importance to the 
impartial observer who, comparing the present with the past, can thus 
foresee a happy future (Biolley 1889:38). 
 
These external evaluations by foreigners helped reinforce the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary.  Costa Rican political leaders understood that it was in 
everyone’s interests to maintain that reputation in order to attract qualified 
European immigrants and foreign financing as well as encourage foreigners to 
set up businesses in the country. The following chapter explores how the 
liberals used the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary to deal with the 
dislocatory effects of World War I and the Great Depression.  
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Chapter 3 
The liberal oligarchic response to the dislocatory events 1900-1940 
 
This chapter analyses the impact of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary in 
shaping political dynamics during the first four decades of the 20th Century. 
Up until the 1930s, political actors articulated their political projects retaining 
the external political frontier set by the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary. 
Liberal oligarchic leaders belonging to the Grupo del Olimpo expanded their 
base of consent by differentially incorporating the “democratic” demands 
made by labour movements, peasant associations, and anti-imperialist 
movements through institutional and legislative means, thus disarticulating 
potential political alliances between these groups. In doing so, they prevented 
the emergence of relations of antagonism prevalent in the rest of Central 
America during this period.   
 
Following the dislocation of the liberal oligarchic hegemony triggered by the 
socio-economic impact of the Great Depression, a group of law students, 
workers, and radical intellectuals founded the Costa Rica Communist Party in 
1931.  The CRCP members were the first to shift the dominant external 
political frontier inwards by introducing for the first time in the country’s history 
an irreconcilable negativity into its social relations.  Seeking to radically 
change Costa Rica’s discursive field, they argued that the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary was a bourgeoisie lie and sought to replace its elements 
of meaning (homogeneity, equality, democracy, peace) with Marxist elements 
of meaning (class struggle, oppression, and inequality). Failing to garner 
political support with this strategy and shadowing the 1936 Soviet shift away 
from the United Front strategy towards a Popular Front strategy, the CRCP 
leaders changed tactics. By 1936 they started to develop a new myth – the 
comunismo a la tica myth - incorporating elements of meaning of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary into their traditional Marxist discourse.  
Despite the gradual evolution of the CRCP discourse, two inherent tensions 
remained. The first tension revolved around the CRCP leaders’ desire to 
remain faithful to Soviet directives and Marxist doctrine, while simultaneously 
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seeking to make their communist project work within Costa Rica’s national 
discursive and institutional context. The second tension revolved around the 
choice of tactics and strategies, with the party shifting from non-institutional 
tactics of mobilization to parliamentary tactics, while always working to 
construct a new communist political identity for a future revolution. There was 
in effect a division of labour within the CRCP.  The CRCP members elected to 
Congress tailored their coordinative discourse to their congressional audience 
in order to have a chance of winning support for their proposals. CRCP 
Congressmen indeed triggered a shift in the national ideational context 
placing the social question at the centre of political debates.  The liberal 
oligarchic presidents responded by further pursuing reformist institutional 
change. On the other hand, the Communist newspaper Trabajo retained the 
radical Marxist discourse to indoctrinate the masses for a future socialist 
revolution. This chapter analyses how the Olympian presidents Cleto 
Gonzalez Viquez (1928-1932), Ricardo Jimenez (1932-1936) and Leon 
Cortes (1936-1940) responded to the rising communist threat. 
 
The primary materials analysed in the chapter come from selected articles of 
the Communist newspaper Trabajo from 1931-1940, key speeches by the 
CRCP leader Manuel Mora, the two most famous Olympian presidents in the 
1900s Cleto Gonzalez Viquez (1928-1932), and Ricardo Jimenez (1932-1936) 
as well as selected articles from the liberal oligarchic press La Tribuna and 
Diario de Costa Rica. The background information comes from historical 
books by Costa Rican academics, biographies and memoirs written by the 
communist leaders Manuel Mora and Jaime Cerdas.  
 
The chapter is divided in three sections. Section one shows how the liberal 
oligarchic administrations of Cleto Gonzalez Viquez (1906-1910) and Ricardo 
Jimenez (1910-1914) absorbed the previous reformist movements – the 
Radicales del 1900 and the Partido Reformista during the 1920s through 
institutional means. Section two analyses the unique way in which the Costa 
Rican Olympian presidents Gonzalez Viquez (1928-1932) and Jimenez 
(1932-1936) addressed the “communist threat” relative to their Central 
American counterparts. Instead of exiling or executing its leaders, outlawing 
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the party, and banning their literature as the Central American dictators 
Hernandez Martinez, Ubico, and Somoza did, the Costa Rican leaders 
pursued two types of tactics – co-opting strategies and combative measures. 
They sought to de-radicalize the Communist Party by incorporating it into the 
electoral system.  Simultaneously, they encouraged anti-communist 
ideological campaigns conducted by the Catholic Church, liberal oligarchic 
intellectuals and the coffee oligarchs. Section three analyses the emergence 
of the comunismo a la tica myth.  Borrowing insights from Carstensen’s model 
of incremental ideational change (2009) it explores how the communist 
leaders were able to integrate elements of meaning of the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary with traditional Marxist elements despite their inherent 
contradictions.  
 
Liberal oligarchic response to the anti-liberal discourses (1900-1930) 
In the early 1900s, a group of intellectuals including professor Joaquin Garcia 
Monge, Jose Maria Zeledon, Omar Dengo, Roberto Brenes Mesen and 
Carmen Lyra formed the Radicales del 1900.  These intellectuals denounced 
the persistence of poverty, electoral fraud and the growing influence of 
American companies in the region. They were initially influenced by anarchist 
and socialist ideas circulating Latin America at the time but were gradually de-
radicalized. The liberal oligarchic presidents Ascencio Esquivel (1902-1906) 
and Cleto Gonzalez Viquez (1906-1910) responded to their demands by 
passing reformist laws geared at expanding access to primary education, 
creating vocational training centres, building infrastructure projects, improving 
health-care facilities, improving working conditions and regulating wage 
disputes.  In 1910, Gonzalez Viquez passed laws to improve the sanitation 
system, to construct the railway road to the Pacific, and to build the National 
Library in order to create jobs. He also reinforced municipal services to 
address particularistic demands. To address the democratic deficit, Gonzalez 
Viquez passed the 1908-1909 electoral reforms with the support of the 
opposing liberal oligarchic party, the Partido Republicano, which controlled 
Congress at the time. The liberal oligarchs also co-opted the leaders of the 
Radicales del 1900 by offering them high-ranking positions in the most 
prestigious educational centres and in their administrations (Molina 2005). 
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The Radicales del 1900 gradually became convinced that the social question 
and the democratic deficit were best addressed through reformist policies 
within the liberal oligarchic institutional framework.   
 
During his first administration, the Ricardo Jimenez (1910-1914) sought to 
address the demands made by the Radicales del 1900 regarding the 
country’s democratic deficit. In 1913, Congress approved an electoral reform 
that eliminated the electoral-college system, opening the way for direct 
presidential elections (Molina 2007:48). Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, the 
subsequent president (1914-1917), focused on the social question. World War 
I had triggered a great socio-economic crisis as England and Germany were 
the main importers of Costa Rican coffee.  Gonzalez Flores argued that 
greater state intervention was needed to address the crisis. He founded a 
National State Bank to compete with private banks by lending money to small 
businesses at lower interest rates, instituted a property tax, and proposed a 
more progressive income tax. He tried to create a “paradigm shift” (Hay 2001) 
away from the liberal oligarchic order towards a social democratic state. 
However, he failed to garner enough political support for what were portrayed 
by his opponents as too radical and unnecessary policy changes. The liberals 
argued that the crisis was the result of temporary external incidents and not 
an indication that the liberal socio-economic model had to be replaced. 
Gonzalez Flores was toppled by a coup in 1917. After the 1917 coup, the 
Minister of War, Jose Federico Tinoco Granados, retained power arguing that 
the severe socio-economic crisis required a dictatorship to preserve order. A 
broad coalition including progressive and conservatives, Radicales del 1900, 
students, workers and the newly formed Partido Reformista finally succeeded 
in overthrowing the Tinoco dictatorship in August 1919. The liberal oligarchic 
hegemonic order was re-established without bloodshed.  
 
In 1923, Jorge Volio founded the Partido Reformista, which was the first 
political party to place the social question at the centre of political debates. 
Until the 1920s poverty was not a central argument in political debates (Sojo 
2010, De la Cruz 2009 and Viales and Fallas 2009). The liberal oligarchic re-
articulation of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary had framed poverty as 
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a general condition. Because the liberals framed poverty as an integrative 
condition uniting Costa Rican society, poverty was not used as a rationale for 
social mobilization (Sojo 2010: 56).  As Ronny Viales and Carlos Fallas 
(2009) argue, by claiming that Costa Rica was an egalitarian and 
homogenous society and by claiming that everyone was poor, they were 
indirectly saying that no one was poor as poverty is a relative concept (Viales 
and Fallas 2009:13). Costa Rica’s poverty had been discursively constructed 
as the key to its greatest virtue – its democratic nature.   
 
Going against the liberal oligarchic interpretation, Volio sought to make 
poverty a political issue. Volio developed his Christian democratic ideology 
while studying in the Catholic University of Lovaine - one of the most active 
centres of discussion of the social question at the time (Miranda Guitierrez 
2008: 77). The Partido Reformista’s platform included greater municipal 
autonomy, agrarian reform, formation of cooperatives, the creation of more 
programs to fight illiteracy, malnutrition and endemic diseases, the foundation 
of a National University and a more just system of taxation (Trejos 2008:199).   
 
Volio became the presidential candidate of the Partido Reformista during the 
1924 presidential elections.  He was competing against the conservative 
candidate Alberto Echandi and former president Jimenez. During the 1924 
presidential elections, none of the candidates reached the majority necessary 
to win the presidency. Congress had to decide between the two candidates 
with the most votes – Jimenez and Echandi. Jimenez convinced Volio to form 
an alliance with him in exchange for taking on board the Partido Reformista’s 
public health and labour protection policy proposals, granting the Partido 
Reformista three key cabinet positions, and creating an institution in charge of 
overseeing the protection of workers’ rights with regards to work-related 
accidents and sicknesses (Orlando Salazar Mora and Jorge Mario Salazar 
Mora 2010:78).  With Volio’s support, Jimenez became president (1924-1928) 
for the second time.  
 
The Partido Reformista was soon disbanded. Most party members 
disapproved of Volio’s alliance with Jimenez as they said this would only 
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serve to co-opt their reformist movement – as indeed happened.  In his 
second administration, Jimenez continued to pursue reformist measures – 
one of the most important being the creation of the National Insurance Bank  
– the forerunner of today’s National Insurance Institute (Miranda Guitierrez 
2008:80). He also continued to address concerns regarding the democratic 
deficit in Costa Rica by passing further electoral reforms.  In 1925, a new 
electoral law was passed that made voting secret. 
  
In 1928, Cleto Gonzalez Viquez was re-elected for a second term. His second 
administration was shaped by the impact of the Great Depression on Costa 
Rica’s economy and the emergence of the Costa Rican Communist Party.  
The Great Depression had devastating effects on Costa Rica’s economy as it 
did in the rest of the region.  By 1929, the United States was the main 
importer of Costa Rica’s coffee and bananas, buying 71% of Costa Rica’s 
total exports.  After the 1929 US stock market crash, banana exports and the 
price of coffee dropped drastically, devastating the Costa Rican economy. 
From 1929 to 1935 banana exports halved, going from 6 million to 3 million 
bunches per year.  Although the volume of coffee exports bounced back after 
a sharp drop, the international price of coffee dropped by more than half its 
original price from 1928 to 1932 and it remained low until 1935. From 1929 to 
1932, the value of Costa Rican exports fell from 18 million to 8 million dollars 
and that of imports fell from 20 million to 5 million dollars (Molina and Palmer 
2005:3).  Since 75% of Costa Rican state revenue came from import and 
export taxes, Costa Rica suffered a big fiscal deficit from 1929 until 1936 
(Botey Sobrado 2009:63).  In 1931, there was a 60% reduction in commercial 
sales.  The drop in sales, coupled with the lack of available credit, forced 
many small industries to shut down. This not only increased unemployment 
and pushed down wages, but also reduced the already limited supply of basic 
goods. The lack of industrial or agricultural diversification meant that Costa 
Rica had to import even basic goods and food supplies, making them 
excessively expensive for the poor (Lynn 2007:201).  
 
The big coffee processors, exporters, and financiers transferred their losses to 
the small producers by charging them more for processing their coffee or by 
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delaying their payment for the coffee they purchased from them (Yashar 
1997:64). Under these circumstances, many small landowners lost their lands 
to banks or the big coffee barons financiers when they were not able to repay 
their mortgages. This started a gradual process of proletarization (though 
significantly smaller than that experienced by South American countries 
during the early 20th Century).  Most of these small farmers joined the ranks of 
the unemployed or the underpaid. According to the 1932 Census of the 
Unemployed, 8,863 out of a 152,263 work force were unemployed. To 
contextualise this number, it is interesting to compare it to the results of the 
1927 Census of the Unemployed, which estimated 1,447 people unemployed 
(Hernandez 2009:12) .  (The numbers are particularly low, as the population 
did not reach half a million at the time and most people were peasants not 
calculated by these numbers).  
 
In keeping with the transformist logic, the Gonzalez Viquez administration 
responded to the growing demands of the recently organized urban workers 
unions and the pressure from reformist politicians by creating new institutions. 
In 1928 the Secretaria de Estado de los Despachos de Trabajo y Prevision 
Social was created to defuse the growing social tension between workers and 
capital (Hernandez 2009:11).  This office was assigned the task to create a 
labour code and to supervise the application of all the labour laws previously 
passed. The Patronato Nacional de la Infancia and the Servicio Nacional de 
Electricidad were also created. Paternalistic charity associations managed by 
the private sector sprung up throughout the country.   
 
As the economic situation deteriorated, unemployment continued to rise. This 
was highest amongst urban workers in small industries located in the capital, 
and former employees of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) in Limon – the 
Atlantic costal area. Instead of firing government employees, the government 
reduced their salaries. The sector that suffered most from these wage 
reductions were teachers and low ranking bureaucrats. The “new proletariat”, 
the UFCO banana enclave workers, and the teachers were the social sectors 
that proved most receptive to communist ideas circulating Latin America. 
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Emergence of the Costa Rican Communist Party 
A group of law students from the Escuela de Derecho led by Manuel Mora, 
Jaime Cerdas, Ricardo Coto, Gonzalo Monter and a member of the 1900 
radical intellectuals, Carmen Lyra,26   founded a Marxist think-tank called 
Accion Revolucionaria de Cultura Obrera in 1929.  They were joined by a 
group of workers including Gonzalo Montero Berry and Carlos Marin Obando.  
Together they founded the Costa Rican Communist Party CRCP on June 16, 
1931. This group was frustrated by the fact that, despite the severe socio-
economic crisis triggered by the Great Depression  (which according to them 
proved the inherent faults of the capitalist development), no one was 
questioning the socio-economic and political model. Deeply disillusioned with 
the previous reformist movements, they were convinced that the only way of 
solving the Costa Rican crisis was through revolutionary means.  
 
In 1931, they founded the newspaper Trabajo to diffuse their counter-
hegemonic discourse.  They argued that Costa Rica was not the exceptional, 
homogenous, egalitarian, democratic society that the liberal oligarchs 
claimed. While they accepted the liberal oligarchic interpretation of the 
colonial period, they offered a Marxist interpretation of its history following 
Costa Rica’s insertion into the international capitalist system during the 1830s 
(Botey 2009).  They stated Costa Rica’s insertion into the capitalist system 
through the coffee-based export development model unleashed the inevitable 
process of creating two distinct antagonistic blocks within society – the 
workers and landless peasants versus the coffee oligarchs, the financiers, 
and foreign investors.  With the state faithfully serving the interest of the 
capitalists, capitalism’s greed had destroyed the colonial egalitarian, peaceful, 
homogenous, and democratic society.  They argued that only communism 
could make Costa Rica become a truly egalitarian and democratic society 
(Botey 2009:273).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Molina (2005) argues that Carmen Lyra was the only Radical del 1900 to join the 
communist party because she was the only member who had been neglected by the 
liberal oligarchs due to her gender.  Despite being a brilliant woman, the Olympians 
did not give her a significant position in their administrations. 
	   120	  
Re-articulation of the Juan Santamaria Myth  
In order to make their communist discourse more appealing to the Costa 
Rican population, the CRCP members sought to link their political project to 
the most popular myth - the Juan Santamaria myth – in the process re-
articulating this myth. In the article entitled “Juan Santamaria and today’s 
filibusters” in the Trabajo edition of the 5th of September 1931, they created 
equivalential links between Cleto Gonzalez Viquez’s policies, the previous 
liberal oligarchic administrations’ policies and the actions committed by 
William Walker: 
What constructive work of freedom to Costa Rica can we offer in memory 
of the soldiers who died defending our Independence?  Is it perhaps the 
giving away of one fourth of our territory to the United Fruit Company and 
Golfo Dulce Costa Rican Land Company?  Is it getting Costa Rican 
indebted to carry out expensive infrastructure at the cost of the wellbeing 
of its people?  Is it giving control of the Atlantic Railroad and the Port of 
Limon to the UFCO?  The fate of Costa Rica is today in the hands of 
filibusters a thousand times worse than those of 56.  Their heirs of the 
great act of the heroic soldiers have not preserved the Independence that 
he died defending. The craving for wealth of some and the ignorance and 
indifference of the majority have destroyed the freedom he helped win for 
us with the sacrifice of his life.  Walker and the troop of freebooters who 
followed him tried to enslave Central America.  Juan Santamaria, one of 
the most humble soldiers of the Costa Rican troops, whom their bosses 
maybe judged only good for playing the drums, became one of the most 
powerful forces acting against that odious threat.  Something as 
insignificant as a wood stick with a rag soaked in alcohol became an 
instrument of liberation. (Trabajo – September 5, 1931). 
 
Juan Santamaria was no longer portrayed as a submissive figure selflessly 
accepting the commands of his superiors, but rather as a revolutionary agent. 
They highlight the fact that he had used a rudimentary weapon to show that 
anyone could fight. Creating equivalantial chains between Walker and the 
capitalist class, this newspaper article argued that Costa Rica’s liberty was 
once again threatened by the greed of the imperialist powers (US companies 
operating in Costa Rica), the capitalist elite, and the ignorance of the 
multitudes.  It was the mission of the workers to follow the example of Juan 
Santamaria and regain Costa Rica’s liberty by fighting the capitalist 
oppressors and the “capitalist puppets” dominating the Costa Rican state. 
Through this new interpretation, they sought to legitimize anti-institutional 
channels of political mobilization.   
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Political mobilization through a discourse using the logic of equivalence  
 
The CRCP leaders argued that the isolated union strikes during the first two 
decades of the 20th century had been limited by the particularistic nature of 
their demands.  Although the shoemakers, the carpenters, banana enclave 
workers, and railroad workers had obtained their specific demands, they had 
failed to see the big picture. These isolated strikes led to reformist actions by 
the government, which only served to de-politicize the masses. The CRCP 
sought to create equivalential chains amongst these disparate groups.  An 
example of this is seen in the article “Only through mass protests and general 
strikes can the proletariat protest the violent reduction in their wages” in the 
March 10th 1935 edition of Trabajo:  
The drivers have been the first to object to the change in the exchange 
rate. As soon as the exchange rate changed, the costs of gasoline 
increased. The drivers union […] has raised a complaint to the Secreteria 
de Hacienda and seems ready to strike to demand the lowering of the 
cost of gasoline. But the drivers are only focusing on one aspect – the 
most visible to them. […] They are worried about the raise in cents of the 
cost of gasoline, without noticing that their cost of living has increased by 
25%, which means that the driver, the carpenter, the government 
employee, and all those who depend on their salaries to survive, are 
having a REAL reduction in their purchasing power. We are witnessing 
the sharpening of a collective misery for the masses that has existed 
since the 1929 crisis.  How are we going to fight? Doing what the drivers 
are doing focusing on our individual issues. No! […] We believe that the 
demand to “lower the price of gasoline” is not enough. We are certain that 
to succeed we need to place the problem in its right dimension and to 
create a united front to fight for all the demands of our class [...] We must 
use the unsurpassable weapon of the proletariat, which is the general 
strike.  The Communist Party will begin immediately to mobilize the 
exploited masses around the demands of an immediate increase in 
salaries, a reduction in the cost of living, a control on speculative moves 
by sales people who are taking advantage of scarcity, and a control on the 
exchange rate (Trabajo - March 10, 1935).  
 
Using the logic of equivalence, the CRCP leaders sought to create unity 
amongst heterogeneous social groups by linking their specific demands 
equivalentially vis-à-vis a common enemy – “the capitalist state”. They sought 
to create a new political identity – “the oppressed proletariat” - by transforming 
these specific demands into “popular demands”27.  By doing so, they were 
seeking to constitute the “people” as a potential historical actor. The CRCP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Laclau defines popular demands as “a plurality of demands which, through their 
equivalential articulation, constitute a broader social subjectivity”. (Laclau 2005:74) 
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leaders realized that the creation of this new political identity would require an 
intense discursive campaign.  They conducted this campaign alongside other 
tactics. 
 
Foiled kidnap attempt of President Cleto Gonzalez Viquez by CRCP 
leaders 
During the first years, the CRCP leaders argued that only radical actions 
could bring real results. In fact, one of the first plans made by the founding 
members of the party was to kidnap the president. They wanted to keep him 
hostage in the National Theatre until he signed a list of pro-worker decrees 
including unemployment benefits.28  The kidnapping attempt was foiled when 
one of the communists told the police about this plan. Gonzales Viquez chose 
not to imprison the potential kidnappers or confront them publicly. One of the 
plotters was Jaime Cerdas a founding member of the CRCP. In his memoirs, 
Cerdas recounts a meeting he had with the president one month after the 
foiled kidnap attempt. Cerdas went to ask the president to send to Congress a 
petition to allow the CRCP to participate in the 1932 congressional elections. 
According to Cerdas, the president asked him: “Why do you want to 
participate in elections when you wanted to kidnap me?” Cerdas writes that he 
was initially shocked that the president knew about the plan, but he then 
admitted it.  According to Jaime Cerdas’ account, the president then said:  
Look, my friend, we were discussing this issue in the government 
because we knew from the beginning about your plot.  And I want to 
tell you this so you understand in what type of country you are living.  
There were two sides.  One side that argued that we should catch you 
red-handed, and another one, headed by me, that argued against 
that.  I said: “Let’s stop this.  These are well-intentioned sincere young 
men.  They are hot-headed men who want to fix this, only by the 
wrong means. We can stop the plot. Let’s leave them alone. Why 
should we ruin the lives of these young men? (Cerdas 1993:58). 
  
Through this type of non-antagonistic discourse president Gonzalez Viquez 
sought to de-radicalize the young CRCP leader.  The president knew that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This group of communist later argued that foreign communists including Adolfo 
Branas Rosas from Asturias and Gerardo Zuniga Montufar former coronel from the 
Chilean army were the ones that had convinced them to do this  – in a typical attempt 
to blame foreigners for radical views.  	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imprisoning the communists would have only served to create more hostility 
towards his administration and potentially could have been used by the CRCP 
to mobilize people.  He portrays the CRCP plotters as “sincere, well 
intentioned, hot-headed” young men who “want to fix this, only through a 
mistaken path”.  Through these words, the president wanted to show Cerdas 
that he understood the frustrations of the CRCP leaders. He argued that while 
he agreed that the current situation was unacceptable, he disagreed with the 
means proposed by the CRCP.  He reinforced this message in various public 
speeches. By reassuring the people that he was aware of their plight and by 
creating ad hoc institutions to address specific demands, the president sought 
to reduce the ability of the CRCP to mobilize people.  Gonzalez Viquez also 
wanted to integrate the CRCP into Costa Rica’s institutional system.  He 
agreed to send the petition to Congress as Cerdas requested.  
 
However, on the 7th of October 1931, Congress voted against allowing the 
CRCP from participating in the 1932 elections by 18 votes against and 14 in 
favour.  The rationale given by Congress was the following: 1) the CRCP did 
not have a presidential candidate; 2) it wanted to change the social 
organization which meant changing the Constitution and thus it was an 
unconstitutional party; and 3) it was violent and radical (Merino del Rio 1996: 
32).  La Gaceta of July 1st, 1931, argued that the CRCP was banned because 
of its “international tendencies that were adverse to two main axis of our legal 
and political system – private property and the sovereignty of the State” 
(quoted by Vladimir Cruz 1980:28). However, the fact that 14 Congressmen 
out of 32 voted in favour of the CRCP’s participation in the elections is 
remarkable when we compare this result with the coercive suppression and 
illegalization of communist parties in the rest of Central America. Many liberal 
oligarchs including former president and member of the Grupo del Olimpo 
Ricardo Jimenez (1910-1914 and 1924-1928) and the owner of the Diario de 
Costa Rica newspaper Otilio Ulate conducted a very active campaign in 
favour of allowing the CRCP to participate in the elections.  In the Diario de 
Costa Rica edition of October 8th 1931, Jiménez stated:  
 If the Constitution guarantees (the communists) the liberty of 
expression, if they can write their propaganda, why can they not 
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participate in elections?  We will not be promoting a revolution by 
allowing them to participate.  On the contrary, we should not create 
political martyrs because sentimentalism can lead the people to 
support those they see as victims (Diario de Costa Rica – October 8, 
1931).  
 
Jimenez argued that it was essential to channel all political forces through 
institutional means to prevent them from becoming more radical and posing a 
real threat to the system. Communism had to be fought through reason and 
not with bullets, as creating martyrs would only make communism grow 
stronger. Jimenez hoped to co-opt the communists as he had done with the 
reformist movement.  
 
During the 1931-1937 period, the CRCP wanted to avoid being co-opted at all 
costs.  In the first edition of Trabajo published on July 14, 1931, they justified 
their desire to participate in the 1932 municipal and congressional elections 
by stating that it was a necessary evil and not an end goal.  They argued the 
CRCP knew they would never achieve power through the ballot box. They 
chose to go to elections in order to use the propaganda surrounding the 
electoral process, as well as potential congressional seats to create a political 
social consciousness amongst the masses and prepare them for the eventual 
revolution (Merino del Rio 1996: 31).  
 
The public support for Ricardo Jimenez’s reformist views were evident by the 
presidential results of the February 14, 1932 elections. Jimenez’s newly 
formed Partido Republicano Independiente - an offshoot of the Partido 
Republicano - received 46.7% of the votes.  Manuel Quesada of the Union 
Republicana received 29.1%, Carlos Maria Jimenez of the Republican Party 
22.8% and Max Koberg Boleni of the Partido Nacionalista 1.4% of the votes. 
Voter turnout was 64.2%. Ricardo Jimenez’s Independent National 
Republican Party also won control of Congress. 
 
Ricardo Jimenez administration (May 1932- May 1936) 
During his administration, Jimenez pursued a dual strategy of de-radicalizing 
the communists by integrating them into the political system and making 
reformist institutional changes, while at the same time encouraging the anti-
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communist campaign conducted by liberal oligarchic intellectuals, coffee 
oligarchs and the Costa Rican Catholic Church.  During his third 
administration, the Oficina Tecnica del Trabajo was founded with the mandate 
of regulating labour disputes and assisting in the negotiation of conflicts. The 
Instituto de la Defensa del Café was created to regulate the price that coffee 
processors and exporters would buy the coffee fruit at from small farmers, 
which was the biggest source of tension between small farmers and coffee 
barons.  His administration sought to appease the landless peasants by giving 
away 100,000 hectares of public land.  It also sought to end the sporadic 
strikes by forcing companies to make concessions to workers such as a 
minimum wage and respecting the 8-hour workdays for morning workers and 
6 hours for night workers.  
 
Costa Rican Communist Party’s strikes  
On May 28th 1932, the communists organized a meeting to examine two 
projects being discussed in Congress – one on minimum wage and another 
on unemployment benefits. Approximately 1000 people attended the meeting.  
The police imprisoned dozens of communist agitators and fined the 
organizers Manuel Mora, Jaime Cerdas and Luis Carballo. Jimenez 
personally ordered the immediate release of the prisoners.   
 
On May 22, 1933, the communists organized another strike of the 
unemployed.  The Jimenez administration responded by exiling foreign 
communist activists including the Spaniard Adolfo Brana - one of the founders 
of the CRCP. The Venezuelan Romulo Betancourt managed to escape and 
thus avoided deportation. Jimenez blamed these foreigners for radicalizing 
the young Costa Rican communists in an attempt to co-opt the young Costa 
Rican communist leaders by not blaming them. 
 
Jimenez argued that the inclusion of the CRCP into the political system would 
have a positive impact on Costa Rica’s democratic development by de-
radicalizing them.  He then sought to absorb the workers’ demands through 
institutional means.  Jimenez was one of the political leaders who lobbied the 
most to convince Congress and the general public of the wisdom of allowing 
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the CRCP to participate in elections, and was instrumental in allowing the 
communists to participate in the December 1932 municipal elections, with the 
only condition placed on them being that they change their name.  They 
agreed to change it to the Workers and Farmers Party WFP (Bloque de 
Obreros y Campesinos).  That same day in the Trabajo newspaper, they re-
assured their followers that the only thing changing was their name.  (This 
dissertation will continue using CRCP for the sake of simplicity.) 
 
In the December 1932 municipal elections, the CRCP won two seats for the 
San Jose municipality - Brana and Guillermo Fernandez. In the February 11, 
1934, congressional elections, it won two congressional seats (Manuel Mora 
Valverde and Efrain Jimenez Guerrero). It also won more seats in the 
municipality of San Jose. Jimenez subsequently started to shift his discourse 
leftwards to appeal to potential communist sympathisers. The reaction of the 
CRCP to this strategy can be seen in the following article of the May 5th, 1935 
edition of Trabajo: 
In the presidential message delivered to Congress the first of May we 
find a sensational message that has made much commotion.  The 
president said: “The Costa Rican administrations have been applying for 
a long time socialist measures.” Those measures, as we will discuss do 
not deserve that name.  But it is interesting that a Manchestarian liberal 
like the current president Jimenez would proclaim the socialist nature of 
certain policies adopted by the Costa Rican state.  Four or five years 
ago neither the president nor any other member of the capitalist state 
would have dared to say this in Costa Rica, but today when the socialist 
ideas have entered the bone and marrow of the Costa Rican masses, 
today when the wisest and more conscious sectors of the proletariat 
fights under the socialist flag, the president has opted for a strategy […] 
to cover with the prestigious banner of socialism the discredited 
bourgeois politics (Trabajo – May 5, 1935).  
 
The CRCP were concerned that Jimenez would once again co-opt leftist 
movements by “covering with the prestigious banner of socialism the 
discredited bourgeois politics” (Trabajo May 5 1935).  The CRCP warned their 
followers not to fall into that trap. 
 
The 1934 “Banana Strike” (Huelga Bananera) in the Atlantic region 
against the United Fruit Company  
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From August to September 1934, the CRCP helped organize the most violent 
strike in the history of Costa Rica – the Huelga Bananera - directed against 
the United Fruit Company (UFCO), not the government.  The banana workers 
were demanding higher wages, to be paid in cash as opposed to stamps that 
could only be used in the UFCO’s stores, better working conditions (including 
sufficient medical supplies on site to deal with common problems such as 
poisonous snake bites and better hygiene), better housing and better overall 
living conditions.  
 
The government was initially divided over how to respond. Labour Secretary 
Herrera argued in favour of a negotiated settlement to ensure social peace.  
Another faction led by Foreign Minister Raul Guardian stated that the 
communist threat was too high and that an anti-communist coalition was 
needed.  He formed the Anti-Communist League that lobbied in favour of 
sending the Costa Rican army to suppress the communist-led movement 
(Miller 1996: 61). Jimenez objected to this course of action. Instead, he 
positioned himself as a neutral negotiator between the UFCO and the banana 
workers.  He forced the UFCO to sign a new contract, which included all the 
demands of the banana workers. The UFCO signed the contract and then 
sought to break it, as had been its common practice before.  The communists 
organized the strikers again and ordered their followers to escalate the 
violence.  They started putting dynamite under the bridges used by the UFCO 
to take the banana crop to the ports. To these violent acts, Jimenez 
responded by ordering the imprisonment of those committing them, but at the 
same time, he forced the UFCO to respect the agreement.   
 
The CRCP immediately started advertising the strike as a communist victory.  
In the Trabajo articles of that period they stated that its success was due to 
the following: a) the determination of the communist activists organized by 
Carlos Fallas; b) the ceaseless efforts by Manuel Mora to convince Congress 
and the President to act in the favour of the banana workers; and c) their 
mass propaganda to convince the general public of the legitimacy of their 
demands.  Indeed, the attention devoted by the communist and the liberal 
oligarchic press to the Huelga Bananera highlighting the misery of the banana 
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workers in the Atlantic region allowed the CRCP to show the contingency of 
the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  The exceptionalist collective 
imaginary had neglected this region and instead had focused on the Central 
Valley only. During several months the Huelga Bananera became the most 
discussed topic amongst political actors and Costa Rican newspapers.  A 
growing consensus emerged that more active state intervention was needed 
to address the social question and avert future strikes.  
 
CRCP strategies during the Jimenez administration  
The CRCP adopted a dual strategy as explained by an article written on the 
May 5, 1935 edition of Trabajo: 
The PC does not deny the importance of legislative action to lower the 
cost of living [...] But our party does not forget the lessons learnt from 
the international experience of class struggle.  A social revolution is 
only obtained through direct mass actions, through strikes and using 
weapons […] The parliamentary route is less reliable. (Trabajo - May 5 
1935) 
 
While the CRCP leaders chose the legislative path to convince other 
Congressman to change specific laws, they incited general strikes to mobilize 
popular support for their counter-hegemonic project. The May 26, 1935 article 
of Trabajo: 
The workers already know that pleadings and appeals to fearful good 
heart cannot achieve anything. We need to respond to the rising cost of 
living with more strikes. In San Jose, in the short space of a week, 
unions have conducted three strikes. There is a general agitation of 
workers of all trades. This working-class consciousness is taking shape 
in the capital and it will probably extend to the country […]. These 
strikes arose spontaneously, isolated from each other, without a 
common direction that unifies them. This is due to a more visible failure 
of the labour movement in Costa Rica - the absence of unions in the 
country in all industries organized on the basis of revolutionary 
syndicalism (Trabajo - May 26, 1935). 
Unions were carrying out strikes, but these unions had not created 
equivalential chains with each other.  The communists argued that it was 
necessary to create a unified labour movement headed by the CRCP. They 
sought to unite the Confederacion de Obreros, the Confederación General de 
Trabajadores, the Federación Obrera, the Sociedad de Ebanistas y 
Carpinteros and other small trade unions into a single trade union called the 
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Confederación de Trabajadores de Costa Rica CTCR. Only by creating a 
united front could these individual associations form a counter-hegemonic 
block. In the same article, the CRCP stated:  
What are the practices common in this area? The pro-worker leaders 
became Congressmen on the shoulders of hope and faith of the 
workers to lose their revolutionary impetus as soon as they came in 
contact with the blandishments of the bourgeois factions. Fernandistas, 
Reformistas, […] agreed to make concessions to the bourgeois 
parliamentary groups. Our members have broken that unfair tradition. 
In Congress, they have continued to act as before they entered it 
(Trabajo - May 26, 1935). 
The communists fought against the attempts being made by the liberals to co-
opt them. They argued that their movement would not follow the path taken by 
the previous reformist movements, which had been absorbed by the 
hegemonic order.  Up until 1937, the communists continued to believe that 
forming an alliance with reformist sectors of Costa Rican society was to 
commit treason to their cause. They argued that their goal was not limited to 
making changes to the political system but starting a radical social revolution. 
On March 29, 1936, an article of Trabajo stated:  
 
For the Marxist revolution means transforming the foundations of social 
life, for which it is considered essential to purify the mentality of the 
masses of their false consciousness and instead infuse them with real 
cultural action. We have said a thousand times that we pursue a social 
revolution and not simply a political revolution  (Trabajo - March 29, 
1936). 
 
The communist leaders argued that in order for their social revolution to 
succeed, the CRCP had to participate in the liberal political system, but 
without forgetting its Marxist goal. For the 1936 presidential elections, the 
communists nominated Carlos Luis Saenz as their candidate. In his 
acceptance speech reproduced in aJanuary 12, 1936 article of Trabajo he 
stated:   
I understand the honour and responsibility that the CRCP has granted 
me.  Without doubt or hesitation I accept it because I am convinced of 
the historical mission of the world proletariat- the revolutionary 
introduction of the socialist, classless society, in other words the 
transformation of social structure in accordance with Marxist doctrine. 
[...]. I have never been a traitor to my class [...] I've never been an 
instrument of the bourgeois democracy. I have never been corrupted by 
its gold (Trabajo - January 12, 1936). 
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Saenz vehemently argued that he would not be co-opted by the “bourgeois 
democracy” or “corrupted” by its gold as the previous reformist leaders had 
been. 
 
1936 Presidential Elections 
Carlos Luis Saenz was running against the staunch anti-communist 
conservative oligarchic candidate Leon Cortes and the more progressive 
liberal oligarchic candidate Octavio Beeche. Both Cortes and Beeche’s 
campaigns argued that the communists posed a grave threat to Costa Rica’s 
democracy.  Communism was an extremist ideology incompatible with the 
moderate and consensual Costa Rican nature. The CRCP responded with 
arguments such as the one used in the article of Trabajo newspaper on July 
7th, 1935:  
 
Communist doctrines are not exotic in Costa Rica as they are not in any 
country where the capitalist regime plunders and murders the producing 
masses […] What is the doctrine that operates in the bourgeoisie system 
that is contrary to communism? Bourgeois liberalism. And this ideology is 
natively Costa Rican?  Did a Costa Rican from Limon or San Jose come up 
with this doctrine? Unquestionably, not. (Trabajo - July 7, 1935) 
 
 
The CRCP party leaders attacked the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
equating Costa Rica with all capitalist oppressive regimes. They then sought 
to show the contingency of the liberal oligarchic hegemonic discourse arguing 
that it was as “alien” to Costa Rica as any doctrine. This crisis narrative was 
not widely accepted as is evident by the results of the 1936 presidential 
elections.  
Leon Cortes administration (May 1936- May 1940) 
On February 9 1936, Leon Cortes won the presidential elections receiving 
60.2% of the votes. Octavio Beeche of the Partido Nacional came in a distant 
second with 34.5% of the votes. The communist came last with only 5.5% of 
the votes. Voter turnout was estimated at 68.8%.  Cortes’ party also won the 
Congressional majority.  The Beechistas and the communists argued that the 
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Cortesistas had committed fraud.29 However, neither one sought to mobilize 
their supporters to challenge the electoral results. To their poor electoral 
results the communist leaders responded the following way as shown in the 
article on the Trabajo edition on March 29, 1936: 
 
The petty bourgeois mentality that cannot distinguish between the political 
and the social see these past elections as a disaster for the communists. 
[…] However, we know that the fundamental thing is not the political.  We 
believe that we are conducting a revolution even if we have not obtained 
political power because we are intellectually preparing the masses for a 
future decisive action […] We know the masses have not responded to the 
extent we had wanted. We must correct our past mistakes and change our 
methods to continue advancing with more efficiency. Gaining political 
power is thus not for us the revolution, but rather a way of pursuing the 
revolution.  The Russian Revolution is still in progress. They are building 
the bases for the new culture. [...] But it is a culture that is real because it is 
based on the economic wellbeing of the masses and not of the few as in 
the capitalist system (Trabajo  - March 29, 1936). 
 
The CRCP argued that their real goal was not merely to obtain political power 
but to incite a social revolution.  After the 1936 elections, they acknowledged 
that to do so they needed to develop a new narrative that was not perceived 
as incompatible with the Costa Rican sense of national identity. They 
therefore developed the comunismo a la tica myth.  
Emergence of the comunismo a la tica myth 
The first time Manuel Mora used the term “Costa Rican communism”, which 
was later coined comunismo a la tica, was right after the 1936 presidential 
elections.  Mora stated: 
 
We Costa Ricans need what we can call a Costa Rican communism: 
that is a Communist Party that can interpret the national reality and 
adjust their slogans and methods of struggle to this reality. From now 
on our goal will be to build a “comunismo a la tica” in that sense. 
Anyone who opposes the realization of this strategy is not a true 
Costa Rican Communist (quoted by Merino 1996:58).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 According to Ivan Molina, the fact that Jimenez made voting mandatory during the 
1936 presidential and parliamentary elections corrected the inflated percentage 
received by the communists in previous elections due to low voter turnouts. The 
Catholic Church also conducted an extremely active anti-communist, pro-voting 
campaign which proved very successful to counter the traditional political apathy.  	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The CRCP shifted strategy away from attacking the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary to trying to redefine it.  To do this they had to re-articulate the most 
influential myth amongst the masses, the Juan Santamaria myth. This can be 
seen in the April 19, 1936 edition of Trabajo entitled “The people and their 
traditions”:  
 
The Costa Rican people have their heroic traditions including the 1856 War 
and the sacrifice of Juan Santa Maria.  But up to now these have been 
dead traditions - things of the past disconnected from historical processes 
with consequences in our present.  The 1856 war was one of the most 
brilliant anti-imperialist and anti-slave wars known in the continent’s 
history. But we are used to seeing the 1856 war as a simple defeat of the 
invading yanquis [...]  This cannot go on like this because history is already 
preparing something else.  Today Costa Rica has a progressive movement 
capable of interpreting these historic processes and capable of giving the 
1856 war its real meaning. That movement is the Communist Party.[…] 
The 1856 war is our war.  We are the authentic heirs of its anti-
imperialist tradition. The soldier, Juan is our best symbol. Costa Rica 
has good traditions and it would be the new generation’s fault if these 
traditions cease to nourish the minds of the Costa Rican people (Trabajo - 
April 19, 1936). 
 
The CRCP re-articulated the 1856 war myth in a different way than in 1931. 
Instead of comparing Walker with the existing government to show the lack of 
liberty that the Costa Ricans endured, they adopted the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary’s perception of Costa Rica as having “good traditions” 
worthy of being defended.  They then presented themselves as the most 
qualified political actors to protect this tradition. The Febrary 20th, 1937 edition 
of Trabajo stated:  
This raises for us all lovers of democracy and especially the Costa 
Rican Communist Party, which is the most effective and the most active 
defender of our democracy, the urgency of putting as our first priority 
the affirmation and the expansion of democracy […] For this end, it is 
essential to give economic content to our democracy in order to include 
the masses in our political deliberations. Only through active 
participation of the masses will our democratic regime flourish (Trabajo 
- February 20, 1937). 
 
We see a shift in the relative weight attributed to the elements of meaning of 
their discursive formation.  They now placed democracy as opposed to class 
struggle as the most important element. They then sought to redefine the 
concept of democracy by changing its liberal interpretation to a Marxist one. 
They stated that only a socialist regime that could increase socio-economic 
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equality could make Costa Rica truly democratic (Merino 1996: 51). They 
argued that there was no contradiction between democracy and socialism as 
the liberal oligarchic discourse claimed, but rather that socialism was the key 
to democracy. Mora stated:  
 
Socialism is not the enemy of liberty or democracy. On the contrary, 
socialism is a realistic defender of democracy. But I ask, are liberty, 
equality and fraternity tangible realities within liberal society? Undoubtedly 
no.  Until the postulates of liberal democracy have no economic content, 
they will have no life (in pamphlet entitled Three Speeches made in 
Defense of Democracy by Manuel Mora printed 1937). 
 
They also sought to counter the attack made by their opponents that 
communism was incompatible with Costa Rica’s national identity.  In the same 
speech Mora states: 
 
I declare that if I believed that the fulfilment of the principles of the doctrine I 
uphold threatened in any way our country’s freedom or the essence of our 
human personality, I would be the most fierce opponent of socialism. I feel 
burning in my soul, like fire flowing through my veins, the ideals of liberty 
and democracy. And I think it is because I am a Costa Rican, an authentic 
Costa Rican, because in my veins flows the blood of the old Costa Ricans, 
who fought and sacrificed themselves in order to build the institutions we 
have today. That is why I will fight with all my might to defend Costa Rica’s 
democracy without thereby contradicting my ideas or my temper [...] And 
back to the topic of the newly consolidated regime in the Soviet Union - if 
the leaders of that country were trying to maintain a dictatorship, for the 
sake of keeping power - we Socialists, at least I can speak for myself - I 
would call them traitors to the socialist cause (Mora 1937: 7). 
 
Mora combined elements of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary with 
Marxist elements. While stating that he felt “running through his veins” the 
democratic institutional tradition of Costa Rica’s liberal founding fathers, he 
then placed the Soviet Union as the model to be followed. He sought to hide 
the inherent contradiction between Marxist discourse and the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary by re-interpreting the meaning of democracy.  An article in 
the November 28, 1936 edition of Trabajo, praises the new constitution in the 
Soviet Union.  The article states: 
 
Stalin declared: “This is the most democratic Constitution of the world.” 
Stalin said that the principal purpose of the new constitution was the 
elimination of dictatorial forms of power and to give the people direct 
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influence and participation in public administration and political power as 
well as to re-establish freedom of press, speech and suffrage. Stalin said 
“Our new socialist democratic constitution is the most valuable asset in the 
fight against fascism.  It will serve as an inspiration for all the people 
fighting against fascism and trying to maintain democracy  (Trabajo - 
November 28, 1936). 
Therefore, their definition of democracy was an idealized interpretation of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union - not the liberal interpretation. This distinction was 
made abundantly clear in the newspaper Trabajo.  When talking about the 
new Constitution in the Soviet Union, Mora stated in the December 5th, 1936 
edition of Trabajo: “upon these (Soviet) bases it is possible to promote true 
liberty and true individualism”.  
This proves that the current dominant view that argues that after 1936 the 
CRCP became a “fervent defender of Costa Rica’s democracy” (Quesada 
2008, Molina 2007, Cerdas 1995) needs to be qualified. The definition of 
democracy that the CRCP fervently defended was a Soviet democracy not a 
liberal oligarchic one. This is seen in the article of Trabajo dated December 
12, 1936: 
Is Marxism exotic to Costa Rica?  Marxism is universal and it 
responds to the necessities of a determined stage of human history. 
Society is a living organism that evolves according to its own laws.  
Marx discovered laws that are true to Costa Rica as well. […] (You 
can) build tall walls around our borders, isolate Costa Rica from the 
rest of the world, blind-fold everyone and cover the ears of all Costa 
Ricans.  Despite of all that, the self-employed will continue to 
disappear, the small properties will disappear as big property owners 
swallow them and the anarchy of capitalist production will continue 
bringing ruin to the country (Trabajo - December 12, 1936).  
Therefore, despite the shift in relative weight of the elements of meaning 
within its discursive formation, the communists still retained a Marxist 
conception of democracy. Mora downplayed the Marxist’s elements during his 
congressional speeches. The adoption of the comunismo a la tica discourse 
was well received by the broader Congress. Indeed, Mora’s Congressional 
speeches started to create an ideational shift in Costa Rica’s politics. This can 
be seen in the following excerpt of the December 19th, 1936 edition of 
Trabajo: 
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These sincere words by our Secretary General (Manuel Mora) were 
received with great sympathy by a group of Congressmen and by 
intellectuals. We know that they influenced in some way the motion 
presented by the Congressman Carlos Maria Jimenez.  The motion 
requested that a Commission be formed to elaborate a list of social laws.  
Carlos Maria Jimenez argued that he was convinced that the only way of 
obtaining social peace was by providing social justice to the masses. The 
motion was approved unanimously which reveals a new orientation in the 
Congress that we hope proves real (Trabajo - December 19, 1936). 
  
Costa Rica’s national ideational shift was triggered by the transformist 
response to the demands raised by the CRCP and by the progressive liberals’ 
reformist inclinations. Regarding this ideational shift, the Trabajo article on 
December 19th, 1936 states: 
 
The program outlined by Deputy Carlos Maria Jimenez has an outspoken 
leftist flavour. Many of his points are part of our party platform and other 
communist ones fit well. This goes to prove that our program and the 
general direction of our movement are in tune with the national reality. The 
first point, the compulsory social insurance, as raised by the Congressman 
Jimenez Ortiz has our support (Trabajo – December 19 1936). 
 
The CRCP no longer presented itself as a revolutionary movement. They 
sought to prove that their political project was in tune with Costa Rica’s 
“exceptionalism”. Mora did not specify the distinction between the CRCP’s 
conception of democracy and the liberal oligarchic one during his 
congressional speeches so as to increase the probability that the CRCP’s 
proposals would be accepted. This change in strategy proved to be effective, 
and the CRCP congressmen did in fact influence national political debates. 
Carlos Maria Jimenez’s proposal of the creation of compulsory social 
insurance set the stage for Congress’s later approval of Calderon Guardia’s 
proposal to create the National Social Security system in 1942.  
 
CRCP strategic shift after the Soviet shift to the Popular Front Strategy 
1936 
Mora took a three-month trip in January 1937 to Panama, Mexico and the 
United States to meet with other Latin American communist party leaders. 
Upon his return on March 27, 1937, Mora officially announced the adoption of 
the Popular Front Strategy. On January 30, 1937, Mora wrote in the Trabajo: 
 
	   136	  
No compromise? The history of Bolshevism before and after the 
October Revolution is full of instances of agreements and commitments 
with other parties, including the bourgeois parties. To wage a war to 
overthrow the international bourgeoisie, an extremely difficult, complex 
and lengthy war and to beforehand give up the possibility of taking 
advantage of the divisions between the bourgeois to create possible 
allies (just temporary alliances) is absolutely ridiculous […]. To obtain 
victory over a more powerful opponent is only possible by using all the 
forces at our disposal including taking advantage of the disagreements 
between our enemies […] He who does not understand this does not 
understand a word of Marxism or scientific socialism […] The question 
is how to apply this tactic without lowering the general level of class 
awareness and revolutionary spirit needed for a proletariat victory. It 
should be noted that the victory of the Bolsheviks demanded the 
application of tactics, agreements, and commitments […] not only 
before, but also even after the October Revolution of 1917 (Trabajo - 
January 30, 1937).  
 
This shows how, despite Mora’s claims that the CRCP did not follow Soviet 
directives, the CRCP leaders shifted strategies in accordance with Soviet 
policies. The CRCP argued that in order to pursue the Popular Front strategy 
without losing the revolutionary fervour of the masses, the CRCP leaders had 
to intensify their Marxist indoctrination by offering courses.  They offered the 
following courses as advertised in the May 1937 editions of Trabajo: 
 
“Course in General History of Socialism and social struggles” A. Ferreto. 
“The ABC of Communism” Rodolfo Guzman “Theme 1 Outline of social 
classes in Costa Rica - bourgeoisie and proletariat. Workers and artisans. 
Farmers and landowners.” Lesson 4 .. “Uneven development of capitalism. 
Features of imperialism.” Lesson 11 “Introduction to the political program 
and purpose of the CRCP”. “The current struggle at the international level 
of the various political groups. The Popular Front Strategy” (Trabajo - May 
1937). 
 
Therefore, the CRCP sought to prepare the Costa Rican “proletariat” for a 
future Marxist revolution.  Their desire to adhere to Soviet directives was also 
evident when the Soviets signed the Non Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany 
on August 23, 1939. The CRCP supported the Soviet decision arguing that 
the war was an “imperialist” battle that should be contained at all costs.  They 
pursued a strong anti-war stand.  Soon after Nazi Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union on June 22, 1942, the CRCP immediately became pro-war 
arguing that fascism posed an “existential threat” to the world and that all 
freedom-loving people had to unite to defend their way of life. 
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The Leon Cortes administration (1936-1940) and the “communist threat” 
Cortes’ opponents accused him of being a Nazi sympathizer.  Although this 
was never confirmed, one thing was certain – he was a fierce anti-communist.  
During the 1938 congressional elections, Manuel Mora, Carlos Luis Saenz, 
Jaime Cerdas and Efrain Jimenez won congressional seats.  Cortes decided 
to annul Saenz’s victory. The CRCP leaders warned their followers that this 
was a provocation by the Leon Cortes administration to incite the communists 
to violence.  The party leaders encouraged the communists not to give Cortes 
an excuse to make the CRCP illegal like all the other Central American 
leaders had done.  Instead, they urged their followers to focus on preparing 
for the 1940 presidential elections.  
 
By 1939 the communists acknowledged that the only way they could place 
themselves in a position of power was through an alliance with other 
progressive political actors. Jimenez had left the Partido Republicano 
Independiente to form a more progressive political party - the Partido 
Republicano Ricardista.  The communists asked Jimenez to form an alliance 
with the CRCP. After initially agreeing to form the alliance, Jimenez 
subsequently declined. According to Molina’s book Ricardo Jimenez (2009), 
Jimenez knew that his opponent Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia was too 
strong of a candidate for the Democratic Alliance to be able to defeat him.  
Calderon had the full backing of the main political party – the Republican 
Party - and the president’s support. Jimenez felt too old to wage an effective 
electoral campaign against the young and charismatic Rafael Angel Calderon.  
 
The CRCP announced the presidential candidacy of their party leader – 
Manuel Mora. During the 1940s electoral campaign, the CRCP consolidated 
their comunismo a la tica myth, emphasizing the elements of meaning derived 
from the “exceptionalist” myth while downplaying their pro-Soviet stance. This 
can be clearly seen in the 28th of January 1939 edition of Trabajo an article 
entitled “Costa Rican citizens of all social classes” stated: 
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It is the primary duty of all Costa Rican citizens to maintain and improve 
the honourable democratic traditions that we have inherited from our 
ancestors. During their time, they fought to provide our nation the 
highest human values of freedom and justice and to lead us towards 
economic and moral progress. It is now up to us to preserve and to 
protect those traditions against any threat whatever its source.  We must 
occupy our rightful place in the struggle for the maintenance of human 
decency only compatible with the full exercise of freedom and the full 
enjoyment of Justice (Trabajo - January 28, 1939). 
 
Therefore, during the 1940 presidential election, the CRCP presented 
themselves as the true defenders of Costa Rica’s democratic traditions, 
consolidating the comunismo a la tica myth.  The fact that former President 
Jimenez considered forming an alliance with the CRCP for the 1940s 
presidential election shows that other political leaders accepted the myth as 
well. Jimenez recognized the de-radicalizing power that this myth exerted on 
both the communists’ sympathizers as well as their opponents.  The next 
chapter explores how this myth was used by Mora to form an alliance with the 




The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary shaped political dynamics during the 
first three decades of the 20th Century by facilitating the absorption of the 
demands of the Radicales del 1900 and the members of the Partido 
Reformista into the expanding liberal oligarchic hegemony. This process led 
to further democratic institutional development. The dislocatory effect of the 
Great Depression encouraged a group of law students, workers and a former 
member of the Radicales del 1900 to form the CRCP. They created the first 
political discourse in the country’s history, directly challenging the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary and seeking to divide Costa Rican society 
into two irreconcilable antagonistic poles. Influenced by the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary, presidents Gonzalez Viquez and Jimenez adopted co-
optive strategies to address the communist threat as opposed to the 
oppressive and ruthless strategies adopted by the Guatemalan dictator Jorge 
Ubico, the Salvadorean dictator Maximiliano Hernandez, the Hondurean 
dictator Tiburco Carias Andino, and Anastasio Somoza Garcia.  Realizing that 
their typical Marxist crisis narrative would never be accepted by the Costa 
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Rican population due to its incompatibility with the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary, the CRCP decided to include elements of the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary into their Marxist narrative.  They thus developed the 
comunismo a la tica myth.  With this new strategy, the CRCP leaders were 
able to increase the influence of the communist discourse. Manuel Mora’s 
congressional speeches encouraged a national ideational shift. By the late 
1930s, the limits of the liberal oligarchic regime were widely recognized and 
the liberal oligarchs were not able to re-establish their hegemony, with their 
liberal discourse becoming one of the many battling for hegemony.  The next 
chapter explores how the hegemonic battles fought during the 1940s created 
the discursive condition of possibility of the 1948 Civil War. 
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There have been transplanted to our country certain doctrines that are clearly 
repugnant to the ideology of Costa Ricans and their religious faith […] besides 
being a mortal threat to our traditions of order, peace and harmony, the 
communists are other great opportunists whose central aim is to establish leftist 
dictatorships throughout the world.  
Social Democrata newspaper  
12th of April 1947   
 
 
Chapter 4  
The discursive condition of possibility for the 1948 Civil War 
 
The dislocation of the liberal oligarchic order during the 1930s encouraged the 
proliferation of new political actors battling for hegemony. During the 1940s, 
the two most influential new political actors were the Christian Democratic 
Generación de los años 40 led by President Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia 
(1940-1944), and the Social Democratic coalition (composed of an intellectual 
arm led by Professor Roberto Brenes Mesen and Rodrigo Facio under the 
Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales (Centristas), and a political 
arm led by Jose Figueres under the Acción Demócrata/Partido Social 
Demócrata). The hegemonic battles fought between these two new political 
actors, the communists, the conservatives, and the progressive liberals were 
influenced by the sweeping changes in the international ideational context as 
a result of World War II followed by the Cold War.  
This chapter traces the emergence of the conditions of possibility for the 1948 
Civil War in a society that prided itself for being “exceptional” for its peaceful, 
egalitarian, homogenous and innately democratic nature.  It argues that the 
mounting opposition to the Calderon Guardia (1940-1944) and Teodoro 
Picado (1944-1948) administrations due to allegations of electoral fraud, 
corruption, nepotism and mismanagement, as well as the growing influence of 
the CRCP in Costa Rican politics and the polarizing effect of the international 
ideational context during World War II and the Cold War enabled the Social 
Democratic revolutionaries to transform peaceful citizens into revolutionary 
agents.  This transformation was greatly helped along by the crisis narrative, 
which argued that the Caldero-comunista regime was threatening Costa 
Rica’s “exceptional” democratic national identity. 
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The chapter is divided in four sections. Section one traces the downfall of 
Calderon Guardia (1940-1944) from his winning the presidential elections with 
the biggest margin in Costa Rica’s history (84.5% of the votes) and being 
portrayed as “the greatest reformer in Costa Rica’s history” by his followers to 
his being presented as a “despotic dictator” or a “puppet of the communists” 
by his opponents.  Section two explores the strategies used by the social 
democrats to promote their counter-hegemonic discourse. Section three 
discusses how the social democrats exacerbated political tensions during the 
Teodoro Picado administration to create the discursive condition of possibility 
for the 1948 Civil War.  Section four concludes by highlighting key events in 
the 1948 civil war and the peace negotiations. 
  
The primary data analysed comes from speeches of the main political leaders: 
President Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia (1940-1944), President Teodoro 
Picado (1944-1948), the communist leader Manuel Mora, and the social 
democratic leader Jose Figueres.  The author has surveyed the 1940-1948 
issues of the Christian Democratic newspaper La Tribuna, the social 
democratic newspaper Accion Democrata/ Social Democrata, the communist 
newspaper Trabajo and the progressive liberal oligarchic newspaper Diario de 
Costa Rica and has chosen a selection of excerpts for analysis.  This chapter 
builds on a wide selection of historical works from the 1940s including the 
biographies and memoirs of key political actors as well as interviews of the 
1948 Civil War veterans made by other academics.  
  
Calderon Guardia administration 1940-1944 
On February 11, 1940, Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia, the presidential 
candidate of the Independent National Republican Party, defeated Manuel 
Mora of the communist Workers and Peasants’ Block and Virgilio Salazar of 
the Confraternidad Guanacasteca by the greatest margin in Costa Rica’s 
history - winning 84.5% of the votes while Mora received 9.8% and Salazar 
5.7%.  Calderon received the full support of the coffee oligarchy, the Catholic 
Church, a significant portion of the urban popular sector, as well as that of the 
overwhelmingly Catholic (anti-communist) peasants, the outgoing president 
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Cortes, and the propaganda machinery of the Independent National 
Republican Party.  During his campaign, Calderon did not present a clear, 
detailed policy program - as was common at the time - with Costa Ricans 
conditioned to voting for the candidate and not a specific policy platform (Diaz 
2009). Calderon’s campaign focused on his personal attributes as a religious, 
philanthropic, humanitarian doctor who understood the needs of the poor, and 
yet was also a member of the liberal oligarchic class. He was a direct 
descendant of General Tomas Guardia who ruled Costa Rica from 1872 - 
1882 and son of Senator Rafael Angel Calderon Munoz (Diaz 2009). In his 
presidential inauguration speech delivered to Congress the 8th of May, 1940 
Calderon Guardia stated: 
 
The coffee industry, which has served as the base of our economic 
structure since Independence, is today in severe crisis due to the wars in 
Europe. Conscious of the central role that the coffee industry plays in our 
country, my government will devote itself to helping this industry.  This will 
be the first task at hand for my administration.  Soon I will present a 
proposal addressing its most urgent problems. I am sure that with the 
collaboration of small farmers, producers and exporters, the situation of the 
industry will greatly improve (Calderon Guardia presidential message to the 
Congressional Assembly delivered on May 8, 1940).  
 
He interpreted the existing economic crisis not as a sign that the development 
model had to be reassessed but as evidence that greater government 
intervention was needed to assist the dominant coffee industry.  The Calderon 
administration eliminated export taxes and reduced municipal taxes (which led 
to the increase in the already high fiscal deficit).  It also guaranteed a 
minimum price of 30 colones per one and a half bushels of exported coffee to 
compensate for the drop in international coffee prices. His administration 
sought to address the demands of the peasants by granting them ownership 
of uncultivated lands, as well as economic and technical assistance for coffee 
production. Along with this, his government promised the poor rural credit 
plans to buy their plots of land and to finance their houses. Calderon 
portrayed his administration as a continuation of Costa Rica’s “exceptional” 
democratic traditions.  
 
To consolidate and perfect the regime that Costa Rica has lived since it 
developed its own identity in front of the international community has 
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always been the supreme aspiration of our nation. Moulding my own spirit 
with the heat of these desires, I will never depart from that political road 
traced with austerity by the patricians who preceded me in the exercise of 
power. Thus, my government will be highly respectful of the glorious civic 
patrimony, which makes Costa Rican people so legitimately proud 
(Calderon Guardia presidential message to the Constitutional Assembly 
delivered on May 8, 1940).  
 
The most significant difference between his administration and the liberal 
oligarchic ones before him was the role he wanted to grant to the Catholic 
Church in Costa Rican politics. Calderon stated: 
 
The Costa Rican Catholic Church and the government should work in 
harmony. I will put all my efforts into achieving this goal, because I am 
convinced of the positive influence that religious teachings has on cultural 
progress and in raising the ethical standards of our people. My 
administration will make sure the Catholic Church has no impediments in 
pursuing their noble duties. I am sure the church will provide my 
government with its valuable collaboration so that Costa Rica proceeds in 
the path of true progress (Calderon Calderon presidential message to 
Congressional Assembly delivered on May 8, 1940). 
 
The Christian democratic discourse placed Catholic social reformism as the 
nodal point of its discursive formation, seeking to use Catholicism as a 
legitimatising and unifying force. They wanted the Costa Rican Catholic 
Church to play the social structuring effect that it had played during the 
colonial period. To highlight this, one of first actions of Calderon as president 
was to counteract the Liberal Laws of 1884, which secularized schools, 
cemeteries, and forced religious orders to withdraw from Costa Rica. He also 
opened a national university (the University of Costa Rica), absent in Costa 
Rica since 1888 when liberal oligarchic president Bernardo Soto Alfaro closed 
the national university of Santo Tomas, run by the Catholic Church, as part of 
a campaign to modernize public education and reduce the influence of the 
Catholic Church.  
 
Calderon argued that Catholic social reformism was the best way to counter 
the communist threat. The devoutness of the Costa Rican peasants meant 
that Catholic ideology could serve as a bulwark to prevent this from 
happening. Alluding to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, Calderon 
argued that Costa Rica did not have class differences.  He stated that the 
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relevant difference was between the men who suffered and the men whose 
duty it was to alleviate that suffering. To avoid the emergence of class 
divisions, Calderon advocated greater state intervention in solving the social 
question.  He believed that the root of the social problem was to be found in 
the low wages received by the workers (artisans, public employees and rural 
plantation labourers), which made it extremely difficult for them to confront 
sicknesses, invalidity, unemployment and old age.  He viewed it as the duty of 
the state to address this unjust situation by setting a minimum wage and 
regulating capital and labour relations. He also believed that the state should 
protect the citizens’ right to have employment, social security, decent working 
conditions and the opportunity to get higher education (Saenz 1995: 39). 
Calderon proposed establishing a new regime of social justice based on three 
fundamental reforms: the creation of a national social security system; the 
addition of Social Guarantees to the 1871 Constitution; and the creation of a 
Labour Code.   
 
National Social Security System  (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) 
In 1940, Calderon sent his friend, Guillermo Padilla Castro, to Chile to study 
its social security program.30 Upon his return from Chile, Padilla Castro gave 
Calderon a draft of the national social security program, which Calderon 
subsequently presented to Congress on July 1941. In his Congressional 
speech, Calderon framed the social security program as the natural 
continuation of the progressive social policies dating back to the creation of 
the Junta de Proteccion Social in 1845, the modernization of the San Juan de 
Dios hospital by Carlos Duran Cartin in 1874, the creation of Subsecretaria de 
Higiene y Salud Publica passed during the Julio Acosta administration by 
executive decree on the 12th of July 1922, the law on Proteccion de la Salud 
Publica passed on the 12th of March 1923 which served as the first sanitary 
code of the country, and the creation of the Secretaria de Salubridad Publica 
y Proteccion Social in 1928 under the Jimenez administration  (Jaramillo 
Antillon 2004: 52).  The main difference between Calderon’s approach to 
social protection and the liberal oligarchic one was that Calderon argued that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Chile and Uruguay were amongst the first countries in Latin America to adopt 
social-welfare legislation.   
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social protection should not be perceived as an act of charity, but rather as a 
basic human right mandated by the state.  In doing so, he set the tone for how 
these policies would be perceived by subsequent administrations.  He further 
warned that without progressive social policies such as the creation of a 
national social security system, Costa Rica’s “exceptional” social cohesion 
and peace were at risk.   
 
Congress rejected the first proposal of the national social security program, 
arguing that urban and rural employers would consider the additional cost of 
funding the program completely inopportune due to the already precarious 
economic situation, and that employees would perceive their share of the cost 
as a salary reduction at a moment in which their purchasing power was 
decreasing due to rising inflation.  
 
With regards to the reforms of the state’s medical system, established doctors 
opposed the potential reduction in their income and organized a general 
strike. Younger doctors did not join the strike, as they believed that working 
for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social would be a good way of 
establishing a clientele and earning a modest salary (Salazar Alfaro 2008). To 
put an end to the doctor’s strike, the Christian democrats agreed to reassess 
the terms of eligibility for coverage by the state plans.  The original project 
stipulated that social security would be obligatory for the following groups: all 
blue-collar workers earning a salary of less than 300 colones per month (US 
$54.00 at the 1941 rate of exchange); all privately employed white-collar 
workers whose salaries did not exceed 400 colones per month ($71.40); and 
all public employees, regardless of salaries (Rosenberg 1981: 285). As a 
compromise solution, Congress set a salary limit of 300 colones per month for 
all categories of workers.  
 
As a result of these changes, the 1941 social security law established a 
parallel health-care market in Costa Rica. Those workers who could least 
afford social protection were obliged by law to contribute a fixed monthly 
portion of their incomes, while those who could most afford to finance a public 
health-care program were given the option of not contributing at all 
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(Rosenberg 1981: 287). Calderon also had to sacrifice his notion of universal 
coverage by eliminating coverage for part-time workers, which meant 
agricultural workers did not qualify, a clause that was inserted due to the 
influential coffee barons’ lobbying efforts. Therefore, the actual coverage of 
the national social security system became quite limited. Congress also 
objected to making the new institution completely autonomous from the 
government, proposing instead the formation of a commission composed of 
the manager of the Banco de Seguros, the manager of the Banco Nacional 
and a representative of the executive, which would jointly be responsible for 
managing the funds. A separate board would be composed of two 
representatives of the government, two representatives chosen by a group of 
employers, two representatives chosen by employees and one doctor. 
Calderon agreed to this watered-down version of his national social security 
system hoping that once the institution was created, future administrations 
could expand it and correct its deficiencies.  Congress approved the new 
proposal in 1941.  Calderon asked Padilla Castro to write the enabling 
legislation, allowing the program to become operational by executive decree 
(Rosenberg 1981: 291), which Padilla and a few of his law students did 
without consulting any organized group or the beneficiaries. In November 
1942, Congress approved the Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de 
Seguro Social CCSS.  The CCSS would administer the pension fund that 
would guarantee retirement benefits to workers based on life-long compulsory 
contributions by government, employers, and employees to the trust fund.  
 
Only at this late stage did Calderon start a “communicative” (Schmidt 2008, 
2012) campaign to convince the Costa Rican people of the necessity of the 
national social security program and how it would work. A newly formed think 
tank - the Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales (Centro) - 
criticized his administration’s closed and paternalistic policy-making style 
(Rosenberg 1981). This think-tank had been founded in 1940 by a group of 
university students under the leadership of Professor Roberto Brenes Mesen. 
According to the memoirs of one of its founding members, Alberto Cañas 
(2006), these young intellectuals were eager to contribute to the formulation 
and implementation of Calderon Guardia’s policies as the Radicales del 1900 
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had done during liberal oligarchic administrations.  However, Calderon 
neglected the Centristas and placed his friends and family members in 
advisory positions.  As a result the Centristas criticized the Calderon 
administration’s policy-making process. They stated that his administration 
was not conducting the rigorous “scientific” analysis of Costa Rica’s reality 
needed to develop appropriate policies, but rather was formulating policies 
based on maximizing political capital (Cruz 2005:132).  They stated that the 
national social security program had many flaws because Padilla had merely 
imposed the Chilean program on Costa Rica’s different socio-economic 
context.   
 
The Centristas founded a magazine called Surco where they wrote academic 
articles covering a wide range of socio-economic and political topics. 
According to the Centristas, their research proved that Costa Rica needed to 
re-assess its liberal socio-economic and political model. The liberal policies 
pursued by the founding fathers were no longer adequate and proved 
obsolete relative to the changing international ideational context. They 
challenged the liberal definition of democracy, which equated democracy with 
elections, and instead proposed a participatory democracy.  In addition, they 
challenged the agro-export development model based exclusively on coffee 
and banana exports. They argued that Costa Rica’s society should not be 
based on liberal principles of individualism and self-reliance, but instead on 
social democratic principles of communitarianism and co-operativism. They 
further argued that it was necessary to diversify Costa Rican exports to 
include other products such as rice, sugar, cattle, and fishery instead of only 
focusing on coffee and banana exports, suggesting the creation of 
cooperatives to help small and medium-sized producers. While 
acknowledging the central role that agriculture played in Costa Rica’s 
economy, they argued that the Great Depression had proven the limits of a 
development model based solely on exports and thus they suggested a 
gradual transition towards an import-substitution-industrialisation model 
similar to that being adopted elsewhere in South America. Acknowledging that 
it would be harder in Costa Rica due to its small economies of scale and its 
lack of an industrial base, they stated that the government had to play a very 
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active role subsidizing the nascent small and medium sized businesses. The 
Centristas portrayed themselves as technocratic intellectuals instead of as 
politicians, becoming amongst the most vocal critics of the Calderon Guardia 
administration. 
 
Calderon also alienated another key group – the Cortesistas. As soon as 
Calderon became president, he replaced government officials who had served 
under President Leon Cortes (1936-1940) with Christian democratic members 
of the 40’s generation and former members of the Partido Reformista such as 
Jorge Volio. Calderon then directly challenged Cortes by supporting Teodoro 
Picado’s presidential bid to the Constitutional Congress instead of backing 
Cortes’ brother - Otto Cortes (Soto Harrison 1995). During the 1940s 
presidential campaign, Leon Cortes had given his support to Calderon with the 
tacit understanding that Calderon would then help Cortes get re-elected in 
1944.  However, Calderon chose to support Picado instead as he believed 
Picado would be a better advocate of Calderon’s progressive reforms. With 
Calderon’s backing, Picado won by a vote of 19-9 affirming Calderonista 
control over the PRN. After this affront, Leon Cortes broke away from the 
Republican Party and founded the Democratic Party in 1941. 
 
Calderon committed another strategic mistake during World War II.  
Immediately before the United States joined the Allies in World War II, 
Calderon made a state visit to the United States.  According to his wife at the 
time, Ivone Clydes, President Roosevelt requested Costa Rica’s help in 
ensuring the safety of the Panama Canal, to which Calderon agreed.  As soon 
as the United States declared war on the Axis powers, Rafael Angel did the 
same (Villegas Hoffmeister 1990).  In January 1942, the US State Department, 
with the help of British and Latin American officials, started to compile a 
registry of Nazi-Fascists living in Latin America.  Local governments were 
encouraged to confiscate the properties and businesses of fascist 
sympathizers and send them to US based prisons (Longley 1997:34). 
According to Longley, the American and British governments pressured the 
Calderon administration to work with US authorities to expose Costa Rican-
based Nazi-Fascists.  In 1942, the Legislative Assembly passed Law N 79, 
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which supplemented existing statutes and permitted the president to revoke 
citizenship of native-born Costa Ricans and naturalized citizens who had 
adopted fascist doctrines  (Longley 1997: 34).  By the end of the war, the 
Costa Rican government had placed more than two hundred German and 
Italian descents in internment camps in the United States and confiscated their 
properties (Longley 1997:34). 
 
World War II triggered a socio-economic crisis in Costa Rica.  The closure of 
the European markets led to shortages of basic food products, gasoline, 
automobile tires, cement, and steel, depressing the economy and escalating 
the national debt.  The Centristas and the Cortesistas severely criticized the 
government’s response to the crisis. Corruption scandals emerged involving 
government-sponsored construction projects that had been assigned to 
construction companies belonging to Calderon Guardia’s friends and family 
members without a proper tender process.   
  
In 1942 Jose Figueres, a marginal political figure in Leon Cortes’s new political 
party, gave a speech on national radio accusing Calderon of incompetence, 
corruption and mismanagement. He argued that Calderon’s policies were 
geared at increasing his popularity amongst the masses and not at addressing 
their real needs. Figueres stated: 
 
What the government ignores is that from government decrees we cannot 
make tortillas. The peasants in my farm have no shoes, no clean sheets, no 
milk for their children, but they have a social insurance that guarantees 
them a pension when they grow old. Gentlemen in the government let’s 
finish this comedy: let’s guarantee them a good funeral and let them starve  
(Figueres radio speech - transcript found in web site "El Espiritu del 48" 
www.elespiritudel48.org). 
 
Adopting the Centrista position, he argued that Calderon’s failure to 
adequately analyse the existing socio-economic situation led him to pass 
reforms such as the national social security system without addressing other 
more pressing needs. According to Figueres, the social question could not be 
solved by addressing the symptoms (e.g. health care); but rather the causes, 
which he argued were the limits of the liberal oligarchic socio-economic 
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model. In the same radio speech, Figueres argued that Calderon’s corrupt 
practices, nepotism, and mismanagement had proven that he was inadequate 
to rule the country.  Figueres argued that the best thing Calderon could do 
was to resign. As he was saying these words, government officials stormed 
the radio station from which he was speaking, and abruptly interrupted and 
imprisoned him. Costa Ricans who had been listening to Figueres speech 
were outraged by the government’s violation of his freedom of speech. 
 
According to the CRCP leader Mora, when he heard of Figueres’ 
imprisonment he rushed to Calderon’s office to request his immediate release. 
Calderon told Mora that he was merely following orders and that if Mora 
swore secrecy, he would reveal to him a state secret. When Mora did so, 
Calderon told him that Figueres’s imprisonment had been ordered by the 
military attaché to the United States embassy in Costa Rica, Coronel Andino.  
The military attaché had shown Calderon proof that Figueres had economic 
relations with the Germans and that he was a potential Nazi collaborator.  It is 
difficult to assess the accuracy of Mora’s story, as Calderon never confirmed 
it.  What is certain is that Figueres’ exile had tremendous repercussions on 
Costa Rica’s history.  Not only was his arrest and exile publicly condemned 
because it violated Costa Rica’s traditional respect for freedom of speech, but 
more importantly it was during this period that Figueres started plotting an 
armed insurrection against Calderon.  In Mexico, Figueres met other Latin 
American political exiles plotting to overthrow the oppressive, personalistic 
dictatorships of Somoza in Nicaragua, Tiburcio Carias in Honduras, 
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez in El Salvador, Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, 
and Trujillo in Dominican Republic. This group of dissidents formed the 
Caribbean Legion. Figueres’ exile and Calderon’s policy against Costa Rica’s 
German descendants during World War II allowed Figueres to create 
equivalential chains between Calderon and the other Latin American dictators 
arguing that he was also violating civil and political liberties. Figueres created 
a new political identity for himself – that of a political martyr of an oppressive 
“authoritarian” regime. In Costa Rica, Calderon’s opponents used Figueres’ 
exile as a rallying point to mobilize the opposition. 
 
	   151	  
Alliance between Calderon Guardia and Manuel Mora 
In 1942, a group of conservative oligarchic bankers led by Jorge Hine, the 
General Manager of the Bank of Costa Rica, were considering a coup d’état 
against Calderon.  According to Mora, he was invited by these men to Hine’s 
house to request the CRCP’s support in the coup. Because Calderon was 
popular amongst the masses due to his progressive policies, the conservative 
oligarchs needed Mora to mobilize popular support for the coup. Instead of 
helping the conservatives overthrow the president, Mora approached 
Calderon the following day warning him about the plot and offering him an 
alliance. According to Mora’s narrative, he offered the communist party’s 
support because he feared that, if the coup succeeded, the conservatives 
would place a counter-reformist government in power. According to 
Calderon’s official narrative, he accepted Mora’s offer out of deep respect for 
the CRCP leader, whom he had grown to admire when they were both 
Congressmen. His official stance also stated that Mora’s political platform at 
the time was not substantially different from the Christian democratic one.  
The truth is that Calderon acknowledged that he had no other choice but to 
form an alliance with the Communists despite knowing that the opposition 
would heavily criticize this alliance.  Without the CRCP’s support he could 
face a coup in the near future. 
Immediately after meeting with Mora, Calderon contacted Monsignor Victor 
Sanabria to ask for his help in winning popular support for this alliance. 
Understanding the president’s weak political situation, he agreed to help, only 
requesting that the CRCP change its name.  Mora agreed to rename the party 
– rebranding it Vanguardia Popular. The day after, Monsignor Sanabria wrote 
a now famous article in the Diario de Costa Rica in which he stated that there 
was no impediment for a devout Catholic to support the alliance between 
Calderon Guardia and Manuel Mora. The same day the communist 
newspaper Trabajo announced the alliance reassuring communist party 
members that despite changing its name, the party would not change its 
ideology.  They explained to their readers that this alliance was in keeping 
with the Soviet war alliance with the Anglo-American forces against the 
fascists. 
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Calderon used the international ideational context and the comunismo a la 
tica myth to justify the alliance. He substituted communism with fascism as 
the new constitutive outside of his discursive formation. The Christian 
democrats reinforced the comunismo a la tica myth arguing that “The Partido 
Vanguardia Popular is not a communist party. It is a national party” (La 
Tribuna - 24 December 1943).  
To this, Calderon’s opponents responded:  
The awkward disorienting lie made by the president is evidence of the 
irresponsibility of Calderon before the Communist problem. As it serves his 
immediate political interests, he does not hesitate to declare, as he is a 
phenomenal opportunists, that by a simple change of name, the Marxist 
ideology has disappeared in the country; and that the order from Moscow 
have ceased to arrive; the Soviet aspirations no longer exists, in a word, 
that the country can now breathe easy because the Stalinist conspiracy to 
take over the world and destroy our free institutions have been cancelled by 
the new hypocritical christening to suite the circumstances. The leader, who 
dares to do such a thing, is responsible, without exaggeration, of the great 
crime of endangering the democratic institutions of our country for a covert 
and treacherous attack (Diario de Costa Rica - December 25, 1943). 
 
Despite the opposition to his alliance with the communists by other political 
leaders, Calderon believed he had no other choice. He chose to maintain a 
very loose alliance. According to the terms of the agreement, each party 
would run independently during congressional elections and Calderon would 
not give the CRCP members ministerial or advisory positions in his 
administration (Contreras and Cerdas 1988).  Despite this, the opposition 
coined the alliance the Caldero-comunista regime and claimed that Calderon 
was following orders from Mora. 
 
Social Guarantees and Labour Code   
Calderon’s next reforms were the addition of the “Social Guarantees” to the 
1871 Constitution and the creation of a Labour Code to codify existing laws. 
On May 1st, 1942 Calderon and Mora held a joint parade commemorating 
International Workers Day in order to gather popular support for these 
policies.  Calderon learnt from his previous mistake of not focusing on his 
communicative discourse (Schmidt 2012) before launching the national social 
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security program - this time he wanted to gain popular support for his reforms 
to help Calderonista and communist Congressmen persuade Congress to 
pass their proposals.  
 
During the May Day parade, Calderon announced his intention of petitioning 
Congress to approve the addition of a set of Social Guarantees (similar to the 
United States Bill of Rights) to be added to the Constitution. On May 1942, 
Calderon gave the following speech to Congress: 
 
The stability and internal peace of the nation depends on the successful 
development and functioning of the institutions that regulate the activities of 
social groups that are placed in opposing positions, but not necessarily 
irreconcilable ones […] We have been inspired by the need to give a 
modern sense to our Constitution because of the un-debatable fact that 
Costa Rica cannot stay behind the evolutionary rhythm swaying the world 
today; without this, however, implying that we are changing the 
fundamental precepts that have served as a base for our democratic 
stability.  Precisely, we believe that in order to guarantee the continuity of 
our democratic institutions, we must prevent situations that may put in 
jeopardy the noble fraternity of the Costa Ricans (Calderon Guardia’s 
presidential message to Congress delivered on May 1 1942). 
 
Thus, Calderon framed the Social Guarantees as the best way to guarantee 
Costa Rica’s “exceptional” democratic and peaceful society. On May 16, 1942 
Congress started discussing the Labour Code, which would grant workers the 
right to form cooperatives, bargain collectively in labour disputes, and create 
labour courts.  It would also regulate working conditions and establish 
minimum wages. To convince Congress of the necessity of the Labour Code 
he argued: 
 
The discussion we will have today on the Labour Code is one of the most 
important ones in our national history. By proposing the Labour Code, I am 
contributing to solidify the peace and tranquillity that we all wish for our 
small nation. With absolute certainty I believe that there is no reason why a 
good Costa Rican should feel threatened by the clear, humane and simple 
laws we are proposing.  They are the result of a long and careful study of 
our national reality. They aim to bring harmony to the legitimate interest of 
the different social classes that compose our nation […] The Labour Code 
aspires to bring legal solutions to the day-to-day conflicts between owners 
of capital and workers. The Labour Code will do justice without losing sight 
that both labourers and owners of capital are collaborators in the extremely 
important task of developing our national resources for the good of our 
nation (Message of President Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia’s to the 
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Congressional Assembly introducing the reform project of the Constitution 
by adding the chapter on Social Guarantees delivered on May 1, 1942). 
 
Once again, Calderon justified the necessity of the Labour Code by linking it 
to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary. However, Calderon’s opponents 
framed the Labour Code and Social Guarantees as a communist policy. They 
argued that this legislation was proof that the communists were dictating 
government policy. Calderon kept insisting that the Labour Code was based 
on Christian Democratic principles and that its end goal was precisely 
preventing class conflict:  
 
Our social work does not seek to bring war within our society, but rather 
peace.  It is not a threatening sward, but an olive branch.  Not in vain have I 
insisted that it is not the product of sectarian exotic doctrines, but rather the 
crystallization of the Catholic Church’s doctrines – paradigm of moderation 
and prudence (Calderon Guardia’s speech delivered in Alajuela on the 29th 
of August 1943).  
 
After more than a year and a half of heated political debates, the 
Constitutional Guarantees were passed in June 23, 1943 and the Labour 
Code on August 23, 1943.  
 
1944 Presidential Elections 
Since Costa Rican law forbade consecutive presidential re-election, Calderon 
Guardia chose Picado31 as his successor for the 1944 elections while he 
planned his own bid for re-election in 1948. As president of the Costa Rican 
Congress, Picado had proven to be instrumental in the passing of the laws 
establishing the national social security system, the national university, the 
Labour Code and the Constitutional amendments mentioned above.  During 
this period, he had established a very close relationship with Calderon. 
 
Former president Leon Cortes created a loose coalition amongst the most 
important sectors of the opposition – the conservative coffee barons, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Picado was a well-respected lawyer, intellectual, and politician. He was Secretary 
of Education under the last Ricardo Jimenez administration (1932-1936) and then 
became the dean of the Escuela de Derecho – School of Law.  During this period he 
taught, and wrote several books regarding the history of education in Costa Rica, 
which are still considered amongst the best books written in the subject. 
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progressive liberal oligarchs, and the Centristas. The only thing uniting this 
ideologically and socially heterogeneous alliance was their animosity towards 
the Caldero-comunista regime (Creedman 1971: 180).  Since Picado knew 
that the alliance with the communists had allowed the opposition to garner 
anti-government support, Picado sought to break this alliance. Picado held 
several meetings with Cortes in an attempt to seek a new alliance with him 
and his faction.  However, Picado did not receive the backing of the 
Republican Party to shift alliances due to the animosity between the 
Calderonistas and the Cortesistas, obliging him to retain the alliance with the 
communists.  The Christian Democratic and Communist alliance was known 
as the Bloque de la Victoria alliance.  
 
The following image shows a caricature of Picado, Calderon and Mora used 




This caricature contrasted the popularity of opposition’s presidential candidate 
Leon Cortes on the left with that of the Bloque de la Victoria Alliance, which 
the caricature renamed the Vanguardia Picada on the right (webpage El 
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Espiritu del 48). The caricature placed Manuel Mora as the central figure to 
show the communists’ predominance in the alliance (hence the fictitious 
change of name of the political party).  Through this caricature we can see 
how the opposition sought to place all the possible negative attributes to the 
Bloque de la Victoria – including placing a Nazi armband on the communist 
party leader Manuel Mora. To highlight the image that Mora dominated the 
alliance, the caricature depicts Picado on the left and Calderon Guardia on 
the right passively contemplating the empty field, while Mora gets agitated by 
the absence of supporters.  
 
The absence of supporters was not factually true. Due to the progressive 
policies passed by the Calderon administration, the Christian democrats had 
significant support amongst the masses. In fact, on February 13, 1944, Picado 
running under the Bloque de la Victoria defeated the opposition coalition led 
by Cortes under the Partido Democrata.  Picado allegedly won by a 2:1 
margin receiving 75.1% of the votes. As was the norm, electoral fraud was 
committed and the opposition denounced it.  However, according to Fabrique 
Lehoucq and Ivan Molina’s research, even adjusting for electoral fraud, the 
Bloque de la Victoria had enough support to win the 1944 elections (Lehoucq 
and Molina 2002:190, Lehoucq 2007:5).  
 
Emergence of the Partido Social Democrata as a counter-hegemonic 
movement 
Upon his return from exile during the Picado administration, Figueres formed 
an alliance with the Centristas based on their shared animosity towards 
Calderon and their social democratic ideology.  During the electoral 
campaign, the Centristas had supported Cortes’s Democratic Party. Soon 
after the opposition’s electoral defeat, the Centristas broke away from the 
Partido Democrata and joined Figueres to form the Accion Democrata party, 
which then became the Partido Social Democrata in 1945.  This party founded 
the Accion Democrata newspaper, which later was re-named the El Social 
Democrata newspaper.  While the Centristas, under the intellectual guidance 
of Rodrigo Facio, developed the ideological base of this counter-hegemonic 
movement, Jose Figueres focused on developing pragmatic strategies for 
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establishing the “Second Republic”.  While on the one hand Figueres sought 
to convince the Costa Rican population of the necessity of substituting the 
liberal oligarchic socio-economic and political order with a social democratic 
one through democratic institutional means, he also kept in touch with the 
Caribbean Legion to prepare an armed insurrection if necessary.  
 
The Accion Democrata party leaders portrayed themselves as a generation of 
young technocrats who had grown tired of the “politiqueria” of traditional 
politicians with their empty promises aimed at increasing political capital, the 
continuous use of electoral fraud, nepotism, widespread corruption, 
administrative mismanagement, a lack of “scientific” planning in policy, the 
maintenance of the liberal economic and political model despite its obvious 
limitations, and the persistent levels of poverty and ignorance of the masses -
which they pointed out, not only undermined fundamental values of social 
justice but also prevented Costa Rica from escaping its state of economic 
underdevelopment (Gonzalez Garcia 2007: 9).  They warned Costa Ricans 
about the grave threat that the rise of totalitarian and authoritarian theories 
and practices in Europe were posing to democracies throughout the world. 
They portrayed themselves as “centrists” - going against Stalin’s communism 
as well as Hitler, Mussolini and Franco’s fascism.  They stated that they were 
against “pure socialism” as well as “savage capitalism” (Gonzalez Garcia 
2007:9).  On the first edition of the Accion Democrata newspaper, the 
Centristas stated: 
 
Accion Democrata is with the righteous and progressive capitalism that 
works by creating wealth and social welfare; which treats its workers 
fairly, as human beings. It is against the communist demagogues 
preaching class struggle. It is against the professional promoters of 
general strikes and disputes; against the despotic government. Accion 
Democrata is against the capitalist that send their millions abroad. It is 
against the hard and greedy employer who treats his workers like beasts, 
against capitalists who hide their income defrauding the tax authorities. 
Accion Democrata does not accept the intellectual dictatorship of 
communist radicals and their servants, who seek to pigeonhole everyone 
in a school or in a cult - liberal, socialist, reactionary to extend approval 
or global excommunication. Accion Democrata does not want a 
capitalist, communist, liberal or conservative, radical or reactionary Costa 
Rica.  It struggles for a free, civilized and prosperous Costa Rica (Accion 
Democrata - February 26, 1944).  
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The social democrats claimed that rather than following blindly an ideology, 
they were pragmatically choosing their policies based on “scientific” evidence 
of what was best for the country – although they were clearly ideological 
themselves. They placed radical ideologies (communist and reactionary) as 
well as “corrupt politicians” and “greedy capitalists” as the constitutive outside 
of their discursive formation.  They claimed that their only agenda was to 
establish a “free, civilized and prosperous” Costa Rica.  While they agreed 
with the liberals that capitalism was the best model to promote economic 
development in Costa Rica, they argued that its excesses had to be tamed 
through more active government intervention. They also believed that the 
state had to play a more active role in social policy, as it was its duty to 
guarantee high levels of human development.  The social democrats were 
also against the excessive political and economic concentration of power in 
the Central Valley to the detriment of the rest of the country and thus 
proposed strengthening municipal and local governments.  They recognized 
that Costa Rica was primarily a peasant rural-based society whose 
competitive advantage relied on agro-exports.  However, they argued that it 
was necessary to diversify its exports to include rice, cattle and fishery.  They 
argued that it should be the state’s role to incentivize and subsidize small 
nascent industries in order to reduce the excessive dependency on exports 
and imports, and concluded that the poor socio-economic conditions and the 
deteriorating political situation proved the limits of the existing liberal 
oligarchic order.  They argued that it was necessary and urgent to substitute 
this model with a social democratic one leading to a “Second Republic”.  
 
Strategies used by the social democrats to promote the social 
democratic “Second Republic”  
To justify the need to transform Costa Rica’s liberal socio-economic and 
political framework, the social democrats had to create a credible crisis 
narrative. As Hay (2001) argues, in liberal capitalist democracies, a paradigm 
shift is unlikely to occur in the absence of a widely disseminated and accepted 
crisis narrative (Hay 2001:202). “Objective” socio-economic limitations are 
necessary but insufficient conditions for a paradigm shift to occur.  Hay further 
argues:  
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Their ‘success’ as narratives generally resides in their ability to provide a 
simplified account sufficiently flexible to ‘narrate’ a great variety of 
symptoms while unambiguously apportioning the blame. […] crisis 
narratives must make sense to individuals of their experience of the crisis 
(whether direct or mediated); they must also be sufficiently general and 
simple to identify clear paths of responsibility and an unambiguous sense 
of the response that must be made if catastrophe is to be averted  (Hay 
2001:204).  
 
Jose Figueres, the social democratic political leader, intuitively understood 
this.  The social democrats unambiguously apportioned the blame on 
Caldero-comunista regime.  They argued that this regime had led Costa Rica 
towards a state of “moral and political chaos”, which was making “Costa 
Rica’s democracy agonize” (Accion Democrata newspaper article written by 
Salvador Lara on March 11, 1944).  At the same time, Figueres knew that, for 
the social democratic project to be perceived as feasible and desirable by the 
Costa Rican population, he had to present his project as a continuation of 
Costa Rica’s exceptionalism.  He therefore had to play a balancing act. On 
the one hand, he claimed that a radical break from the previous liberal 
oligarchic order was necessary, as it had degenerated during the Caldero-
comunista regime. At the same time, he sought to present the social 
democrats as the best defenders of Costa Rica’s “exceptional” democratic 
tradition.  According to the social democrats’ crisis narrative, the Caldero-
comunista regime had taken Costa Rica away from its “exceptional” 
democratic path.  Only by establishing a social democratic Second Republic 
could the country be led back onto it. To reconcile this tension between 
continuity and change, the Centrista intellectuals Rodrigo Facio and Carlos 
Monge Alfaro developed a concept they coined “innovative continuity”. 
Figueres’s speech delivered on March 17, 1945 during the founding ceremony 
of the Partido Social Democrata summarizes this dual strategy of proposing 
change within continuity: 
 
Our baptismal name is ‘the Social Democrats’ and our motto is: “We will 
found the Second Republic”.  Faithful to those principles, we prepare 
ourselves to fight for a future conquest, while maintaining and perfecting 
the conquests made by our predecessors.  
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On February 1944, the First Republic of Costa Rica died.  We want to 
conquer with our strength the Second Republic, because we cannot live 
without free institutions that give shape to our democratic life. As we say in 
Costa Rica: “Borron y cuenta nueva” (Let’s start from scratch). This is the 
meaning of the Second Republic. Costa Rica wants to be born again with a 
physiology in keeping with our present times. We will allow Costa Rica to 
be born again, gathering our strength from the horrors we are witnessing in 
order to faithfully march towards the future. If we are men of dignity we 
must return the blow that has been given to our country by those 
irresponsible men.  Our grandfathers of 1856 did it, our fathers of 1918 as 
well, now our children and grandchildren expect us to do it too. From our 
strong roots deeply engrained in our glorious past, a new bud is being born 
that will be able to produce, for the good of the country, a new trunk, a new 
flower with new fruits (Figueres speech delivered on March 17, 1945 during 
the founding ceremony of the Partido Social Democrata). 
 
 
Comparing the 1944 elections with William Walker’s invasion of Costa Rica in 
1856 and the Federico Tinoco dictatorship (1917-1919), Figueres argued that, 
just as the Costa Ricans had risen up to defend Costa Rica’s democracy then, 
they now had the obligation to rise up against the new threat.  According to 
this interpretation of the existing situation, the “fraudulent victory” of the 
Bloque de la Victoria had given Costa Rica’s democracy a “fatal blow”.  The 
front-page article of the first edition of the Accion Democrata newspaper 
argued that the “tragic” results of the 1944 election made evident the need for 
a new political party capable of mobilizing Costa Ricans to “defend” their 
democracy.  The article stated:  
 
During the last years Costa Rica has fallen under the hands of a group of 
political gangsters of the worst type. Our nation has had to endure all the 
worst social evils including fraud, intimidation, violence, crime and torment.  
The time has come for the good citizens to form a permanent political party 
willing to do what it takes to rid this country of this evil. 
 
To join Accion Democrata is not to subjugate oneself to a superior will to 
the detriment of one’s individual will. On the contrary, it is to partake in the 
democratic exercise that all citizens have the right to partake. In the 
Assembly of the Accion Democrata, individual ideas will find the most 
adequate and powerful means to make themselves heard. Costa Ricans, 
join Accion Democrata. Do not let OTHERS take a hold of the destiny of 
our nation. Participate in the democratic process. Let your voice be heard!  
Join an association that can make your ideas, your advice, your initiatives 
become a reality (Accion Democrata - February 26, 1944). 
 
 
The social democrats were advocating a re-interpretation of the appropriate 
role and responsibility of citizens in the democratic process.  They argued that 
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the limited definition of democracy provided by the liberal oligarchic discourse 
- which had a confined definition of democracy as an electoral process - 
induced a sense of general political apathy amongst Costa Ricans. The 
population had been led to believe that their only contribution to the 
democratic process was limited to voting every four years for a presidential 
candidate.  To make matters worse, the existing political parties did not 
provide them with a clear set of policy proposals to choose from, instead 
predicating their campaigns on the personality and reputation of the 
presidential candidates.  Citizens were encouraged to believe that once they 
had voted, their political participation was over.  This limited conception of 
their political obligations had encouraged the population to condone electoral 
fraud and other abuses.  In this narrative, political apathy and a lack of 
accountability had allowed the Caldero-comunista regime to lead the country 
towards a state of socio-economic and political crisis.  The Caldero-comunista 
regime was allowed to commit electoral fraud, violate the citizens’ freedom of 
speech (exiling critics including Figueres himself), disregard property rights 
(confiscating lands of German descendants), and commit acts of corruption 
and nepotism without being held accountable by the Costa Rican population.  
To stop this, Costa Ricans had to enter a new phase in their democratization 
process.  Citizens had to demand their right to participate in all levels of the 
democratic process including the formulation of policies.  They should no 
longer passively accept the will of “others”.  They claimed that the Accion 
Democrata/Partido Social Democrata would provide them the vehicle to 
achieve this. The structure of the Accion Democrata would also be 
democratic.  An article entitled “To the Costa Rican People” on the 11th of 
March 1944 edition of the Accion Democrata newspaper stated: 
 
If we want to fight to restore our democracy, we must join Accion 
Democrata, taking into account that this is a party that does not have an 
owner, nor pre-established leaders, but it does have a concrete platform.  
Its only aim is to defeat the corrupt politicians, defeat them with the truth, in 
order to give our country the worthy and responsible statesmen it deserves 
(Accion Democrata - March 11, 1944). 
 
 
As opposed to the liberal oligarchic parties in which a small group of leaders 
made all the decisions behind closed doors, the social democrats argued that 
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their party would integrate all the “honest” and “responsible” Costa Ricans 
seeking to “re-instate Costa Rica’s democracy”.   Their counter-hegemonic 
movement was thus aimed at incorporating previously neglected actors into 
the political process.  With regards to the social question, they stated:  
 
The most profound and permanent problems of every human community 
are those related to the welfare of the masses. To those we must dedicate 
our special attention, but always bearing in mind that we should not destroy 
the privilege of some to build it for others. Justice is the unshakable 
foundation for the stability and the happiness of all social classes. This is 
ignored by the radicals, especially the communists. (Accion Democrata- 
March 11, 1944). 
 
 
They argued that the focus of the Accion Democrata party would be to 
address the social question - not by instigating a class struggle as the “radical 
communists” were doing, but rather by creating policies geared at fostering 
social justice.  They further argued that to address the root cause of the social 
question, it was necessary to make a critical revision of Costa Rica’s values.  
This would lead to the “destruction of myths and the formulation of a real 
national culture at the service of real people” (Centro’s publication “Respuesta 
a Ideario Costarricense” (1943) Vol 1 145-62 quoted by Cruz 2005).  These 
“old myths” the social democrats sought to destroy were the underlying 
assumptions of liberalism.  Facio argued in an article entitled “Authority and 
Liberty” published in the Surco magazine Vol 1, No 1, that: 
 
The fundamental error of liberalism lies in the belief that economic relations 
are natural and therefore inalterable. (This erroneous belief accounts for) 
the economy’s untouchable status; and for the abdication of the state’s 
responsibility to press for social reforms that would make the system of 
production perform in accordance with contemporary ethical demands of 
justice (quoted by Cruz 2005:133).  
 
According to the social democrats, the myth that “economic relations are 
natural and therefore inalterable” had prevented Costa Ricans from 
questioning the appropriateness and effectiveness of the liberal socio-
economic and political model.  According to Facio, liberalism committed two 
fundamental errors: a) it neglected the economic foundations of freedom; and 
b) it limited the participation of the citizens in the democratic process to 
elections (Cruz 2005:134).  Costa Ricans needed to re-assess their economic 
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development model and expand the definition of democracy. According to the 
social democrats, a rigorous scientific analysis of Costa Rica’s situation 
proved that a substantial change was necessary not only in individual policies 
but also in the way Costa Rican’s perceived themselves and their history.  As 
Consuelo Cruz states: 
 
The Centre’s leading lights worked from the premise that Costa Rica did 
indeed possess a unique collective soul. But they also claimed that the 
characteristics of this soul would have to be discerned through a cool 
investigation of the nation’s history.  On their view, much like an 
archaeological expedition might lead to the discovery of an ancient 
civilization’s remains, a level headed incursion into the nation’s past could 
be expected to reveal its “real” institutional foundations. Absent a precise 
knowledge of these characteristics and foundations, they further argued, 
innovative continuity with Costa Rica’s venerable tradition was impossible 
(Cruz 2005: 132). 
 
According to the Centristas, the key to Costa Rican exceptionalism did not lie 
on their sense of self-reliance (that evolved out of their experience of self-
government during the colonial period), or their sense of individualism and a 
frontier mentality (that evolved out of the abundance of land since the colonial 
period), as liberals argued, but rather on their sense of community and 
cooperation (that evolved out of the need for the creole elite to work alongside 
the peasants to produce their daily substance).   
 
They further argued that flaws in the liberal framework were preventing Costa 
Rica from achieving its full democratic potential. To commemorate Costa 
Rica’s independence in 1944, they wrote the following article entitled “Costa 
Rica must be Independent”: 
 
The Costa Rican people have a deep sense of equality, democracy, social 
peace, but they have also developed a sense of indifferent that has served 
to allow injustices. After 123 years of separation from our mother Spain, we 
have still not achieved our full Independence. The people of Costa Rica 
have been ready to live under a full democracy.  Since the colonial period it 
has been developing and cultivating a democratic way of life. But we are 
living under economic slavery to foreign capital because of our 
irresponsible politicians, we are caught up in a coffee based economy to 
the detriment of our economic development and of the happiness of the 
masses, living without our full freedom due to the betrayal of the 
degenerate politicians. Today we are seeing the culmination of a process of 
gradual decomposition initiated since the end of the century (Accion 
Democrata - September 16, 1944). 
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Including elements of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary in their crisis 
narrative, the social democrats asserted that Costa Ricans indeed possessed 
a “profound feeling of equality, democracy and social cohesion”; however, 
they also had gradually developed “a sense of indifference”.  Their 
“indifference” was preventing them from achieving their “full independence”. 
Costa Ricans were not achieving their democratic potential due to their 
“economic slavery” - their “subjugation” to foreign capital, their excessive 
dependence on the coffee industry at the expense of the economic well being 
of the people, and their lack of liberty due to “degenerate politicians”.  What 
was needed was a shift away from their traditional liberal oligarchic 
individualist conception of society, and its flawed socio-economic model 
towards a “modern” socialist conception of society and a more diversified and 
sustainable socio-economic model.  They proposed an end to the domination 
of the coffee industry in Costa Rica’s economy.  They wanted the state to 
incentivize alternative export products, promote new industries (following 
South America’s import substitution industrialisation policies), and re-
negotiate contracts with multinational companies including the United Fruit 
Company.  
 
To illustrate with a concrete example how Costa Rica could regain its historic 
“democratic destiny”, social harmony and internal peace, the social democrats 
presented the following case study of a farm in Costa Rica in which social 
democratic principles had been put into practice. In an article entitled: “An 
interesting case study in our agricultural capitalism”, Emilio Valverde, wrote an 
account of his visit to Jose Figueres’ farm in San Cristobal: 
  
The specificity of San Cristobal is that it is a lucrative and privately owned 
business, but with its primary concern to provide the wellbeing of its 
workers. A peaceful adaptation of our agricultural capitalism to the technical 
necessities and to the concern of social justice that is presently shaking the 
foundation’s of the world [...] Jose Figueres has not hid his earnings in the 
United States, Germany or in national banks.  He has not built magnificent 
residences for himself neither in the capital nor in his farms.  Instead, he 
spends it on improving the standard of living of his employees and making 
them directly interested in making the farm prosperous. This method can 
create a true cooperative spirit, while ownership remains legally under the 
hands of an individual owner. That spirit of identification with the company 
	   165	  
that makes owners feel responsible and makes them feel that they can 
benefit directly from their common work, is precisely what makes San 
Cristobal a unique case in Costa Rica - there is a general feeling of friendly 
cooperation and trust (Accion Democrata - April 7th, 1944). 
 
 
Through this article, the social democrats were highlighting their traditional 
ideas of inter-class cooperation and benevolent capitalism based on social 
justice, which, they argued, would lead to a “pacific adaptation of agro-
capitalism”.  Also, they were starting to create the image of Jose Figueres as 
a socially conscious and successful administrator capable of translating the 
experience he had gained in managing his farm San Cristobal to 
administering the nation. Using strategies defined as “populist interventions” 
(Panizza 2009), they presented Figueres as a “political outsider” (i.e. not 
corrupt, self-interested or oblivious of the plight of the masses). They claimed 
that Figueres had the successful business qualifications needed to lead Costa 
Rica out of its deep socio-economic crisis caused by self-interested petty 
politicians and argued that neither Figueres nor any other leader of Accion 
Democrata would transform their new party into an old-style personalistic 
party.  
 
The Christian democratic “crisis narrative” under the Picado 
administration 
President Teodoro Picado responded to the social democratic crisis narrative 
by developing his own. Instead of interpreting the current crisis as an 
indication of the need for a paradigm shift, Picado argued that the current 
crisis was due to the broader global economic crisis and to the country’s 
historic fiscal problems that pre-dated the Calderon administration.  Those 
external factors had constrained the Calderon government.  Lowering the 
expectations of what his administration could accomplish due to those 
external constraints, in his inaugural speech Picado stated: 
 
My administration will not be one of brilliant achievements due to the fact 
that the existing circumstances place us in an iron cage that we must 
accept with resigned modesty. Thus, we must limit ourselves to the things 
we can do effectively  (President Teodoro Picado message to the 
Congressional Assembly delivered on May 8, 1944). 
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He stated that his administration’s first task would be to address the fiscal 
crisis. Picado argued that the Calderon Guardia administration had inherited 
the fiscal problem from previous administrations dating back to World War I.  
The deficit had not grown due to government corruption as the Centristas 
claimed, but rather due to the lack of adequate fiscal controls and 
inefficiencies in the system.  To address this problem Picado passed the Ley 
Organica del Presupuesto, which created the Oficina del Presupuesto, the 
Contraloria Central de la Republica and the Tesoreria Nacional.  Picado 
argued that taxes had to be raised.  He was able to get Congressional 
approval for an income tax and a property tax by linking the taxes to a raise in 
the salaries of teachers, something Costa Ricans broadly agreed on given the 
importance they had historically given to education (Formoso Herrera 2007: 
6).  
 
Picado also argued that electoral fraud had been regularly committed due to 
weakness in the existing electoral system. In his inaugural speech delivered 
to Congress on May 1944:  
 
We will promote a new Electoral Code […] The project proposal will be 
written by a commission integrated by representatives of three political 
parties that participated in the last elections.  The aim of the reform is that 
the right of suffrage comes with the maximum guarantees for all Costa 
Ricans (President Teodoro Picado message to the Congressional 
Assembly delivered on May 8, 1944). 
 
Picado sought to reduce the political tensions that had been exacerbated by 
the social democrats by incorporating the opposition in the formulation of a 
new Electoral Code.  He proposed an Electoral Reform that sought to 
strengthen the authority of the Grand Electoral Council (an institution created 
in 1925 to supervise the organization of electoral contests), which he renamed 
the National Electoral Tribunal.  The NET was meant to eliminate the 
president’s previous discretionary authority in electoral matters as well as his 
ability to manipulate his powers of appointment and of adjudication (Lehoucq 
1999).  According to Picado’s Electoral Code, the NET would consist of three 
members and three alternates selected one by the executive, one by the 
legislative, and one by the judicial branches of government. The NET’s role 
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would determine the composition of provincial electoral juntas, settle claims 
regarding the implementation of the Electoral Code and, most importantly, to 
issue a provisional verdict on the results of the elections, which then would be 
accepted or rejected by an extraordinary session of Congress on March 1st 
(three weeks after election day).  In order to ensure that the ruling party did 
not have an unfair advantage, Picado’s electoral reform stated that 
representatives of all registered parties would be able to play a role in every 
aspect of the electoral process.  Parties would be able to supervise the 
registration of voters, the printing of ballots, and certify the initial tally of votes 
conducted at each polling station.  The absentee balloting system would be 
eliminated and a new Electoral Registry would be created in order to prevent 
citizens from voting more than once.  Photo identification cards would be 
required to vote (Lehoucq 1999, 2002). 
 
Congress approved the Electoral Reform right before the mid-term elections. 
Picado announced that the new electoral reforms could not be applied to the 
mid term parliamentary elections, because the government did not have 
enough time to implement the reforms.  The opposition protested the delay, 
forcing Picado to agree to an extraordinary session of parliament devoted to 
discussing a motion promoted by opposition parliamentarians Fernando Lara 
and Eladio Trejos.  On December 11, 1945, parliament approved the 
Minimum Guarantees for the Electoral Process.  These included: a 
reorganization of the Grand Electoral Council, integrating it with delegates of 
the three branches of government; a guarantee that all political parties could 
supervise the voting stations throughout the country; a restriction of absentee 
balloting; and the right of electoral supervisors to ask the Juntas Receptoras 
de Votos for proof of their declared electoral results as soon as they finished 
the count (Formoso Herrera 2007:9).  These were the new laws put in place 
for the mid-term parliamentary elections held on February 10, 1946. 
 
During the 1946 mid-term election, Picado’s party suffered a great loss 
relative to the last elections, though they still retained the majority in 
Congress. The results were the following: the Independent National 
Republican Party won 50.5% of the votes; the Democratic Party 41.5%; 
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People’s Vanguard Party 5.4% and the Republican Party 1%.  The INRP won 
11 seats, the main opposition party DP received 10 seats and the communist 
party PVP won only 1 seat (Nohlen 2005).  The opposition nevertheless 
argued that electoral fraud has been committed.   
 
In late 1946, former president Calderon announced his intention to run in the 
1948 presidential elections.  He maintained the alliance with the communists 
although relations between the two parties had deteriorated under the Picado 
administration due in part to the Cold War and also to Picado’s rejection of 
communism even in its comunismo a la tica variant.  The opposition created a 
loose, ideologically diversified coalition composed of the conservative coffee 
barons, progressive liberal oligarchs and social democrats known as the 
Union Nacional coalition.  During the presidential candidate nominations, 
Otilio Ulate, the progressive liberal oligarchic owner of the newspaper Diario 
de Costa Rica, overwhelmingly defeated Jose Figueres of the Partido Social 
Democrata.  According to Perez Delgado, only 5% of the population 
supported the Partido Social Democrata at the time (Perez Delgado 1998:35).  
 
After this defeat, Figueres realized the social democrats would not be able to 
establish their “Second Republic” through democratic means as they had 
failed to convince the population that a social democratic paradigm shift was 
necessary.  In response, Figueres sought to induce the paradigm shift through 
revolutionary means.  He contacted members of the Caribbean Legion to 
seek their support in an armed insurrection. According to Alberto Beto 
Lorenzo, a close friend of Jose Figueres whom he had met during his exile in 
Mexico, the Caribbean Legion told Figueres that his insurrection would be 
easily crushed by the government if it did not have mass support (Delgado 
1998).  Figueres sought to mobilize mass support by increasing popular 
animosity towards the Caldero-comunista regime and destabilizing Costa 
Rica’s political order.  He created “shock brigades” ordering them to conduct 
acts of terrorism throughout the country.  These shock brigades were 
composed mainly of men who had been directly impacted by Calderon 
Guardia’s World War II policies as family members of people who had been 
targeted by the government as nazi-fascist collaborators.  
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One of the most notorious acts committed by the shock brigades to stir public 
unrest was the placing of a bomb in Mora’s car while Mora was visiting 
Carmen Lyra, another founding member of the CRCP.  The bomb exploded 
before Mora left Lyra’s house.  In retaliation to the Figuerista shock brigades, 
the communists formed their own.  Street clashes between these two bands 
produced levels of violence that Costa Rica had never experienced before.  
 
Failed attempted coup: the Alma Ticazo 
 
On the 24th of June 1946, a group of men led by the founder of the Centro 
para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales, Roberto Brenes Mesen, attempted 
a coup.  Their plan was for a group of armed men to meet outside the radio 
station Alma Tica where Brenes would give an incendiary speech on the radio 
calling for Costa Ricans to rebel against the Caldero-communista regime.  
The armed men would then launch their insurrection hoping other Costa 
Ricans would join in.  The Picado administration had been warned about the 
uprising and intervened before Brenes gave his speech, storming the station 
and arresting the armed insurgents (Aranda 1984).  According to another one 
of the coup plotters, Edgar Cardona, Picado immediately went to personally 
release the prisoners.  Picado allegedly stated: 
 
No, no!  In Costa Rica we can speak and solve anything! Why do we have 




Not wanting an escalation of the tensions, Picado released the prisoners 
without charging them.  According to Cardona, Figueres, who had not been 
part of the Alma Tica plot, visited him the day after.  Figueres told him about 
his contacts with the Caribbean Legion and asked him to join them, to which 
Cardona agreed.  Figueres knew that for the insurrection to succeed, his 
faction needed to continue to exacerbate the political tension, and therefore 
sought to mobilize the masses through general strikes and other means and 
to wait for an opportune moment to seize power.   
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The General Strike known as the Huelga de los Brazos Caidos (Fallen 
Arms)  
On July 19th, 1947, the opposition staged a general strike called Huelga de 
Brazos Caidos (Fallen Arms), which consisted of a generalized closure of 
banks, supermarkets, and clothing stores to demand greater guarantees of 
electoral transparency in the 1948 elections.  While the opposition 
newspapers Diario de Costa Rica and the Social Democrata framed the strike 
as a battle between “pro-democratic forces” demanding “the sanctity of 
suffrage” against a “corrupt authoritarian regime”, the Christian Democratic 
newspaper La Tribuna and the communist Trabajo framed it as a “reactionary 
counter-reform movement” protesting the new income and property taxes 
introduced by the Picado administration.  While the workers belonging to the 
Catholic Rerum Novarum CCTRN supported the strike, those belonging to the 
communist CTRC supported the government.  Street clashes took place and 
political tensions further escalated.   
 
After the second week of the strike, Picado agreed to allow the opposition’s 
presidential candidate for the 1948 elections, Otilio Ulate, to determine the 
composition of the new Electoral Tribunal as a way of guaranteeing that the 
Picado administration would not influence the Electoral Tribunal.  The strike 
came to an end when all parties agreed to recognize the Tribunal’s 
supervisory authority and its final judgment on the coming elections (Cruz 
2005:130). 
 
Picado was willing to make this highly unusual concession in order to de-
radicalize and de-mobilize the opposition by eliminating a major source of 
unity amongst the enemies of the Caldero-comunista regime – allegations of 
electoral fraud. Alluding to the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary Picado 
pleaded with all political actors to avoid further conflict: 
 
Because Costa Ricans are by habit peaceful and rational, they have been 
able to make their country prosper despite their scarce resources. I have 
thus made it my task to advocate peacefulness.  The leaders of the 
opposition will have to follow suit.  After all, disorder is not in their interest 
either, since the Costa Rican people, by tradition, repudiated violence and 
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prefer to follow the channels of legality (Picado speech quoted by Cruz 
2005:130.) 
 
Despite Picado’s plea to respect Costa Rica’s “peaceful” and “rational” nature, 
the social democrats had no intention of de-escalating tensions.  They needed 
to maintain the perception that Costa Rica was under a state of political and 
moral crisis to create an anti-government movement. To do this they 
exaggerated the influence of the communists in the Picado administration 
regardless of the fact that there was an increasing rift in the Caldero-
comunista alliance in part due to the emergence of the Cold War and also due 
to Picado’s distrust of the communists.  Picado was once again talking to 
Leon Cortes about a potential alliance between the Christian democrats and 
the conservatives.  These negotiations were abruptly interrupted by Leon 
Cortes’s sudden death caused by a heart attack.  During this period, the 
communist paper Trabajo also continuously criticized the Picado 
administration, further demonstrating the growing rift in the Caldero-comunista 
alliance.  Despite this, the social democrats framed the Picado administration 
as “communist puppets”.  They disseminated their crisis narrative through 
articles like the one entitled “The Tactic of Terror and the Communist Party” in 
the 13th of Diciembre 1947 Edition of El Social Democrata: 
 
The conjuncture of the Second World War was used by the Costa Rican 
comrades to assert their influence over the government of Calderon 
Guardia and start their gradual work of disintegrating the democratic 
institutions of our country.  We counter their tactic of contempt of mankind, 
typical of all totalitarian systems, with ours of sincere respect for freedom.  
More specifically, our work has been devoted to uncovering the workings 
and backstage manipulations of our communists, whose ideology turns out 
to be the acceptance of Soviet dogmatism and the outright rejection of the 
social truths of the Costa Rican case because their ears can only listen to 
the words of the Soviets (El Social Democrata – December 13, 1947).  
 
The Social Democrats argued that the comunismo a la tica was a lie.  The 
Costa Rican communists were not different from other communist parties and 
the Caldero-comunista regime was leading Costa Rica into militarism, 
anarchy and corruption.  An article entitled “Forward” in the December 13th 
1947 edition of El Social Democrata stated:  
 
	   172	  
The disaster in which we have been living for the past several years 
because of the Caldero-comunista regime have made many want to return 
to the old Costa Rica. While Calderon, Mora and his followers try to keep 
the country sunk in a mix of militarism, lawlessness and corruption, many 
are nostalgic of the Costa Rica of the great liberals Don Cleto and Don 
Ricardo. We do not want to stay as we are or go back.  We want to go 
forward.  The liberals gave our country a physiognomy reflective of the 
ideas of the last century.  These are now anachronistic. They had many 
virtues but also many flaws. They grew accustomed to politics dominated 
by a few economically powerful families, to candidates chosen behind 
closed doors by elite groups, and to great elasticity with regards to the way 
the electoral process was conducted. All these defects that stayed with us 
when the great liberals passed away, produced the gradual decay of the 
Costa Rican democracy that allowed Costa Rica to fall into the hands of the 
irresponsible men currently ruling our country (El Social Democrata – 
December 13, 1947).  
 
 
The social democrats argued that although the great Olympians, president 
Cleto Gonzalez Viquez and Ricardo Jimenez, had made important 
contributions to Costa Rica’s democratic development, their liberal oligarchic 
model was now obsolete.  The social democrats criticized Ulate for looking 
backwards instead of looking forward, framing this criticism around his 
wanting to re-establish the liberal oligarchic hegemonic order.  The social 
democrats continued to reinforce their crisis narrative, through articles such 
as the one entitled “Our Independence”:  
 
The regime that came to power in 1940 in Costa Rica enthroned a system 
of governance similar to those in Nicaragua and Honduras.  Our 
government became significantly militarized and one by one all human and 
democratic values were marched upon. The electoral fiction has served to 
fool and humiliate the Costa Ricans.  Irresponsibility, demagoguery and the 
absence of moral scruples, makes the men of this regime feel owners of 
the public treasury. This scheme has led to moral decay.  The communist 
Black Jacks have filled our streets with violence […]  We are entering a 
new phase in our history […]  We are coming to the final stage, in which the 
people of Costa Rica will show the world their victory against tyranny, and 
prove that we are ready to build an educated, civilized and just Republic.  
The political phenomenon we are witnessing now is the organization of 
popular forces, which march on their own because they find their strength 
within, outside the influence of politicians.  The Social Democratic Party 
believes that the duty of politicians is to delineate the outlines of a new 
Republic in order not to betray the popular will (The Social Democrat – 
September 15, 1947).  
 
 
They argued that the Caldero-comunista regime had shattered Costa Rica’s 
exceptionalism.  By creating equivalential chains between the Calderon and 
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Picado administrations and the Nicaraguan and Honduran dictatorial regimes 
under Somoza and Carias, they shifted the external political frontier created 
by the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary inwards.  The Caldero-comunistas 
were portrayed as an existential threat “trampling one by one on all humane 
and democratic values”.  The social democrats claimed that the regime had 
used the façade of elections to “deceive” the Costa Ricans.  Their 
“irresponsibility”, “demagoguery” and “lack of morals” had allowed them to 
treat public funds as their own.  The regime had led to a state of moral 
decadence and violence.  According to their narrative, Costa Rica was 
entering a “new phase in its history”.  A new popular movement was 
emerging, a movement of national consciousness outside of traditional 
politics.  This was the Partido Social Democrata.  Instead of seeking to 
impose the agenda of its leaders, the task of this new political party was 
merely “to help trace the contours of the new republic so as not to betray the 
popular will”.  With this crisis narrative, the social democrats were seeking to 
create a counter-hegemonic movement mobilizing formerly excluded sectors 
of society into the democratic process.  They claimed that the social 
democratic intellectuals were not seeking to inflict a new order but rather were 
acting upon the “unspoken” demands of the people.   
 
As the 1948 presidential elections approached, they challenged the 
comunismo a la tica myth and argued that Calderon had allowed the 
communists to take over his administration: 
 
(Calderon Guardia) based on the lie that the communist party just by 
eliminating the word communism from its party’s name has ceased to be 
communist, has allowed them to become part of the governing coalition 
alongside the established plutocratic oligarchy.  He has created the Juntas 
de Abastos, agencies which in theory were meant to address the food 
shortages and has allowed the communists to run them. That way the 
comrades gain a central position to indoctrinate the masses. […]  He has 
allowed them to form Shock Brigades, communists street-fighting units that 
completely disregard the Republican and orderly life of Costa Ricans.  He 
created the National Social Security system and allowed the communists to 
control it directly or indirectly.  Mora is the real boss  (The Social Democrat 
- May 11, 1947).  
 
The social democrats countered the Christian democratic narrative that 
portrayed Calderon Guardia as the most progressive reformer in the country’s 
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history, arguing that Calderon had tainted these worthy institutions by allowing 
the communists to run them and had allowed the communist shock brigades 
to disturb the country’s peaceful tradition.  They continuously claimed that the 
Caldero-comunista regime had led Costa Rica away from its peaceful, 
moderate, and innately democratic nature.  They mocked the “unholy alliance” 
between the Christian democrats, the Costa Rica Communist Party with the 
blessing of the Costa Rican Catholic Church with images like the one below: 
 
 
Once again they portrayed the communist leader, Manuel Mora, as the 
dominant central figure.  They sought to highlight the contradictions within the 
communist discourse by showing that, although Mora is dressed as a priest, 
he is taking towards the altar the typical Marxist symbols.  On the left, 
Calderon Guardia, and on the right, Teodoro Picado, are portrayed as Mora’s 
altar boys.  Through visual images like this one and political speeches, they 
sought to reinforce the image that the Christian democrats were following 
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orders from the communists, and therefore their policies were communist 
inspired. To counter the social democratic narrative, Calderon Guardia 
repeatedly argued: 
 
I am not an extremist, as my bitterest enemies want the simple people to 
perceive me.  I am a moderate man of deep democratic convictions.  The 
reforms that I have proposed are not extremists, they are meant to provide 
greater justice to the working class without affecting the basic interests of 
capital […]  I pray to the divine Providence that He does not forsake our 
beloved country and that He gives all of us the wisdom necessary to exit 
this terrible fight and lead us back on the path of democracy, justice and 
peace. (La Tribuna – February 8, 1948).  
 
Calderon pleaded once again with the social democrats to de-escalate 
tensions and to solve their differences through “democratic”, “just” and 
“peaceful” means. The leader of the opposition Otilio Ulate also sought to 
reduce political tensions.  As he stated in a speech as presidential candidate 
transcribed in the Diario de Costa Rica on February 1, 1948: 
 
Since the beginning of our campaign, we have made it clear that we want 
to defend the institutional order, that we want peace for all Costa Ricans, 
and safety in their homes. We have been giving copious evidence that 
despite the bad intentions of our adversaries, who have claimed that we are 
disturbing the peace, we have proven that despite provocations and 
aggressions to some of our colleagues, we have always sought to maintain 
peace to allow the elections to go undisturbed (Diario de Costa Rica – 
February 1, 1948).  
 
The Calderonistas were not differentiating between the Ulatistas and the 
Figueristas within the opposition and thus were accusing all members of the 
National Unity coalition of disturbing the peace. However, throughout the 
campaign period, Ulate had continuously sought to convince his followers not 
to antagonize their opponents. Despite the attempts made by Ulate, Picado 
and Calderon to defuse the political tension, the social democratic crisis 
narrative and the continuous street clashes between the social democratic 
and the communist shock brigades meant that the Costa Ricans went to the 
voting stations on February 8th 1948 believing they were living under the most 
socio-politically polarized period in Costa Rica’s history.  
 
 
	   176	  
1948 Presidential Elections 
The newly established Electoral Tribunal granted Ulate victory over Calderon. 
According to the Electoral Tribunal official results posted on February 28th, 
1948, the Union Nacional received 54.931 votes against 44,438 votes for the 
Republican/Vanguardia party.  However, the Calderonista-dominated 
Congress viewed these results as fraudulent. 32  On March 1st, Congress 
annulled the 1948 presidential elections stating that the fact that the 
opposition controlled both the newly established Electoral Tribunal, as well as 
the Electoral Registry had allowed their supporters to commit fraud.  They 
argued that thousands of their party members had not been allowed to vote 
due to confusion associated with their electoral identification cards or the fact 
that they did not receive them in time to vote. 
 
After the annulment of the presidential elections, Ulatistas, Calderonistas, 
communists, and the Costa Rican Catholic Church leaders began to search 
for a consensual solution - as was the norm after contested elections.  The 
two main leaders of the opposition – Otilio Ulate (progressive liberal oligarchs) 
and Jorge Hine (conservative liberal oligarchs) were close to reaching a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  These results are indeed dubious. As Ivan Molina’s studies indicate, these 
numbers meant that while in the 1944 elections 83.81% of the population eligible to 
vote had participated in the elections, in 1948 only 57.66% did, despite the fact that 
voting was made mandatory only in 1948. The fact that almost 75,000 people had 
decided not to vote in one of the most contested election in Costa Rica’s history is 
very odd.  The stakes of the elections were extremely high.  A victory by the Union 
Nacional could mean the elimination of the progressive reforms made by Rafael 
Angel Calderon during his first presidency (1940-1944). Therefore, the degree of 
political mobilization both in favour and against Calderon had been extremely high.  
A high turn out rate was to be expected in the 1948 elections. Yet, according to the 
official figures this had not been the case. The other suspicious fact was that the 
reduction of voters came precisely from the provinces in which Calderon had won by 
an overwhelming majority in the 1940 elections and his handpicked successor 
Teodoro Picado in the 1944 elections. Puntarenas had a 20,72%, reduction, Limon 
20,47% and Guanacaste of 9,18%, while the provinces dominated by the opposition 
– Alajuela, Heredia and Cartago – had no significant reductions. The Calderonistas 
believed that this reduction was due to the majority of their supporters not receiving 
the recently required documentation for voting (cedula) by the date of the elections 
and thus not being able to vote. The Calderonista’s argued that this was due to the 
fact that the opposition had elected the president of the Electoral Registry, which was 
in change of emitting the necessary identification for voting. The Electoral Registry 
was also in charge of overseeing the electoral registry and of guaranteeing the 
sanctity of suffrage. The opposition had also handpicked the three heads of the 
newly formed Electoral Tribunal.  
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compromise solution with president Picado and the Christian democratic 
presidential candidate, Calderon Guardia.  In keeping with the traditional 
Costa Rican compromise (transacción), they were seeking a neutral political 
figure to rule Costa Rica for two years after which new elections would be 
held.  
 
The social democratic Figueristas were the only ones not interested in finding 
a consensual solution.   Instead, Figueres took advantage of the political crisis 
created by the presidential elections to launch an armed insurrection. 
Figueres contacted General Juan Rodriguez Garcia, the leader of the 
Caribbean Legion in Guatemala, stating that the annulment of the elections 
was proof that Calderon was seeking to establish a dictatorship with the help 
of the communists.  He argued that the Costa Rican masses were mobilizing 
against the government due to their indignation at the arbitrary annulment of 
the elections.  Figueres promised the Caribbean Legion that after a 
revolutionary victory, he would help them overthrow the remaining 
dictatorships in Latin America, arguing that Costa Rica would serve as an 
ideal base for the Caribbean Legion’s subsequent attack on the Nicaraguan 
dictator Somoza.  The rebels’ victory in Costa Rica and Nicaragua would 
reinforce anti-dictatorial movements throughout Latin America.  The 
Caribbean Legion agreed to help Figueres under those conditions. 
 
With the backing of the Caribbean Legion, Figueres summoned the six men 
who had been in charge of the “shock brigades” to his farm in San Cristobal. 
The men were Max Cortes (former president Leon Cortes’ nephew), Edgar 
Cardona (one of the participants of the failed 1946 coup attempt), Alberto 
Lorenzo (who had met Figueres during his exile in Mexico) as well as his 
close friends Jose Santos Delocre, Victor Alberto Quiros, and Roberto Figuls. 
Figueres informed them of his plan to smuggle the Caribbean Legion’s 
armaments, high-ranking officials, and mercenaries into the country (Vargas 
Ortega 2010:181).  The day after, they executed his plan.  On March 12, 
1948, the social democratic rebels took over the airport of San Cristobal close 
to Jose Figueres’s farm La Lucha and hijacked two commercial TACA planes.  
Figueres ordered Macho Nuñez and Otto Escalante to fly to Guatemala to 
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meet General Rodriguez’s contact and bring back the weapons.  During that 
period Guatemala was under the progressive presidency of Arevalo and 
therefore the Caribbean Legion exiles had sought refuge there. 
 
When Picado was informed that rebels had taken over the airport of San 
Cristobal, he chose not to crush the insurrection, fearing that an aggressive 
response would further inflame the situation.  He did not know that armaments 
and mercenaries were being brought from Guatemala and erroneously 
believed a consensual solution could still be found.  He asked the United 
States and Mexican ambassadors and the Monsignor Victor Sanabria for help 
in negotiating with the rebels.  The United States wanted to stop the 
insurrection and stated they would not recognize a de facto government.  At 
the same time, they did not want to provide military assistance to the Picado 
government fearing that the communists would subsequently take over.  They 
also feared the prospect that a Costa Rican civil war could spill over to the 
rest of Central America dividing Costa Rica and Guatemala with reformist 
governments (if the insurgents won) against Nicaragua, Honduras and El 
Salvador with authoritarian dictatorial regimes.  The United States 
ambassador to Costa Rica, Nathaniel Davis, worked with Picado to find a 
consensual solution to the crisis (Longely 1997). 
 
However, the delayed response of the Picado administration to the uprising 
allowed the rebels to receive indispensable armament and manpower from 
Guatemala without which their armed insurrection would not have been 
possible.  Once they had secured these, the social democrats started a 
discursive campaign geared at mobilizing and unifying the different sectors of 
the opposition belonging to ideologically and socio-economically diverse 
sectors of Costa Rican society.  In order to transform “innately peaceful” 
citizens into revolutionaries, the social democrats framed the annulment of the 
1948 presidential elections as Guardia’s attempt to impose a Caldero-
comunista dictatorship.  They divided political space into two irreconcilable 
antagonistic forces, arguing that the dictatorial Caldero-comunista regime was 
oppressing the innately democratic, anti-communist, law-abiding, liberty 
seeking Costa Rican population.  In doing so, they created a common cause - 
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the defence of the sanctity of the vote – obscuring their underlying intention of 
founding a Second Republic even to their own followers until the end of the 
Civil War (Vargas Ortega 2010).  They called their army the National 
Liberation Army to portray the revolutionaries as pro-democratic freedom 
fighters.  They framed their armed insurrection as a pro-Ulate movement 
encouraging the government to call them “Ulatistas”, despite the fact that 
Figueres had no intention of handing over power to Ulate.  
 
The social democrats knew that in order to mobilize the greatest number of 
people they had to stir anti-communist sentiment.  Without the perceived 
communist “existential” threat to Costa Rica’s “exceptional” national identity, it 
would have been impossible for Figueres to mobilize the opposition as Ulate 
was doing everything in his power to avoid the conflict from escalating.  When 
the civil war started, Ulate fled to the Palacio Arzobispal where he stayed for 
most of the war period.  The only request Ulate made to his followers was to 
“boycott the corrupt government” by staging a general strike.  In the March 
26th, 1948 edition of his newspaper Diario de Costa Rica, Ulated posted the 
following announcement:  
 
BULLETIN OF THE REVOLUTION: CIVIL RESISTANCE 
 
We must immediately enhance civil resistance. The indifferent people, who 
denature this revolution by going to the theatres, shopping for non-
essentials, who open businesses or are doing other irresponsible things, 
are betraying our cause. Merchants, you have a duty to close down your 
stores. Help us now. The country demands it (Diario de Costa Rica - March 
26, 1948). 
 
This was clearly not a call to arms, but only a call for passive resistance. The 
only party actively mobilizing their supporters to fight the rebels was the 
CRCP.  To mobilize the communists, Mora claimed that a victory of the 
revolutionaries would lead to a reactionary government that would not only 
reverse the progressive policies passed during the Caldero-comunista regime 
(national social security, Labour Code, and the “Social Guarantees” 
amendment to the 1871 Constitution), but would also outlaw the CRCP, exile 
its leaders, persecute its followers and prohibit communist propaganda. 
Therefore, the social democratic Figueristas and the communists were the 
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two groups doing most of the physical and ideological fighting during the civil 
war, with individual Calderonistas and Ulatistas joining the communists and 
social democrats respectively.  For all practical purposes, the military 
remained uninvolved in the civil war (Cruz 2005:131). 
 
Reading the government newspaper La Tribuna editions from the February 
8th, 1948 presidential elections to when the civil war ended in April 19, 1948, it 
is evident that the Picado administration continuously sought to avoid the 
escalation of the conflict at every stage. The front page of La Tribuna on the 
16th of March 1948 reproduces the president’s speech the previous day in an 
article entitled “With all rigour we will impose the necessary measures to 
return peace in our nation”. President Picado stated: 
 
The seditious outbreak in our country, that you are aware of, requires a 
vigorous action from the government to return us to our traditional peace 
now altered by a group of bad Costa Ricans assisted by numerous foreign 
mercenary adventurers (La Tribuna - March 16, 1948). 
 
Rather than mobilizing the masses against the “bad Costa Ricans” assisted 
by foreign mercenaries, Picado reassured the population that the government 
would do everything in its power to quickly end the conflict.  Because Picado 
did not want to mobilize the population against the rebels, he did not seek to 
establish a rigid antagonistic internal political frontier framing the social 
democratic revolutionaries as “enemies” posing an “existential threat”.  His 
priority was to contain the conflict. In another article in the same newspaper, 
they refer to Jose Figueres as “The Catalan” while others called him “the 
crazy man” alluding to the belief that a “real” and “sane” Costa Rican would 
not launch an armed insurrection. 
 
The fact that Picado’s response was very limited can also be seen in the 21st 
of March 1948 newspaper article on La Tribuna. The article states: 
 
The measures taken by the government were limited to cutting the outlets 
to Figueres. The operations of the colonels Lopez Roig and Duran have 
been successful. They forced Figueres to flee his farm and we know that 
his group is retreating southward, while he wanted to go north to San Jose. 
[…] The operation not only forced Figueres to call for backup, it also forced 
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him to seek refuge elsewhere. His farm has been in the hands of the 
government for many days. We could not wish for a better situation (La 
Tribuna - March 21, 1948). 
 
 
As the article states, Picado had ordered a small “Mobile Unit” to survey the 
situation.  This mobile unit was composed of 65 men who had been originally 
sent by the United States to Costa Rica to defend the Public Road 
Administration Villa Mills while it was building the Interamerican highway.  
Picado ordered the mobile unit to take-over Figueres’ farm and confiscate the 
weapons of the insurgents.  According to the article in La Tribuna quoted 
above, the Picado administration stated that without Figueres’ farm as a base, 
the rebel forces would be easily defeated.  These newspaper articles served 
to reassure the Costa Rican population that the president was in control of the 
situation, and confirm to the citizens that no further action was needed on 
their behalf.  
 
In the meanwhile, the communists had mobilized a group of banana workers 
from the Atlantic region under the command of Carlos Fallas.  This group 
known as La Columna de los Linieros del Pacifico was composed of men who 
had fought during the 1934 Banana Strike against the United Fruit Company 
in Limon.  According to communist veterans, most of these men were 
Guatemalans or Nicaraguans who had been working for the UFCO (Delgado 
1998).  Picado did not order the military to provide the communists with the 
necessary armaments, technical, or logistical support. Coronel Enrique 
Alvarado, the head of the Cuartel Bellavista and person in charge of 
distributing weapons confirmed the government’s lack of support for the 
communist insurgents, as government officials and military leaders feared that 
a communist victory could lead to a communist regime (Delgado 1998: 270).  
 
Most opposition and Calderonista veterans also expressed their anti-
communist sentiment. It was common knowledge that Rene Picado, the 
president’s brother, was also boycotting the communists.  Rumours spread 
that Ulate had promised Rene Picado to make him Minister of Security in his 
new administration in exchange for his help.  This rumour was never 
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confirmed and was quite unlikely given the fact that Ulate was not actively 
fighting or involved in the conflict.  
 
As several historians have pointed out, and as a reading of the La Tribuna 
editions of the period confirm, neither Calderon nor Picado sought to mobilize 
the Calderonistas until April 13th, 1948.  Before this date, they simply 
requested the help of Costa Ricans to contain the conflict.   According to 
Mora, on the 12th of April he went to Calderon’s house pleading him to 
mobilize his supporters to help the communist fighters.  Mora asked Calderon 
to go with him to Tres Rios, where a base had been set up by the communists 
to plan their attack. According to Mora, Calderon asked:  
 
“Are you taking me prisoner?” I (Mora) replied: “No doctor, my party simply 
asks for your collaboration.  Our enemies can thwart all our past efforts if 
he sees we are fighting alone. We have worked together so far and it is 
necessary that we continue to do so till the end.” The doctor came with me. 
He passed by a barracks close by the Escalante area and then we went to 
Tres Rios. We established our base, as we had agreed, in the house of 
Don Ramon Cespedes and we immediately started to deliberate (Delgado 
1998: 231). 
 
Therefore, it was not until one month after Figueres launched his armed 
insurrection that Calderon agreed to join Mora’s counter-attack. That day, 
Calderon gave the first speech mobilizing his party.  The day after, La Tribuna 
posted on its front page a speech given by Jorge Volio (founder of the Partido 
Reformista in 1923, and one of Calderon Guardia’s closest advisors):  
 
If we could resolve this with words, we would talk at length, but this time we 
cannot solve it this way. We cannot allow the beautiful democratic edifice 
that we have built come tumbling down (La Tribuna - April 13, 1948). 
 
The way Jorge Volio phrased his call for arms reflected his acknowledgement 
that Costa Ricans preferred consensual solutions. He argued that if they could 
solve the crisis through words, they would have. Yet he warned that this time 
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Cease-fire agreement 
While the Figueristas and the Communists fought in the countryside, Picado, 
Ulate and Monsignor Sanabria were negotiating the terms of a cease-fire.  
Picado proposed having an interim president acceptable to all parties who 
would govern for two years after which new elections would be held.  The 
interim government would be composed of an equal number of ministers from 
the warring factions.  He proposed Doctor Julio Cesar Ovares, a well-
respected dermatologist as a potential candidate.  Ulate agreed, and they 
informed Mora of these terms.  Mora had realized that, without government 
backing, the communists had no chance of defeating the Caribbean Legion-
backed rebels and so agreed to the cease-fire.  Monsignor Sanabria offered 
to personally take Otilio Ulate’s letter to Figueres.  Max Cortes recounts the 
meeting between Monsignor Sanabria and Figueres: 
 
Monsignor explained that he bore a letter written by Otilio Ulate to Figueres. 
Ulate wanted to reach a settlement and for that he would renounce his 
presidential aspirations and allow Dr Ovares to govern. He requested Don 
Pepe to returned the weapons to Guatemala and the tractors to Villa Mills. 
They were sending one hundred free passes for the rebels to go to 
Panama (Delgado 1998:184). 
 
 
Figueres rejected the terms of the cease-fire.   He would not stop fighting until 
he placed himself in a position to establish the social democratic Second 
Republic.  Meanwhile, Somoza was getting ready to invade Costa Rica to 
prevent the victory of the Caribbean Legion-backed rebels and their 
subsequent attack on Nicaragua while Figueres was preparing to invade 
Cartago, Limon and then San Jose.  Upon hearing of Somoza’s plan to 
invade, Picado chose to surrender to prevent further bloodshed.  The 
communist leaders argued that Picado was surrendering prematurely as the 
rebels had not won any decisive victories.  However, when Picado told Mora 
that Somoza was going to invade Costa Rica, Mora agreed to surrender. 
Mora requested a secret meeting with Jose Figueres.   They met in the Alto 
de Ochomogo.  Mora told Figueres that the communists would surrender 
under the following conditions: a) that Figueres guaranteed that the 
progressive social policies passed under the Calderon and Picado 
administrations would be kept; b) that the lives and properties of the 
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communistas and Calderonistas would be respected; and c) that the CRCP 
would not be outlawed.  He then offered Figueres his support for defeating 
Somoza if he invaded Costa Rica.  Figueres guaranteed Mora that the social 
democratic “Second Republic” would not only maintain, but would actually 
improve the institutions created under the previous administrations.  He also 
promised to respect the lives and properties of the defeated (a promise he did 
not keep).  Somoza’s invasion was averted as by April 24, 1948 the civil war 
was over.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the 1948 civil war was not the inevitable result of 
rising class tensions triggered by the socio-economic crisis due to the impact 
of World War II - as was the consensual view up until the 1980s. It was also 
not the result of growing opposition to Calderon amongst the dominant 
classes due his progressive policies (national social security system, Labour 
Code, and constitutional Social Guarantees), allegations of corruption, 
nepotism, his rift with Leon Cortes, or his alliance with the communists as has 
been widely assumed.  Indeed, Lehoucq (1991), Rosenberg (1981), Cruz 
(2005) have criticized the assumption that the dominant classes opposed 
Calderon because his policies harmed their economic interests by highlighting 
that Calderon passed many policies that protected the economic interests of 
the dominant classes such as tax exemptions and subsidies.  The national 
social security system did not incite much opposition to the government 
amongst the coffee oligarchs as they were able to exclude the seasonal 
workers that compromised the bulk of their workforce.  The progressive liberal 
oligarchs and the social democrats actually supported a good deal of 
Calderon Guardia’s progressive policies - they only criticized his paternalistic 
policy-making process and his manipulation of these reforms for political 
ends.   While there was indeed growing opposition to Calderon Guardia due 
to allegations of corruption, nepotism, administrative mismanagement and his 
alliance with the communists, all political actors except for the social 
democrats wanted to channel their opposition to Calderon Guardia through 
institutional means.  While the other leaders of the opposition portrayed 
Guardia and Mora as “adversaries”, the social democrats were the only ones 
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portraying them as “enemies”.  
  
Although during the 1940s there was indeed rising class tension, growing 
opposition to Calderon Guardia, and an electoral breakdown following the 
annulment of the 1948 presidential elections, these were at best necessary 
but insufficient conditions for the war.  It is a fact that there was only one 
political group wanting to fight a civil war – the social democrats.  While all 
other political actors were desperately working to find a consensual solution to 
the 1948 electoral crisis to avoid a civil war, and were anxiously trying to 
contain the crisis once Figueres had launched his armed insurrection, the 
social democrats were the only ones wanting to fight.  Their motivation was 
not class-based, nor was it geared at defending the sanctity of the vote (as 
they claimed to gain the support of the Ulatistas - the biggest group of the 
opposition).  It was also not mainly based on Figueres’ desire to avenge his 
exile during the Calderon Guardia administration as other Costa Rican 
historians have argued (Diaz 2009).   Although there is no doubt that Figueres 
hated Calderon, he could have murdered him if revenge was his main 
motivation.  The main reason why Figueres launched his armed insurrection 
was because he viewed it as the only way he could found a social democratic 
Second Republic. 
 
Throughout the 1940s, the social democrats had failed to garner enough 
political support for their idea of founding a Second Republic.  The Costa 
Rican population had rejected what they perceived as “radical” change and 
did not like the social democrats’ antagonistic rhetoric. In fact, the Social 
Democratic Party won only 6,500 votes in the 1948 legislative elections.  It 
remained a minor player within the opposition coalition formed between the 
conservative coffee barons and the progressive liberal oligarchs to run against 
the Caldero-communista Bloque de la Victoria coalition during the 1948 
presidential elections.  Due to their political weakness, the social democrats 
decided that the only way they could induce their paradigm shift was through 
an armed insurrection.  They knew that they had to find an appropriate 
justification for an act that would be viewed as violating Costa Rica’s 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  They took advantage of the political 
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crisis created by the annulment of the 1948 elections to mobilize support for 
their insurrection.   
 
This chapter has shown that it is crucial to analyse the discursive dimension 
of the 1948 civil war.  To understand the discursive condition of possibility for 
the 1948 civil war it is necessary to explore: 1) the changing international 
ideational environment that made possible both the alliance between 
Calderon Guardia and the CRCP during World War II and its subsequent 
transformation into a great liability during the emergence of the Cold War, as 
well as the existence of anti-dictatorial Latin American movements such as 
the Caribbean Legion – without whose support Figueres could not have 
launched a successful insurrection; 2) the belief held by most political leaders 
that the CRCP could shift strategies away from the comunismo a la tica 
strategy towards a confrontational strategy if circumstances changed (i.e. the 
CRCP became more powerful); and 3) the existence of a counter-hegemonic 
movement – the social democrats - willing to consider the use of force to 
impose their Second Republic.  Without these three factors, the 1948 political 
crisis could have been resolved through consensual means.  
 
Therefore, the 1948 Civil War was not the result of “objectively” antagonistic 
socio-economic and political interests and personal vendettas, as the current 
dominant view states.  The social democrats discursively created these social 
antagonisms and exacerbated political tensions in order to wage their 
counter-hegemonic battle. Through a counter-hegemonic movement, the 
social democrats sought to incorporate previously excluded sectors of society 
into Costa Rica’s democratic process – starting with the Centristas and 
extending it to all other citizens.  They wanted Costa Rica to shift towards a 
participatory democracy with political parties based on clearly defined and 
“scientifically based” political projects as opposed to personalistic political 
parties (i.e. built around a charismatic leader). They sought to induce a shift in 
the Costa Rican value system away from privileging the liberal principles of 
individualism and self-reliance, and towards social democratic principles of 
communitarianism and cooperativism.  They also wanted to replace the 
exclusively coffee and banana based development model with a more 
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diversified agro-export model and gradually transition towards an import-
substitution-industrialization model. This would eliminate the economic 
predominance of the coffee oligarchs and allow new agricultural sectors and 
new industries to develop and prosper. 
 
The social democrats hoped that their military victory would guarantee them 
political success.  They assumed that after winning the war, they could found 
their Second Republic.   The next chapter explores the difficulties 
encountered by the social democrats in the process of creating the social 
democratic Second Republic.   
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The war of National Liberation was a disagreeable and primitive 
way for opening the door for the foundation of the Second 
Republic. (Social Democratic leader Jose Figueres - Act 2 of 
Constitutional debate held on the 16th of January 1949) 
 
If the people had been called to the revolution telling them that 
they were fighting for the establishment of the Second Republic, 
for the nationalization of the banks and for the 10% tax on capital, 
our people would not have fought. The people fought for Otilio 
Ulate to become the President – for the sanctity of suffrage. The 
Costa Rican revolution was fought to restore constitutional 
normality. (Conservative liberal oligarchic leader, Otton Acosta, 
during the Constitutional Assembly debate held on 




Institutional Development during the immediate Post Civil War Period  
(April 1948 – November 1949) 
 
This chapter analyses Costa Rica’s institutional development during the 
immediate post civil war period - from the signing of the peace treaty on the 
19th of April 1948 to the end of the social democratic Junta rule on the 8th of 
November 1949.   It analyses the 183 Acts of the 1949 Constitutional 
Assembly and reviews articles from the progressive liberal newspaper Diario 
de Costa Rica as well as the conservative liberal oligarchic newspaper La 
Nacion.  This chapter explores: 1) the subjective and discursive nature of the 
moment of institutional crisis following Costa Rica’s civil war; 2) how notions 
of continuity and change were discursively constructed by the different crisis 
narratives elaborated by the political leaders in their attempt to convince the 
Costa Rican population of the appropriateness, feasibility and desirability of 
their political projects; and 3) the role of Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary in a) influencing the extent, scope and pace of 
institutional change ensuring a transformist model of institutional change in 
Costa Rica despite the civil war, b) shaping the different political actors 
conception of their interests, and c) informing their strategic calculations 
thereby “circumscribing and delimiting the realm of the politically possible” 
(Hay 2001:202). 
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During the post civil war period, the different political groups within the 
victorious opposition coalition – the Figuerista social democrats, the Ulatista 
progressive liberals and the conservative liberal oligarchs - developed their 
own crisis narrative to explain the causes of the 1948 civil war.  Based on 
their interpretation of the civil war, they sought to justify their own political 
projects. The social democrats initially believed that their military victory 
granted them the right to create a Second Republic. They wanted to form a 
new constitutional order based on social democratic principles. To convince 
the Costa Rican population of the necessity of this institutional change, the 
social democrats developed a crisis narrative that portrayed the civil war as a 
marking the end of the so-called First Republic. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum of institutional change, the conservative oligarchs sought to interpret 
the civil war as a confirmation of the wisdom of returning to the liberal 
oligarchic order (1880-1940) after the failed Caldero-comunista experiment 
during the Calderon Guardia and Teodoro Picado administrations (1940-
1948).  Proposing a middle ground between these two approaches, the 
Ulatista progressive liberals agreed with the liberal oligarchic view that no 
paradigm shift (Hay 2001) was required, thus rejecting the social democrats’ 
idea of a Second Republic.  However, they acknowledged that significant 
reforms had to be made to the liberal oligarchic model.  
 
By focusing exclusively on the period between the signing of the civil war 
peace treaty to the end of the social democratic Junta rule, we find that during 
the immediate post civil war period it was far from certain which of these 
political projects would succeed in the long term and which model of 
institutional change would be adopted.  This goes against the dominant 
interpretation of Costa Rica’s post civil war institutional development, which 
argues that the social democrats’ military victory enabled them to impose their 
socio-economic political system (Naranjo Chacon 2010, Molina and Palmer 
2009, Cruz 2005, Isbester 2010).  The dominant view assumes that the social 
democrats’ military success naturally translated into the party’s political 
success by under-analysing the period under study.  
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This chapter argues that social democrats military success did not guarantee 
their political success.  In fact, even after victoriously marching into San Jose, 
the social democrats remained a marginal political force as was evident by 
their dismal results in the December 8, 1948 Constitutional Assembly 
elections when they received only 7.6% of the popular votes versus 74.2% of 
the votes received by the Ulatista progressive liberal Partido Union Nacional 
and the 12.9% received by the conservative liberal oligarchic Partido 
Constitucional.  Similarly, in the October 4th, 1949 parliamentary elections the 
Social Democrats received only 6.6% of the votes versus 71.7% for the 
National Union Party and 15.7% for the Constitutional Party.  The degree of 
support the social democratic revolutionaries received during the war was 
limited to their claim that they were fighting to defend the sanctity of the vote 
(Molina and Palmer 2007, Vargas Ortega 2010).   As discussed in the 
previous chapter, they had framed their armed insurrection as a revolt against 
the arbitrary annulment of the 1948 presidential victory of Otilio Ulate, the 
candidate of the opposition coalition, by the Calderonista-dominated 
Congress under the pretence that there had been electoral fraud.  Therefore, 
the backing that the social democrats received from the opposition block 
during the war did not at all reflect support for a social democratic Second 
Republic (Molina and Palmer 2007: 113).   Instead, all other members of the 
opposition block supported the establishment of an Otilio Ulate administration.  
 
Therefore, despite their military victory, the social democrats were actually in 
a weak political position.  Due to their political weakness and to the 
transformist nature of Costa Rica’s political system, they were forced to 
negotiate with Ulate to exercise power (despite the fact that Ulate had not 
participated in the war).  Paradoxically, the social democratic military success 
and their Junta rule placed the social democrats in a vulnerable political 
position because it enabled their opponents to portray their actions as 
incompatible with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary (their armed 
insurrection, their military rule and their support to the Caribbean Legion 
clashed with the peace-loving, democratic and consensual Costa Rican 
nature).  Their idea of installing a Second Republic was portrayed as too 
radical for Costa Rica’s transformist tradition.   
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This placed the social democrats in a unique position relative to other 
victorious Latin American revolutionary leaders.  They had to shift their initial 
political strategies and adjust them in such a way as to be perceived as 
respecting Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” tradition in order to gain legitimacy 
and popular support.  Therefore, they had to accept their humiliating electoral 
defeat in the December 1948 Constitutional Assembly elections, as well as 
the Constitutional Assembly’s rejection of their Constitutional Proposal known 
as the 1949 Constitutional Project.  The social democrats were forced to settle 
for an amended version of the liberal 1871 Constitution in line with the 
transformist model of political change.  They also voluntarily handed power to 
Otilio Ulate after 18 months of Junta Rule instead of the two years envisioned 
by the Ulate-Figueres Pact.  The social democrats were also forced to 
abandon their project of actively assisting the Caribbean Legion 
revolutionaries in overthrowing dictatorships in other Latin American 
countries.  In order to prove their commitment to regional peace and to 
neutralize the perception that they were incompatible with the “exceptionalist” 
tradition, the social democrats committed an unprecedented act.  Instead of 
trying to use the military power to impose their will (as all other victorious Latin 
American revolutionary leaders did), they abolished the military.  This was a 
way of portraying themselves as the ones responsible for making Costa Rica 
a truly exceptional country.  The social democrats also shifted their discourse 
towards a more conciliatory tone vis-à-vis the conservatives and the liberals.  
They sought to present their views as in keeping with the progressive liberal 
oligarchs’ position and also sought to appeal to former Calderonista 
supporters.  This meant that the only losers of the civil war were the 
communist party members  (Rovira 1988).  The social democrats chose to 
outlaw the CRCP a) to counteract the accusations made by the conservative 
liberal oligarchs that their policies were communist, b) to reassure the United 
States government of their anti-communist inclination, c) to gain the support of 
leftist voters as they became the only leftist political party, d) to increase the 
hegemonic appeal of their discourse by placing a widely rejected political 
group as the constitutive outside of their discursive formation, and e) and to 
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eliminate the internal political frontier re-establishing the external political 
frontier needed to create a new myth of unity. 
 
Because the social democrats were in a very weak political position during the 
immediate post civil war period, it is incorrect to say that their military success 
shaped Costa Rica’s institutional development.  Instead, this chapter argues 
that Costa Rica’s institutional development was shaped by the intense 
ideational battle between the social democrats, the conservative oligarchs and 
the Ulatista progressive liberals.  These three political groups in turn based 
their institutional reforms on past reforms made by the Caldero-comunista 
regime (1940-1948) as well as those made by the previous liberal oligarchic 
regime (1880-1940).  Therefore, despite the civil war, Costa Rica’s 
institutional development followed a very gradual process of reformist change.  
This was due to the strong ideational path dependency exerted by the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  Its transformist logic of articulation 
limited the scope, pace and the extent of institutional change during the period 
under study and ensured that what could have been a foundational moment in 
Costa Rica’s history remained a significant, yet transformist moment. 
 
This chapter is divided in four sections. Section one discusses the 
negotiations following the cessation of the armed conflict.  It also explores the 
difficulties the social democrats encountered in legitimating their Junta Rule 
due in large part to the perceived incompatibility between their actions 
(starting an armed insurrection, ruling through a Junta and supporting the 
Caribbean Legion) and the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  It shows how 
the social democrats had to change their approach from arguing that their 
military victory justified their political power (thus attempting to impose radical 
change), to showing their commitment to peace and consensual politics and 
by highlighting the continuity between the social democratic project and the 
previous liberal oligarchic model.   
 
Section two discusses the policies passed by the Junta during the first six 
months of its rule and their implications.  It discusses the negative reception 
that the most radical reforms (the nationalization of the banking system and 
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the 10% wealth tax) received from the population and shows how only the 
policies perceived as in keeping with the “exceptionalist” tradition (e.g. 
reformist policies seeking to improve the provision of basic services by the 
state, extending suffrage rights to women, abolishing the military) were 
positively received. 
 
Section three reviews the 183 Acts of the Constitutional Assembly. It 
discusses the overwhelming rejection of the social democratic Constitutional 
Proposal by the Constitutional delegates and their decision to use the 1871 
Constitution as the base for the new constitution.  It shows how the battles 
between the social democrats, the conservative liberal oligarchs and the 
progressive liberals led to reformist changes to the 1871 constitution.  The 
only changes that were adopted were those perceived as making the liberal 
political system more efficient, preventing administrative mismanagement, 
eliminating the possibility of nepotism and corruption, reducing the power of 
the executive and increasing the power of Congress, guaranteeing the 
sanctity of the vote by creating a new institution to oversee all electoral 
aspects the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, extending suffrage rights to 
women, eliminating the military, and improving the provision of basic social 
services by the state.  All the changes proposed by the Figueristas dealing 
with increasing the role of the state in the economy were categorically 
rejected, as were their attempts to move Costa Rica’s political system 
gradually away from a presidential system towards a parliamentary system.  
The amendments proposed by the Figueristas that were passed were only put 
through after the conservative liberal oligarchs modified them. The 
conservative liberal oligarchs would include clauses such as possible 
exceptions to the articles (such as eliminating the right to strike of people 
working in the agricultural sector claiming that this sector was of vital 
importance to the nation) as well as minimizing the content on the chapter on 
autonomous institutions to allow for this concept to be changed by Congress 
in the future.  
 
Throughout the constitutional debates, the delegates emphasized the 
elements of continuity between the amendments they were proposing and the 
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spirit of the 1871 Constitution.  After their Constitutional Proposal was 
rejected, even the social democratic delegates started to emphasise elements 
of continuity between their proposal and the 1871 constitution.  In the 
concluding remarks made by the delegates when they voted for the approval 
of the 1949 Constitution at the 178th session of the Constitutional Assembly 
(Act 178 of the Constitutional Assembly held the 31st of October 1949), the 
vast majority of the delegates showed their pleasure at producing a 
constitution that was in keeping the Costa Rican “exceptionalist” tradition and 
in keeping with the spirit of the 1871 Constitution.  Only the social democratic 
delegates expressed their frustration and disappointment for not being able to 
create a more progressive constitution. 
 
Section four concludes that this chapter shows the crucial role that the Costa 
Rican “exceptionalist” collective imaginary had on Costa Rica’s post civil war 
institutional development. This chapter also shows how political actors 
constantly modified their ideas and discourses in an attempt to be perceived 
as being in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  In this 
process the different political actors also sought to reinterpret the meaning of 
the collective imaginary.  This fluid and unstable conception of ideas and 
discourses is in keeping with Martin Carstensen’s (2009) work on the role of 
ideas in institutional development.  Carstensen argues that most theories 
about ideas in politics implicitly conceptualize ideas as relatively stable 
entities that act as a catalyst for political change in times of crisis.  In these 
theories political change is usually brought on by the full and sudden 
replacement of old ideas with new ones.  This chapter supports Carstensen’s 
view.  It argues that Costa Rica’s post civil war period shows how institutional 
change was not brought about by a sudden replacement of one paradigm by 
another after the war.  Instead, it was the result of gradual yet constant and 
incremental changes made by liberal oligarchic administrations (1880-1930s) 
and Christian democratic administrations (1940-1948) following the 
transformist nature of Costa Rica’s political system.  After the war, Costa Rica 
continued its process of reformist institutional transformation.  This process 
led to the gradual rise of the social democratic hegemony during the late 
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1950s and beginning of the 1960s.  We will now explore how this process of 
institutional change began during the immediate post civil war period. 
 
End of the Civil War 
On the 19th of April 1948, the Calderonista President Teodoro Picado (1944-
1948) and the representative of the social democratic revolutionaries, priest 
Benjamin Nuñez, signed the Mexican Embassy Pact ending the 1948 Civil 
War. Teodoro Picado nominated his second vice-president Santos Leon 
Herrera as the interim president.33 Calderon Guardia, Teodoro Picado and 
Manuel Mora went into exile.34 During this period, Calderon started to plot a 
counter-revolution from Nicaragua, but neither Picado nor Mora supported his 
counter-reform attempts in December 1948 and again in December 1955.35  
 
During the days immediately following the peace agreement, the social 
democratic revolutionary leaders believed that they could retain power for 
themselves, instead of handing it over to president elect Otilio Ulate (as the 
rest of the opposition and the Costa Rican population expected).  The social 
democrats wanted to take advantage of their victory to create a social 
democratic Second Republic. Since they had not been able to garner 
significant political support during the 1940s for their Second Republic, they 
sought to impose one through a revolutionary junta. The social democrats 
sought to justify their decision not to hand over power to president elect Ulate 
by claiming that Ulate had lost the legitimacy needed to rule because instead 
of fighting during the Civil War “in defence of Costa Rica’s democracy”, he 
had been hiding in the Palacio Arzobispal (Vargas Ortega 2010: 233).  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Picado had not accepted the first conditions set by the revolutionaries, which 
stated that Picado should hand over power to a revolutionary triumvirate Jose 
Figueres, Alberto Marten, and Gonzalo Facio. Picado categorically objected to this 
point, as he did not want to break the constitutional order and did not want to hand 
over power to the social democratic revolutionaries, but rather to the Ulatista 
progressive liberal oligarchs. 
34 The social democratic narrative states that these leaders left out of their own will 
claiming that Calderon Guardia was the last leader to exile his opponents.  The 
social democratic narrative is clearly false.  
35  As Rovira (1988) states, the communist movement remained a marginal 
decentralized force until the 1970s when they reorganized as an anti-imperialist force 
seeking to block the contract the Costa Rican government was negotiating with 
ALCOA an American multinational (Rovira 1988: 13). 
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narrative was widely rejected by other political leaders and the Costa Rican 
population.  The Diario de Costa Rica newspaper was filled with open letters 
to Jose Figueres written by members of the opposition requesting him to hand 
over power to Otilio Ulate immediately.  For example, on the 29th of April 1948 
edition of the Diario de Costa Rica, J.E. Piza wrote: 
 
You [Figueres] ask us to have faith in you during this period of crisis. I now 
ask you to GIVE US REASON TO HAVE FAITH IN YOU. Today more than 
ever the Costa Rica people urgently need to be certain that there will be no 
further impediments to the full respect of their popular will as expressed 
during the February 8, 1948 elections. It is your voice the one capable of 
giving Costa Ricans that hope and that certainty.  Go to a radio station and 
tell the Costa Ricans that the elections that granted victory to Don Otilio 
Ulate Blanco will be respected in all of its aspects, and the faith you ask us 
to have in you will be immediately granted to you (Diario de Costa Rica – 
April 28, 1948 signed by J.E. Piza. Capital letters in original.). 
 
With popular pressure mounting, the social democrats realized that they had 
to publicly acknowledge Ulate’s legitimate claim to the presidency and that 
they had to show a more conciliatory approach by accepting the terms 
established by the Pacto de la Embajada de Mexico. This pact placed the 
Vice President of Teodoro Picado, Santos Leon Herrera, as the head of a 
transitional government.  The social democrats initially thought of refusing the 
transitional government, as they wanted to argue that a revolutionary junta 
was needed to stabilize the political situation.  If the political situation started 
to stabilize under Leon Herrera’s transitional government, it would be harder 
to justify the need for a revolutionary junta.  However, they were forced to 
accept the transitional government.  Three days after Santos Leon Herrera 
took over power, Figueres wrote in the Diario de Costa Rica: 
 
At the request of the diplomatic corps, our Army has allowed the 
organization of a provisional government for a few days in order to avoid 
the war from spreading to San Jose. The press has been misinformed  and 
has wrongly created a sense of ambiguity that does not exist. The same 
organization who achieved victory during the war will shortly assume total 
control of the country.  This force will ensure a rapid national 
reorganization and a restoration to normality. Then it will execute the 
great plans of constructing the Second Republic (Diario de Costa Rica- 
April 22, 1948). 
 
 
Through this newspaper article, the social democrats sought to explain to the 
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Costa Rican population that the transitional government of Santos Leon 
Herrera was necessary only to allow the social democrats time to organize 
their Junta rule.  This quote shows the balancing act that the social democrats 
had to make.  On the one hand, they wanted to convince the population that 
Costa Rica was in a critical turning point requiring a Second Republic, while at 
the same time they wanted to reassure them that Costa Rica would soon 
return to its traditional institutional order.  During the civil war, only Figueres 
and his closest advisors knew the end goal of the revolution was to create of a 
Second Republic (Vargas Ortega 2010: 247).  Interviews, biographies and 
autobiographies of opposition civil war veterans confirm that they were 
fighting to defend the sanctity of the vote, as Figueres himself had claimed 
when mobilizing the opposition. 
 
Right after the civil war ended, the social democrats started building their 
discursive case for the Second Republic by reinterpreting the meaning of the 
civil war. As Padre Nuñez, one of the leaders of the social democratic 
revolution, stated in one of his speeches regarding the civil war: 
 
It was a struggle that had to lead to the liquidation of a political system, 
which had struck fiercely against citizens in almost every corner of the 
country and had shamelessly violated their electoral freedom. But that 
fight was also a struggle to liquidate, an economic system that had 
exploited its people and robbed them of their legitimate hopes for a better 
wellbeing. Because this struggle represented the tormented soul of 
Costa Rica, the Revolutionary Movement acquired a mystique and an 
unstoppable force that, from the beginning, assured it God’s favour, the 
support of the people and the final victory.  Jose Figueres, the visionary 
leader of the National Liberation War, in his "Second Proclamation of 
Santa Maria de Dota", pointed out that these heroic deeds not only had a 
civic goal but also a grander goal with a greater historical depth, the 
struggle for improving the welfare of the greatest number (Speech entitled 
“Los Molinos de Dios Proclama Patriotica por la Defensa Heroica de la 
Democracia” delivered by Padre Nuñez on March 6, 1948 by radio.) (My 
emphasis.)  
The social democrats wanted a complete rupture with the past socio-political 
and economic order. According to their narrative, it was necessary to 
“liquidate” the previous political system soiled by electoral fraud and 
corruption, and the unjust and failed economic development model.  They 
presented Costa Rican society as “a tormented soul” arguing that the “Eight 
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Year regime” (the Calderon and Picado administrations 1940-1948) had led 
Costa Rica away from its “exceptionalist” path.  Alluding to the key central 
figure of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, the Costa Rican peasant, 
Nuñez states:   
 
This struggle is directed against all the errors of a regime that the people 
had been repudiating for years and that it had now decided to liquidate 
definitively. In this cause we find the honest and determined soul of Costa 
Rican peasant who had been humiliated far too long by the oligarchs or the 
incendiary communists. (Speech delivered by Padre Nuñez on March 6, 
1948)  
 
At this point, the social democratic narrative created a political frontier that 
placed the “oligarchs” and “the incendiary communists” as the opponents. 
Portraying the “oligarchs” as the constitutive outside proved to be a bad 
strategy as it created animosity amongst influential people, without 
accomplishing its intended goal of mobilizing the masses.  Costa Ricans 
rejected class based political frontiers.  The social democratic narrative 
presenting Costa Rican society as possessing a “tormented soul” was also 
not well received by the Costa Rican population.  
 
When the social democrats announced that they would install a Junta Rule in 
order to found a Second Republic, the liberal oligarchic newspapers started 
circulating articles stating that Figueres was violating Costa Rica’s democratic 
tradition. The liberal oligarchic narrative highlighted the incompatibility 
between the social democratic actions of imposing a military junta rule and the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  To these accusations, Figueres argued 
in an article written April 23, 1948 in La Presa: 
 
We regret that certain situations imposed by circumstances have created 
the impression among some citizens that we seek to establish a military 
dictatorship in Costa Rica. Nothing more alien to the temperament and 
inclinations of the men who have led the liberation movement. We believe 
that we interpreted the national feeling when we went to war and now 
again we are respecting this national feeling by making sure that the 
qualities of discipline, sacrifice and continued effort remain now that we 
return to peace… without the contamination of abusive military practices, 
which are in conflict with the norms, desires and traditions of Costa Ricans 
(La Prensa - April 23, 1948). 
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The social democrats soon realized that to convince the Costa Rican 
population that a Junta rule was necessary, they had to develop a myth that 
re-interpreted the 1948 civil war.   This consisted in portraying the rebels as a 
liberating force fighting for Costa Rica’s democracy.  However, the 
conservative oligarchs developed their own narrative.  They portrayed the 
Figueristas actions (starting a civil war and establishing a revolutionary Junta) 
as incompatible with Costa Rica’s democratic tradition.   In order to justify the 
fact that they had started the civil war, the social democrats argued that they 
acted in self-defence.  They argued that the Calderonistas had committed an 
act of war when they arbitrarily annulled the 1948 presidential elections.  This 
act of war had been preceded by eight years of Calderonista and communist 
violations of Costa Rica’s democratic tradition - abnormal circumstances, 
which in turn forced the social democrats to take abnormal measures.  The 
Costa Rican population wanted to return to the normal institutional order as 
quickly as possible.   To this the social democrats responded: 
 
We need to warn the public against the impatience naturally causes by 
these abnormal situation. The Army has not completed its work. We first 
need to consolidate the civil and political order that will allow us to return in 
due time to the institutional order that we all love so much (article on the 
Diario de Costa Rica newspaper on April 24, 1948). 
 
Figueres feared that the Costa Rican population’s demand of a return to 
institutional order with Otilio Ulate as their president would destroy the social 
democrat’s chances of building a Second Republic.  Through open letters 
written in the Diario de Costa Rica newspaper to Figueres during this period, 
we can see how the members of the opposition were linking Figueres’s 
credibility with his respect for the 1948 elections.  For example, Ramon Arroyo 
Blanco wrote the following open letter in the 29th of April, 1948 edition of 
Diario de Costa Rica: 
 
When you asked us to join you, you said: THE POPULAR WILL OF THE 
COSTA RICANS HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE FEBRUARY 
ELECTIONS.  THAT POPULAR WILL MUST BE RESPECTED. I do not 
want to believe that you are now seeking to establish a military or civil 
dictatorship (Diario de Costa Rica – April 29, 1948). (Capital letters in the 
original.) 
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Ramon Arroyo Blanco went on to say that establishing a “military or civil 
dictatorship” could not be farther from what they had fought for.  He recounted 
his brother’s death in the battlefield and declared that his brother had not 
sacrificed his life to substitute one dictatorship for another.  
 
As tensions mounted between the Figueristas and the Ulatista progressive 
liberals over who had the legitimate right to rule, Professor Emma Gamboa, 
don Luis Uribe, don Edmundo Montealegre and doctor Fernando Pinto 
organized a committee to look for a solution.  On April 26, 1948 they sent a 
proposal to Otilio Ulate and Jose Figueres.  Their proposal confirmed the right 
of the social democrats to rule through a revolutionary Junta, but reduced the 
functions of the Junta to the confirmation of Ulate’s right to become president, 
the dissolution of the Congress, and the calling for the election of a new 
Constitutional Assembly to amend the 1871 Constitution.  After doing this, the 
Junta would hand power over to Ulate.  Figueres would then become Head of 
the Cabinet and would be allowed to choose his own portfolio.  Under an 
Ulate administration, the social democrats would work with Ulate to pass their 
proposed policies.  
 
Clearly this outcome was not acceptable to the social democrats, as it would 
guarantee a return to the liberal oligarchic order.  While Ulate responded 
favourably to the proposal, Figueres did not.  Emma Gamboa and other 
political leaders organized a demonstration to force the revolutionaries to 
hand power directly to Ulate.  Figueres instead met with Ulate to find a 
compromise solution.  On April 30, 1948, Figueres and Ulate signed the Ulate 
- Figueres Pact that stated that the social democrats would rule through a 
revolutionary Junta for 18 months and could then request a six-month 
extension to the Constitutional Assembly.  The Junta would rule without a 
Congress for the first six months and could issue decrees.  The judicial 
system would remain intact in order to act as a check to the Junta’s authority. 
After the first six months of Junta Rule, elections would be held for a 
Constitutional Assembly that would vote on either amending the 1871 
constitution or creating a new constitution based on social democratic 
principles.  Once the Junta rule period was over, Otilio Ulate would start his 
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administration, which would last 4 years (Longley 1997: 87). The social 
democrats sought to use the Ulate-Figueres Pact to legitimatise their rule, 
creating the following narrative around this pact:  
 
Public opinion was agitated. This was a very dangerous time because the 
clashes between us benefitted the defeated. As saviour of the time, 
emerged the figure of a young bright, wealthy businessman, who excelled 
in his culture and patriotism: the Lawyer Jaime Solera Bennett. Jaime 
suggested that Ulate and I meet at his house so that, with the interests of 
the republic in our hearts, we would reach an agreement. On April 30th, 
1948, don Otilio and I stayed late at night pondering until the early morning 
of May the 1st for what could be the best solution. While outsiders were 
trying to created divisions between us, inside Jaime’s house we were 
seeking a solution assisted by the patriotism of Jaime, the civility of Ulate 
and my devotion to our Fatherland. At dawn, on the first of May 1948, 
eighty-two years after the surrender of William Walker and inspired by the 
greatness of Juan Rafael Mora, we reached an agreement. Actually in my 
spirit there never existed a disagreement with Otilio. I never wanted to stay 
in power as have other Latin American victorious revolutionary leaders (Act 
N 2 of Constitutional Assembly January 16, 1949).  
 
This narrative sought to place the opponents of the social democrats as the 
ones disrupting Costa Rica’s peace by creating intrigues between Figueres 
and Ulate.  The narrative stated that, on the contrary, Figueres and Ulate 
were both working together to find the best solution for the country.  It sought 
to connect the Ulate-Figueres Pact with the defeat of William Walker during 
the 1856 National War alluding to a key event in Costa Rica’s history.  From 
that day forward, Figueres denied the fact that he had originally intended to 
take over power disregarding Ulate’s right to rule.  Since this Pact was the 
only thing that could legitimatise the social democratic junta rule in the eyes of 
the Costa Rican population, the social democratic narrative framed this pact 
the following way: 
 
The pact Ulate-Figueres thus has enormous legal and ethical authority.  It 
constitutes the cornerstone of the reconstruction of our democracy, hence 
the irrefutable virtues of the statements included in this document. This 
Pact must be taken as an indivisible whole, which reflects the will and the 
honour of those who belong to the Costa Rican community (Act N 2 of 
Constitutional Assembly January 16, 1949).  
 
The social democratic narrative argued that the Ulate-Figueres Pact 
represented the will of the majority of Costa Ricans as witnessed by the 
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popular support of Ulate during the 1948 presidential elections and the 
popular support received by the Figuerista revolutionaries during the civil war.  
Acknowledging the widespread support that Ulate had amongst the Costa 
Rican population, their narrative sought to create equivalential chains 
between Ulate and Figueres, often referring to these two political figures as 
inseparable heroes in a common struggle to defend Costa Rica’s democracy, 
despite the fact that Ulate and Figueres did not share the same vision of 
Costa Rica’s institutional development.  Figueres then sought to legitimize the 
Junta by asking Ulate to form part of it, which Ulate refused.  Ulate also did 
not allow anyone belonging to his party to join the Junta so his party would not 
be associated with any of the decrees passed by the Junta. 
 
The conservative oligarchs interpreted the Ulate-Figueres Pact quite 
differently.  They argued that through this pact Otilio Ulate was helping the 
social democrats violate Costa Rica’s national sovereignty.  According to the 
liberal oligarchic narrative, there was no legitimate justification for a 
revolutionary Junta during this particular historical period.  One of the main 
conservative oligarchs Arturo Volio Jimenez stated: 
 
I acknowledge the wisdom, the political tact, the spirit of sacrifice that 
guided Mr. Ulate to accept this compromise, but I do not understand 
who gave Ulate the right to compromise the country’s national 
sovereignty for 18 months, a decision that should have been taken only 
by the Costa Rican population. Fortunately, Ulate had the wisdom to 
add to the Pact the obligation that after six months the Junta would 
convene elections to choose representatives for the Constitutional 
Assembly. This was the lighthouse, the light of hope for the nation, 
since we all know that once a Constitutional Assembly meets the 
country regains its national sovereignty since it represents the will of 
the people allowing the opinions of different sectors of the public 
opinion to be expressed (Act N 25 of the Constitutional Assembly on 
February 28, 1949).  
 
Despite the opposition by the conservatives, the progressive liberals 
reluctantly accepted the Ulate-Figueres Pact and the Junta Rule.  Everyone 
wanted to end this period of uncertainty and they realized Figueres was not 
going to back down. 
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Junta Period 
On the 8th of May 1948, the self-proclaimed Junta for the Foundation of the 
Second Republic had its opening session.  During the first six months, the 
Junta ruled without legislative oversight.  The Junta was composed of eleven 
men coming from a variety of professions including business, law and 
education.  The first decrees they issued were meant to weaken their 
opposition.  The social democrats banned the communist party, closed the 
communist newspaper Trabajo, started shutting down communist labour 
unions, exiled Calderonista and communist party leaders, and created the 
Tribunal de Sanciones to investigate cases of alleged corruption and abuse of 
power by Calderonista government officials during the Calderon and Picado 
administrations (1940-1948) (Rodriguez Vega 2006: 248). 
 
On June 19, 1948, six weeks after taking power, Jose Figueres announced 
the nationalization of the banking system.  The Junta justified the Decree 70 
arguing:   
 
Considering that within the organization of a modern economy, all 
agricultural, industrial and commercial activities depend on bank credit, the 
allocation of which determines the progress or stagnation of the country. 2) 
That an economic activity of such importance should be in public hands 
since it represents, by its own nature, a public function.  3) That the private 
banks lend not only the shareholder’s own funds but also mobilizes the 
country’s savings, in the form of deposits from the public. 4) That it is unfair 
that the high profits of the bank, guaranteed by the state and the social 
order, be earned by their shareholders, who represent a minimal portion of 
the capital mobilized.  Rather, these profits should become national savings 
and their investment should be directed by the state.  Therefore, the Junta 
decrees: Private banking is nationalized.  Only the state will be allowed to 
mobilize, through its own institutions, the deposits of the public.  2) The 
shares of the Banco de Costa Rica, Banco Anglo Costarricense and the 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago are expropriated for reasons of public 
convenience.  The state, through its Ministry of Economy, will take the 
banks over immediately.  The form and condition for payment of the shares 
will be regulated afterwards.  3) The Ministry of Economics will provisionally 
keep the present form of organization of the banks and it will appoint their 
boards of directors and mangers (quoted by Gonzalez Vega and Mesalles 
1988:2).  
 
The Junta sought to present the nationalization of the banking system as a 
“technical necessity” in order to develop Costa Rica’s economy.  They argued 
that the banking nationalization was needed in order to do the following: 1) 
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diversify the country’s productive structure by selectively allocating funds to 
priority sectors (which traditionally did not receive credit from the private 
banks because the private banks preferred to invest in more secure and 
profitable enterprises such as coffee exports and import of fine goods such as 
whisky); 2) to increase access to subsidized credit for large segments of 
population including new entrepreneurs leading to the “democratization of 
credit”; and 3) to reduce the excessive concentration of power in the hands of 
the conservative liberal oligarchs and thus make Costa Rica’s society more 
egalitarian as the “exceptionalist” myth claimed.  They stated that the “state-
owned banks will serve the interests of all sectors of the economy, the weak 
and the powerful, without distinction due to wealth, position or influence” and 
that “in the hands of the state, banking will always be managed with the aim of 
maximizing social welfare” (Gonzalez Vega and Mesales 1988:4).  Therefore, 
they sought to justify the nationalization of the banking system through values 
in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary. 
 
This announcement shocked the Costa Rican population - particularly the 
conservative oligarchs, who exercised a monopoly over the banking system. 
They perceived this move as an attempt to take economic and political power 
away from them and to modify the country’s economic policies and productive 
structure to the advantage of their adversaries. They started an intense anti-
Junta campaign through La Nacion newspaper arguing that the social 
democratic Figueristas were actually Soviet communists in disguise.  To these 
accusations, the social democrats responded: 
 
A policy that is meant to foment precisely that which communism combats, 
which is private property, cannot possibly be Soviet. The nationalization of 
credit is neither communist, nor does it combat private property in the best 
sense of private property, nor does it hinder private initiate but rather 
incentivizes it. By nationalizing credit, private investments will gradually be 
incentivized so that whomever wants to produce something will have 
secure credit at low interests rates (quoted by Rovira Mas 2000: 43).  
 
The conservatives never accepted this argument.  However, the progressive 
liberals including Ulate argued that although the measure had been passed in 
a drastic undemocratic way (which they did not approve), the nationalization 
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of the banking system could potentially be beneficial to the country’s 
economy.  They wanted to make sure that the bank shareholders would be 
adequately compensated and that the banking system would be 
professionally managed.  
  
Another Junta policy that outraged the conservatives was the 10% tax on 
domestic and private capital valued at more than 50,000 colones (equivalent 
of 9,000 US$ at the time). The Junta justified this tax as the only way of 
raising the revenue necessary to rebuild the public infrastructure destroyed 
during the war and to re-establish basic social services.  The Junta instituted 
the Office of Direct Taxation to oversee tax collection, as previous taxes had 
never been properly collected.  They also nationalized electric companies and 
created the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad declaring it an autonomous 
institution.  They also declared the Consejo Nacional de Produccion and the 
Oficina del Café (which was previously named the Instituto de Defensa del 
Café) autonomous institutions (Rovira 2000: 47-53).  They argued that these 
crucial institutions had to be independent from the executive to prevent 
practices of nepotism, corruption and administrative mismanagement that had 
been common during the Calderon Guardia and Picado administrations.  
Under the aura of “non-political technical expertise” they sought to impose 
their permanent influence of Costa Rica’s institutional development through 
placing Figueristas in key administrative positions in these autonomous 
institutions and ensuring that future administrations would not be able to 
remove them or dictate their policies. 
  
During the first six months, the Junta increased Costa Rica’s state 
bureaucracy significantly.  The Junta also raised the salaries of the public 
employees and established a minimum wage for coffee and sugar workers 
(which had not been done during Calderon Guardia’s period because of the 
opposition of the oligarchy).  The conservatives were emphatically protesting 
all of these decrees (Rodriguez Vega, 2006: 249).  Their narrative argued 
that: 
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If people had been told that the revolution was to establish the Second 
Republic, to nationalize the banking system, and to impose the 10% tax on 
capital, no one would have fought. The people fought for Otilio Ulate to 
become President, and to defend the sanctity of suffrage. The revolution 
took place in Costa Rica to restore constitutional normality (Conservative 
delegate Otton Acosta during the Constitutional Assembly debate held on 
January 16, 1949).  
 
 
The Junta also renegotiated the United Fruit Company’s tax contract, 
increasing state revenue up to 1.5 million dollars a year. The social 
democratic policies initially worried the United States ambassador to Costa 
Rica, Nathaniel Davis, as well as the State Department.  However, the social 
democrats were very tactful and conciliatory when negotiating with the United 
Fruit Company.  As Longely (1997) argues, the social democrats were very 
astute in offsetting much of the criticism of economic nationalism raised by the 
liberals by portraying themselves as staunch anti-communists and presenting 
themselves “as an alternative to the authoritarian governments on whom the 
US relied to maintain order in Latin America” (Longely 1997:92).  Their 
success in this endeavour can be verified by the report written by the United 
States Embassy in Costa Rica entitled “the First Hundred Days of the Junta” 
which equated the social democratic reforms to the New Deal and the Fair 
Deal.  
 
The United States’ main concern with the Junta became the assistance that 
the Junta was giving to the Caribbean Legion.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, when Figueres signed the Caribbean Pact in 1942 he swore that 
once the Costa Rican revolution had succeeded, the Costa Rican 
revolutionaries would assist the other members of the Caribbean Legion in 
overthrowing oppressive dictatorships throughout Latin America starting with 
the Somozista dictatorship.  During the Junta period, Figueres was fulfilling 
his obligations by providing assistance to other exiles.  The Junta hosted their 
troops in the artillery barracks and their leaders in their homes around the 
capital.  An Army of National Liberation of Nicaragua under the command of 
Figueres and his friend, Rosendo Arguello Jr, was set up using the money 
and arms provided by the Guatemalan president Arevalo. According to 
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Longley (1997), no direct confrontation occurred because Somoza’s spies 
managed to infiltrate this association through bribes.  In July 1948, the 
movement suffered a set back when Nicaraguan officials captured an 
important leader of the exiles, Edelberto Torres.   In the meanwhile the United 
States officials continued to pressure Figueres and the Caribbean Legion 
members to stop their plots, fearing that the communists would exploit any 
regime changes in Latin American countries.  Many people in the US State 
Department started to see Figueres as a threat to regional stability.   
However, Figueres managed to reassure the United States Ambassador to 
Costa Rica and other officials in Washington that he was a firmly pro-
American and presented his anti-communist credentials - his banning of the 
communist party, closing down of the communist press and shutting down 
communist labour unions.  By the end of September 1948, the social 
democratic diplomats promised Washington that no Caribbean Legion 
activities would originate from their country (Longley 1997: 94).  
 
It was during this period that Figueres decided to take the unprecedented step 
of abolishing the military. This was meant to show the United States Figueres’ 
commitment to regional peace.  It also allowed Figueres to portray himself 
nationally and internationally as the true defender of Costa Rica’s exceptional 
peaceful tradition and to counter the narrative created by his opponents that 
portrayed Figueres as a dictator who was violating Costa Rica’s 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  The timing of this announcement was 
also crucial.  Figueres announced the abolition of the military a week before 
the elections for the Constitutional Assembly.  On the 1st of December 1948, 
Figueres conducted a public ceremony full of symbolism.  Figueres broke a 
wall of the military barracks in the Cuartel Bellavista with a mallet symbolizing 
the end of Costa Rica's military spirit.  In order to allude to the “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary that argued that Costa Rica had more teachers than 
soldiers, Figueres gave the Cuartel Bellavista building to the Costa Rican 
Ministry of Culture for the creation of the National Museum of Costa Rica.  
This truly exceptional act allowed the social democrats to start the process of 
constructing the image of Jose Figueres as an exceptional figure.  In the 
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December 3rd, 1948 edition of the Diario de Costa Rica, Luis Dobles Segreda 
wrote an article entitled “Figueres is a unique figure in America”.  He stated: 
While Latin American dictators rely on the army to combat civilian enemies, 
as in Venezuela and Peru, in our little democracy a man, the product of an 
armed revolution, dissolved the Army... He not only delivered the military 
headquarters to the Ministry of Culture to house a museum, he also 
transferred the entirety of the war budget to the Ministry of Education. If our 
country’s continuous source of pride is to have more teachers than soldiers, 
he reinforces this by making the unproductive money previously used to 
buy weapons become productive by using it to improve the education and 
the culture of the Costa Rican population (Diario de Costa Rica - December 
3, 1948).  
 
 
This social democratic intellectual alluded to the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary contrasting Costa Rica to other Latin America countries.  With the 
abolition of the military Costa Rica became truly an exceptional country, and 
Figueres became the exceptional figure responsible for making it happen.  
Now the previous military budget would be spent on improving Costa Rica’s 
educational system and providing better social services to the people in 
keeping with Costa Rica’s tradition of prioritizing education and social services 
over military spending. In the same article, Dobles Segreda states: 
 
It requires a deep loyalty to the republican principles to dissolve an army 
that could have been his source of strength, his unconditional support for 
any policies he wanted to pass and a docile executor of his orders. […] It 
requires a strong and courageous commitment to defending this 
exemplary democracy [...]. The spirit of good has triumphed. Don Jose 
Figueres, who was the first to fight for it, is now the first to guarantee 
its peace (Diario de Costa Rica December 3, 1948) (my emphasis). 
 
 
As seen in this quote, the social democratic narrative sought to prove that the 
social democrats were the true defenders of Costa Rica’s “exemplary 
democracy”.  It was an attempt to close a deep contradiction within the 
Figuerista narrative.  How could a man who had launched an armed 
insurrection be perceived as a legitimate defender of Costa Rica’s 
exceptionalist tradition?  By abolishing the military, the social democrats 
provided an answer. 
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The conservative oligarchic narrative tried to downplay this act arguing that 
Costa Rican never had a significant military. The social democrats responded 
to this narrative in the December 2, 1948 edition of the Diario de Costa Rica 
stating: 
 
They say that we have never had a quantitative or qualitatively important 
army and consequently that the ceremonies conducted only had symbolic 
splendour. For us, these acts have an enormous importance because 
they contribute in a decisive manner to strengthen the existence of civility 
in Costa Rica [...]. Its importance lies also in the fact that it is a measure 
done in absolute coordination with the national sentiment, which is 
deeply anti-militaristic and that hopes to achieve a dignified place 
amongst the civilized nations, not because of the nation’s general, their 
barracks and military parades but for the nation’s moral and spiritual 
values, for its schools and its love of education, order, peace and 
labour (Diario de Costa Rica - December 2 1948) (My emphasis). 
 
 
This quote encompasses all the elements of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary (the image of Costa Rica as a peaceful, democratic, consensual 
nation, which cherishes education, work, and order and, because of this, has 
a special place amongst the greatest nations).  Drastically shifting strategies, 
the very instigators of the socio-political crisis of the 1940s who had formed 
shock brigades committing terrorist acts, and had launched the 1948 civil war 
with the aid of Latin American political exiles were now portraying themselves 
as peace-loving political leaders defending Costa Rica’s exceptional 
democratic tradition.  According to the social democrats, the proof of this 
claim lied in the fact that Figueres had abolished the military.  
 
As various Costa Rican historians have pointed out, the abolition of the army 
also served a strategic military purpose as the military was composed of 
Calderonista supporters. Figueres feared that Calderon Guardia could 
mobilize them for a counter-revolution.  The abolition of the army was not 
objected to by any sector of society (during the 101st Constitutional Assembly 
session, the article declaring the abolition of the military was welcomed by all 
the delegates).  While Figueres disbanded the Costa Rican army, he created 
the National Guard composed of former social democratic revolutionaries and 
then built up his own military supplies.  According to people working for 
Figueres on his farm La Lucha, Figueres kept the weapons that the 
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Guatemalan president Arevalo had lent to the Costa Rican revolutionaries 
hidden on his farm.   When Arevalo had demanded his weapons back after 
the civil war was over, Figueres offered to pay $340,000 for them (Longley 
1997: 93).  Arevalo refused the money, demanding the weapons.  Figueres 
kept the weapons on his farm until 1979, when he gave them to the 
Nicaraguan Sandinista revolutionaries to help them overthrow the Somoza 
dynasty.  
 
Constitutional Assembly Elections  (December 8th, 1948) 
Eight days after the abolition of the military, the Costa Ricans held the 
Constitutional Assembly elections. The Partido Social Democrata was 
humiliatingly defeated by the Ulatista progressive liberal party Union Nacional, 
which won 34 out of the 45 constitutional assembly seats, receiving 72.4% of 
the popular vote.  The conservative party, the Partido Constitucional, secured 
6 seats with 10.8% of the popular vote, while the social democrats obtained 
only 4 seats receiving only 7.6% of the popular vote. The Confederacion 
Nacional party won 2.9% of the votes securing 1 seat.  (It must be noted that 
these elections had a very low turnout rate as the Calderonistas boycotted 
them and the Communist Party were banned from participating).  Another 
three political parties participated - the Civic Action, the Popular Republican 
Movement and the Liberal Party but they received less than 1.0% of the 
popular votes and thus were not represented in the Congressional Assembly 
(Castro Vega 2007:90).  
 
The four social democratic Constitutional Assembly delegates were former 
leaders of the Centro para el Estudio de Problemas Nacionales - Rodrigo 
Facio, Fernando Fournier Acuna, Rogelio Valverde Vega and the young 
leader of the Catholic labour union Rerum Novarum, Luis Alberto Monge 
(future president of Costa Rica 1982-1986 who was handpicked by Padre 
Benjamin Nunez). 
 
The social democratic narrative sought to find a positive spin on their electoral 
defeat.   They argued that although the social democratic candidates had 
been defeated, the Junta and Costa Rica’s democracy had won because no 
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electoral fraud had been committed.  It was indeed very unusual in a Latin 
American country for a victorious revolutionary group to allow itself to be 
defeated in an election that would determine the constitutional fate of the 
nation.   
 
Calderon’s Failed Counter-Revolution (December 10th, 1948) 
Knowing that Figueres had abolished the military, and learning about the 
Partido Social Democrata’s humiliating defeat in the Constitutional Assembly 
elections, Calderon decided to launch a counter-revolution.  On December 
10th, 1948 Calderon invaded the province of Guanacaste with the support of 
the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza (Longley 1997:92).  The Calderonista 
uprising floundered as no mass uprising occurred as Calderon had hoped.  
The Ulatistas set aside their differences with the social democratic Junta and 
demonstrated a united front.   Even the communists refused to assist 
Calderon because of Somoza’s involvement in the counter-revolution.  The 
United States pressured Somoza, Calderon Guardia and Figueres to stop the 
conflict.  The counter-revolution was quickly over.  Following this, the real 
battle for the Figueristas began – their battle to install a Second Republic.  
 
Constitutional Assembly (January 1949 – November 1949) 
On the 15th of January 1949, the Constitutional Assembly held its first 
session.36 The day after, Figueres made the following introductory speech 
attempting once again to convince the other political leaders that Costa Rica 
was currently facing a critical turning point that required a “paradigmatic shift” 
(Hay 2001) in its institutional development:  
 
With the triumph of the Liberation Army, which was the triumph of a people 
struggling against a tyranny, the constitutional order was definitively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Jose Maria Vargas Pacheco became the president of the Constitutional Assembly.  
He was considered a neutral and balanced leader in keeping with the Costa Rican 
consensual political tradition.  He won the approval of all political parties and the 
Costa Rican press by allowing the different political leaders to express their quite 
radically contradictory views without allowing these tensions to disrupt the 
Constitutional Assembly. (Castro Vega 2007:160)  This is also a testament of how 
the Costa Rican exceptionalist myth influenced the perception of interests and 
shaped the behavior of the different political actors.  Despite their wide 
disagreements, all political parties and all political leaders sought to find consensual 
solutions. 
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broken. This constitutional order had been present only in appearance 
under the ousted regime. There was a legal vacuum […] It was a simple 
fact that the popular sovereignty had no positive legal institutions through 
which to exercise that sovereignty in the form of a national government. […] 
Under these circumstances the Junta entrusted the delicate task of 
preparing the draft constitution for the Second Republic to technical 
commission composed of men of recognized morality and social and legal 
competence (Act N 2 Constitutional Assembly January 16, 1949).  
 
 
Thus, the social democratic narrative argued that the war broke the 
constitutional order that had been maintained only in appearance by the 
Calderon and Picado administrations.   Due to this legal institutional void, the 
Junta had entrusted the task of writing a new constitution to a so-called 
technical committee.  They argued that, after consulting with multiple 
stakeholders, this technical committee had developed a Constitutional 
Proposal that reflected the changing aspirations of the Costa Rican population 
as well as the existing international ideational environment.  The social 
democrats argued that their constitutional proposal was ideologically neutral, 
as a technical committee had written it after an objective analysis of Costa 
Rica’s situation.  This concept of “technical” criteria was once again used by 
the social democrats to argue that, unlike under the Calderon and Picado 
administrations, the Junta administration was basing its decisions on 
“objective” studies as opposed to purely political and demagogic decisions. 
Within this technocratic shift there was also a generational shift away from the 
older liberal administrators towards the social democratic administrators 
formerly belonging to the Centro.   
 
Regarding the Social Democratic Constitutional Proposal, Figueres further 
stated in his speech delivered on the 16th of January 1949 to the 
Constitutional Assembly:  
 
Interpreting the legal and social aspiration of the Costa Rican 
population, we decided to replace the 1871 Constitution with its many 
reforms, by a new one, which could combine the essential principles 
of our political life with the modern intellectual thoughts that have 
been gradually accepted by other civilized nations [...] To provide the 
country with a Constitution that addresses a series of concerns that 
have been called “revolutionary” yet which are nothing more than a 
reflection of ideas of human progress -  this has been the real work 
behind the founding a Second Republic. The common aspirations of 
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the people of Costa Rica of individual freedom, social justice and 
economic wellbeing for all, have to become crystallized in a national 
legal platform (Act N 2 of Constitutional Assembly January 16, 1949). 
 
The social democrats insisted that their new constitution was not revolutionary 
as their opponents claimed.  It simply reflected the progress made by other 
civilized nations to solve the social question.  This new constitution would 
allow Costa Ricans to finally fulfil the dream of achieving social justice and 
economic prosperity for all, which had remained only an aspiration under the 
liberal oligarchic hegemonic order.  
 
They argued that simply amending the 1871 Constitution - as the conservative 
and progressive liberals oligarchs wanted - would produce numerous internal 
contradictions.   The constitution had to be a harmonious document in which 
every article reflected the underlying values that inspired the entire document.  
The conservatives and the liberals precisely wanted to avoid the inclusion of 
social democratic principles, having no desire to create a social democratic 
Second Republic.  As the conservative delegate Zeledon Brenes stated on 
the 28th of January 1949:  
 
I do not understand why there is so much talk about a Second Republic, 
when we should go back to the first Republic of our forefathers, who gave 
this nation its lustre and its shine abroad. As I have said in the press, we 
should endeavour to return to the first Republic, to our democratic tradition 
(Act 14 of Constitutional Assembly on January 28, 1949). 
 
 
The Constitutional Assembly voted for the following procedure to decide on 
whether to use the social democratic Constitutional Project as a constitutional 
draft or to amend the 1871 Constitution.   A sub-committee would be elected 
to present their recommendation to the Constitutional Assembly.  This sub-
committee would be composed of three liberals from the Union Nacional, one 
social democratic delegate of the Partido Social Democrata, and one delegate 
of the Partido Constitucional to reflect the proportions of the Constitutional 
Assembly.   The members would not be selected by their parties, but rather 
would be elected by the whole Constitutional Assembly.  On the 1st of 
February, the Constitutional Assembly voted for the Comision Dictaminadora 
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sobre el Proyecto de Constitucion Politica.  The composition was the 
following: Partido Union Nacional: Everardo Gomez, Luis Felipe Gonzalez 
Flores, and Miguel Brenes Gutierrez; Partido Social Democrata: Rogelio 
Valverde; and Partido Constitucional: Otton Acosta.  
 
While this sub-committee worked on their recommendation, the Constitutional 
Assembly deliberated on the six-month extension of the Junta rule.  On 
February 3rd, 1949, the Constitutional Assembly received a letter from Ulate 
arguing that the Constitutional Assembly should grant the extension to the 
Junta.  In his letter Ulate states: 
 
After all, before the outbreak of revolution of March last year I had 
proposed, that a citizen of relevant merits and who inspired confidence in 
all political groups should take over power for a term that would not exceed 
two years. During this period a Constitutional Assembly would be elected. I 
had proposed this to ensure the normal development of the political 
process and to prevent the civil war. If I came up with this proposal before 
the civil war, how can I now deny the right to exercise power under the 
same conditions and for the same period of time to another Costa Rican 
who toppled the oppressive regime, who has respected the sanctity of 
suffrage during the February 1948 elections and has convened this 
Constituent Assembly? I sometimes have discrepancies with the Junta.  I 
have occasionally protested publicly against certain decrees or attitudes of 
some of its members.  In the future, I may have other differences of 
opinion. These disagreements are inevitable and sometimes necessary in 
free societies. But I cannot take away my vote of confidence to a group of 
men who fought for the country and who have showed their service to it 
through their Junta rule (Letter from Otilio Ulate read to the Constitutional 
Assembly on February 3, 1949).  
 
It is interesting to note that the rationale used by Ulate to ask the 
Constitutional Assembly to extend the Junta rule was not based on his 
approval for the Junta administration.  Instead, Ulate argued that if he had 
been willing to grant the right to rule to a consensual candidate for a two-year 
period right after the contested 1948 Presidential elections to try to avoid the 
Civil War, he did not see the harm in allowing the Junta to rule for the 
equivalent amount of time.   He presented the extension of the Junta rule as a 
practice in keeping with the consensual Costa Rican political tradition. Ulate 
was encouraging the Constitutional Assembly to grant the Junta a six-month 
extension to avoid further conflict with the social democrats. 
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This letter was not well received by the delegates.   They argued emphatically 
that this act was an undue intromission by Ulate in the deliberations of the 
Constitutional Assembly.  For several days after, the Constitutional Assembly 
debated the wisdom of granting the Junta the six-month extension now that a 
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly was in session.  The 
conservative delegates Acosta, Arroyo and Gamboa ferociously attacked the 
Junta rule questioning the legitimacy of its very existence.  In turn, the social 
democratic Facio Brenes mounted a defence to justify the legitimacy of the 
Junta rule.  The debates centred on the meaning of the “revolution”.  The 
conservatives argued that a distinction had to be made between an 
insurrection against a corrupt government and a revolution to overthrow a 
political system.  According to Jimenez Ortiz’s constitutional assembly speech 
delivered the 22nd of February 1949: 
 
Revolution from a political standpoint is an uprising against a government 
that has been unfaithful to the will of the people, i.e. that has deviated 
from the Constitutional rules. From a historical and social perspective, a 
revolution is a rupture of a legal order before the installation of a new 
order, revolutionizing the government structure and changing not only the 
political but also the social organization. Such was the case of the French 
Revolution, which was fought not just against a tyrannical government but 
also against a series of social injustice and against a form of organization 
and government that was considered inconvenient. But our revolution was 
not made in that regard. We were led or rather we went to the revolution 
to fight against the vices of a government that was disregarding the laws 
and cheating the system of government, but not against the system itself.  
That is why the Junta does not have the power to transform the financial, 
economic and political organization of the country (Act N 21 of 
Constitutional Assembly debate on February 22, 1949).  
 
 
The vast majority of the Constitutional Assembly delegates agreed with 
Jimenez Ortiz’ interpretation of the Costa Rican revolution and his 
assessment that a Second Republic was not necessary.   The liberals agreed, 
arguing that reformist policies could be pursued within the existing liberal 
oligarchic order.  After several days of intense debate, the Constitutional 
Assembly agreed to grant the Junta the six-month extension but under the 
condition that the Junta would consult with the Constitutional Assembly before 
passing any further decrees.   A small delegation was chosen to see if 
Figueres would agree to this.  On the 7th of March 1949 on the 30th Session of 
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the Constitutional Assembly, the delegates who met with Figueres offered this 
summary of the meeting: 
 
The commission found that Figueres had the strongest desire to maintain 
and strengthen the harmony between the Junta and the Assembly, and […] 
to find a compromise solution, acceptable to all parties involved [...] 
Figueres stressed that he had no difficulty in accepting that the Assembly 
review the laws of paramount importance for the country, but that the Junta 
should determine which decrees constitute issues of “primary importance”, 
as the Assembly could not possibly engage in a review of all the decrees 
issued by the Junta, as this would mean the transformation in its mandate. 
(Act N 30 of Constitutional Assembly on March 7 1949). 
 
This shows how Figueres sought to appear consensual while still trying to 
retain control over which issues the Constitutional Assembly could debate.  
He carefully worded his reply to appear conciliatory to the members of the 
Constitutional Assembly who wrote daily articles in La Nacion attacking the 
Junta. The Constitutional delegates accepted this compromise solution in 
order to move forward with the most pressing task at hand - deciding whether 
to amend the 1871 Constitution or to adopt the 1949 social democratic 
constitutional proposal as the negotiating draft.   
 
In the 38th Session of the Constitutional Assembly, the Comision Especial 
encargada de dictaminar sobre el Proyecto de Constitucion Politica had to 
present their recommendation to the Constitutional Assembly.  Since the 
social democratic delegate could not agree with the recommendation of the 
majority, the delegates decided to write two separate statements entitled “The 
recommendation of the majority” and “The recommendation of the minority”. 
The recommendation of the majority composed of Luis Felipe Gonzalez, 
Miguel Brenes Gutierrez and Oton Acosta stated: 
 
The project under study (Social Democratic proposal)..contains extreme 
theories that are not, in our opinion, the expression of national 
sentiment, nor do they represent the will of the majority of Costa Ricans 
whose will must be respected by this Assembly in the most faithful possible 
way. Therefore, we cannot form a judgment favourable to the project under 
study, as it is alien to our Costa Rican traditions… 
 
So if we want to encourage the country's to return to a state of complete 
normality, giving our national family the harmony and concord that it 
needs, thus fostering the rule of tranquillity and peace, we advise to 
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restore the total force of the 1871 Constitution, and take the time to 
improve those aspects in which there is a consensus adding these reforms 
as amendment to the prestigious 1871 Constitutions, and writing these 
reforms in harmony with this Constitution (Act N 38 of the Constitutional 
Assembly on February 16, 1949). 
 
 
Gonzalez, Brenes and Acosta further compared the 1871 Costa Rican 
Constitution with the United States Constitution, arguing that its flexibility had 
allowed it to make as many necessary amendments as the nation had seen 
fit.  They argued that it was not possible to state that the 1871 Constitution or 
the United States Constitution had blocked the material progress of the two 
countries or had hindered their positive institutional development.  They 
therefore suggested to the Constitutional Assembly the following: 
 
We propose a Constituent Assembly to declare the basis of its deliberations 
the Constitution promulgated on December 7, 1871, with all amendments 
and incorporate by way of amendment, those reforms to be introduced 
formally and have the acceptance of this Assembly (Act 38 of Constitutional 
Assembly on February 16, 1949). 
 
The statement by the minority faction of the Commission composed by 
Rogelio Valverde and Everardo Gomez37 stated the following:   
 
We believe that the social democratic constitutional project has not 
deviated in spirit from the 1871 Constitution, which, for over seventy years 
has governed our political life, but rather has limited itself to making the 
modifications looking at the Costa Rican’s daily reality has taught us are 
necessary as well as those that are in accordance with the new ideological 
currents (Act 38 of Constitutional Assembly on February 16, 1949). 
 
 
It is interesting to see how these delegates now sought to present the social 
democratic Constitutional Proposal as in keeping with the 1871 Constitution 
when Figueres had previously argued that Costa Rica had to start with a 
“clean slate”.  These delegates sought to show how the chapters on individual 
rights and political rights only expanded and made more precise the vague 
concepts in the 1871 Constitution.  The chapters on the judicial, the legislative 
and the executive only sought to rebalance the power of the executive and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Although Everardo Gomez belonged to the progressive liberal party, he sided with 
the social democrats.	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ensure that past practices of corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement 
would be averted.  They then stated that: 
 
An innovation of the social democratic project, at least in the form it is 
currently presented, is the chapter on the state’s involvement in the 
economy. However, this actually establishes norms that the country has 
been already applying, giving them only constitutional support. [...] In 
general terms, it enables the state to direct its policies in a humanitarian 
sense. […] The future laws will be responsible for giving concrete 
expression to these aspirations [...](Act 38 of Constitutional Assembly on 
February 16, 1949). 
 
Therefore, these delegates sought to present the social democratic proposal’s 
most controversial chapter – the one proposing an interventionist state in the 
economic sector, as a continuation of previous policies during the liberal 
oligarchic period.  Although it was true that the state had been intervening 
more in the economy during the World Wars, this did not mean that the Costa 
Rican population was willing to grant the state control over the economy.  (In 
fact, this whole section of the social democratic proposal was categorically 
rejected during the congressional sessions dealing with it.)  These delegates 
further stated: 
 
The chapter on "Labour rights" condenses the principles that have inspired 
our social legislation, as well as the commitments we have made by signing 
international conventions (Act 38 of Constitutional Assembly on February 
16, 1949). 
 
The social democratic delegates stated that their proposal on social legislation 
did not depart from the amendments passed under the Calderon 
administration.  It only expanded these principles and gave them the 
institutional backing necessary to apply them fully.   It is interesting to note 
that during the congressional session when they discussed this chapter, the 
social democratic delegates proposed a motion that the existing chapter 
should be voted as a whole with no individual amendments because they 
feared that the conservative delegates might use this opportunity to undo 
much of the legislation.  Ironically, the social democrats were now defending 
Calderon’s reforms. 
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The social democratic motion on voting for the whole chapter was rejected.  
Each article was analysed separately.  Contrary to the social democrats’ 
fears, the social legislation was not changed drastically by the Constitutional 
Assembly - despite attempts made by the conservative delegates 
Montealegre and Trejos.  This shows that the social legislation passed by 
Calderon was not the major source of opposition to the Caldero-comunista 
regime as some scholars have argued. 
 
During the following congressional assembly sessions, Baudrit Solera, 
Gonzalez Flores, and Esquivel Fernandez, the progressive liberal delegates, 
expressed their support for the view of the majority. On March 30th, 1949 on 
the 45th session Esquivel Fernandez argues:  
 
Those of us who long for Costa Rica to continue living their traditional 
existence of peace, freedom and democracy, those who reject exotic 
experiments, those of us who think we should not change certain 
fundamental concepts of the Costa Rican political ideology, support the 
Majority recommendation, because this view represents a defined 
ideological tendency, a respect for Costa Rican norms, that we think must 
endure. More than the letter of the Constitution of 1871, Costa Rican want 
to maintain the spirit of it (Act N 45 of the Congressional Assembly on 
March 30, 1949).  
 
The conservatives then accused the social democrats of being inconsistent. 
On one hand, they argued that it was necessary to have a new constitution, 
while at the same time they argued that their constitutional proposal 
incorporated almost all the chapters of the 1871 constitution.  During the 47th 
session of the Constitutional Assembly, the social democratic delegate 
Fernando Fournier responded to these accusations: 
 
Delegate Esquivel wants to confuse us saying that we have stated that the 
Constitution of 71 is bad and in the same breath we continue to claim that 
almost all of its provisions are included in the project. We are not 
contradicting ourselves. Both are true.  The problem with the old 
Constitution is its poor distribution, which we try to correct as well as its 
grammatical errors. Most importantly, we try to correct its serious 
omissions. The social democratic project addresses these omissions by 
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This shows the extremely hard balancing act that the social democrats had to 
do to claim that there was continuity between their project and the 1871 
Constitution, while at the same time arguing for the urgency of adopting a new 
constitution based on social democratic principles.  One of the best speeches 
by the social democrats explaining how elements of continuity coexisted with 
elements of change in the social democratic project was the one given by 
Rodrigo Facio on April 6th, 1949:  
 
It has argued that the social democratic project departs from the old 
traditions of Costa Rica, but no one, neither the Majority recommendation 
nor the various delegates who continuously repeat this argument, have 
explained which traditions they are referring to. I believe there are two kinds 
of traditions; those that are valuable and those that have proven to be 
dangerous. To the first set of traditions belong the values of political 
freedom, Catholicism, religious tolerance, respect and promotion of 
small properties, individual liberty, respect for rule of law, the sense 
of equality and civility, and promotion of a peaceful life. The project 
does not conflict with any of these valuable principles that form the 
Costa Rican tradition. […] You could say that within this classification of our 
traditions we has been left out, individualism, one of the constants of our 
character, but no one can deny that this closed individualism, has been 
harmful, and this fact has opened the way for the notion of collectivism to 
increase in our society.. The Project hosts the best national traditions; it 
solidifies them and strengthens them. It also incorporates, as a mere 
option a trend towards state interventionism that the country has 
been testing for several years, by enacting frankly interventionist laws 
such as creation of State Banks, controlling the value of the currency, 
creating a national insurance company, the Labour Code, Social 
Security etc. This project however, reacts against traditional vices that 
have prevailed in Costa Rica as the hypertrophied personalism that has 
led to an exaggerated presidentialism that has proved very harmful. This 
Project therefore does not aim to destroy the work of our ancestors, but 
rather seeks to improve it by reconciling technical progress with democracy 
[...] (Act 49 of Constitutional Assembly on April 6, 1949).  
 
   
Following their “innovative continuity” strategy (first developed by Rodrigo 
Facio in the 1940s), the social democrats sought to present their proposal as 
in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, while at the same 
time trying to change this collective imaginary to reflect their political project.  
They claimed that the social democratic project would retain the best Costa 
Rican traditions, while attacking a negative tradition – its excessive 
individualism.   We see the beginnings of the social democrats’ attempt to 
shift the liberal oligarchic interpretation of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary, which boasted about Costa Rica’s individualist nature, to the social 
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democratic version that emphasizes the collectivist nature of the Costa 
Ricans.   This new interpretation did not become hegemonic until the 1960s. 
 
The Constitutional Assembly held a general vote to decide which 
recommendation to accept.  The social democratic proposal was 
overwhelmingly defeated – the 1871 Constitution would serve as a base for 
the new constitution.  Figueres was so disappointed by their defeat that he 
called Ulate to tell him that the Junta was ready to hand over power to Ulate 
immediately.  However, Ulate rejected the offer saying he did not want to rule 
without a constitution.  The conservatives sought to convince Ulate that the 
1871 Constitution could be quickly reinstated and later amended by the 
following legislative assembly.  However, Ulate objected.  He did not want his 
administration to be consumed by political battles over constitutional 
amendments and wanted to start his administration with a fully established 
institutional order.  During this period, Ulate did not actively seek support for 
the amending of the 1871 Constitution, as he wanted to appear as a “neutral” 
president elect. 
 
However, Ulate had been instrumental in convincing a group of conservative 
lawyers to form the Constitutional Party.  As Jimenez Quesada stated during 
the 25th meeting of the Constitutional Assembly on the 28th of February 1949, 
Ulate personally convinced Manuel Francisco Jimenez Ortiz, Brenes 
Gutierrez and Victor Chavarria to join the Constitutional Party to provide their 
conservative views to the constitutional assembly.  Due to the fact that this 
party was composed at the last minute, Ulate had to personally convince 
Figueres to allow the Partido Constitucional to participate in the 1948 
Constitutional elections.  Ulate wanted to have a balancing force within the 
Constitutional Assembly to counter-act the most radical proposals by the 
social democrats,but he did not want to be perceived as partisan. 
 
Constitutional Amendments 
Since there was a consensus that the excessive power of the executive had 
contributed to the 1940’s political crisis, the social democrats were able to 
pass reforms creating three new institutions that reduced the previous powers 
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of the executive.  The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, first created under the 
Picado administration, was reinforced.  This later became a fourth branch of 
Costa Rica’s government. The Direccion General del Servicio Civil was 
created to appoint public servants in order to eliminate nepotistic practices 
and political persecution and to increase meritocracy.  The Controlaria 
General de la Republica was created to check corrupt practices by high 
ranking government employees and to act against favoritism in the granting of 
state financed projects to private firms (Naranjo Chacon 2010:97).  The 
municipal governments were also granted more autonomy.  
 
Although the social democratic desire to shift Costa Rica towards a 
parliamentary system was strongly rejected, the social democrats succeeded 
in increasing the power of Congress vis-à-vis the executive.  This change has 
been crucial for the social democrats, as they have controlled Congress since 
1953.  This has allowed them to continuously block any motions by the liberal 
oligarchs to dismantle the social democratic reforms – such as the 
nationalization of the banking system and the creation of autonomous 
institutions (Naranjo Chacon 2010: 97). 
 
The liberals supported and proposed measures geared towards eliminating 
nepotism, reducing corruption and preventing administrative mismanagement, 
limiting the power of the executive, and increasing the power of Congress. 
The progressive liberals argued these amendments were necessary to make 
sure that Costa Rica would not suffer again from these issues as it had 
suffered under the Caldero-comunista regime.  The conservatives tried to 
block some changes, arguing that the problems the Costa Rican political 
system faced were not due to deficiencies in the 1871 Constitution, but 
attributable to the particular individuals running the country (Calderon Guardia 
and Manuel Mora).  They continuously argued that the 1871 Constitution had 
served its purpose extremely well in the past and should be kept as intact as 
possible.  In some proposals the progressive liberals supported the 
conservatives and in some others they supported the social democrats.   
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In some amendments the conservatives, the progressive liberals and the 
social democrats all agreed without debate, such as the extension of suffrage 
rights to women, enabling the African Caribbean descendants born in Costa 
Rica become citizens, abolishing the military, strengthening the Tribunal 
Supremo de Elecciones to enable it to oversee all aspects of the electoral 
process, improving the educational system through the allocation of a fixed 
amount of the annual budget to education, and retaining the traditionally good 
relations between the Costa Rican Catholic Church and the Costa Rican 
state.   
 
Therefore, as Rovira (2007) accurately concludes, the social democratic 
reforms that were accepted by the Constitutional Assembly were only those 
that modernized the capitalist state system, strengthened the democratic 
liberal oligarchic system and increased the relative autonomy of the state.  
The only socialist reformist policy passed was the introduction of autonomous 
institutions (Rovira 2007:62).  The delegates also categorically rejected the 
social democratic proposal to include a preface referring to the 1948 Civil 
War.   There was an overwhelming consensus that the civil war should not be 
mentioned at all in the constitution.   
 
End of Junta Rule 
On November 7th, 1949 the Junta handed over power to Ulate.  Figueres 
decided not to use the six-month extension that the Constitutional Assembly 
had granted the Junta since there was such widespread opposition to the 
Junta.  On April 3, 1949, the Minister of Public Safety Edgar Cardona seized 
the Bella Vista barracks and demanded the immediate installation of the Ulate 
administration.  This event became known as the Cardonazo.  Cardona, one 
of the seven rebels who had helped Figueres launch his armed insurrection, 
stated that Figueres had lied to him and to all Costa Ricans about his true 
intentions regarding his armed insurrection.  He pressed Figueres to respect 
the will of the insurgents and the majority of Costa Ricans.  Ulate did not 
support Cardona’s action, as he did not want his administration to be 
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associated with a coup.  Faced with mounting opposition, the social 
democratic leader acknowledged that ruling through the Junta was counter-
productive.  The longer the social democrats ruled through undemocratic 
means, the harder it would be for them to garner popular support for their 
Second Republic.  Therefore, instead of handing over power to Otilio Ulate in 
May 1950 as originally agreed upon by the Ulate-Figueres Pact, the Junta 
announced it would hand it over on the 8th of November 1949.  
 
The social democrats realized their energies were better spent building a new 
political party – the Partido Liberacion Nacional - than by constantly battling 
against the opposition.  By renaming the Partido Social Democrata, the social 
democrats sought a new start.  This new start required a re-writing of their 
role in Costa Rican history.  It entailed overlooking certain facts such as: a) 
their role in destabilizing Costa Rica’s political order through acts of terrorism 
and sabotage during the 1940s; b) their single-handed responsibility for 
starting the Civil War; c) their promise to support the Caribbean Legion’s 
efforts to overthrow dictatorships throughout Latin America violating Costa 
Rica’s traditional neutrality; and d) their refusal to hand over power to the 
legitimately elected president Ulate.   Instead of focusing on these facts, they 
shifted public attention to a new narrative. The next chapter will trace the 
emergence of the National Liberation myth.  It argues that only after this new 
myth of unity was widely accepted were the social democrats able to 
accomplish their dream of making their political project become hegemonic.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This period in Costa Rica’s history is one of the best examples of the power of 
the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary in influencing its political outcomes 
and shaping its institutional development. What could have been a 
foundational moment in Costa Rica’s history remained a transformist one due 
to the ideational path dependence exerted by it.  This shows the weakness of 
the dominant interpretation used by scholars analysing Costa Rica’s 
democratic consolidation, which assumes that the social democratic military 
victory naturally led to the transition into the social democratic model.  This 
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view is widely accepted by the best Costa Rican scholars including, amongst 
others, Mahoney 2001, Cruz 2005, Rovira Mas 2000, and Quesada 2008.  It 
is a view that was originally created by the social democratic academics 
Alberto Canas, Rodrigo Facio, and Oscar Castro Vega during the late 1950s 
early 1960s when they started the process of re-interpreting the social 
democrats’ role in history.  Their success in spreading this myth has meant 
that even the most recent works by non social democrats seeking to disprove 
the social democratic myth (such as Molina and Palmer 2009) have kept this 
image of the 1948 civil war as naturally leading to the social democratic 
paradigm shift.  
 
The influence of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary also meant that the 
immediate post civil war experience in Costa Rica was unique relative to other 
Latin American revolutionary experiences.  While a military victory granted the 
victors the right to rule and impose foundational changes in other Latin 
American countries, the Costa Rican social democratic revolutionaries faced 
enormous difficulties in legitimatising their rule and saw their dream of 
founding a Second Republic frustrated.  For example, while the October 1944 
revolution in Guatemala legitimised the right to rule of the social democratic 
revolutionaries Juan Jose Arevalo (1944-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-
1954), allowing them to impose radical changes (major land redistribution and 
nationalizations), the Costa Rican social democrats’ actions were constrained. 
However, this also meant that while the Guatemalan revolution abruptly 
ended in 1954 with the CIA led coup that installed the oppressive right wing 
counter-revolutionary Castillo dictatorship, the Costa Rican social democrats 
eventually succeeded in transforming Costa Rica’s institutional framework 
through gradual yet continuous reformist change.  The unresolved socio-
economic and political tensions in Guatemala led to a 36-year civil war.  
Instead, the transformist nature of Costa Rica’s political system guaranteed 
Costa Rica’s political stability and facilitated the eventual rise to hegemony of 
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Costa Rica has given the world a living example of purity and democratic 
strength.   
(US Ambassador General Philip Flemings on July 31, 1953) 
 
 
I pray to God that the battle that began in 1948 come to an end.  The price we 
paid for our freedom was very high, but we did not fight for the freedom of 
some at the expense of others.  Now we all want to work in peace.  We need 
sanity, mutual forgiveness, peace and love.   
(Jose Figueres’s speech during the transfer of power to the newly elected 




The discursive dimension of Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation  
 
The lack of popularity of the social democrats during the immediate post-civil 
war period has been overlooked by academics analysing Costa Rica’s 
democratization process, with the academic consensus heavily influenced by 
the social democratic re-interpretation of its own role in this time period. This 
narrative argues that Jose Figueres became a national hero as a result of the 
social democrats’ victory in the 1948 Civil War.  It views the 1948 Civil War as 
a critical juncture (Collier and Collier 1991) in Costa Rica’s history, after which 
the social democrats were able to create the institutional framework that 
enabled the consolidation of Costa Rica’s democracy (Yashar 1997, Booth 
1999).  It highlights the reforms implemented in the 1949 Constitution 
particularly: a) the abolition of the army making it more difficult for dissenting 
forces to engineer coups; b) the creation of a fourth branch of government – 
the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, which has served to guarantee 
transparent, free and fair elections; c) the establishment of an extensive social 
state including a social security and public health system strengthening the 
state and making it become highly respected; and d) the development of a 
strong party system facilitating democratic governance as a key to Costa 
Rica’s democratic consolidation (Ordonez, Padilla, Andrews, De Gennaro 
2009, Isbester 2010, Seligson 2014). This chapter seeks to complement the 
findings of previous studies analysing Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation 
by focusing on a dimension that remains under-appreciated.  It argues that in 
order to understand how these factors came into being in the first place it is 
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important to analyse the discursive dimension.  By doing so, we can begin to 
understand what factors encouraged political actors to take atypical decisions 
compared to the rest of the region during post-civil war situations.  While the 
prevalence of discourses creating relations of antagonism in the rest of the 
region encouraged the continuation of conflict making the civil wars in Central 
America last decades (Guatemala civil war 1960-1996, Nicaraguan civil war 
1979-1990, El Salvador civil war 1979-1992), the transformist logic of 
articulation used during the Ulate administration served to de-radicalize and 
de-mobilize the Costa Rican population.  
 
The dominant view also argues that Costa Rica’s democratic stabilization was 
due to the rise to hegemony of the Partido Liberacion Nacional during the 
1950s, which led to a stable, bi-partisan, and predictable electoral system 
(Seligson 2014: 367).  It argues that the hegemony of the social democratic 
model inspired by the ideas of John Keynes led to the emergence of a big 
middle class – a strong democratic stabilizing force (Ordonez, Padilla, Andres 
and De Gennaro 2009).  The dominance of this model from 1949 to the 1980s 
meant that regardless of which political party came to power, the state 
continued to invest in human resources, in the creation of social infrastructure, 
in the promotion of private investment and in the expansion of the market.  
The development of the welfare state was also a fundamental factor leading 
to Costa Rica’s democratic success.  Some scholars have focused on the 
quality of these public policies as the main source of Costa Rica’s democratic 
stability (Lehoucq 2010), while others have shown how the success of the 
social democratic institutional order throughout the 1949-1980 period created 
the high level of regime support that enabled Costa Rica to remain 
democratically stable despite the severe socio-economic crisis triggered by 
the 1980s debt crisis (Booth and Seligson 1999).  Most scholars such as 
Seligson (2014) highlight the crucial role played by Jose Figueres in the 
consolidation of Costa Rica’s democracy.  Seligson states:   
 
First, he abolished the Costa Rican military. Second, he did what no other 
successful leader of a coup in Latin America has ever done: he voluntarily 
turned the control of the government over to the victor of the annulled 
elections. By doing so he firmly established a respect for elections that 
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have grown in Costa Rica since the turn of the century.  Third, the civil 
war largely delegitimized the Communist Party, and since that time, even 
after the elimination of the constitutional prohibition on Communist 
candidates running for office, the voting strength of the Communist Party 
has not exceeded 3% of the total presidential vote. Fourth, Figueres 
ushered in with him a group of social reformers who, though in many ways 
merely expanded on programs begun by Calderon, sought to spur 
economic development and social progress without resorting to outright 
socialist schemes  (Seligson 2014: 367). 
 
The current academic consensus views Don Pepe (as Jose Figueres became 
known in Costa Rica) as the “founder of Costa Rica’s modern democracy” and 
the social democratic institutional framework as the main source of its political 
stability.  Most of these accounts fast-forward from the end of the civil war to 
the 1953 presidential elections won by Figueres, assuming that the social 
democrats’ military success naturally translated into their political success 
leading to the rise of the social democratic hegemony.   
 
This chapter disputes this widely held view by focusing on a period of Costa 
Rica’s history that remains under-analysed by scholars exploring Costa Rica’s 
democratic consolidation – the Otilio Ulate administration (1949-1953).  While 
this period has recently received the attention of Costa Rican historians under 
the guidance of Ivan Molina, their findings have not yet been incorporated into 
the dominant political scientists’ explanations of Costa Rica’s democratic 
consolidation.  This chapter argues that Ulate played a crucial role in creating 
the discursive condition of possibility for Costa Rica’s democratic 
consolidation.  He contributed to the emergence of the social democratic 
hegemony and to the institutional framework widely attributed to have 
facilitated Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation.  Ulate’s critical role has 
been neglected due to the dominance of the social democratic narrative, 
which has downplayed Ulate’s contribution in order to highlight Figueres’ 
contribution.  By focusing on the Ulate administration, the crucial importance 
that the discursive dimension had on Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation 
becomes evident.  Without the predominance of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary and its transformist logic of articulation, the post-civil war period 
could have been politically unstable and violent.  Some incidents such as the 
Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones’ rejection of the Partido Union Nacional’s 
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registration for the 1953 presidential elections could have re-sparked civil 
unrest, with the wounds left amongst the citizens from the death of 
approximately 2000 family members and friends still very fresh.  Yet no such 
unrest happened.  
 
This chapter explores how the influence of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary encouraged all major political leaders during the post-civil war 
period to erase the internal political frontier that had divided Costa Rican 
society into two antagonistic blocs.  Using discourses applying the logic of 
difference, the main political leaders in Costa Rica sought to reconstruct the 
perception that Costa Rica was a homogenous, harmonious, and peace-
loving society seeking to once again integrate the particular demands of 
disparate social sectors into an expanding hegemonic order.  These political 
leaders sought to recreate the strong external political frontier uniting Costa 
Ricans against external destabilizing influences – a possible invasion from 
Somoza.  The abolition of the CRCP by Jose Figueres allowed the Ulate 
administration and the social democrats to argue that the “existential threat” to 
Costa Rica had been eliminated.  The fact that political leaders succeeded in 
pushing the political frontier to the margins of society is one of the crucial 
factors assisting Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation after the 1948 Civil 
War.  
 
The chapter is divided in three sections.  Section one shows how the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary influenced the political decisions of the 
most important political actors during the Ulate administration (1949-1953) 
and the 1953 presidential campaign.  It argues that this period set the 
discursive condition of possibility for the emergence of the social democratic 
hegemony.  Section two focuses on the first Figueres administration (1953-
1958), exploring the factors that contributed to his victory. Section three 
concludes by tracing the rise of the social democratic hegemony.   
 
The data analysed comes from the Constitutional Assembly debates, the 
newspaper Diario de Costa Rica, and key political speeches by President 
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Otilio Ulate (1949-1953), Monsignor Victor Sanabria and President Jose 
Figueres (1953-1958).  
 
Transition to Constitutional Order  
Due to continuous popular pressure to put an end to the Junta rule, Figueres 
decided to hand over power to Ulate on November 8, 1949 without taking 
advantage of the six-month extension that had been granted by the 
Constitutional Assembly after weeks of intense debate.  During the last 
sessions of the Constitutional Assembly, the conservative liberal oligarchic 
delegates tried to overturn the decrees passed by the Junta through decree-
laws (a right granted by Otilio Ulate through the Ulate-Figueres Pact with no 
democratic foundation).  The Junta had nationalized the banking system and 
had created autonomous institutions including the Instituto Costarricense de 
Electricidad (ICE) responsible for the development of electric and 
telecommunication infrastructure, and the Consejo Nacional de Produccion 
(CNP) whose mission was to stabilize agricultural prices in the domestic 
market, stimulate production through price subsidies and act as an 
intermediary between farmers and consumers (Mesa-Lago 2000:406).  To 
counter the attack made by the conservative delegates, the social democratic 
delegates argued that the Constitutional Assembly had no right to overturn 
these decrees.  The mandate of the Constitutional Assembly was limited to 
drafting a new constitution.  They argued that the only legitimate body to 
address the fate of the banking system and the autonomous institutions was 
the Congress under the Otilio Ulate administration that would soon come into 
session.  The conservatives argued that the fact that Figuerista Boards of 
Directors headed these autonomous institutions was already limiting the 
mandate of the Otilio Ulate administration and the next Congress, equating 
their autonomy with unaccountability.  The conservatives further demanded 
that Ulate be given the right to appoint the heads of these autonomous 
institutions.   This was unacceptable to Figueres and the current heads of the 
autonomous institutions.  The Director of the Banco Anglo Costarricense, 
Fernando Barrenechea, wrote the following article on the Diario de Costa Rica 
on the 27th of October 1949: 
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I think the step taken by the constituents can have grave consequences 
because it can deeply harm the autonomous institutions, which should be 
administered abiding by technical criteria and be a-political. This 
institutional innovation will serve as the foundation of the stability of our 
modern democracy (Diario de Costa Rica – October 27, 1949).  
 
Ulate knew that the “apolitical” and “technical” character of the board of 
directors of the autonomous institutions meant that Figuerista heads would 
control these institutions regardless of who governed.  This would make it 
difficult for other administrations to reverse the social democratic reforms.  
However, Ulate feared that this crisis could escalate into another civil war. 
Figueres had already proven the extent he was willing to go for his political 
project.  Ulate tried to defuse the politically charged situation through radio 
speeches and articles in the Diario de Costa Rica warning Costa Ricans 
against the negative consequences of allowing oneself to be blinded by 
passion and intransigence – an attitude that could only lead to violence.  Ulate 
was able to convince the conservative delegates that the most appropriate 
institution to deal with this issue was the Congress under his administration.  
He repeatedly argued that it was in everyone’s interest to re-establish social 
harmony and democratic institutional order as smoothly and quickly as 
possible.  He portrayed himself as a centrist moderator who was going to 
reunite the Costa Ricans after their family feud.  The Partido Union Nacional 
presented Ulate as: 
 
[Ulate] will be the bridge between the traditional and the impatient 
revolutionary Costa Rica, which without a defined orientation, tries to 
overcome the shortcomings of a social organization that took a century 
to build (Diario de Costa Rica – November 8, 1949).  
 
Accusing the social democrats of trying to change a social organization that 
had been successfully evolving for the past century through inappropriate 
revolutionary means, the progressive liberals portrayed Ulate as a president 
who would lead Costa Rica back to its traditional reformist path as defined by 
their “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  To de-escalate political tensions, 
the progressive liberals and Costa Rican Catholic Church leaders gave radio 
speeches and wrote articles in the Diario de Costa Rica requesting that the 
conservative coffee barons and the social democrats allow a prompt and 
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peaceful transition to institutional rule.  For example, a progressive liberal, 
Jose J. Chacon, wrote on November 8, 1949: 
Let’s not put obstacles to Ulate’s work of national reconstruction.  The 
time has come for everyone, absolutely everyone, to make some 
sacrifices, even to sacrifice our sense of revenge, for the sake of the 
common good. We must sacrifice our ambitions for the sublime hope of 
re-establishing national peace […] With just laws, impartial Tribunals of 
Justice, worthy congressmen, respectful and zealous officials fulfilling 
their duties, and with deep faith we can finally delight in our peace […] 
Cowardice and parsimony are enemies of peace (Diario de Costa Rica – 
November 8, 1949).   
 
Just like Chacon, hundreds of other political leaders, teachers, businessmen, 
and lawyers wrote articles in the Diario de Costa Rica stating that everyone’s 
priority should be to forget the horrors of the civil war, to control their political 
passions and to work together to return to Costa Rica’s traditional institutional 
order.  The head of the Costa Rican Catholic Church, Monsignor Victor 
Sanabria, a former ally of Calderon Guardia stated:  
 
As head of the Costa Rican Catholic Church I am happy to see a return to 
constitutional life in an atmosphere of calm and optimism.  Costa Rica 
enters an era of peace and progress. We must ask God to give all of us the 
ability to return to the old Costa Rica, the Costa Rica of order, work and 
faith.  Let’s pray that Don Otilio Ulate succeeds in being the president of all 
Costa Ricans.  That he succeeds in merging the wills, the efforts and the 
aspirations of all to work in the economic and spiritual national 
reconstruction, without thinking that one man is capable of doing everything 
on his own (Diario de Costa Rica – November 9, 1949).  
 
  
For Ulate’s inauguration, some political leaders encouraged a group of 
women to set up a committee to decorate the capital with flowers and Costa 
Rican flags.  This was a way of mobilizing the population in a peaceful and 
constructive way.  The Diario de Costa Rica describes the mood this 
committee created on the capital on November 8, 1949: 
 
Yesterday, within moments the capital city was embellished […] with street 
ornaments decorating public buildings and private residences.  Both the 
Committee of Ladies who organized the distribution of banners, and the 
tradesmen and the public in general were devoted entirely to the task of 
putting our national flag everywhere.  In the early afternoon, San Jose was 
in full gala ready to celebrate enthusiastically the big day – the historical 
event that rightfully fills with joy every Costa Rican (Diario de Costa Rica – 
November 8, 1949).  
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During this transition, the social democrats had to play a balancing act.  From 
one side, they wanted to be seen as sharing in the joy felt by Costa Ricans for 
the return to the constitutional order.  On the other side, they wanted to 
reinforce their crisis narrative that institutional change was necessary. On 
inauguration day, the PSD wrote the following article in the Diario de Costa 
Rica: 
 
An uplifting climate lifts the spirit of Costa Ricans to see occupy the 
presidency to the citizen they elected.  But the joy that floods the souls of 
Costa Ricans should not end in flittering enthusiasm.  It is urgent for our 
nation to analyse its vital signs so we can commit ourselves to the 
responsible task of restoring our moral pulse, stabilizing the economy, and 
laying the necessary foundations for true social harmony, which means we 
must raise the standard of health and education of our people, build 
together and perform the necessary work to lead us once again to the path 
that will make us regain our prestigious position.  If we do not form a 
collective national will to confront our problems, the optimism of the people 
will become disappointment, lack of faith, and civil indifference.  If this 
happens, the politicians without scruples of the past will thrive once again 
(Diario de Costa Rica – November 8, 1949).  
 
While the social democrats wanted to maintain the sense of urgency and the 
necessity for profound institutional change, Ulate sought to de-radicalize the 
Costa Ricans.  One of the ways in which he did this was by co-opting the 
social democrats (potentially the most destabilising group) by adopting the 
social democratic narrative that portrayed the civil war as a democratizing 
action.  He integrated elements of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
(that argued that Costa Rica was an innately democratic, homogenous and 
peace-loving country) with elements of the social democratic narrative that 
argued that the civil war had been a necessary action to protect Costa Rica’s 
democratic tradition.  In his inaugural speech President Ulate stated:  
 
Costa Rica cheerfully returns to its constitutional order and to its 
representative system of government after a joyous ending of the war - a 
war, which though foreign to our habits of peace, was imposed by us by 
necessity and was carried out in the service of our Democracy.  
 
The Founding Junta of the Second Republic has made possible this 
exemplary act we are living today by transferring power from the clean 
hands of a government of revolutionary origin, which did not try to hold on 
to power, to another of judicial structure, with the express commitment of 
the first not to interfere in any way in the administration of the second 
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(Inaugural message delivered by President Otilio Ulate on November 10, 
1949).  
 
Through this speech Ulate was indirectly negotiating with the social 
democrats.  He would adopt the social democratic interpretation of the 1948 
Civil War, in exchange for the social democrats not to interfere in any way in 
his administration.  Thus, Ulate sought to co-opt the social democrats as the 
liberals had done before during the 1900s-1920s with the Radicales del 1900 
and the Volistas of the Partido Reformista.  Ulate feared that going against the 
social democratic narrative would only incentivise the social democrats to 
boycott his administration.  Having learnt from Calderon’s mistakes, he did not 
want to turn them into his enemies.  
 
By praising Figueres for handing over power instead of keeping it - as most 
Latin American revolutionary victors would have done in his position, Ulate 
was seeking to create the perception that, despite the civil war, Costa Rica 
was still an exceptional country relative to its neighbours.  Through his first 
presidential message, Ulate also indirectly stated that any interference from 
the social democrats in his administration could lead to the soiling of the good 
reputation that Ulate was helping build for Figueres.   
 
Ulate adopted the social democratic interpretation of the civil war also 
because he believed that it would be the most suitable narrative for de-
escalating political tension across the country.  The fact that this narrative was 
more in keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary than other 
narratives would make it easier for the Costa Ricans to come to terms with the 
1948 Civil War and return to political stability.  It would allow them to 
overcome the “identity crisis” induced by the civil war, as this narrative sought 
to reconcile the contradiction between their self-perception as a peace-loving, 
democratic, egalitarian and homogeneous society with their actions during the 
civil war by re-interpreting the war as a necessary pro-democratic movement.  
 
Since Ulate wanted to re-establish the external political frontier that shaped 
Costa Rican politics until the 1930s-1940s, he did not want to place 
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Calderonistas or the communists as the “constitutive outside” or enemies of 
his discursive formation.  In his inaugural speech, he did not even mention 
them.  His message was the following: the civil war was over; a new era had 
begun.  Ulate was going to be the president of all Costa Ricans.  He 
repeatedly stated that only by re-establishing internal social cohesion could 
Costa Rica once again regain its position as an exceptional democracy 
admired by the international community.  With regards to the Calderon and 
Picado administrations he stated in another presidential message:  
 
What divides the current government from the one in place from 1940 to 
1948 are not hatreds, but rather simply different policies and modes of 
governing.  My administration has the greatest respect for the suffrage.  In 
Public Finance we believe that the best manager is the one who saves, 
organizes and works rather than the one who overspends increasing the 
international debt and leading the country to fiscal insolvency, thus 
committing the country to new foreign debts (Presidential Message 
delivered by Otilio Ulate to Congress on May 1, 1952).  
 
 
Therefore, Guardia and Picado were portrayed as “bad administrators” and as 
“violators of the sanctity of the vote” but not as “enemies” posing an existential 
threat to the country, as the social democratic crisis narrative had portrayed 
them during the 1940s to mobilize the opposition.  
 
The Ulate administration also gave priority to addressing the social question, 
solving the fiscal crisis, and improving the existing socio-democratic 
institutional framework.  In keeping with the transformist nature of Costa 
Rica’s political system, Ulate stated that he would pursue reformist policies 
avoiding radical change.  He warned Costa Ricans that they would not see 
immediate results as his work consisted in establishing a solid base for long-
term growth and prosperity.  The only way of solving the social question was 
to address the root cause of poverty – the lack of productivity.  The state had 
to play an active role in incentivizing agricultural diversification and promoting 
new industries.  Ulate believed that the autonomous institutions created by the 
Junta could be key institutions to assist the government in this role - he stated 
that before creating, eliminating or changing existing institutions, he wanted to 
first see how they worked in practice.  After studying the Consejo Nacional de 
Produccion, Ulate concluded that this institution could play a vital role in 
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promoting economic development.  The conservative oligarchs had been 
trying to convince the Ulate administration and Congress that this institution 
was interfering with private initiative.  Ulate responded that he had no 
intention of turning the state into a business owner, but rather of ensuring the 
state would play a positive role in promoting private initiative.  
 
Ulate tried to seek a balance between the social democratic leftist policies and 
the conservative coffee oligarchs’ rightist policies.  Just like the social 
democrats, Ulate believed in the necessity of creating a mixed economy.  Like 
the conservative coffee oligarchs, he also believed one of the state’s top 
priorities should be to balance its budget and pay down its foreign debt.  Ulate 
argued that by balancing the budget, paying down the foreign debt, stabilizing 
the colon, and consolidating the constitutional regime, Costa Ricans could 
attract much needed foreign investment. He argued that to achieve these 
goals it was necessary to create a new institution – the Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica.  Congress approved this and in 1951 the Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica was founded.  This was the only major institution created by Ulate.  
 
To increase the taxes received from the United Fruit Company, Ulate 
negotiated directly with the US Bureau of Internal Revenues.  The UFCO was 
paying 65% of its taxes to the US government and the rest to the Costa Rican 
government.  Ulate negotiated with the US government for a greater 
proportion of the taxes to go to the Costa Rican government.  Given the 
circumstances Costa Rica found itself in after the war, the US government 
agreed.  Ulate also sought to decrease the dependency on coffee and banana 
exports by diversifying to fishing, cattle and other agricultural products as the 
Centristas had been proposing during the 1940s.  Ulate agreed with the social 
democrats that this would not only help the Costa Rican economy but would 
also target the poorest areas of Costa Rica – Puntarenas, Guanacaste and 
Limon.  These areas had been neglected during the liberal oligarchic 
hegemonic period. 
 
Although Ulate believed fiscal discipline was indispensable, he stated that it 
did not mean that there had to be low government spending.  He argued that 
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the state should invest heavily on setting the foundations for long-term growth. 
He stated: “we must eliminate the superfluous and spend all we can on the 
indispensable” (Otilio Ulate’s presidential message to Congress on May 1st 
1950).  This included building basic infrastructure, providing technical and 
financial support for new businesses, and reducing the risks of starting new 
enterprises.  Just like all his predecessors, Ulate placed great emphasis on 
education and on disseminating democratic values, yet he argued that 
schools were not the only ones responsible for this.  He argued that each and 
every government official from the most junior to the president had to teach 
the importance of democratic values through their example as creating 
democratic institutions was not enough.  When talking about the new Electoral 
Laws he stated: 
 
The institutions that the country has created to protect the sanctity of the 
vote are respectable, but they will not be effective if they rely on poor 
human material. The men who from now on will accept the responsibility of 
governing Costa Rica, will also have to commit themselves to conducting 
the public function with all the moral force needed to mould the newly 
created institutions. From the not too distant past, when Costa Rica had the 
absurd electoral law, which in Article 135 conferred the President of the 
Republic disciplinary jurisdiction over the National Election Council and all 
other agencies and operations connected with the electoral operations, that 
provided the executive the right to interpret any dubious part of the law, and 
to remove those who did not follow his criteria, to today, we have travelled 
a long way in the institutional route. But that is not all.  To give these 
institutions a permanent real force, we must place men capable of 
sacrificing themselves to preserve these institutions (Presidential Message 
delivered by Ulate to Congress on May 1, 1950).  
 
Ulate believed that the key to Costa Rica’s democratic success rested on a 
combination of improving the existing democratic institutions and reinforcing 
the “moral democratic force” (Ulate’s presidential message to Congress May 
1, 1950).  Just like all presidents before him and all those after him, Ulate 
understood the crucial importance of the discursive dimension of democracy. 
Setting high moral standards through speeches like the one above would 
make government officials be held accountable to those standards by the 
citizens.   
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Ulate acknowledged that he had been granted the task of governing during a 
particularly delicate period of Costa Rica’s history.  His responsibility 
consisted in eliminating the internal political frontier that had been created by 
the communists during the 1930s, and later used by the social democrats 
during the 1940s, to mobilize opposition to the Caldero-comunista regime and 
help transform citizens into soldiers.  
 
To eliminate this internal political frontier, he had to address the worker-
capitalist relations.  Ulate argued that the social legislation passed under the 
Caldero-comunista regime had an underlying problem.   According to him, 
due to the influence of the communists on the Calderon administration, this 
legislation had been based on the perception that there was an antagonistic 
relation between labour and capital.  Without changing the substance of the 
social legislation, Ulate argued that it was crucial to change the underlying 
philosophy.  Under his administration, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Pension 
would follow a “technical” and not “sectarian logic”: 
 
The task of the Ministry of Labour and Social Pension will become more 
bearable and efficient if it is uprooted from sectarian interests and political 
trends and it is transformed into a true centre for the application of social 
justice. This institution has to adhere strictly to technical considerations. […] 
Only through this conciliatory function can we solve conflicts within an 
understanding between different social sectors. In the past, influential 
groups have had an interest in introducing and encouraging the seeds of 
discord (Presidential Message to Congress delivered by Otilio Ulate on May 
1st, 1952).  
 
 
With this new underlying philosophy, Ulate encouraged the labour unions to 
devote their energies in creating cooperatives instead of organizing strikes.  In 
the same speech, Ulate stated: 
 
Now the situation has changed and the government can confirm to this 
assembly that the communist sector is reduced to impotence, having 
disappeared as a political force, which is one of the most effective factors 
that the new system offers to the cause of democracy (Presidential 
message to Congress delivered by Ulate on May 1st, 1952).  
 
Just like Figueres, Ulate also used the communists as the “constitutive 
outside” of his discursive formation.  By arguing that the communist threat 
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was over, Ulate wanted to reinforce the perception that there was no longer 
an internal political frontier dividing Costa Rican society into two antagonistic 
poles.  During his administration, former CRCP members helped organize 
several strikes to protest the rising cost of living.  Ulate did not want to refer to 
them as a political group but rather as individuals with particular demands.  
He acknowledged that the economic situation was difficult, but quoted 
statistics showing the economy was improving.  He argued that the best way 
to address the demands of the workers was through institutional means.  
Ulate viewed the Consejo Nacional de Salarios (created by the Junta’s 
decree-law N 832 to set minimum wages and settle labour disputes) as a 
crucial institution to address labour disputes.  Another crucial institution to 
address the popular demands was the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. 
Ulate stated:  
 
CCSS is the most appropriate vehicle to guarantee social security for all 
Costa Ricans. Despite the vices with which it was born, it managed to 
evolve.  It is true that social security services have not been extended 
across the country and have not reached some areas that desperately 
need it. But this is due to problems of economic nature.  We are currently 
studying new solutions that are more in keeping with the reality we are 
finding on the ground. The CCSS is the best institution to ensure 
appropriate medical attention to the particularly vulnerable working class. 
Therefore, it does not simply fulfil the state’s duty to provide social justice; it 
also strengthens the state by avoiding the development of tendencies that 
can jeopardise its own existence. The government will seek to maintain and 
develop a comprehensive social security policy that is in keeping with the 
goals set by the United Nations (Presidential Message to Congress 
delivered by Otilio Ulate on May 1st, 1952).  
 
 
Under his administration, he extended social security coverage and worked to 
improve the efficiency of the CCSS as well all other social institutions created 
by his predecessors.  He also sought to increase the coordination between 
them by creating comites de enlace to create synergies.  Another major 
concern for Ulate was to reinforce the perception that his administration was 
not politically motivated in its appointments or removals of people in these 
institutions.  He decided to keep the heads of the autonomous institutions 
selected by the Junta.  Through this example, he wanted to set the precedent 
that the executive should not interfere in the workings of the autonomous 
institutions.  As the 1953 presidential elections approached, Ulate also wanted 
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to set the precedent of the executive’s neutrality in presidential campaigns 
and elections.  Ulate knew the 1953 presidential elections were crucial as they 
were the first elections after the 1948 Civil War.  He did everything in his 
power to make sure that Costa Rica’s democratic political stability was not 
threatened again.   
 
1953 Electoral Campaign 
By 1952 four political parties were preparing for the 1953 presidential 
elections: the Figuerista Partido Liberacion Nacional, the Cortesista Partido 
Democrata, the Ulatista Partido Union Nacional and the communist Partido 
Progressista Independiente.  This was the first election in which the Tribunal 
Supremo de Elecciones was completely autonomous from the other branches 
of government - the institution had become a fourth branch of government 
under the 1949 Constitution.  The Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones accepted 
the registration of only two political parties for the 1953 elections: Liberacion 
Nacional and Partido Democrata.  We will first present these two political 
parties and then explain why the other two were not allowed to register.  
  
Partido Liberacion Nacional 
On October 12, 1951 the social democrats officially founded the Partido 
Liberacion Nacional (PLN).  The social democrats decided to found a “new” 
political party in order to distance themselves from the unpopular Partido 
Social Democrata.  They chose the name National Liberation to promote the 
view that their party had “liberated their nation” from the potential Caldero-
comunista dictatorship and similarly chose Columbus Day for the first meeting 
of their party arguing that, just like Christopher Columbus had brought a new 
beginning to the continent, the PLN would bring a new beginning to Costa 
Rica.  It was interesting to note that they did not choose any dates related to 
the civil war to be symbolic signifiers as they wanted to broaden their base of 
support.  The social democrats presented themselves as a counter-
hegemonic force seeking to integrate the previously excluded sectors of 
society including women, black Caribbean descendants living in the Atlantic 
region, peasants living outside the Central Valley, and former Cortesistas, 
Calderonistas and left-leaning groups.  This was evident in their selection of 
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speakers during the founding ceremony of the PLN.  For example, one of the 
guest speakers in their first party conference was the widow of Leon Cortes, 
who would serve both to attract female voters – allowed to vote for the first 
time in the country’s history - as well as former Cortesistas.  On the 8th of 
March 1952, Jose Figueres announced his presidential candidacy.  No party 
convention was held to select a presidential candidate, as Jose Figueres was 
the undisputed leader of the PLN.  The TSE approved their registration. 
 
Partido Democrata 
On June 2, 1952, the Partido Democrata announced the presidential 
candidacy of Fernando Castro Cervantes. This was the party founded by 
former president Leon Cortes and represented the most conservative 
oligarchs.   Castro was the owner of one of the biggest cattle ranches in the 
country and was a very successful businessman.  It was rumoured that he 
had amassed a great fortune due to his close connections with the United 
Fruit Company managers. Castro represented the conservative coffee 
oligarchs.  He also sought to appeal to the former Calderonistas as well as the 
Ulatistas.  However, his party’s reactionary policies did not appeal to the 
progressive liberal Ulatistas or the progressive Christian democrats.  By the 
1950s, Costa Rica’s ideational environment had shifted leftwards as a result 
of the hegemonic battles fought over the 1930s and 1940s.  
 
Partido Union Nacional 
On April 27, 1952 the Partido Union Nacional celebrated their convention in 
the National Stadium.  Out of the 4117 delegates, 4056 voted for Mario 
Echandi as their presidential candidate.  Echandi had been one of the most 
vocal opponents of the Junta rule so this was perceived as a direct affront to 
Jose Figueres  (Ocontrillo 2004: 140).  During the party’s registration process, 
the TSE found some irregularities, with the result that this party was not able 
to present the adequate paper work in time to register for the 1953 elections.  
Mario Echandi accused Ulise Soto Mendez, the director of the Registro Civil, 
of violating his oath of neutrality and of being a Figuerista.  Echandi 
demanded his resignation.  The battle between Soto Mendez and Echandi 
went on for several weeks without Ulate intervening at all so as not to appear 
	   242	  
to be favouring his own political party.  On November 18, 1952, the TSE 
cleared Ulise Soto of any wrongdoing.  On December 23, 1952 the TSE 
confirmed that the Union Nacional would not be able to participate in the 1953 
presidential elections.  The Costa Rican population appreciated Ulate’s 
impartiality.  The front page of the December 23, 1952 edition of the Diario de 
Costa Rica stated: 
 
One of the greatest virtues achieved for our democracy now is that the 
government has no political bias (Diario de Costa Rica – December 23, 
1952).  
 
This incident is one more example of the high value that Costa Rican political 
leaders and its population have historically placed on the rule of law. It is truly 
rare to see the political party of an extremely popular sitting president not be 
granted the right to register for upcoming elections.  It is even more unusual to 
see the sitting president not intervene in the matter at all.  All of this is more 
extraordinary when we consider that it was the same political party that 
people had died defending during the 1948 Civil War being excluded from the 
subsequent elections.  And yet, when the TSE denied it the right to register for 
one of the most important presidential elections in the country’s history, the 
leaders of the NUP did not mobilize their supporters to protest this action.  
They only complained that this action was politically motivated and sought to 
remove the head of the Civil Registry.  When they failed to do so, they 
accepted the verdict of the TSE, in turn helping to set the precedent of the 
independence of the TSE from the other branches of government and from 
political machinations.  It was an action that proved to the population that the 
TSE had absolute control over all electoral matters.   
 
The TSE also banned another political party from participating in the 1953 
elections without this leading to mass mobilization – the Independent 
Progressive Party. 
 
Partido Progresista Independiente 
The former CRCP activists sought to register the Partido Progresista 
Independiente for the 1953 presidential elections.  However, the TSE stated 
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that amongst the signatories of their petition, there were 900 known former 
members of the CRCP.  Evoking Article 98 of the 1949 Constitution, which 
outlawed communist parties, the TSE did not accept their registration 
(Ocontrillo 2004: 140).  The communists accepted the TSE’s decision, as they 
knew they could not mobilize mass support to counter this decision. 
 
1953 Presidential Campaign 
During the months leading to the July 1953 elections, political, business and 
religious leaders gave speeches and wrote articles reminding Costa Ricans 
that it was in everyone’s interests to maintain democratic stability.  The Diario 
de Costa Rica was full of articles seeking to defuse political tensions such as 
the one below: 
 
Remember that no one has the right to offend anyone because they do not 
share their opinion.  Political passions are very dangerous because they 
obscure our understanding and do not allow us to see clearly that we are all 
brothers of the same heavenly Father (Diario de Costa Rica – July 26, 
1953).  
 
On July 26, 1953 Costa Rica held its first presidential election since the 1948 
civil war.  Figueres defeated Castro Cervantes obtaining 121.108 i.e. 64.7% of 
the total votes.  Castro Cervantes received 65.625 votes i.e. 35.3% of the 
votes.  Voter turnout was approximately 67.2% for the presidential elections 
and 67.5% in the parliamentary elections.  The PLN won control over 
Congress, taking 30 seats, while the Partido Democrata took 11, the 
Independent National Republican Party 3 seats and the Union Nacional 1.  
 
The social democratic newspaper articles written in the Diario de Costa Rica 
stated incorrectly that this was the greatest electoral victory in the country’s 
history, purposely neglecting the fact that Calderon Guardia had won with 
84.5% of the votes in the 1940 Presidential Elections.  They also did not state 
the fact that the National Union Party, the Republican Party and the CRCP 
had not participated in these elections.   
 
The attention of the Costa Rican public was focused on the transparency of 
the elections.  These were the first elections in the country’s history in which 
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no allegations of electoral fraud were made. Several articles in the Diario de 
Costa Rica praised Ulate for guaranteeing transparent, free and fair elections. 
For example, on the 29th of July 1953 edition of Diario de Costa Rica, Gonzalo 
Calderon wrote: 
 
Otilio Ulate, you have also been a winner as you have supervised a 
presidential campaign that has proven the civic maturity reached by Costa 
Ricans when exercising their suffrage rights (Diario de Costa Rica – July 
29, 1953).  
 
After this election, it became common to praise the sitting president for 
overseeing transparent, free and fair elections.  During the 1953 elections, 
this served to reinforce the perception that Costa Ricans would no longer 
tolerate electoral fraud.  It also stressed the image that the 1953 elections had 
marked a turning point in the country’s democratic evolution, which was also 
cemented by the comments from the defeated parties and candidates.  The 
day after their defeat, the members of the Partido Democrata placed the 
following message in the front page of the Diario de Costa Rica:  
 
Fully aware of our responsibilities to the nation and to its institutions 
whose zealous guards we have been throughout the past electoral 
campaign and in keeping with our goal of maintaining peace and public 
tranquillity and acknowledging the fait accompli of the triumph achieved by 
Jose Figueres, we ask our supporters to demonstrate their high civility 
and adherence to democratic principles. We ask them to return to their 
normal activities without forgetting for one instance their constant concern 
for the fate of the Republic (Open letter signed by Fernando Castro 
Cervantes, Ricardo Castro Beeche, Antonio Pena transcribed in the Diario 
de Costa Rica – July 27, 1953).  
 
 
Political leaders across the ideological spectrum praised the defeated Castro 
Cervantes for his democratic attitude. For example, on the July 28th 1953 
edition of the Diario de Costa Rica, an article entitled, “Above all other 
interests, we have to place the interest of the Nation”, stated: 
 
With this noble attitude Castro Cervantes has given a new impetus to the 
perfectible and fruitful progress of our democracy and has offered his own 
contribution, despite the turbulent moments the country has faced, so that 
Costa Rica can once again cement in an unshakable way the good name 
it has earned on the eyes of the American people for its freedoms and for 
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the respect its leaders have displayed towards their civic responsibilities 
(Diario de Costa Rica – July 28, 1953).  
 
The praising of the defeated for accepting their loss has also become another 
common characteristic in every presidential election since 1953, reducing the 
possibility that the defeated mobilize people against the verdict passed by the 
TSE.  The lessons learnt in the 1948 presidential elections have guaranteed 
that the defeated parties accept their electoral defeat gracefully. 
 
Jose Figueres Administration 1953-1958 
Without the progressive liberal candidate, Echandi, running in the elections 
and without a Calderonista or communist candidate, Figueres easily defeated 
his only opponent – the conservative candidate - Castro Cervantes.  Once 
Figueres became the legitimately elected president, the contradictions in the 
social democratic narrative that portrayed Figueres as a democratizing actor 
while seeking to justify his Junta rule could be glossed over.  The discursive 
strategies known as populist interventions (Panizza 2009) that Figueres had 
been using since the end of the war could finally become effective.  The social 
democrats were thus able to start building the myth of Don Pepe as the 
founder of Costa Rica’s democracy.  The following article in the Diario de 
Costa Rica article neatly summarizes the image the social democrats built of 
Figueres: 
 
When the honest and virile people were mocked, and when for the second 
time they tried to silence their voices through force, an idealistic man 
emerged, the greatest revolutionary.  His small figure, in the clouded fields 
of San Isidrio, El Empalme, El Tejar and elsewhere, appeared as a 
miraculous apparition, leading a handful of brave souls.  He gave them 
council.  He encouraged them; he prompted them to undertake the great 
campaign of liberation.  During this period, a hero was born, not a vain and 
power-hungry politician, but rather a hero of an epic battle that was as pure 
and transparent as his own spirit and his own heart (Diario de Costa Rica – 
January 1953).  
This narrative argued that when the Costa Rican honourable and “virile” 
population were denied for a second time their sacred right of suffrage by 
the Caldero-comunista regime, Jose Figueres appeared as a “miraculous 
apparition” leading the “brave souls”.  Costa Ricans were described also 
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as manly – thus capable of using force when absolutely necessary.  
Using religious imagery, which compared Figueres’ presence in the 
battlefield as a “miraculous apparition”, this narrative sought to construct 
a mythical image of Figueres that would be appealing to the devoutly 
Catholic population.  It portrayed Figueres as a guiding fatherly figure 
giving the “advice” and “strength” to the masses as opposed to portraying 
him as a military leader at odds with the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary.  It then states: 
The nation has showered him with honours.  But these honours have 
failed to make him vain as happens to mediocre men.  With exquisite 
seriousness, with astonishing calm, without a trace of political 
machinations, after completing his victorious deed, he thought of 
something large.  He thought of reconstructing what others had destroyed.  
Without being a politician, he took the enormous responsibility to do what 
has always corresponded to politicians.  He did not think of anything else 
but to give back to the badly hurt and ruined country, what once belonged 
to it: economic and spiritual freedoms (Diario de Costa Rica - January 
1953).  
Arguing that the military victory had translated into widespread popular 
support for Figueres, this myth claimed that despite people’s request for 
Figueres to stay in power, his democratic nature encouraged him to hand over 
power to Ulate as soon as the political situation had stabilized.  Adopting a 
typical populist intervention, it argued that Figueres was not a politician, but 
rather a deeply patriotic man whose only concern was to give Costa Rica its 
economic and spiritual freedoms.  It neglected the fact that the Junta had 
faced widespread opposition from the population as it was viewed as an 
illegitimate body.  In keeping with the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, it 
described Figures as a man possessing “exquisite serenity” and “absolute 
calm” - qualities that were perceived as desirable in a leader by the Costa 
Ricans. It argues that after the civil war had “destroyed” Costa Rica’s 
democratic institutions, Figueres had thought of building what others had 
destroyed. Without being a politician, Figueres had understood his 
responsibility and he had heard the pleas of the masses requesting him to 
guide them in these difficult times.  In keeping with the social democratic 
conception of a bottom-up democracy, this narrative stated that Figueres was 
merely addressing the democratic demands of the people. 
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The image below clearly illustrates how the social democrats wanted the 




Instead of portraying him as a revolutionary leader gun in hand, Figueres is 
wearing civilian clothes and has a serene, fatherly look.  With this new image 
of Don Pepe and with the legitimacy gained after the 1953 elections, Figueres 
could fully use the power of his charismatic personality to connect with 
different sectors of society.  An article on the August 8th, 1953 edition of the 
Diario de Costa Rica entitled “Jose Figueres is a phenomenon” adequately 
presents this view: 
 
Working alongside the peasants in his farm, he saw directly the problems 
that peasants faced and decided to organize a tiny benevolent state (in his 
farm) geared towards addressing the needs of the labourers.  He built 
houses for them, and provided free milk for the children. In 1948, when the 
government tried to deny the passage of power to the legally elected 
president Otilio Ulate, Figueres led a group of students, office workers, 
labourers – many armed with 22 calibre revolvers. They triumphantly 
defeated the government forces.  Afterwards, he personally assumed 
power for a year and a half until there were no stumbling blocks to give the 
presidency to Ulate (Diario de Costa Rica – August 8, 1953).  
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Adopting populist strategies, this myth argued that Figueres understood the 
needs of the masses because he had worked alongside them in his farm La 
Lucha, where Figueres had created an equivalent of a welfare state.  It claims 
that when the government tried to deny Ulate his legitimate right to rule, 
Figueres headed a group of “students, office workers and peasants” not 
mentioning at all the Caribbean Legion.  It is interesting to note that this 
narrative no longer places Calderon as the constitutive outside, but rather 
uses a more vague term – “the government” – as the enemy.  This was done 
in part to avoid alienating potential former Calderonista voters.  It also allowed 
them to eliminate the internal political frontier that they themselves had 
created in 1948.  By arguing that the 1948 government was the enemy, they 
were stating that, with its dissolution, there was no longer an internal enemy. 
This interpretation of the civil war period remains the predominant 
interpretation of the 1948 civil war used not only by travel guides, but also by 
academics analysing Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation.  Despite its 
historical inconsistencies, it has been widely adopted by Costa Rican political 
leaders because it serves to confirm their “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
– thus presenting a positive image of Costa Rica to foreigner investors, 
political leaders, tourists and to the Costa Rican masses. 
 
Figueres spread his image of a leader in touch with the needs of the peasants 
through his political speeches full of colloquial expressions, often referring to 
anecdotes from his farm La Lucha.  In 1956 he published his book entitled 
Cartas a Un Ciudadano in which he stated that because he could not spend 
more time explaining his policies directly to the people due to his 
administrative commitments, he felt the need to write this book.  As he states 
in his opening page, his book was addressed directly to the common citizen: 
 
Dear Citizen: I’m thinking of you.  Rarely you and I have a chance to meet.  
The president of the Republic has few opportunities to communicate 
privately with the common citizen.  That is why some misunderstandings 
arise.  It would be nice if you and I could talk (Figueres 1956: 1).  
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Following “populist strategies”, he sought to symbolically eliminate the 
distance between himself and the people by addressing them directly in this 
book.  He also wrote other articles and books geared at more intellectual 
audiences.  One of the best recompilation of his writings is the book Writings 
of Jose Figueres: Politics, Economics and International Relations published in 
(2000).   
 
Another advantage Figueres had throughout his career was his ability to draw 
from the multiple political identities he created for himself as an anti-
dictatorship revolutionary figure fighting for Costa Rica’s democracy (which 
enabled him to convince the Caribbean Legion to sponsor his revolution), as a 
non-politician or “the worst politician” as he described himself (which enabled 
him to connect with the common citizen), as a “farmer-socialist” experimenting 
in his farm La Lucha with socialist policies (which enabled him to argue that 
he understood the needs and demands the rural workers and the masses and 
allowed him to effectively communicate with them through colloquial 
language), as a rope manufacturer and entrepreneur who saw the difficulties 
of starting his own business in the liberal oligarchic model (which enabled him 
connect with the rising middle class entrepreneurs and new industrialists), as 
the son of a newly emigrated Catalan speaking Spanish couple with an 
American wife (which allowed him to empathize with the English speaking 
Afro-Caribbean descendants born in Costa Rica who had not been fully 
integrated into Costa Rica’s society), and as a staunch anti-communist (which 
helped him win the approval of the United States and reduced the animosity 
of the conservative liberal oligarchs).    
 
An interesting thing to note about Figueres’ discursive strategies is that, 
although he used populist interventions, he did not want to develop a populist 
mode of identification in which he was perceived as being above Costa Rica’s 
institutional framework.  This supports Panizza’s argument that the 
relationship between populist interventions and democracy “cannot be 
established in abstract terms but should be assessed in relation to the political 
context in which they emerge” (Panizza 2009).  As Panizza states, “different 
varieties of populist interventions have context-dependent relations with 
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democratic institutions” and it is important to “make explicit their normative 
implications” (Panizza 2009: 3-4).  Figueres had to work within the existing 
highly institutionalized democratic structures. His normative framework was 
influenced/delimited by the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  Instead of 
developing a populist mode of political identification (a la Castro and a la 
Chavez/Maduro to name a few examples), Figueres worked very hard to 
create a strong political party with a democratic organizational structure and 
strong grass-root bases throughout the country.  By late 1952, the PLN had 
established itself in all of Costa Rica’s cantons as well as 82% of all the 
districts (English 1971:53, Yashar 1997:220).  This permanent ideological 
political party was able to appeal to sectors of society previously excluded by 
the liberal oligarchic order.  Its internal democratic practices gave political 
access to lower and upper middle class members as mid-ranking officials.  It 
incorporated women by granting them the right to vote in 1949, having the first 
two female congresswomen in Costa Rica history, as well as its first female 
president (Laura Chinchilla 2010-1014).  The PLN also had the first African 
Caribbean Costa Rican congressman in 1953.  
 
The PLN also created permanent branches throughout the country making 
many people living in areas outside the Central Valley such as Puntarenas, 
Guanacaste, and Limon become politically active for the first time in their 
lives.  The liberal oligarchic interpretation of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary had focused on the Central Valley (San Jose, Cartago, Alajuela and 
Heredia) at the expense of the rest of the country and had had a limited 
definition of democracy - electoral democracy.  The PLN was able to cultivate 
support in rural areas through the expansion of the welfare programs first 
created by Calderon during the 1940s, which had not been able to reach 
certain areas of the country due to economic and technical limitations at the 
time (Yashar 1997:220). 
 
Once Figueres was democratically elected (1953-1958), his administration 
was able to address particularistic demands differentially through the 
expanding welfare state and through integrating potentially antagonistic 
groups and avoiding populist ruptures.  The Figueristas also benefitted from 
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the infrastructural progress brought by the autonomous institutions to the 
Costa Rican rural areas.  When the ICE brought electricity, telephone lines, 
and water pipes for the first time to rural areas, their workers became heroes 
in these communities.  Jorge Amador’s sociological studies analysing the 
impact of the ICE on rural communities shows the life-changing 
transformation that the ICE brought to them.  The rural peasants viewed the 
ICE as the institution that had brought them out of the “dark ages” into 
modernity.  Since the people equated the ICE with the PLN, the party 
benefited from this transformation (Amador 1991).  The PLN sought to 




Photograph of Jose Figueres with ICE engineers. 
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The enormous growth of the Costa Rican state under the social democratic 
administrations was also possible due to the favourable international 
economic environment during the 1950s and 1960s.  As Longley (1997) 
argues, the social democrats were able to play Cold War politics in their 
favour receiving substantial amounts of foreign aid from the United States 
through programs such as the Alliance for Progress.  They capitalized on the 
fact that it was also in the United States’ interests to display Costa Rica as 
proof of the success of the capitalist liberal democratic order.  
 
When Figueres’ opponents criticized the excessive expansion of the 
Keynesian welfare state, he portrayed his opponents the following way: 
 
While our party is successfully struggling to perfect Costa Rica’s 
democracy, removing it from the privileged halls and taking it directly to the 
people, there is a sector of the aristocracy who resents the fact that they 
can no longer act as Great Electors.  They develop useless and insidious 
campaigns to attack us, misusing their freedom of speech to disorient and 
mislead the people.  
 
All our efforts to raise the country from its slumber, to take it out of the 
painful category of underdeveloped nation, are opposed by the 
newspaper s of the oligarchs and politicians, who long to go back to the 
days when the government of the Republic was only a tool they could 
manipulate safely to conduct their business and meet their vanity 
(Speech made by Figueres 1954).  
  
 
Figueres thus presented the social democratic political project as a counter-
hegemonic force seeking to expand the concept of democracy by including 
previously marginalized sectors.  His opponents were portrayed as 
“aristocrats” seeking to obstruct the full democratization of Costa Rica to 
defend their historic privileged positions.  Yet it is important to highlight that 
these oligarchs were portrayed as adversaries not as enemies – as the social 
democrats had done with the communists during the 1940s.  Figueres argued 
that the existential threat was now over - this meant that politics once again 
could be perceived as the interaction between different political adversaries 
with competing legitimate political projects.  As the 1958 presidential elections 
approached, the social democrats reinforced the message that political 
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differences should not lead to hostility.  In his presidential message to 
Congress on May 1956, Figueres stated: 
 
There are still two more years before the next elections.  There is no 
reason to initiate a premature political struggle.  Let us strive to make the 
work of the TSE of registering new voters easier and let’s avoid when 
possible agitations that can disturb the peace of our country.  Our voters 
now enjoy full guarantees; our electoral mechanisms have been remarkably 
improved. The TSE is faultless; citizens have become each time more 
demanding making government officials more accountable, and the 
government is now being run by a political groups whose raison d’etre has 
been the respect of the sacred right of suffrage […] Costa Rica can rest 
assured that the purity of their suffrage will be guaranteed. We all have an 
obligation to ensure that this struggle is orderly, honest, peaceful and 
exemplary (Jose Figueres Presidential Message to Congress delivered on 
May 1, 1956).  
 
 
Presenting an image of Costa Rica as a consolidated democracy, Figueres 
argued that political battles could be contained within the post-civil war 
institutional framework.  Politicians were now being held accountable by the 
active participation of the citizens.  The Figueres administration was portrayed 
as being run by a group of men who rose to power to guarantee the sacred 
right of suffrage and Costa Rica was portrayed as having once again returned 
to its “exceptional” peaceful and consensual democratic path.  
 
During the electoral campaign leading to the February 1958 elections, all 
political leaders sought to reduce potential tensions.  Just like in the 1953 
elections, the 1958 elections were perceived as transparent, fair and free 
elections.  On February 2, 1958 Mario Echandi of the National Unity Party 
won the presidential election obtaining 46.4% of the votes.  The PLN 
candidate, Francisco Orlich, won 42.8% of the votes and a new political party, 
the National Independent party, won 10% of the votes.  The PLN won the 
congressional elections obtaining 20 seats, while the Republican Party had 11 
seats, the National Unity Party 10, the Independent Party 3, and the 
Revolutionary Civil Union party 1.  Although they did not control Congress, 
they were by far the largest party.  Costa Rican political leaders portrayed the 
1958 presidential election as proof that Costa Rica’s democracy had been 
consolidated.  The peaceful electoral campaign, the respect of the sanctity of 
the vote guaranteed by the TSE, and the transfer of power from the 
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government to the opposition confirmed Costa Rica’s democratic nature.  The 
path to the rise of hegemony of the social democratic discourse had been 
cleared.  We will now explore the rise of the social democratic hegemony. 
 
Emergence of the new myth of Unity and the rise of the social 
democratic hegemony 
While the military victory of the social democratic revolutionaries did not 
guarantee their hegemonic success, it did constitute the condition of 
possibility for it, as it created a dislocation in the existing political symbolic 
order.  As Norval states, “political change involves a change in political 
identification, a change in the understanding of one’s self and one’s place in 
relation to others and to a set of wider practices” (quoted by Panizza and 
Miorelli 2012:6 from Norval 2006: 243-245). The civil war created the 
possibility for political change by creating a crisis of identity.  Neither the 
liberal oligarchic discourse nor any other discourse available at the time could 
explain how a civil war had occurred in a society that had been defined as a 
peace-loving, egalitarian, homogenous, consensual and democratic due to its 
atypical colonial history, its unique socio-economic and political model, and its 
political culture.  This identity crisis allowed the social democrats to start the 
process of re-defining the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary in accordance 
with their own political project.  The first step in this was to create a new myth 
to give meaning to the social dislocation.  As Buenfil Burgos explains, 
mythical discourses emerge “to offer a reorganizing principle when identities 
have been dislocated, thus concealing the contingent ‘origins’ of social 
institutions”(Buenfil Burgos 2000: 88).  The social democrats used the 1948 
civil war as a key articulatory episode to build a new imaginary horizon.  They 
framed their armed insurrection as the National Liberation War and started 
constructing the image of Jose Figueres as the “defender” of Costa Rica’s 
democracy and, by the 1960s, as the “founder” of Costa Rica’s democracy 
(arguing that before 1948 Costa Rica was a proto-democracy).  Through 
these myths, the social democrats succeeded in creating a new national 
unifying nodal point around which they could justify their alternative 
hegemonic project.  As discussed in previous chapters, before the 1948 civil 
war the social democratic discourse had not been able to appeal to different 
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sectors of Costa Rican society.  Through the emergence of the National 
Liberation myth, they had the vehicle to do it. 
 
By 1958 the social democratic interpretation of the 1948 civil war had become 
widely accepted by all sectors of Costa Rican society.  The civil war was 
portrayed as a pro-democratic movement, and the internal political frontiers 
became less rigid and less antagonistic.  Figueres summarized this 
interpretation in a speech he delivered during the transfer of power: 
 
After a war between brothers, when all have reached full freedom and the 
wide enjoyment of their rights as citizens, there is no reason for hatred to 
continue;  even less for this hatred to be transmitted from one generation to 
the next. In its place, we must develop a system in which we can debate 
the normal discrepancies in our political views and have a free game of 
electoral forces. The parents who belonged to one side or the other during 
the war, and are now transmitting to their children their feelings of the Civil 
War are doing a bad thing.  
 
Faults were committed by both sides, but enough blood has been spilled 
to wash away all sins.  If we keep on feeding the feeling of hatred, it will 
be hard to avoid another violent outbreak.  And that violent outbreak in 
turn would engender new hatreds (Speech made by outgoing president 
Figueres when handing over power to president elect Mario Echandi May 
8, 1958).  
 
Through this agonistic type of discursive logic, Figueres sought to recreate the 
image of Costa Rica as a “family”.  He integrates elements of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary into the National Liberation myth by re-
framing the civil war as a “war between family members” no longer as a battle 
to prevent a Caldero-comunista dictatorship as he had previously argued.  
This new interpretation allowed him to push the political frontier once again to 
the margins of Costa Rican society.  Setting this external political frontier 
allowed Figueres to use the National Liberation myth as a new unifying myth.  
He persuaded the war veterans and the family members of the departed to let 
go of their hatred and think of the future.  The fact that he integrated elements 
of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary made his narrative appear not only 
plausible, but also desirable to the Costa Rican population.  Through this 
myth, they could explain to themselves and their children why an innately 
peaceful and democratic society had had a civil war.  More importantly, it 
showed why civil unrest was no longer an acceptable mode of political 
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mobilization.  The civil war had successfully consolidated Costa Rica’s 
democracy, which meant that from now on political battles had to be 
understood as battles between “adversaries” not “enemies” (Norval 2000).  
The power that this myth had in de-radicalizing Costa Ricans made it 
appealing to all political actors regardless of the fact that they recognized the 
contingency of this narrative and its internal contradictions. As other political 
actors adopted it, starting with Otilio Ulate, the myth created the discursive 
condition of possibility for the social democrat’s rise to hegemony.  Once 
again it was possible to have a hegemonic discourse that could differentially 
integrate particular demands as the liberal oligarchic discourse had done 
during the 1880s-1930s. 
Dislocation created by the 1948 Civil War 
The dislocation created by the 1948 Civil War meant that the previous floating 
signifiers that had been temporarily fixed by the liberal oligarchic discourse -
democracy, equality/homogeneity, generalized poverty and the appropriate 
role of the state - which had been articulated in relation to the nodal point 
liberalism - became detached from the chain of signification into which the 
liberal oligarchic discourse had fixed them.  With this new political frontier, the 
social democrats created a new chain of signification redefining the nodal 
point – liberalism.    
 
The most prominent social democratic intellectual, Rodrigo Facio, argued that 
liberalism had to be divided into two different elements: political liberalism and 
economic liberalism.  According to Facio, retaining some elements of political 
liberalism was wise and necessary as those elements were the basic 
components of a democracy upon which the social democrats could build a 
more expanded version.  However, economic liberalism had to be changed.  
Economic liberalism was corrupting political liberalism’s goals of 
strengthening democracy as it led to society’s selfish neglect for collective 
problems.  The separation of political liberalism from economic liberalism was 
necessary to avoid placing the whole concept of liberalism in danger as had 
happened during the Calderon Guardia and Teodoro Picado administrations 
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(1940-1948).  According to Facio’s narrative, the Costa Rican communists 
had correctly pointed out the deficiencies of economic liberalism but were 
proposing the wrong remedy based on their flawed ideology.  Marxist ideology 
would lead to the complete destruction of political liberalism.  In order to 
defend liberalism from extreme foreign ideologies, social democrats proposed 
modifying the concept to include the economic dimension, and expanding its 
definition to include a participatory notion of democracy.  Following the 
“innovative continuity” strategy, Facio developed the concept of “constructive 
liberalism” (a word the social democrats considered would be more appealing 
than their original term economic socialism).  Facio elaborated this concept in 
his article entitled “Constructive liberalism is an evolutionary and humanist 
way of achieving social democracy” published in the Surco magazine edition 
of December 1942. In another article in the same magazine, he argued: 
 
Therefore, we will have abandoned economic liberalism, but not destroying 
it with a totalitarian anti-capitalist model; rather by improving the capitalist 
system through a mixed regime of autonomous institutions and 
cooperatives, and through state assistance towards small companies 
helping them compete with the strong oligarchic ones and eliminating 
monopolies (Surco N 25 February 1945).  
 
This re-articulation of liberalism also meant a redefinition of the role of the 
state.  The Costa Rican state had to become more interventionist in order for 
the state to fulfil its function of defending the Costa Ricans’ economic rights, 
not just their limited political rights – as the liberal oligarchic hegemonic order 
had done before them.  The social democrats argued that it was necessary to 
build upon the positive attributes of Costa Rica’s democratic tradition, but 
move the concept forward so that Costa Rica’s political and economic system 
would be in keeping with the changing historical circumstances.  This 
transition to a more active state did not encounter the ideological resistance 
found in other countries such as the United States, which have historically 
equated state intervention with loss of personal liberty.  It was a much easier 
transition in Costa Rica due to the positive perception of state involvement for 
Costa Ricans, and to the transformist nature of the liberal oligarchic 
hegemonic order that had encouraged a significant amount of state 
intervention as discussed in the previous chapters. 
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The social democratic discourse built upon the liberal oligarchic interpretation 
of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary, but modified it: 
 
We find ourselves in the mid twentieth century in a country with strong 
democratic traditions, generalized public education, a strong work ethic 
and a desire for peace.  We owe these characteristics probably due to 
certain attributes of our people, our temperament, and the vision of our 
educators as past statisticians (Surco N 52 – February 1945).  
 
 
While the liberal oligarchic explanation of Costa Rica’s “exceptionalism” 
emphasized atypical structural factors present during the colonial period, the 
social democratic discourse placed emphasis on political decisions taken by 
its political leaders.  The liberal oligarchs had sought to minimize the role of 
the political leaders so as to argue that the liberal oligarchic hegemonic order 
had “naturally” evolved as a result of structural factors.  This sense of “natural 
evolution” de-politicized the liberal oligarchic order and hid the contingency of 
its discursive formation.  The social democrats instead wanted to expose the 
contingency of the liberal oligarchic discourse so as to form their counter-
hegemonic order - the social democratic Second Republic.38  However, after 
failing to create a sense of urgency by convincing the Costa Rican population 
of the need for a “complete rupture” (as Figueres did during the period leading 
to the 1948 civil war), the social democrats shifted their argument to one of 
necessary gradual modifications to the existing liberal oligarchic order.  
 
Regarding the two most important political leaders of the liberal oligarchic 
period, Don Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, twice president of Costa Rica, (1906-
1910 and 1928-1932) and Don Ricardo Jimenez Oreamuno, three times 
president of Costa Rica (1910-1914, 1924-1928 and 1932-1936), Figueres 
argued: 
 
I feel the greatest esteem for our past visionary statesmen. But we 
have to recognize that they were waging a different battle than ours.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The social democrats wanted to hide the contingency of their own discourse, 
stating that their political project was not ideologically based but rather based on 
scientific evidence.   
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They had to set the foundation for our democratic rights when it was 
still believe that it was not the state’s obligation to provide social 
services to its citizens and guarantee the well-being of each individual 
(Jose Figueres in his book Cartas a un Ciudadano 1956).  
 
While the liberal oligarchs’ struggle had allowed Costa Rica to transition to 
democracy, it was now time for the social democrats to consolidate it by 
focusing on the economic dimension of democracy.  The social democrats 
argued that with regards to economic development, Costa Rica was not 
“exceptional” relative to its Latin American neighbours:  
 
In the world stage, Costa Rica appears as an “under-developed country” 
defined as a country with low national and household income, low wages, 
which has the majority of the population living in poverty and disconnected 
from the progress of the time.  This classification alone may be of little 
importance, since a country is theoretically entitled to follow the path it 
wants if its people feel satisfied with what they have. But actually the 
people of Costa Rica are not satisfied. They love the peace and freedom 
that our political system has given them, but they feel the urge to improve 
economically, to be better educated, to become homeowners in the city or 
own their fertile plot of land in the country side, to increase the productivity 
of their harvest or have higher wages; to be able to feed the family without 
anxiety; to have health services within their reach when they are sick and a 
secure income in case of an emergency, to send their children to high 
school and university (Figueres 1956: 18).  
 
The social democratic narrative argued that Costa Rican society could no 
longer passively accept its state of poverty, as it had done under the liberal 
oligarchic hegemonic order.  Although Costa Rica did not have the extreme 
inequality that other Central American countries had, there was a significant 
portion of the population living in poverty:  
 
Our greatest weakness is not the bad distribution of wealth (which is, to a 
certain extent unavoidable), but rather the lack of abundant wealth due to 
low levels of productivity leading to low GDP growth (Figueres 1956:67).  
 
 
Figueres argued that to address the problem of poverty it was necessary to 
modify the economic development model.  With the assistance of the state, 
new industries could be created to reduce the external dependence on basic 
goods.  They argued that the devastating impact of this dependence on 
foreign goods had become clear during World War I and World War II.  It was 
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not enough to address the social question through institutional reforms like the 
liberal oligarchs (1821-1930) and the Calderonista regime had done (1940-
1948).  Figueres stated: 
 
The ills of our country cannot be remedied with only good intentions, nor 
exclusively with political policies.  Social problems have an economic 
background.  To end the misery we must produce wealth (Figueres 
1956:67).  
 
The social democratic narrative argued that the Partido Liberacion Nacional 
provided the most advanced answer to solving the social question.  It argued 
that ideological tendencies seeking to address the social question could be 
divided into three groups: 
 
1) Those who simply highlight the evils of poverty and injustice 
without seeking plausible and productive remedies.  
2) Those who are concerned with a fairer distribution of existing 
wealth without dealing with economic growth because they 
consider it to be outside the scope of the state and feel that the 
state’s role must be solely to create institutions to correct social 
injustices […] They have the merit of promoting labour laws, of 
creating taxes to cover public services, of guaranteeing higher 
minimum wages, social insurance and other measures to 
distribute the proceeds of the national work.  Unfortunately, in 
Costa Rica such honourable developments have sometimes 
served as a smokescreen used by the communists to cloud graft 
and commit electoral fraud.  The ones to blame for this are the 
leaders of democracy focused on political rights without focusing 
on economic ones, who either, out of routine or out of ignorance, 
do not understand the times we are living and allow opportunistic 
politicians to take charge (Figueres 1956:46).  
 
In the second category, the social democrats were referring to the Caldero-
comunist regime’s approach.  Although they acknowledged the great progress 
made by the social reforms passed during the Calderon Guardia 
administration, they emphasized the limits of the Christian democratic 
approach.  The Christian democrats, under the influence of the communists, 
had focused on the distribution rather than the creation of wealth.  They 
further argued that it was deeply regrettable that the Calderonistas and the 
communists tainted their success in passing these social reforms in a context 
of committing electoral fraud, corruption, political demagoguery, and 
nepotism.   
	   261	  
 
The social democrats proposed a third way that would include the economic 
dimension of democracy by focusing on the production of wealth.  Regarding 
the proponents of the third approach, the social democrats argued: 
 
3) And finally there are those who study the national economic situation 
scientifically, formulate development plans to increase production while 
simultaneously seeking to improve the distribution abiding by the criteria 
of social justice, both by raising minimum wages and by building new 
public schools and colleges, health care centres, improving social 
insurance and guaranteeing housing (Figueres 1956:46).  
 
According to the social democratic narrative, this third approach would 
increase economic development while spreading social justice. Their 
argument can be summarized as follows: there cannot be distribution without 
production, and without justice, production does not lead to widespread 
economic growth.  The social democrats sought to position themselves at the 
ideological centre, placing the liberal oligarchic discourse on the far right and 
the communist discourse on the far left.  They then argued that economic 
development was a precondition for the achievement of true liberty. They 
sought to redefine the role of the state in the economy by arguing that most 
economic activity had a social - public function and that therefore it had to be 
regulated and assisted by the state.  This narrative argued that: 
 
In developed countries that have mixed economies from Sweden to Japan, 
whatever their political system might be, behind every business, large or 
small, there is a strong state supporting them. […] We (Costa Ricans) still 
do not understand the proper interaction between the state and companies 
in the nation’s economic progress. We still perceive the producer as 
someone merely seeking personal/company gains. In turn, the producers 
also perceive themselves this way.  As important as their activities are for 
the public good, they are still viewed and called “private”, as if it is possible 
to disconnect it from the overall interests of the nation. I repeat once again: 
we consider that business activities, regardless of their size, the goods they 
produce and the specific service they provide are all fulfilling a public 
function and therefore they need and deserve support from the state 
(Figueres 1956: 47).  
 
By redefining what should be considered public (any economic activity that is 
necessarily linked to the general interest of the nation) and private (all family 
affairs that do not transcend the household unit), the social democratic 
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discourse was trying to redefine the relation between businesses vis-à-vis the 
national economy and state involvement vis-à-vis these businesses.  They 
were also trying to re-define the perceptions of interests of the 
producers/entrepreneurs.  Figueres argued: 
 
The competent owners of industries and commerce [...] must realize that 
their activities are really social, not private, since they provide a good or 
service for everyone.  Their perception of “government waste” must be re-
assessed by analysing the effects of government spending within the 
context of the whole economy. […] The notion that government positions 
are pursued for the purpose of self-enrichment has kept honest people from 
working in government.  Public service instead should be perceived as the 
most important and honourable activity of all, since government provides an 
orientation for all of us to follow […] They (capitalists) must also understand 
that their subordinates are not instruments to fulfil their personal ambitions, 
but rather partakers of a common activity due to a natural division of labour. 
That these people deserve equal respect as human beings of a single class 
and that they deserve to have living standards and cultural opportunities 
aligned to the general wealth of the country. They must realize that the 
world asks for their constructive and patient help in maintaining delicate 
relations in the economic sphere and that in return for their help they will 
not only get stability but also the great joy of feeling helpful (Presidential 
message by Jose Figueres delivered on March 22, 1957).  
 
The social democrats sought to encourage the businessmen to look beyond 
mere profit and to see the social function that their business was fulfilling. 
They also sought to widen their concept of interest to include not just mere 
profit but the satisfaction of working towards the betterment of society.  This 
discourse also sought to redefine labour-capital relations.  The social 
democratic discourse stated: 
 
Labour- management struggle in industrial countries would have been less 
harsh, if manufacturers had realized that the sales of their products 
increases as wages rise across the country, and if workers had understood 
that to raise the standard of living of the majority it is first necessary to 
become more productive.  Labour relations have entered a new phase in 
the advanced nations.  Modern employers struggle less against labourers 
and more against inefficient production methods. Union leaders focus less 
on organizing resistance movements and more on collaborating with 
others. There are fewer mass strikes and more round-table conference 
between managers and labour leaders, seeking common ways to raise 
production, consumption, wealth and justice.  The democratic trade union 
movements have shown that they understand economic dynamics 
(Figueres 1956: 47).  
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Through this idealized characterization of Keynesian economy models, the 
social democrats argued that the interest of capital and labour were not 
necessarily irreconcilable, and that developed countries already 
acknowledged this.  They argued that capital and labour had common 
enemies - lack of economic progress due to inefficiency, lack of productivity, 
and lack of adequate technology.  To fight these common enemies, capital 
and labour had to cooperate.  
 
The social democrats also argued that Costa Rica’s democracy had evolved 
to a point that Costa Ricans had to focus not only on their rights, but also on 
their responsibilities. Figueres argued: “Our democracy has reached a level of 
maturity that obliges the citizens to shoulder their responsibilities” (Figueres 
1956: 3).  He argued that the communists had incorrectly focused only on 
demanding citizens’ rights, neglecting that they also have responsibilities.  
 
While the liberal oligarchic interpretation of the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary had placed the rural worker as the key articulatory actor, the social 
democrats placed the middle class in this central position.  According to an 
article published in Diario de Costa Rica on August 8, 1953: 
 
His (Figueres’) revolution was not a Marxist revolution.  It was a middle 
class revolution.  The middle class has taken over and the peasants 
have become middle class (Diario de Costa Rica – August 8, 1953).  
 
The middle class was framed as the motor of social and economic 
development.  The larger the middle class and the greater its purchasing 
power, the larger the internal market and thus the greater Costa Rica’s 
economic growth.  As the social democrats stated: 
 
The aim we are now pursuing is for all social classes to fuse into a larger 
middle class that enjoys the comforts and cultural opportunities of our 
times thanks to technical improvements in economic production (Figueres 
quoted by Rodriguez 1998:99).  
 
The middle class was used as a national unifying concept by including the 
working classes, peasants, as well as progressive sectors of upper class 
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(Rodriguez 1998: 99).  Its purpose was to replace the liberal oligarchic 
conception of ethnic homogeneity, which had already been discredited by the 
Radicales del 1900, the communists, and other anti-liberal oligarchic 
discourses, with a new unifying concept - class homogeneity.  The previously 
assumed egalitarianism was replaced with equality of opportunity.  Costa Rica 
remained cast as a classless society, now not because of the old narrative of 
widespread poverty, but instead because everyone inclusively belonged to the 
middle class.  The concept of ethnicity also expanded to include African 
Caribbean Costa Ricans.  
 
As mentioned previously, the social democrats were the first to include the 
African Caribbean Costa Ricans into the political system.  As an African 
Caribbean man stated: 
 
When Jose Figueres began his presidential campaign, he visited the black 
communities and offered us hope.  He proclaimed that everyone deserved 
the right to vote and that we were all equal. He said that the time had 
come for black children to receive quality education and quality 
opportunities. Figueres included for the first time the blacks and we felt 
part of the country (Diana Senior 2011:217).  
 
In fact, the social democrats were the first to have an African Caribbean 
congressman, as well two female congresswomen.  This historic turning point 
is emphasised during the November 2, 1953 congressional session: 
Congressmen Ruben took the floor to state a historical fact.  Yesterday 
two ladies adorned this Congress.  For the first time in our history women 
have been elected to Congress. There is no doubt that democracy is 
increasingly being perfected.  Also for the first time in our history a 
member of the coloured race has been elected to Congress. Members of 
the coloured race were brought to our soil to work under harsh 
conditions, in areas with inclement weather where our own workers did 
not want to live. They have offered the country their hard efforts, their 
energies and contributed as all other Costa Ricans to the achievement of 
the economic progress we now enjoy.  Therefore, it was necessary to do 
justice to this race.  It was about time for us to show them that in our 
country people have the same rights regardless of their skin colour – 
white, black, or yellow (Act of Congress on November 2, 1953).  
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Therefore, by re-articulating and stabilizing the floating signifiers democracy, 
poverty, equality/homogeneity and state around a new nodal point 
constructive liberalism (which was more appealing than social democracy), 
the social democrats created the new discursive structure needed to 
legitimize the interventionist/welfare state model.  Following a transformist 
strategy, they appealed to the sectors previously excluded from the liberal 
oligarchic hegemonic order.  To address the growing demands of the Costa 
Rican population, the social democrats expanded the Costa Rican state, 
leading to the bureaucratization of Costa Rica’s democracy (indirectly serving 
as a source of patronage).  
 
The PLN was the perfect vehicle to institutionalize the social democratic 
discourse. Indeed, the organizational power of the Partido Liberacion 
Nacional has been one of the greatest sources of strength for the social 
democratic discourse.  During the rise to hegemony of the social democratic 
discourse (1960-1980), the PLN delegates occupied the highest positions in 
autonomous institutions including perhaps the most influential from an 
ideological point of view – the University of Costa Rica.  Rodrigo Facio, the 
founder of the Centro and the most important social democratic intellectual, 
was the Dean of the University of Costa Rica from 1952 to 1961 when he died. 
During the period under study, most of the Deans of the University of Costa 
Rica were active members of the PLN.  The PLN supporters were traditionally 
the leaders of the unions of the autonomous institutions and served as high-
ranking officials in the banking sector.  From the creation of the Direcion 
Nacional de Desarrollo de la Comunidad to the 1980s, the PLN controlled 
most of the Development Associations as well as the community organizers. 
The party’s leaders were very actively involved in the cooperative sector and 
the state police was also influenced by the PLN, as its highest-ranking 
members were once members of the social democratic revolutionary armies. 
The PLN also dominated the media through the newspaper La Republica, 
which competed with the liberal oligarchic newspaper La Nacion.  All of these 
factors facilitated the social democratic rise to hegemony during the late 
1950s up until the 1980s. 
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Conclusion 
Contrary to the consensual view, the social democratic rise to hegemony was 
not the natural result of their military victory. The social democrat’s gradual 
rise to hegemony was facilitated by the following: a) the adoption of the 
National Liberation myth by the most important political actors during the 
immediate post-civil war period – particularly Otilio Ulate; b) Figueres’s use of 
populist interventions that became effective only after the National Liberation 
myth had become widely accepted; c) the creation of the Partido Liberacion 
Nacional – the first party to integrate marginalized sectors of national unity 
directly into the political system; and d) the creation of the welfare state with 
autonomous institutions headed by Figueristas.  The fact that most political 
leaders adopted the National Liberation myth and the predominance of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary facilitated the process of national 
reconciliation after the civil war.  
Applying insights from Carstensen’s (2009) model of ideational change allows 
us to explain how these two contradictory myths could co-exist. By 
incorporating elements of meaning from the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary into their re-interpretation of the 1948 civil war, the social 
democrats were able to create the National Liberation myth.  They were able 
to hide the inherent contradictions between their actions in the civil war and 
the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary by framing their actions as a defence 
of Costa Rica’s democracy.  Both of these myths have served as crucial 
factors fostering Costa Rica’s democratic political stability.  The next chapter 
concludes this dissertation highlighting the lessons that can be drawn from the 
Costa Rican case study with regards democratic transitions and 
consolidations. 
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Chapter 7  
 
Lessons to be Drawn from the Costa Rican case study 
 
The persistence of façade democracies throughout much of Latin America, 
Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, as well as the transformation of the “Arab 
Spring” hopes with the tumbling of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan and Yemeni 
dictatorships into the “Islamist Winter” remind us of the extreme complexity 
behind processes of democratic transition and consolidation.  Although one of 
the most important lessons we have learnt over the past decades is that 
democracy cannot emerge simply by imposing foreign discursive structures 
and replicating democratic institutional frameworks, it remains as crucial as 
ever for scholars to explore successful cases of democratic consolidations to 
extract some very broad lessons.  Costa Rica is one of the few consolidated 
democracies in Latin America.  
 
Alongside Uruguay and Chile, Costa Rica outperforms other Latin American 
nations with higher levels of economic growth and social spending, lower 
levels of poverty and inequality, more opportunities for human development 
and a great respect for public institutions.  As Isbester (2010) states, these 
nations share some common characteristics.  They are middle-income 
countries, have strong states with professional institutions, relatively 
competent and embedded bureaucracies, a strong party system that 
facilitates democratic governance, an executive that must work with Congress 
and widespread respect for the rule of law.  Their states have invested heavily 
in human development and have actively intervened in the economy.  They 
have had visionary political leaders.  Costa Rica’s Jose Figueres can be 
compared to Uruguay’s Jose Batille y Ordonez – both are still evoked to this 
day as powerful national myths (Isbester 2010:363).  It is clear that the 
experiences of these countries cannot be replicated elsewhere as they also 
share highly specific characteristics.  These three countries are comparatively 
small, with relatively homogenous ethnic populations and predominantly of the 
same faith.  They have had long and proud traditions of democracy (despite 
some interruptions), and have developed dense civil societies, with social 
norms of trust and equality, and a democratic political culture based on the 
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notion of social justice (Isbester 2010: 364).  How did the Costa Rican, 
Chilean and Uruguayan political leaders develop these strong institutions and 
these civic political cultures?  Why haven’t other Latin American countries 
followed their lead? 
 
This dissertation focuses on one of these three exceptional cases – Costa 
Rica – and explores one under-analysed dimension of its democratization 
process – the discursive dimension.  When analysing Costa Rica’s 
democratization process, this dissertation agrees with the current academic 
consensus that views its “atypical” socio-economic structures during the post-
Independence period as necessary but insufficient conditions for its 
democratic transition (Lehoucq 2012, Cruz 2005, Seligson 2014).  Central 
American analysts have shown that Costa Rica’s socio-economic conditions 
were not as “atypical” relative to its Central American neighbours as the rural 
democracy proponents have argued.  The dissertation agrees with the 
political crafting argument that, to understand Costa Rica’s “exceptionalism”, it 
is crucial to analyse the policy choices taken by political leaders during key 
moments in the country’s history – its immediate post-independence period 
(1820s), the liberal reform period started during the 1870s, the dislocatory 
impact of the Great Depression (1930s), and the post 1948 civil war period.  
The policy choices made by these key political actors during these moments 
helped build the democratic institutional framework that then triggered path 
dependent tendencies.   
 
This dissertation further builds on the political crafting propositions, arguing 
that it is crucial to understand why Costa Rican political leaders chose 
drastically different policy paths relative to their neighbours. To understand 
why Costa Rican political leaders chose to interpret and frame their socio-
economic and political situations in ways that were conducive to democracy, 
while their Central American neighbours chose to interpret and frame them in 
ways that were conducive to authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to analyse 
a crucial institution that remains under-analysed by academics exploring 
Costa Rica’s democratic success – the role played by its “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary.  This dissertation argues that the “exceptionalist” 
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collective imaginary is best conceived as one more institution shaping political 
outcomes.  Throughout Costa Rica’s history, it has influenced political 
outcomes by: a) impacting the way political actors have interpreted and 
framed their socio-economic and political context; b) influencing the 
perceptions of interests held by key political players and how they framed 
these interests to other political actors in their search for allies; c) delimiting 
the types of discourses and actions considered legitimate within historically 
specific national and international ideational contexts; d) defining what political 
outcomes were perceived as desirable or “necessary” depending on which 
“crisis narrative” succeeded in becoming hegemonic during critical periods; e) 
influencing the way political leaders presented themselves to the public by 
determining which attributes were considered desirable in a political leader; f) 
impacting the way political leaders responded to international factors; and g) 
structuring political dynamics by determining the possible modes of political 
mobilization during specific historical periods.  
 
This dissertation traces the roots of Costa Rica’s democratization back to its 
colonial period when the first governor of Costa Rica, Vazquez de Coronado, 
created a sense of proto-national identity that led to the emergence of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  It supports Consuelo Cruz’s view that a 
nation’s sense of collective identity helps shape political outcomes (Cruz 
2000, 2005).  By creating a proto-national identity that portrayed Costa Rica 
as an “exceptionally” peaceful, consensual and egalitarian society, Vazquez 
de Coronado and the political leaders who followed him delimited the range of 
political actions considered acceptable, feasible and desirable.  Building on 
Cruz’s work, but taking a “thicker” definition of discourse, this dissertation 
argues that this sense of national identity served to constitute social relations 
enabling the discursive construction of certain types of political identities and 
precluding others.  Breaking away from Cruz’s “deliberative democracy” 
model of politics (also used by the proponents of the political culture 
approach), it adopts PSDT “adversarial model” of politics.  
 
This dissertation argues that, while conflict remained central in Costa Rican 
politics, the hegemonic battles fought throughout its history have been 
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confined by the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary.  This discursive 
institution shaped the hegemonic battles fought between the conservatives 
and the liberals during the post-independence period, influencing the 
country’s democratic institutional development.  During the 1820s and 1830s, 
the group of intellectuals called the Tertulias Patrioticas was able to contain 
the inevitable tensions that broke out between the two competing factions by 
warning them not to follow the Central American path of violence and 
encouraging them to channel their conflict through the liberal democratic 
institutions they created.  Therefore, paradoxically, Costa Rica’s democratic 
transition was facilitated by the fact that it was surrounded by violent, 
oppressive authoritarian regimes.  This politico-discursive technique of using 
the threat of the “Central Americanization of Costa Rican politics” to weaken 
internal divisions has been used by political leaders throughout its history.  
 
The “exceptionalist” collective imaginary also led to the predominance of 
transformist political projects.  This in turn influenced the scope and pace of 
Costa Rica’s institutional development, favouring constant, gradual and 
reformist institutional change as opposed to revolutionary change.  During the 
liberal oligarchic period, the predominance of the logic of transformism led to 
a “reformist” variant of liberalism as opposed to the “radical” variant present in 
Guatemala and El Salvador or the “aborted” variant present in Nicaragua and 
Honduras.  Costa Rica’s democratic transition was facilitated by the ability of 
the liberal oligarchic leaders to disarticulate political alliances between 
potentially antagonistic groups by differentially incorporating the demands 
made by labour movements, peasant associations, and anti-imperialist 
movements through institutional and legislative means, thus preventing 
populist ruptures.  This meant that, unlike the rest of Central America, the 
“Liberal Revolution” did not lead to authoritarian regimes, but rather served to 
further consolidate Costa Rica’s liberal democracy.  
 
The fact that Costa Rican liberals had to integrate elements of meaning of the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary in order to make their political discourses 
appealing to the Costa Rican population constrained their actions. The 
predominance of the transformist logic of articulation also shaped the types of 
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counter-hegemonic movements that emerged.  During the late 1800s, while 
the Guatemalan liberal dictator Justo Ruffino and the Nicaraguan liberal 
dictator Jose Zelaya imposed authoritarian and coercive regimes, and liberal 
dictator Tomas Guardia pursued a counter-hegemonic movement that 
integrated previously excluded sectors into Costa Rica’s political system, 
further consolidating its democratic institutions and expanding economic 
opportunities to previously marginalized sectors.  His success in this 
endeavour enabled the Olympians to make their liberal oligarchic discourse 
the hegemonic one.  The liberal oligarchic hegemony in turn ensured Costa 
Rican democratic political stability until the 1930s. 
 
The dislocatory effect of the Great Depression encouraged a group of law 
students, workers, and radical intellectuals to found the Costa Rican 
Communist Party in 1931.  This was the first political discourse creating a 
strong internal political frontier dividing Costa Rican society into two 
irreconcilable blocks.  The vast majority of the Costa Rican population 
perceived the CRCP as an “existential threat” to Costa Rica’s “exceptional” 
national identity.  Yet the influence of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
shaped the strategies used by the Costa Rican political leaders Cleto 
Gonzalez Viquez (1928-1932) and Ricardo Jimenez (1932-1936) in reaction 
to this perceived threat.   Instead of brutally repressing the communists as the 
other Central American leaders did at the time (Martinez Hernandez in El 
Salvadro, Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Tiburcio 
Carias in Honduras), the Costa Rican political leaders sought to de-radicalize 
them by integrating them into the political system.  This in turn encouraged 
the CRCP to shift their initial revolutionary strategies towards more 
conciliatory ones.  This shift in strategy was also possible due to the changing 
international ideational environment (i.e. the 1936 Soviet shift towards a 
Popular Front strategy and the Soviet alliance with the Anglo-American 
forces).  After their overwhelming electoral defeat in the 1936 presidential 
elections, the CRCP decided to create the comunismo a la tica myth to make 
their political project more appealing to the Costa Rican population by 
incorporating elements of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary into their 
Marxist discourse.  The contingency of this myth was evident by the fact that 
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the CRCP shifted strategies in accordance with Soviet strategic shifts and by 
the fact that the CRCP retained its Marxist goal of an eventual socialist 
revolution in Costa Rica.  While working to create the conditions for an 
eventual socialist revolution, the CRCP sought to increase their influence by 
forming an alliance with the Christian democratic president Calderon Guardia.  
 
Calderon’s multiple strategic mistakes (breaking his alliance with former 
president Leon Cortes, alienating coffee oligarchs of German descent with his 
World War II policies, neglecting the Centristas, allowing corruption in all 
levels of his administration, using nepotistic practices, and violating his 
opponents’ freedom of speech) had placed him in a weak political position.  
To avert a potential coup, Calderon agreed to form a loose alliance with the 
CRCP.   At the same time, the dislocation of the liberal oligarchic hegemony 
had also encouraged the emergence of another political group battling for 
hegemony – the social democrats.  The Centro para el Estudio de Problemas 
Nacionales intellectuals and the Figueristas created a social democratic 
counter-hegemonic movement.  They sought to further expand the concept of 
democracy, shifting from an exclusively electoral conception of democracy to 
a participatory democracy.  They also linked the concept of democracy to 
what they called economic freedoms (Rodrigo Facio 1940s).  They proposed 
a gradual shift away from the primarily coffee and banana based agro-export 
development model to a more diversified export model, seeking to build the 
base for an eventual transition to an import-substitution-industrialisation 
model.  Throughout the 1940s, the social democrats interpreted the socio-
economic and political crisis triggered by the effects of World War II as 
evidence that a “paradigm shift” (Hay 2001) was necessary. 
 
After failing to garner political support for their “Second Republic”, Figueres 
took advantage of the growing discontent amongst the people due to the 
deteriorating economic situation and the animosity felt by Costa Ricans 
towards the communists to create a crisis narrative that argued that the 
Caldero-comunista regime was leading Costa Rican into a state of political, 
economic and moral chaos.  They framed the Caldero-comunista regime as 
“enemies” posing an “existential threat” to Costa Rica’s “exceptionalist” 
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collective imaginary.  Figueres also kept in contact with the members of the 
Caribbean Legion he met in exile, creating equivalential chains between 
Calderon Guardia, Somoza, Trujillo and Carias to convince the Caribbean 
Legion to help him overthrow the Caldero-comunista regime.  Figueres then 
waited for an event that could help him rally support amongst the 
heterogeneous political groups forming the opposition (conservatives, liberals 
and social democrats).  The annulment of the 1948 presidential elections by 
the Calderonista-dominated Congress that had granted the victory to the 
opposition candidate, Otilio Ulate, proved to be the perfect event to mobilize 
the opposition.  Figueres argued that Calderon was seeking to impose a 
dictatorship with the help of the communists.  Portraying the Caldero-
comunista regime as an “existential threat” to Costa Rica’s “exceptional” 
national identity, Figueres was able to transform peace-loving citizens into 
revolutionary agents.   
 
Upon winning the war, Jose Figueres erroneously believed that his military 
victory had granted him the right to found a social democratic “Second 
Republic”.  However, the influence of the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary 
constrained the actions of Figueres, ensuring that what could have been a 
foundational moment in the country’s history remained a reformist one. 
Paradoxically, Figueres’ military victory placed him in a weak political position 
because it allowed its opponents to portray the social democrat’s actions as 
incompatible with Costa Rica’s “exceptional” national identity (starting a civil 
war and ruling through an illegitimate Junta were perceived as going against 
the “exceptionalist” national identity).   
 
This dissertation disputes the consensual view that assumes that the victory 
of the social democrats during the civil war naturally translated into political 
success.  It argues that the social democratic rise to hegemony was a 
complex and non-linear process that was possible only after the social 
democrats changed their initial political strategies and limited their goals.  It 
explores three crucial factors that enabled the social democrats rise to 
hegemony.   First, the social democrats were able to re-interpret the 1948 
Civil War by creating the National Liberation myth, incorporating elements of 
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the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary into their narrative.  Second, the fact 
that this myth became hegemonic was, in large part, because President Otilio 
Ulate (1949-1953) adopted it.  Despite its historical inaccuracies, Ulate chose 
to adopt the National Liberation myth because he recognized the positive 
structuring power of this myth.  Third, the National Liberation myth and the 
“exceptionalist” collective imaginary played crucial roles in suturing the 
dislocated order and ending the “identity crisis” caused by the civil war, which 
in turn transformed revolutionary agents back into peaceful citizens; thus 
facilitating Costa Rica’s democratic consolidation.  
 
The post-civil war period in Costa Rica is an extremely interesting case study 
of how political leaders could de-radicalize political tensions through 
discursive strategies.  The fact that all political leaders, regardless of their 
ideology, encouraged Costa Ricans to maintain their civil war grievances in 
the private realm made the reconciliation process remarkably smooth.  This 
facilitated the elite settlement that took place amongst the conservatives, the 
liberals and the social democrats during the post-civil war period.  In keeping 
with the transformist logic of articulation, the post-civil war institutional 
framework built upon the previous reformist ideas dating back to the 
Radicales del 1900, the Partido Reformista, president Alfredo Gonzales 
Flores (1914-1917), the reforms made by the great disciples of the Grupo del 
Olimpio – Presidents Cleto Gonzales Viquez (1906-1910 and 1928-1932) and 
Ricardo Jimenez (1910-1914, 1924-1928 and 1932-1936), and those made by 
Otilio Ulate (1949-1953).   Following the logic of “innovative continuity” 
proposed by the social democrats during the 1940s, the institutional 
framework that emerged retained many elements of the liberal oligarchic 
socio-economic and political order.  Building on its liberal democratic base, it 
expanded the concept of democracy to include continuous active citizen 
participation through non-personalistic political parties with internal democratic 
mechanisms.  It translated the liberal oligarchic concept of equality that made 
poverty the unifying factor (i.e. if we are all poor, no one is poor) to the 
concept of equality of opportunity.  The social democrats retained the sense 
of Costa Rica being a classless society arguing that Costa Ricans were all 
middle class.  They then included all different sectors of society, in all different 
	   275	  
regions of the country, and all different ethnicities and genders into this 
unifying “middle class” concept.  Under the social democratic hegemony, 
political leaders succeeded in integrating growing demands differentially 
through institutional means, greatly expanding the state.  The autonomous 
institutions they established facilitated the continuation of the social 
democratic hegemony.  At the heart of the social democratic discourse, the 
party retained the liberal oligarchic conception that Costa Rica’s greatest 
strength was its internal unity and that it was the responsibility of everyone to 
discursively reinforce it.  
 
Therefore, an analysis of Costa Rica’s democratization process focusing on 
the discursive dimension allows us to appreciate how certain logics of 
articulation help shape political dynamics. The predominance of discourses 
using the logic of difference has encouraged democratic practices and has 
stimulated the creation of inclusive institutions to differentially address 
heterogeneous demands.  Costa Rica’s case study shows that weak internal 
political frontiers (opponents = adversaries) with strong external frontiers 
(Costa Rica as distinct from neighbours) leading to a strong sense of national 
identity and internal social cohesion are conducive to democratic practices.  It 
also supports the view that while agonistic relations can be discursively 
transformed into antagonistic ones as the social democrats did during the 
period leading to the 1948 Civil War, they can equally be reversed to agonistic 
ones as happened during the immediate post civil war period.  
 
With regards to the sequencing of the factors that led to Costa Rica’s 
democratization process, this case study argues that the first pre-requisite for 
Costa Rica’s democratic transition was the emergence of a sense of national 
identity (“exceptionalist” collective imaginary) developed by political 
leaders/intellectuals by combining their political projects with elements of the 
existing international and national ideational context.  This “exceptionalist” 
collective imaginary encouraged political leaders to interpret their socio-
economic contexts in ways that encouraged them to pursue policies 
conducive to democracy, which in turn created an inclusive institutional 
framework leading to a strong, legitimate, and respected state.  The 
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interaction between these state institutions, the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary and the different political projects battling for hegemony created the 
discursive condition of possibility for Costa Rica’s democratization process. 
To promote their own political projects, intellectuals and political leaders 
created new myths by incorporating elements of this collective imaginary and 
gradually changing it.  However, the actions of these political leaders were 
also constrained by these myths.  Therefore, these myths exerted an 
ideational path dependency, which was hard to escape even after the 1948 
Civil War.  This dissertation builds on Dankwart Rustow’s argument that 
certain ingredients are indispensable to the genesis of democracy: a sense of 
national unity, ways of channelling inevitable political conflict, and a conscious 
adoption of democratic rules by both politicians and the electorate (Rustow 
1970:361) by making the case that political myths and discursive structures 
play a crucial role in helping achieve these basic ingredients.  
 
The Costa Rican case study also shows how contradictory myths can co-
exist, much as the National Liberation myth and the “exceptionalist” collective 
imaginary did in Costa Rica, exposing the contingency of all discursive 
formations.  It also highlights the link between hegemonic myths and the 
success or failure of populist interventions.  While Jose Figueres used 
“populist interventions” (Panizza 2009) before the civil war and during the 
immediate post civil war period to attract popular support, these populist 
interventions were not greatly effective - as the electoral results in the 1949 
elections for the Constitutional Assembly show.  It was not until after the 
National Liberation myth became hegemonic that these “populist 
interventions” proved effective.  The importance of a credible myth for the 
success of a political project is also evident by Rafael Angel Calderon’s 
political trajectory.  From winning the 1940s presidential election with the 
largest margin in the country’s history and being perceived as the most 
progressive reformer in the country’s history, he descended to being 
portrayed as a puppet of the Costa Rican Communist Party and as posing a 
threat to Costa Rica’s exceptionalism.  To understand why Calderon 
Guardia’s Christian democratic discourse failed to become hegemonic, we 
must consider the fact that his alliance with the communists created a 
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contradiction within his Christian democratic discourse, which his opponents 
capitalized on. Calderon’s downfall also highlights the importance of 
communicative and coordinative discourses, disregarded by this president.  
 
To conclude, we can state that the Costa Rica’s case illustrates the 
importance of foundational myths in creating certain types of political identities 
and structuring socio-political relations in certain ways, the crucial role played 
by intellectuals in forming hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects, as well 
as the role of political myths in promoting certain forms of political mobilization 
that can either radicalize or de-radicalize opposition movements and thus 
encourage either revolutionary change or reformist democratic institutional 
development.   It confirms the belief that, without a sense of national identity 
and a common vision of where a nation should be heading, as well as political 
myths and certain narratives that can serve to de-radicalize opposition 
movements, it is difficult for a country to transition to democracy.  It is also 
crucial to create an institutional framework that can absorb the growing 
demands of distinct sectors of society differentially.  This encourages political 
actors to transform potentially antagonistic relations into agonistic ones. 
Another crucial factor facilitating democratization processes is to allow 
counter-hegemonic movements to flourish, thus encouraging the continuous 
re-assessment of existing socio-economic and political models.  This constant 
questioning of the model encourages gradual and reformist institutional 
change.  Costa Rica’s transformist model has allowed counter-hegemonic 
movements to develop freely. 
 
Today, a counter-hegemonic movement is emerging in Costa Rica led by the 
new president Luis Guillermo Solis of the Partido Accion Ciudadana.  His 
surprising victory in the 2014 elections confirmed the end of the bi-party 
political system – previously dominated by Partido Liberacion Nacional and 
the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana.  Interesting research questions for a 
future study include the following:  Will the PAC intellectuals succeed in their 
political project of gradually shifting Costa Rica towards a “Third Republic” 
through their current strategy of “innovative continuity” which modifies 
elements of the social democratic hegemonic order and includes previously 
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excluded sectors of society such as gays, women, and atheists and which 
broadens the political agenda (for example, by making environmental 
sustainability not a development option, but rather one more obligation the 
state has vis-à-vis its  citizens)?  Will Luis Guillermo Solis succeed in his 
attempt to place himself in the national consciousness as the “real heir” of the 
National Liberation spirit through his current attempt of creating equivalential 
links between himself and Jose Figueres?  How will the PAC intellectuals re-
interpret the “exceptionalist” collective imaginary and the National Liberation 
myth?  The period Costa Rica is living through today confirms that Costa 
Rican “exceptional” democratic evolution will continue to intrigue scholars for 
a while to come. 
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